contents

“POST”-DILEMMAS

MICHAEL CHAPMAN                        POSTCOLONIALISMA LITERARY TURN / 7
PIA BRÎNZEU                            “POSTCOLONIALISM” OR “POSTCOLONIALISMS”?: THE
                                         DILEMMAS OF A TEACHER / 21
ILEANA SORA DIMITRIU                    POSTMODERNISM AND/AS POSTCOLONIALISM: ON RE-
                                         READING MILAN KUNDERA AND BREYDEN
                                         BREYDENBACH / 33
ELISABETTA MARINO                       FROM BRICK LANE TO ALENTEJO BLUE: CROSS-CULTURAL
                                         ENCOUNTERS IN MONICA ALF'S WRITINGS / 51
DANIELA ROGOBETE                        PROTEAN IDENTITIES AND INVISIBLE BORDERS IN HARI
                                         KUNZRU'S THE IMPRESSIONIST / 59
MARIA ŞTEFÂNESCU                        AN ARTIST OF FLOATING WOR(L)DS / 71
ANDREEA ȘERBAN                          CANNIBALISED BODIES: MARGARET ATWOOD'S
                                         METAPHORS OF TROUBLED IDENTITIES / 79
ANDREEA TEREZA NIŢIŞOR                 TWO INSTANCES OF THE FRAGMENTARY IN THE
                                         POSTMODERN NOVEL: ITALO CALVINO'S IF ON A WINTER'S
                                         NIGHT A TRAVELER AND ANNIE PROULX'S THE SHIPPING
                                         NEWS / 89
CRISTINA CHEVEREŞAN                     DEARLY BELOVED: TONI MORRISON'S RESURRECTION OF
                                         THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN NARRATIVE / 105
JACQUES RAMEL                           UNDEAF YOUR EARS: WHAT THE TRAGEDY OF RICHARD II
                                         GIVES US TO HEAR / 113
KLAUDIA PAPP                            INSCRIPTION AND ENCRYPTION: DAPHNE DU MAURIER'S
                                         REBECCA / 121
CLAUDIA IOANA DOROHOLSCHI              WILLIAM MORRIS'S CHILD CHRISTOPHER AND GOLDILIND
                                         THE FAIR: MEDIEVALISM AND THE ANTI-NATURALISM OF
                                         THE 1890S / 129
ANNIE RAMEL                             THE WHEEL OF DESIRE IN THE MILL ON THE FLOSS / 139
DANA PERCEC                            BARRY UNSWORTH AND THE HISTORICAL NOVEL
                                         TODAY / 151
TERESA BELA                            NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE IN THE EARLY NOVELS OF PIERS
                                         PAUL READ / 161
ISTVÁN D. RÁCZ                           WHAT IS “ALMOST TRUE”: LARKIN AND KEATS / 171
CLAIRE CRABTREE-SINNETT                 INTENSITIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS DELUSION, DREAM, AND
                                         DELIRIUM IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S MRS. DALLOWAY AND
                                         KATHERINE ANN PORTER'S “PALE HORSE, PALE RIDER” / 181
## CULTURAL SPECULATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAD WEIDNER</td>
<td>“THE GREAT GOD PAN IS DEAD!” THE ECOLOGICAL ELEGY OF WILLIAM BURROUGHS’ GHOST OF CHANCE</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARIA BAJNER</td>
<td>THE POWER OF ATTRACTION IN THE NARRATIVE OF SOAP OPERAS</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERIC GILDER,</td>
<td>THE PEDIGREE OF AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: AN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERVYN HAGGER</td>
<td>ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANA VASILIU</td>
<td>THE MEDIEVAL SOCIAL HIERARCHY: FROM CONGREGATIO FIDELIUM TO SOCIETAS HUMANA</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGDA DANCIU</td>
<td>THE END OF THE JOURNEY: BACK TO SCOTLAND</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRINA DIANA MĂDROANE</td>
<td>TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES: ROMANIA AND EUROPEAN VALUES IN OFFICIAL VS. FORUM DISCOURSES</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## LINGUISTIC ZIG-ZAG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DELIA ROBESCU</td>
<td>LINGUISTIC RESOURCES OF BIAS IN NEWS DISCOURSE</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEEN SCHOUSSBOE</td>
<td>LINGUISTIC FLIM-FLAM?</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREDRAG NOVAKOV</td>
<td>ENGLISH PRESENT PERFECT: ASPECTUAL AND TEMPORAL COMPONENTS</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARYA PROTOPOPESCU</td>
<td>ON DEPICTIVES, MANNER AND TRANSPARENT ADVERBS IN ENGLISH AND ROMANIAN</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADINA OANA NICOLAE</td>
<td>MACHINES AND TOOLS IN ECONOMIC METAPHORS</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORTENSIĂ PĂLLOG</td>
<td>HIS COCKLE HAT</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBERT VERMES</td>
<td>CONTEXTUAL ASSUMPTIONS AND THE TRANSLATOR’S STRATEGY. A CASE STUDY</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATALIA VID</td>
<td>POLITICAL - IDEOLOGICAL TRANSLATIONS OF ROBERT BURNS’ POETRY IN THE SOVIET UNION</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“POST”-DILEMMAS
POSTCOLONIALISM
A LITERARY TURN

MICHAEL CHAPMAN
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban

Abstract: The paper poses a Commonwealth (more generally, a South) challenge to British (or northern institutional) delineations of the postcolonial. It is suggested that globalisation and postcoloniality represent interlocking categories, in which the political supersedes the literary. The argument here, in contrast, pursues a literary turn.

Is there a role for literature — or, to be specific, imaginative literature, or the literary — in postcolonial studies? And where may one locate my own country, South Africa, or any other marginalised country, for example Romania, in a field delineated by northern, that is, U.S., British, institutional purposes, practices, paradigms and, more pragmatically, career/publishing opportunities?

Having developed as a set of conceptual and perceptual resources for the study of the effects on people’s lives of colonial modernity — from its Renaissance expansions to contemporary manifestations of global capital — postcolonialism has come to describe heterogeneous, though linked, groupings of critical enterprises: a critique of Western totalising narratives; a revision of the Marxian class project; utilisation of both poststructural enquiry (the displaced linguistic subject) and postmodern pursuit (scepticism of the truth claims of Cartesian individualism); the condition of both nativist longing for independence from the metropolitan power and recognition of the failure of the decolonisation trajectory; a marker for voices of pronouncement by non-resident, ‘Third-World’ intellectual cadres in ‘First-World’ universities. More positively from the perspective of the South — if, indeed, postcolonialism, as Robert J.C. Young has it, is a mark of “the West’s own undoing” (2001: 65) — there is a focusing of the ethical and imaginative lens on expression, writing, and testimony outside of, or in tangential relation to, the metropolitan centre-space. Such a focus, in curricular design, involves new selections of texts and revised reading practices.
prompted by what was earlier called Commonwealth literature or, more recently, new literatures in English or, simply, the new englishes.

I refer lastly in the above list to literary matters. For postcolonialism identifies its priorities not as literary, but as political or ideological. Again to quote Young, who visited South Africa under the auspices of a project, Postcolonialism: A South/African Perspective:

The assumption of postcolonial studies is that many of the wrongs, if not crimes, against humanity are a product of the economic dominance of the north over the south. In this way, the historical role of Marxism in the history of anti-colonial resistance remains paramount as a fundamental framework of postcolonial thinking. Postcolonial theory operates within the historical legacy of Marxist critique...which it simultaneously transforms according to the precedent of the greatest tricontinental anti-colonial intellectual politicians (2001: 6).

With tricontinental referring here to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it is indeed political figures, or at least philosophical spokespersons, not literary people, who feature most prominently in Young’s monumental Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (2001), from which the above passage is taken.

There is seemingly a paradox here. For postcolonialism has sought to accord value to the personal or human dimension — the effects on people’s lives — of asymmetrical power relations between North and South. The field — however mixed in its material and cultural presuppositions — has struck, continues to strike, a chord in literature departments which, as Young has noted, constitute the “solitary space within academic institutions where subjective forms of knowledge were taken seriously” (2001: 64). Yet a literary turn — my qualifier to the title of this paper — requires defence not only because of its marginalisation in postcolonial political mapping and revisionism, but also because of its status in the field as handmaiden to theory. In its discursive categorisations — its Foucauldian acts of enunciation by which the postcolonial formulates the condition of its own possibility (see Foucault 1970) — postcolonial theory predominates as sense-maker, or event-maker, over and above the experiential terrain to which its theory directs its diagnostic or emblematic or, too often, its obscurantist pronouncements. After twenty-five years of northern institutional postcolonialism — its beginning is usually tied to the publication of Edward Said’s entirely lucid study, Orientalism (1978) — we encounter a repetitious opposition between
the ‘framework ideas’, principally, of Said, Spivak and Bhabha, designated compositely as the linguistic-cultural or poststructural turn, and the ‘conflict ideas’ of a persistent Marxist materialism in, among others, Ahmad and San Juan Jr (see also Ali 1993, and Parry 2004). In what too often is reminiscent of binary argument, the theory or methodology stands the danger of replicating the very power positions it wishes to challenge: “the West and the rest of us” (see Chinwezu 1975).

The ordering of the questions, in consequence, has led to scepticisms emanating from those of ‘South’ identity. Such scepticisms are summarised in Kwaame Anthony Appiah’s wicked parody — does he, ensconced in the northern university, include himself in his parody? — of postcoloniality as “the condition of a relatively small western-style, western-trained group of writers and thinkers, who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery” (1992: 63). What constitutes a nation; what, an ethnic group; what, the new world order; what may oppose the hegemony of U.S. imperialism? These questions characterise the utopian agenda of postcolonialism: the aim being a just social or, more precisely, a socialist world, in which class is again granted significant explanatory power, and in which the issues of race, gender, and the translation of cultures are posited upon the value of difference. In such an agenda, difference, or différence (see Derrida 1978), does not confirm division, but transforms ‘othering’ from negative to positive premise.

The utopian model, however, may be as totalising in its configuration as the narrative of Enlightenment-modernity against which, in almost mantra-like reaction (race, class, the unfinished business of gender), postcolonialism regularly pits its opposition. Its cultural materialist tendency seeks to resurrect a Leftish programme of social action in the wake of Thatcherism and, now, in reaction to U.S. capitalist and military adventurism (see Young 2001, Lazarus 2004, and Loomba et al 2005). The emphasis on difference opposes what in neo-liberal global-speak is termed the convergence of markets. That the study of postcolonial literature has not in itself pushed the boundaries, to quote Tariq Ali (1993), of “market realism” — a preference for the elite work in English that is not entirely alien to the suppositions and conventions of Western modernist or postmodernist genre or style — represents an irony of an anti-metropole endeavour located within the corridors of the metropolitan institution.
Where or how do critics of literature position themselves in a project which elevates sociological or economic analysis, or the discourses of philosophy or politics, over and above literary intervention, and in which literature, when it does engage attention, is subjected to issue-driven interpretation. As E. San Juan Jr phrases it, literature is regarded as “an instance of concrete political practice which reflects the dynamic process of the national democratic revolution in the developing countries” (1998: 254).

This formulation promises little more than a return to an earlier economistic base/superstructure rigidity. To which a critic of the linguistic turn — Homi K. Bhabha, for example — might respond that, no, the literary text, indeed the subject in its subjectivity, is characterised not simply as materialist reflection, but as rhetorical, performative act. Accordingly, meaning emerges in the textual palimpsest, deconstructively, or against the grain of full intent, in the slippages, in the ‘in-between’, the ‘liminal’, or ‘Third Space’. It is here that coloniser and colonised interact: not in the binary oppositions of master and slave, but in more intricate, more devious sparrings. In the ‘sly civilities’ of the hybridised encounter — we are told, following Heidegger’s insight that a boundary is not where matters stop, but where newness is possible — new social and cultural forms of resistance, or even exchange, find their “presencing” (Bhabha 1994). If the subaltern, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1985) maintains, cannot speak, she or he can at least mimic the coloniser, ridicule and thus undermine the authoritarian substance and manner. To which the cynic might retort, or simply confirm the coloniser’s view, that the colonial babu in his wheedling and winking remains — well! — a babu.

In scintillating verbal display, which is far removed from communication with any subaltern, Bhabha suggests — some might say, imposes — his own alternative totality: deferrals of ethical anchor, splits of signifier from signified, and plays of difference — we are led to understand — will lead us to a better world. If San Juan Jr is unambiguous in his commitment to political praxis, Bhabha is less than clear as to the connection between word and deed. Yet, having said this, we recognise in Bhabha’s rhetoric of difference a check on forms of domination: a check on erasures of the local archive within the ‘flow’ of globalisation. It is a flow that presents apparent choice — ten brands of the same product with different labels — in the ‘no-real choice’ of what was referred to above as market convergence.
Here is a conundrum. It is a conundrum that for the last decade or more has characterised post-debate. Our investment in a common human enterprise is qualified by our investment in the dignity of our different selves. The conundrum, nonetheless, is more intractable when located in the large categories of conflict-oriented or framework-oriented postcolonial theory than when located in the experiential purchase of literary works, or in the analysis of individual texts, or — dare one say it — in the aesthetic appreciations of a literary turn.

It is widely agreed, for example, that a considerable output of the most exciting contemporary literature emanates from non-metropolitan sources of creativity and concern. Let me permit Salman Rushdie his colourful response to George Steiner’s complaint that literary energy is being generated not in the metropolis, but at the edges of the world: “What does it matter...? What is this flat earth on which the good professor lives, with jaded Romans at the centre and frightfully gifted Hottentots at the edges” (Rushdie 1996:1). We — that is, we in the academy, who have taken the post-challenge seriously — no longer think of Achebe or Gordimer or Coetzee as writing, in reaction, back to the centre. If we are willing to grant Achebe his initial project of re-inserting the African human being in the heart of darkness, then his critical as well as his creative writing — are the two easily separable? — has offered telling adjustments to dominant perspectives on the Western canon, in which the novelist has been always an artist before, as recast by Achebe, a teacher (1988 [1965]). Is Conrad or Bunyan or Shakespeare unifocally a metropolitan writer? Is the Third World writer merely the doppelgänger of the metropolitan counterpart? We may wish to read Toni Morrison as postcolonial, or J.M. Coetzee as both South African and international, or — through his recent work (Coetzee 2005) — as exploratory of the postcolonial as a settler-colony identification: Canberra, or previously Cape Town, placed somewhere ‘in-between’ London and Lagos.

As I have said, the focus in postcolonial literary studies has remained attached to the elite work in new englises by the emigré or multicultural metropolitan author (the Salman Rushdie or the Zadie Smith). The oral or indigenous voice, or popular expression on the periphery (African praises, say, or Kenyan market literature), has had limited impact so far on post-debate, where the tendency has been to replace Western canons with Third-World canons (instead of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, we have
Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart*) or where the tendency has been to re-appraise metropolitan ‘touchstones’ through the telescope of alternative modernities (Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* or Bunyan’s *The Pilgrim’s Progress* in the New World). Such ‘elite’ constrictions notwithstanding, a literary influence may be fruitfully pursued. It is an influence that can be identified, more recently, even in critics whose interest is principally philosophical, political or ideological.

Although he retains his Marxist predilection for class analysis in his denigration of postmodern sceptics of truth, unity and progress, for example, Terry Eagleton in *After Theory* (2003) suggests a consideration of truth categories — virtue, evil, morality, pleasure, death — which have been in short supply in ideological critique, but which constitute the truth of poetry as opposed to the truth of history (to invoke an Aristotelian distinction). For Robert J.C. Young (2001: 409), to whom I have already referred, literary texts — he names *Passage to India*, *King Solomon’s Mines* and *Kim* — are not an expression of higher or more complex truth, but an aspect of discourse no greater in import than the private letter as evidence in a law court as part of legal discourse: discourse being not the direct or indirect representation or misrepresentation of experience, but a system of statements, or rules, that govern institutional practice. (In Young’s attention the practice, of course, is colonialism.) Such a line of argument might seem unpropitious of a literary turn; Young reminds us, nevertheless, that postcolonialism as a spur to thought and activity predates Said, Bhabha and Spivak, the ‘holy trinity’ of the northern university. Rather, the postcolonial has long had important voices on the peripheries; that, in fact, peripheries may be an inappropriate descriptive term, as perhaps is postcolonial itself, Young preferring tricontinental in its internationalist ambition. Not only was Gandhi an influential presence — a kind of embodied creative text, to be interpreted in multiple contexts of imaginative and ethical challenge — but it is significant that what shaped those thinkers whose work is synonymous with post-debate — Foucault and Derrida — was their experience in colonial Tunisia and Algeria, respectively (see Young 2001: 317-334; 395-426).

Closer to a literary turn, Bart Moore-Gilbert (1997) — like Ato Quayson (2000), another critic who has sustained a literary interest — distinguishes between postcolonial theory and postcolonial practice, and includes as formative influences not only philosophical and political thinkers, but also the ‘first wave’ of Caribbean and African writer-critics of the decolonisation
years. We are reminded that Achebe’s landmark essay, ‘An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*’ (1988 [1975]), was published three years prior to Said’s *Orientalism*; that Ngugi’s ‘decolonising the mind’ (1981) — the phrase had been coined earlier by Es’kia Mphahlele (1962) in his response *Négritude* — anticipated the agitation of Spivak, in particular, for curricular reform; and that both E.K. Brathwaite’s theory of “creolisation” (1971) and Wilson Harris’s neologism of “the in-between” (1967: 8) (a means to figure a position between cultures) anticipated Bhabha’s conception of the Third Space. Harris well before Bhabha, in fact, had defined “the void” as the element which, as in Bhabha, complicates full translation: the void prevents cultures or cultural forms, which are being negotiated, from attaining the easy commerce of equivalence or synthesis, Harris notes, while at the same time the void — the apparent paradox is key to Bhabha’s hybridity — is a place which allows cultures to mix not by erasing differences, but by “endorsing difference yet creatively undermining biases” (Harris 1992: 20).

I mention the insights of so-called Third World literary figures not to score ‘South’ points against the North, but to remind us that what we now refer to as the postcolonial is, spatially and temporally, an entanglement of the colony with modernity, in which — as Said (1993) has argued — no cultures are pure and in which the philosophical home may not be the nation but the world. Not only in Bhabha or in Harris, but in observations dating back to Roman and Christian encounters, we may identify — to return to my earlier point — a post-conundrum: a narrative of causality suggesting both progress (one stage to the next) and imposition (a dominating story); or a local story susceptible, also, to its own paradoxes of difference, as both identity-recognition and ethnicity-identification. It is a conundrum which, in granting respect for ‘my story’, may trigger in ‘your story’ vicious regional competition, as in the Balkan wars of the 1990s: why your story and not my story? Or, whose story has authority? Or, according to post- ‘dissensus’, is cultural understanding or literary history desirable, or even possible?

Given a rhetoric that is able to paralyse claims of rationality or ethical choice, it is not really surprising to note impulsions to greater nuance and complexity in either/or scenarios. The physical sciences, for example, point out that as in scientific experimentation so in social life, we artificially construct our conjunctures of events. These hypothetical models chart causality according to provisional patterns while subjecting such patterns — which
are, after all, constructed patterns — to ever more challenging observation in the pursuit of truer or, at least more invariant, accounts of reality. (See Potter and López 2001) Or, to turn to economics, Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory (1974; 1991) in its narration of modernity is not as singular as literary critics of Enlightenment tend to find convenient. While attached to European and now U.S. global expansion, capitalism overlaps differently, at different times and in different spaces, with the intrusions — not simply the passivities — of decolonisation and neocolonialism. (It is not a new observation that South Africa’s development invokes the consideration of colonialism of a special kind.)

Such tensions between global universalism — or a mélange of cultural production in U.S. sweatshops at the edges of the world — and the identity politics of regions, even nations, provoke several essays in the collection, Postcolonial Studies and Beyond (Loomba et al 2005). The conclusion of the editors, in their Introduction, is that in an era of globalisation debate must move beyond the “conundrum” — consensus or dissensus — of the past decade, and seek a “new critical language for articulating the linkage between local, lived experience and the broadest structures of global economic and political power” (2005: 19). It is not, as Said suggests in what for him is an unusual flourish to popular effect, that “stone-throwing Palestinian youths or swaying dancing South African groups or wall-traversing East Germans” (1993: 396) by their actions alone collapsed the relevant tyrannies. Rather, it is that metanarratives, as Kelwyn Sole (2005) argues in Postcolonial Studies and Beyond, must not be erased, but must be qualified by scrupulous attention to local conditions. Sole illustrates his point in an analysis of the “quotidian experience” — the everyday, as a category — in contemporary South African poetry, which questions the “pseudo freedoms” bred and licensed by neoliberalism in the new South Africa.

At the same time, Sole — alert to the danger of racial division — cannot contemplate a future progressive South Africa simply as an accumulation of discrete observations detached from the trace of a trajectory: a trajectory urging citizens towards a community of awareness. The concept, community of awareness, is Fanon’s (1961): his synthesis beyond the antithesis of native resistance. It is quoted approvingly by Said (1993: 262); and it is endorsed by Young in his conclusion as to why, even though he himself prefers the term tricontinental, postcolonialism retains its definition- al purpose in globalised times. Postcolonialism marks the fact that, despite
setbacks to decolonisation, human beings require a return to what has come to be known as a radical humanitarian tradition. (See Fanon 1961: 315-316, and Young 2001: 67-68)

We touch again on the terrain of the literary, where explorations of the subjective and imaginative life should seek the gradations that are too often erased in the abstractions of postcolonial theory. Sole is unlikely to label himself a postcolonial critic. His caution bears, perhaps, on Said’s observation (1993: 264) outside his flourish about stonethrowing youths and toyi-toying (struggle-swaying) crowds: the postcolonial paradigm — the West’s turning its gaze on its ex-colonies — is least applicable to the topographies, both imaginative and developmental, of countries with particularly complicated relationships to a colonising/anti-colonising dialectic. Said’s examples are Algeria, Guinea, sections of the Islamic and Arab worlds, and Palestine and South Africa; and at the conference at Wits University (Johannesburg) in 1996 on ‘Post-Colonial Shakespeares’ Jonathan Dollimore sought both precariously and elegantly to tackle a certain hostility among South African participants to a postcolonial discourse:

There was, for example, distrust of ‘metropolitan’ theory, including by myself; a sense that this theory which gestured so much towards difference as a fundamental philosophical premise, disregarded its material realities. But what struck me, as an outsider, as the most hostile divide of all, was that between a materialist tradition of criticism and subsequent developments conveniently (though again reductively) lumped together as ‘the postmodern’ (1997: 259-260).

How to avoid the either/or dichotomy, or the divide — implicit in northern institutional postcolonialism, despite its best intentions — between a still confident West as the framer of the discourse and the silent, or winking, or rebellious native subjects of the South? As far as academic enquiry is concerned, the response to the travelling theorist cannot be the indigene who, in the blood and the bones, knows the local story, and Dollimore’s conclusion, even as it feels compelled to retain the European thinker as measure, shifts either/or to both/and:

I reconsider the place of pessimism within the political project in the spirit of Gramsci’s familiar yet never more apposite remark: ‘Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will’ (1997: 260).
Optimism of the will reinforces a literary turn, even if such a turn refuses to follow David Punter’s own imaginative, sometimes quirky attempt in his study *Postcolonial Imaginings* (2000) to redirect postcolonial theory towards the substance of his subtitle, “Fictions of a New World Order”. Instead of postcolonial criticism’s “establishing a ground” — what are the forms of colonialism, what is a comprador formation, etc.? — the question, according to Punter, is how to respond to the pressures under which the postcolonial experience is felt, how the narrative, recursive, struggling forward, burdened by setbacks, emerges in image, in speech, in the shocks of its insights, in the complexity of its human interactions. It is an imagination which Punter, in his attempt to turn to the literary, can identify only in “melancholy, ruin, loss” (2000: 186): an imagination (defined by Punter as postcolonial) of violent geographics, displacement, of ghosts in the history house, in which the freight of centuries of colonisation can never be erased.

In the postcolony, however — if South Africa may be designated, tentatively, as a postcolony — the “spectral” (Punter 2002) does not necessarily negate the energies of renewal, even as the in-between space presents an ongoing challenge. How then may the literary intervene? According to Wilson Harris, “the possibility exists for the literary work to involve us in perspectives on renascence which can bring into play a figurative meaning beyond an apparently real world or prison of history…. I believe a philosophy of history may well be buried in the arts of the imagination (1970: 8).

Or, more recently, according to Hanif Kureishi, “the only patriotism possible is one that refuses the banality of taking either side, and continues the arduous conversation. That is why we have literature, the theatre, newspapers — a culture...” (2005:19).

Both Harris and Kureishi would agree with Derek Attridge (2004: 126-131) that literature defines its ‘singularity’ in its resistance to the all-encompassing frame or idea; that literature although a cultural product is rarely self-contained by the culture; and that whatever its effect or affect on our experience, a literary turn is unlikely either to fast track into power any new social movement or save our souls.

What literary culture might achieve is its own apprehension of otherness; its capacity to offer surprising articulations of, and insights into, the complexity of human potential and conduct. Despite the utopian pronouncements of many postcolonial projects, we should heed Ania Loomba’s more realistic purpose: we academics “should at the very least
place our discussions of postcoloniality in the context of our own educational institutions and practices" (1998: 258). The objective is to stimulate our students, and ourselves, to see afresh, and comparatively, across worlds. In this, a literary turn may achieve an ethical dimension.

References


“POSTCOLONIALISM” OR “POSTCOLONIALISMS”?: THE DILEMMAS OF A TEACHER

PIA BRÎNZEU
University of Timişoara

Abstract: The paper discusses the need to redefine “postcolonialism” in the light of recent theoretical developments. If traditionally postcolonialism is seen as what happens after a colony gains independence, the shifting nature of the term “colony”, as well as the more recent direction of “Neo-” or “Supercolonialism” imply a unification of divergent tendencies through globalization and through the sustained effort to cope with the hybridity of non-Western cultures and with the new threats of terrorism.

The present considerations on postcolonialism are the result of the problems I encountered when I started a new course on Postcolonial Voices: Races, Cultures, and Identities in Commonwealth Literatures. This course, offered to the second-year students of English at the University of Timişoara, was part of a grant supported by the “New Europe College”, an institute for advanced studies which encourages teachers in various Romanian universities to introduce new courses at both under- and postgraduate levels.

A first discovery I made when inaugurating the course was that the term “postcolonialism” resists all attempts to define it. It has become so overlaid with accumulated meanings that it is almost impossible to avoid its pitfalls and ambiguities. Interpretations, too numerous to be of any help, lead to that kind of “shoulder-shrugging disenchantment” that Rushdie (2002: 186) speaks about when referring to the Taj Mahal. The architectural masterpiece is so often reproduced in images or objects that many travellers tend to avoid it when touring India. In literary and cultural theory, however, we cannot shrug our shoulders with disenchantment, avoiding the difficult terms that are used by theorists and critics. We have to fight with definitions and to find a solution, especially when we find ourselves in the demanding situation of giving a lecture to students.
The term “postcolonialism” in the singular also signals a reluctance to give up the perspective of approaching the postcolonial world in terms of a singular abstraction. Various books and articles, dealing with the postcolonial “condition”, “discourse”, “scene”, “Other”, “identity”, or “blackness”, treat these terms as if they were single issues, common to such diverse countries as Canada, Australia, Kenya, Fiji, and Jamaica. Only a few authors resist the temptation of seeing postcolonialism as a singular and ahistorical abstraction and prefer to use the term so as to denote multiplicity (McClintock 1994, Chapman 1996).

The present paper aims, therefore, at enlarging the term “postcolonialism” towards its plural significations, using an academic framework, in which the positions of teachers and students offer various perspectives, depending on whether they are outsiders or insiders to a postcolonial context. Outsiders can offer only a speculative approach to Commonwealth cultures and can articulate a merely theoretical background to the common curricular subject of “postcolonialism” (in the singular), while insiders, being familiar with the particular realities of their own country, can make comparisons and think about the subject in terms of a multiplicity of “postcolonialisms”. The new tendencies of globalization, however, and mainly its negative aspects generated by terrorism, mark a new direction in the dialectics of the postcolonial countries, illustrating a more and more evident tendency to form a homogenous and monolithic world in order to oppose evil.

A well-known definition of postcolonialism is given in The Empire Writes Back (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin 1989: 2), where the term “postcolonial” is considered to cover “all the cultures affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day”. The authors refer to the entire colonial period, although “post” clearly indicates a chronological posteriority to the colonized period. Even if we consider postcolonialism as a post-independence historical period in once-colonised nations, the definition does not work, since Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were granted dominion status. Their relationship to the metropolitan centre was obviously different from that of Kenya, Nigeria or Uganda. Even in the case of the latter category, the extent to which they can be considered postcolonial countries is both variable and debatable (McClintock 1994).

Simon During (1993: 449) offers a broader definition of postcolonialism, including all nations or groups “which have been victims of imperial-
ism” and which “need to achieve an identity uncontaminated by universal-
ist or Eurocentric concepts and identities”. His definition excludes the
colonies of non-European countries (Korea colonized by Japan, East Timor
by Indonesia, Tibet by China) and does not solve the problem of writers
who are outsiders to a postcolonial country, but who are so much involved
with it that their contribution can no longer be ignored. Thus, although an
outsider to India, V. S. Naipaul, for instance, has paid so much attention to
this country both in his fictional representations and in his non-fiction that,
in the opinion of Salman Rushdie (2002: 170), no account of India’s mod-
ern literature would be complete without him.

and “resistance”, written out of the specific local experience. This definition
solves both the problem of relationship with Europe and that of colour, but
locates a specifically anti- or postcolonial discursive attitude of opposition,
one which begins as soon as the colonizing power inscribes itself onto the
body and space of its “others” and continues as an often occluded tradition
into the modern theatre of neo-colonialist international relations. In the
case of John Lye’s definition, problems are raised by white African writers,
such as J. M. Coetzee, who investigate the cruelty and complicity of
Apartheid from the African people’s position, and by white Englishmen —
William Boyd (Brazzaville Beach, 1995) or Giles Foden (Last King of
Scotland, 1999) —, writers who show more political sensitivity and empathy
to the Africans than usual outsiders. Are they to be considered postcolonial
writers or not?

If “hybridity, marginality, mimicry, and subalternity” are the basic ele-
ments in the definition of postcolonialism, as it appears in the dictionary
entry of the Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Literatures in English (Benson,
Conolly 1994, vol. 2: 1303), then a lot of major writers from former colonies
would be excluded, writers who write in their own language about local
experiences that do not necessarily deal with the postcolonial issues men-
tioned above. Ken Saro-Wiwa is a notable example in this respect.

http://www4.cord.edu/projects/Murphy/Postcolonial%20Theory/), develops
a three-point construct, based on ontological, contextual, and textual com-
ponents. The ontological aspect is related to the postcolonial identity condi-
tion and shows different nations and writers fighting to come to some
understanding of identity; the contextual aspect refers to the socio-political domination of a native people by any encroaching alien power, not necessarily a European one; the textual aspect deals with story telling, which has at least three sides: the native history, the state construct, and the individual investigation that interrogates the other two.

This approach results into a more suitable definition of postcolonialism because it annihilates the major pitfalls of the previous ones and allows a more detailed discussion of the major postcolonial issues. However, my experience as a Romanian professor teaching postcolonialism to Romanian students has brought me to the conclusion that the last approach can be enriched with a fourth component, the teacher-audience relationship. Disregarded by Duncan, the pedagogic context allows an in-depth exploration of the multiple imagological perspectives offered by teachers and students. Outsiders have a different perception of postcolonialism from insiders. While the former treat it without having had the experience of what colonization means, the latter can add a lot to the correct understanding of their own identity constructs, nationness, degrees of “nativness” and “foreignness”, etc. Collective and individual self-definition in postcolonial countries is part of a broader process in which not only economic, social, historical, and cultural forces interact, but also academic relationships produce a range of identities, which may be taken up, rejected, opposed, or adapted for individual or group needs. This is not the case with teachers for whom postcolonialism remains a mere textual phenomenon.

In order to clarify the nuances arising when postcolonialism is placed within a pedagogic framework, one has to resort to imagology, the science which deals with the images and stereotypes that peoples have of a nation. Traditionally, such images are differentiated into self-images, i.e., the perception of identity a nation has of itself, and hetero-images, i.e., the way in which the nation sees others or is seen by them (Klineberg 1969: 225, Spiering 1992: 18). This classification is, in my opinion, too simplistic, because it leaves out the point of view of the exiles, i.e. the images of immigrants, who are initially outsiders in a community, but get partially integrated, and the images of emigrants, who were once insiders, but have more or less lost contact with their native community. As shown elsewhere (Brînzeu 2000), the former are a special category of self-images, to be differentiated as infra-images, while the latter should be included as alo-images within the category of hetero-images. These points of view offer more shades of
difference because they combine involvement with detachment and adapt the images of otherness to suit self-images, completing the more frequent stereotypes of the natives with a new set of attitudes brought from abroad.

Adapting the above-mentioned imagological concepts to the classroom context, four basic situations can be noticed. The first one is when teachers and students belong to the colonized people and when, being both insiders, discuss the problems as knowledgeable persons, who have developed similar self-images. It represents a good occasion for teachers to insist on the identity, history, tradition, and cultural uniqueness of the former dominion or colony, a process important in defining their identity and in getting students, as Homi Bhabha (1995: 5) says, to establish “acts of affiliation and establishment”, to live moments of disavowal, displacement, exclusion, and cultural contestation” or, as Edward Said (1994: 330) suggests, to name “their basic requirements for democracy and for the right to an assured, decently humane existence”.

In the second situation, when students are insiders, having developed a self-image, and teachers are outsiders, having only a hetero-image, it is obvious that an unequal status is created. The latter’s perspective is incomplete, deficient, and/or wrong, especially if it based on a specific Eurocentric and logocentric historical legacy, according to which otherness has been constructed as inferiority. A variant of the above situation is illustrated by Myrtle Hooper (1998: 24), a British teacher in South Africa, teaching a Zulu writer, Thomas Mofolo, and his novel Chaka to a Zulu audience. She comments on her infra-image and on the sense she had of herself as one of those “abazindlele zikhanya ilanga” (people whose ears are translucent in the sun), i.e. one of the white colonizers who assassinate Chaka in the end of novel. She voices her anguish: “Who am I? What am I doing here? Do I belong? Why do I stay?...If my students know more about the subject of the text than I do, if the text defines me as oppressive Other, what am I doing trying to teach it?” That Hooper is worried by the tension created within the classroom represents a natural situation, since she is both an outsider and one of those who have contributed to an educational system which “exiles the child, and while s/he learns to ‘master’ the other tongue, and to live through the narratives and the stories of the imperial masters, the feeling of homesickness — of severance from one’s own stories or one’s ‘real’ home — creates a radical split within the child’s psyche” (Azim 1993: 219).
The third situation may be that in which the teacher is an insider and the students are not. Professor Michael Chapman illustrated the case when he came to lecture about South African literatures to a Romanian audience. Here, again, we have to be aware of different degrees of involvement: the experience of the Romanians, for instance, whose historical past implies a Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, and Soviet domination, is perhaps closer to the teacher’s context than that of a non-colonized audience, but not as close as that of African students who were colonized by the British. While the image of, let us say, a Swiss audience is a hetero-image, the image of the Romanians or Kenyans are alo-images, images of outsiders who have had a certain experience of colonialism.

Finally, the last category is represented by teachers and students who are both outsiders. Having been neither colonizers nor colonized, they create a hetero-image of the nations under discussion and approach the issues from a merely theoretical perspective, without any direct knowledge of the real postcolonial circumstances and patterns.

The above classification highlights the various orientations, discrepancies, contradictions or paradoxes appearing in the discourse of teachers and students. Acceptance or abrogation, appropriation or refusal establish relationships which underline a heterogeneous, often contradictory aspect of “postcolonialism” and help teachers and students to avoid the danger of not understanding the multiple nature of postcolonialism. If in lectures about the literatures of Canada, South Africa, Australia, or any other Commonwealth country, they deal with the common issues of imperial discourse, anti-colonial resistance, ethnic and/or hyphenated identity, the devalued Other, whiteness versus blackness, the centre and the margin, diaspora, and hybridity, teachers tend to have an integrating attitude and to level things to a generally valid “postcolonialism” in the singular. Edward Said (1994: 6) notices the phenomenon: “The British empire integrated and fused things within it, and taken together it and other empires made the world one.” William McNeill (1983: 260-61) also claims that as a result of imperialism, “the world was united into a single interacting whole as never before”. But teaching and theorizing postcolonialism should not aim at providing a totalising model for postcolonial texts and at homogenizing crucial geo-political and cultural distinctions into invisibility. On the contrary, teachers should underline the plural, multiple dimension of postcolonialism, since the efforts to create a coherent national culture in the act of narrative
performance, the fight to obtain cultural autonomy, and the colonized
nation’s self-generation are all unique processes started after liberation.
Each colony fights in its own way with identity problems, with the overlap
and displacement of domains of difference, and with the intersubjective
and collective experience of nationness, community interest, or cultural val-
ues. Differences are articulated in concordance with social or minority
perspectives, with the on-going negotiations that seek to authorize cultural
hybridities, with the persistence and/or re-invention of tradition, the restag-
ing of the past, and the consensual or conflictual engagements of cultural
difference. It is obvious that in this case we should speak of “postcolo-
nialisms”, of the alternative aspects immediately recognizable when going
deeper into the study of a native culture. When comparing, for instance,
Michael Chapman’s *Southern African Literatures* (1996) and A. H. New’s *A
History of Canadian Literature* (2003), the different specificities of the two
countries become immediately obvious. South Africanness is to be under-
stood in connection to the three characteristics highlighted by Chapman
(1996: 72, 173): that the European settlement consisted mainly in the form-
ing of a new group of people on the African continent, the Afrikaners, who
would continue to regard themselves as European in racial hierarchies, but
who saw their home and destiny in Africa; that the white serious writers
struggle with their hesitations and retreats, involving questions regarding
their appurtenance to Africa or to Europe, in which collisions occur
between attachments to the great English or European culture and attempts
to establish indigenous convictions; and that South Africa is marked by the
Apartheid racial discrimination that lasted from the 1950s to the end of the
century. The troubled South African realities are dissimilar to the Canadian
context, marked by “Snow, North and Wilderness” (New 2003:2). Even a
single native culture, such as the Canadian one, is sufficiently varied in itself
to add a lot to the idea of postcolonial heterogeneity. A. H. New (2003:2)
comments:

Snow, North, Wilderness: these stereotypes of Canada suggest a fierce
uniformity — but even from earliest times, such generalizations have been
inaccurate. To read Canadian literature attentively is to realize how diverse
Canadian culture is — how marked by politics and religion, how influ-
enced by differences of language and geography, how preoccupied (apparently) by the empirical world, but how fascinated by the mysterious
and the uncertain. ‘Apparent’ is important: illusion is everywhere. For
repeatedly Canadian history has designed images of continuity and order, which the social realities touch, but only sometimes reconfirm.

The differences underlined by the two authors, besides many other differences noticeable in the way in which the postcolonial nationness is articulated and in how community interests or cultural values are negotiated, make postcolonialism appear in the last decades of the 20th century as a space of transit, of territorial and ethnic hybridities, specificities, and multiplicities. The relation with the past makes colonized peoples be highly diverse in their nature and in their traditions, so that while they may be the ‘other’ from the colonizers’ point of view, they are also different one from another and from their own pasts, and should not be totalized or essentialized through such concepts as black consciousness, Indian soul, aboriginal culture and so forth.

Facing the future, however, the reverse process becomes more and more obvious. Due to globalization, we have entered a post-postcolonial period, which can be seen as a time of transit, in which differences are levelled by the media, the information technologies, and the multinational corporations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, the UN, which express and exert power on a global level. Globalization makes postcolonial countries be subject to similar patterns of production and consumption, to increased cultural influences, to new information systems linking the most disparate parts of the planet. They standardize the most varied lifestyles, manners, and mentalities, homogenize cultural and vestimentary items, make films and books cross borders. The numerous examples of globalization in fiction can be symbolically reduced to the little ditty sung by Gibreel Farishta, Salman Rushdie’s hero in The Satanic Verses: “O, my shoes are Japanese/ These trousers English, if you please/ On my head, red Russian hat — / My heart’s Indian for all that” (1988: 5). Gibreel refers to the commercial circulation of goods, but omits an important negative instance of globalization, of which Salman Rushdie would become aware only after having published The Satanic Verses: terrorism. Offensive, violatory, and rule-breaking, terrorism is the manifestation of a primordial fascism, permanently surrounding us and working mysteriously, without motivation and logic. The new axes of terrorism, which have shaken the world in the last decades by throwing it into a labyrinth of chaos, require new strategic alliances and contribute to a new form of solidarity between postcolonial countries which would have otherwise remained inimical. Symbolically, the beginnings of the new peri-
od can be associated with the attack on the World Trade Centre, “a monstrous act of the imagination”, “an iconoclastic act”, sending “a message that the modern world itself was the enemy, and would be destroyed. It may seem unimaginable to us, but those who perpetrated this crime, the deaths of many thousands of innocent people were a side issue. Murder was not the point. The creation of a meaning was the point. The terrorists of September 11, and the planners of that day’s events, behaved like perverted, but in another way brilliantly transgressive, performance artists: hideously innovative, shockingly successful, using a low-tech attack to strike at the very heart of our high-tech world” (Rushdie 2002: 436). Unfortunately Rushdie is right, and so is Derrida’s (1976: 135) proposition that “violence is writing”. This explains the fact that terrorism, even as supreme negativity, inspires a lot of writers. Penelope Lively’s Cleopatra’s Sister (1993), Giles Foden’s The Last King of Scotland (1998), Christopher Wakling’s Beneath the Diamond Sky (2004), John Fullerton’s The Green Land (2004), and, last but not least, Hisham Matar’s In the Country of Men, shortlisted for the 2006 Man Booker Prize, are only a few examples of recent “terrorism novels”, remarkable for their aesthetic potential. They illustrate the fact that the postcolonial world has become united by a common concern to answer the major questions raised by terrorism: How can we oppose evil? How are we going to live? What strategies should we adopt? What new responsibilities do we have as citizens of a world in which a new kind of war, new enemies and new weapons appear? According to Talal Asad (2007: 2), the creation of terror and its perpetuation, even on a literary level, are aspects of a common militant action “in the unequal world we inhabit”. We are all involved in understanding what is cruel and what is necessary, what should be justified or condemned in the particular acts of death dealing. Thus, we should speak about “postcolonialism” in the singular again. It is no longer that the colonizers face the colonized in their fight for supremacy, democracy, integration and the like. It is “us”, who are against terrorism, and “they”, who stand for evil, irrespective of the country they come from. Terrorism has interconnected the world in its common fight against violence, discovering a different otherness and integrating the colonial “devalued Other” into a new pattern of “sameness”, a framework which absorbs all differences and contradictions. Both centre and margin feel equally desirous to cooperate, to discover common strategies, to unite
in spite of former enmities against the horrors of terrorism. Teachers and students should feel morally responsible and join them in the effort.

References


Duncan, Dawn. 2007. *Introduction to Postcolonial Theory*. Available at: http://www4.cord.edu/projects/Murphy/Postcolonial%20Theory


POSTMODERNISM AND/AS POSTCOLONIALISM:
ON RE-READING MILAN KUNDERA AND BREY TEN
BREY TEN BACH

ILEANA SORA DIMITRIU
University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal Durban

Abstract: This paper compares Kundera and Breytenbach, two writers who address conditions of social oppression and reveal similarities of ‘double vision’ concerning what is home, what is exile. Both have been classified as postmodern, but this analysis argues that their writing modality is an expression of ‘postmodernism-as-postcolonialism’ (Quayson 2000). The present reading resists any easy separation of the two ‘posts’ of our time, and offers a model of interpretation that, by analogy, may be applied to several writers whose postmodernist art emanates from a historical burden.

The two ‘posts’ of our times (postmodernism and postcolonialism) have tended to be placed as oppositional categories of sense-making. This paper suggests that, in the times in which we live — specifically to my purpose here, after the Cold War, after Apartheid —, the separation of postmodernism and postcolonialism is a simplification of a necessary ‘double vision’ in which, amid new global mobilities, positions of home and exile, for example, intersect in both the economic and aesthetic life.

My point will be illustrated in a ‘post-reading’ (which involves both postmodern and postcolonial reading practices) of two writers who have been difficult to classify as occupying either one of the ‘posts’: Milan Kundera and Breyten Breytenbach, the former from the ex-Czechoslovakia, the latter from South Africa, two countries which in different ways may be said to have suffered the impositions of totalitarian systems, whether ideology- or race-based, whether Stalinism or Apartheid. So far, there have been two main lines of critical approach to these two writers: one approach has tended to see them mainly as voices of protest, the other continues to focus on their aesthetic achievements, analysing the array of recognisably postmodernist tactics of fictional experimentation.
My attempt of seeking a more inclusive approach, one more appropriate to the post-1990 moment, has been anticipated by various critics — e.g. Hutcheon 1988; Boehmer 1995; Connor 1997; Quayson 2000; Appiah 2006. Such attempts have sought to establish paradigmatic affinities between marginality and difference, and hence to investigate not separate categories of sense-making, but the ‘double vision’ of complex responsiveness to cultural practices. Both ‘posts’ are continuations of poststructuralist rethinking of the relationship between sign and referent, and both express their anti-systemic drive through insistence on pluralism and borders, and through incredulity towards meta-narratives. Both — in their critique of totality — elevate the plurality of the atomised fragment and of the peripheral locality to prominence, thus foregrounding the uneven forces of cultural representations and their contestation of any central social authority. Artistic strategies such as indeterminacy, ambiguity, deferral and fragmentation are meant to encourage multiple points of entry to cultural phenomena. In fact, it is precisely “the question of double vision [which] a peripheral existence in the world engenders” (Quayson 2000: 141) that is the major common denominator between the two. But then, of course, questions regarding exactly whose point of view is being represented spring to mind. Ironically, then, it is in the most obvious similarity that the most glaring dissimilarity is located. To be more exact, although exercising a double vision by taking into account the existence of multiple peripheries, postmodern thought still tends to “reference a particular socio-cultural configuration ... from the vantage point of the western metropolis” (Quayson 2000: 140), while postcolonial thought tends to analyse global phenomena from the specific material contexts of countless peripheries.

While postmodernism is, in the first instance, an a-political reaction to the over-inflation of western rationality and its proliferation of representations, postcolonialism is primarily focused on the politics of representation, on restoring the marginalised to radical emancipation. As Gaylard puts it, “postcolonialism may offer postmodernism and postmodernity a moment of undecidability that enables, indeed forces agency, rather than destroying it in a morass of relativism” (2005: 52).

In sum, while not ignoring postmodernism’s anti-totalising impulse and its celebration of hybridity and syncretism, postcolonialism also has a strong positionality (a “geo-political edge” Gaylard 2005: 36). Its hybridity is not a-historical, its distorted world is not only incredibly fissured, but fis-
sured by grim material reality, the material reality of Third World social and economic slippage and disintegration. Referred to by some as “Third World postmodernism” (Gaylard 2005) — and by others as “postmodernism of resistance” (Cornis-Pope 2004), or “postcolonialising postmodernism” (Quayson 2000), or “interstitial/liminal postcoloniality” (Jeyifo 1990), or “localised cosmopolitanism” (Appiah 2006) — this inclusive brand of postcolonial project goes beyond both new orthodoxies of our times: that of western/international postmodernism and that of context-based postcolonialism. It is a project that blends experimentation with social engagement, whose ‘self’ is both profoundly alienated and deeply anchored, in an attempt at reconciling cosmopolitanism with emancipated nationalism. Offering a postcolonial perspective on the contemporary postmodern condition helps generate a more nuanced understanding of the grammar of postmodernity. As Quayson says: “postmodernism can never fully explain the state of the contemporary world without first becoming postcolonial, and vice versa” (2000:154).

In the light of these considerations, I shall offer a comparative ‘interstitial’ reading of two controversial novels: Milan Kundera’s *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* (1995; 1984) and Breyten Breytenbach’s *Memory of Snow and of Dust* (1989). Both novels suggest the postmodern becoming postcolonial, and vice versa: the ‘double vision of home and exile’, of belonging and migrancy. Although neither would wish to be classified as post-anything, an exploration of intersecting ‘posts’ provides a challenging approach to their writings and, by extension, to something of the complex relationship of fictional and material universes that are pertinent to the world today. Both Kundera and Breytenbach have had first-hand experience of violent societies, and as dissident writers they responded to totalitarian over-determination — ideological/Stalinism and racist/Apartheid, respectively. At the same time, both have used recognisably postmodernist artistic techniques of experimentation. Such classifications, as I have suggested above, have to be qualified in relation to a postcolonial political drive.

Despite the political pressures of Eastern Europe, Kundera is routinely considered to be a major representative of international postmodernism, and more seldom as a dissident challenging a by now defunct regime. My contention is that neither of these clear-cut classifications does justice to Kundera’s artistry or political vision. Attitudes towards classifying
Breytenbach are also divergent, with critics positioned in various ‘laagers’, some praising his aesthetic achievements, while others debating the divorce between writer and person, judging the person’s political activism as reductionist intoxication.

It was in fact the totalitarian pressure of their home countries — the ex-Czechoslovakia and South Africa — that was responsible for a writer-person/art-politics split in the reception of both writers. The political contexts prompted each to live outside the country of his birth. Both moved to Paris, a city which seemed to offer a space free of the emotions of ideological constriction. Both Kundera and Breytenbach have become migrant writers and cultural pioneers, “real explorers and frontierspeople of the abyss” (Okri 1997: 39). Their travelling cosmopolitanism may be defined as an act of radical emancipation: an anti-systemic impulse giving a voice to the many ‘voiceless’ people who experience dislocation. For Bhabha too, migrants represent a new kind of political stance: “it is by living on the borderline of history ... that we are in a position to translate the differences ... into a kind of solidarity” (Bhabha 1994: 170).

Such a stance draws on a “double perspective” (Rushdie 1991:12) or “double vision” (Quayson 2000: 141) which allows home (as conceptual locus) to be experienced from both inside and outside an exilic condition. Writers-in-exile embody the postcolonial trope of displacement and migrancy, and, paradoxically, it is in migrancy that one can find links between postcolonial and postmodern thought — the common denominator being the ‘double vision’ of focusing simultaneously on centre and periphery. My investigation of double vision in Kundera and Breytenbach entails a degree of perspectival alienation: I shall be looking at each one of the two novels mentioned above as alienated from normal grids of interpretation, while I follow Quayson’s suggestion of “attempting to alienate images, tropes and texts from themselves by reading them against others that do not seem to share historical similarities.” (2000: 154). Or as Loomba puts it, “while we cannot gloss over the real differences between our various locations ... it is equally important to forge links between the differently positioned subjects” [on the world scene] (2005:14). Such will be my approach to the two novels to be discussed.

The Unbearable Lightness of Being (1995 [1985]) has been subject to various readings. Some have read this novel as a love story between a
young and ambitious Czech doctor, Tomas, and his naïve admirer, Tereza. Their love story is shown to have survived difficulties, such as the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the self-exile of the two in France and their subsequent return home. Other critics have focused on political implications, seeing the novel as a fictional account of the Russian invasion. According to such a reading, Kundera expresses “a humour capable of seeing history as grotesque” (McEwan in Bradbury 1990: 211), as for example, when he reflects on the persecution of intellectuals in a dictatorial workers’ state: Tomas has to resign as a surgeon and become a window-cleaner, as retribution for having written an anti-communist tract. Yet another perspective sees the novel as a treatise on the existential concepts of ‘lightness’ and ‘weight’: “The heavier the burden ... the more real and truthful [our lives]. Conversely, the absolute absence of a burden causes man to be lighter than air ... his movements as free as they are insignificant. What then shall we choose?” (Kundera 1995: 4-5). Kundera returns to this question throughout the novel: he uses the dichotomy of heaviness/ lightness as an important trope and organising device for his investigation of human nature and relationships, to echo Kafka, in “the trap that the world has become” (McEwan in Bradbury 1990: 220), a trap in which the individual is caught in binaries of private/ public, truth /lie, the West/ East European divide.

From a postmodernist perspective, however, Kundera’s mastery lies in his taking his readers on a journey of transforming binaries and, in the process, exploring the slippery in-betweens. This is most obviously manifest in the development of the two main characters: Tereza and Tomas. At the beginning, they are placed at opposite ends of the spectrum. Tereza is a marker of weight: she is mentally entrapped in an over-dependent relationship with a philandering husband. Yet, Tereza gradually learns how to become more existentially light-footed in acts that may seem frivolous, yet for Tereza represent a maturing process, a counter-balancing act to her earlier ‘unbearable heaviness of being.’ Tomas, on the other hand, moves in the opposite direction, from ‘unbearable lightness’ to meaningful heaviness of being. At the beginning, he is presented as a notorious womaniser searching for the “millionth particle of difference” between his many conquests (1995: 11). But heaviness increasingly invades his life: he loses his job and becomes a “déclassé intellectual” (226), being forced to join the disenfranchised lumpen proletariat. At the end of the novel, the couple get killed in an accident; they literally die crushed under the weight of a truck.
Tereza’s ‘unbearable heaviness of being’ merges with Tomas’s ‘unbearable lightness of being’, a process that happens via insistent reversals in the contact zones between the two.

Kundera does not pursue his lightness vs heaviness existential riddle in the mode of individual/vertical introspection, but rather according to the rules of what Deleuze and Guatarri (1972) call “rhizomes” — the invisible, horizontal network of filiative connections and mental internalisations. Kundera produces capillary-like linkages of incidents and characters who explore their identity disjunctively, in the mirror of the other’s difference from self. The heaviness/lightness equation, for example, is pursued in a related fashion in the section, “Words Misunderstood,” in which the reader is presented with a key-word digest of another pairing in the novel: that of Sabina (a Czech who lives in exile) and Franz, her married Swiss lover. Here, Kundera introduces an exercise in intercultural translation, while suggesting that there are no conceptual universals, and that the replicas of such absent originals can only be simulacra. All one can do is navigate in a world of irreconcilable differences that are arbitrarily juxtaposed on the pages of a dictionary, a dictionary of ‘words misunderstood’. To give an example of such dictionary entries: ‘truth/ lies’; while for Sabina, living in truth with her married lover, Franz, “was possible only away from the public” eye (109), Franz “was certain that the division of life into private and public spheres is the source of all lies” (109). Not surprisingly, therefore — given these and many other ‘words misunderstood’ between them — the affair ends the moment Franz brings it out into the light, which makes Sabina feel a profound loss of intimacy, for now “they failed to hear the semantic susurrus of the river flowing through the words exchanged” (84). One lover’s unbearable heaviness is the other’s unbearable lightness. The search for a common narrative proves to be futile: there are no stable centres in life or fiction, but only isolated dictionary entries.

The above suggests a postmodernist reading of the novel, a reading that focuses on both aesthetic and philosophical incertitude (see Brink’s essay on Kundera’s novel, 1998). We need to keep in mind, however, that the characters play out their destinies in an over-determined socio-political context, i.e., in a country under (Soviet) occupation. So, is a postcolonial reading of the novel — ‘the postcolony’ weighted with the political determinant — also possible? Yes, provided one redefines postcolonialism beyond, to quote Young, its “tri-continental” (2001) application of Africa, Latin
America and Asia. Rather, we must include Eastern Europe which, although not affected by race-based colonialism, was ideologically colonised/militarily occupied for nearly half a century. As Quayson says: “a postcolonial project has to be alert to imbalances and injustices wherever these may be found, in East and West, North and South ...” (2000: 11).

To reiterate, Quayson’s concept of the ‘postcolonialising’ discourse — the willingness to look at global phenomena through the prism of postcolonial theory — does not exclude a dialogue with postmodernism. A useful working description of such an intersection is Jeyifo’s ‘interstitial’ postcolonialism (1990), as opposed to Achebe’s ‘normative’ postcolonialism of the “novelist as teacher” (1988: 27-31). The former “embraces what is normally perceived in the West as a metropolitan or hybrid sensibility [that] is neither securely and snugly metropolitan, nor assertively or combatively Third-Worldist” (Jeyifo 1990: 53). Writers like Rushdie, Walcott, Marechera, Soyinka, Marques, Allende and also Coetzee, alongside Kundera and Breytenbach, could all be referred to as ‘interstitial or liminal postcolonial’ writers. Their double vision/consciousness is a marker of three inter-related conditions: the postcolonial in its political imperative; the postmodern as resistant to master narratives; and the migrant state of being as permanent impermanence. The writers I have just mentioned all inhabit such in-between mental and geographical locations.

According to such a perspectival and terminological shift, Kundera offers postcolonial insights, albeit — as in East European criticism — presented through the grammar of the postmodern. In short, prominent critics in the East European region do not make much use of postcolonial language, or indeed theory, preferring instead the notion of an ‘East European postmodernism of resistance’, which highlights resistance to the Soviet dictatorship. This suggests that West and East European postmodernisms are not identical, the ‘eastern’ version presenting itself as “an aesthetic-ideological modality of surpassing aberrant political conditions ... with the state as ‘author’, its ideology as ‘master-narrative’, and its citizens as silenced ‘peripheries’” (Cornis-Pope 2004: 45). It is interesting to note, however, that even though preoccupied with the socio-economic and political dimensions of the postmodern condition, the ‘postmodernists of resistance’ (Jameson or Harvey, for example) have omitted the East European paradigm from their conversations. Or have they allowed it conveniently to dis-
appear behind the Iron Curtain as an embarrassment to the Marxist inflections of their particular theorising?

To return to Kundera’s preoccupation with heaviness/lightness — we may introduce a heavier context to the postmodernist interpretations offered in the first half of this paper. What is unbearably light in Kundera’s fictional universe? It is not only the slipperiness of boundaries or styles of representation; what is unbearable is also the farcical simulacrum of normality under communist dictatorship. The term ‘simulacrum’ is reminiscent of Baudrillard’s definition of the term (1983: 170), as well as of Jameson’s insistence on “depthlessness” in a culture of the image, “the identical copy for which no original has ever existed” (1991: 6, 18). Although it has become axiomatic, at least since Jameson, that postmodernism be conceived through the prism of (western) late capitalism, East European critical approaches have found that postmodern features can also describe state-orchestrated ‘late socialism’: “The totalising nature of the simulacrum … meant that it could manufacture itself — not just in cultural or interpretive — but also in economic terms [whereby] the Soviet system replaced economy with a spectacle of economy insofar as it tried to administer the economy through the power of ideology” (Annus and Hughes 2004: 58, 60).

Not surprisingly, therefore, the ‘late socialist simulacrum of commodity’ imploded in 1989, when — in a domino effect — the economies of Eastern Europe collapsed. Although Kundera does not actually use the term simulacrum, he alludes to its salient features, which are ‘unbearable lightness’ and ‘unbearable kitsch.’ The ‘late socialist simulacrum’ is presented as the great historical kitsch of the twentieth century. In the section titled, “The Grand March,” for example, Kundera defines kitsch as a grand march of conformism, a sanitised rejection of real life. Starting with a stark meditation on “shit” as necessarily part of life, Kundera says provocatively that “either man was created in God’s image — and God has intestines! — or God lacks intestines and man is not like him” (1995: 239), in which case “human existence loses its dimensions and becomes unbearably light” (238). He then proceeds to give a definition of kitsch as “the absolute denial of shit [for] kitsch excludes everything which is essentially unacceptable in human existence” (242). While such comments can be considered to echo postmodernist irreverence in their juxtaposition of unexpected levels of reality (God and intestines), we are aware that in this novel Kundera reflects on the politically kitschy ideal of enforced consensus in a totalitarian
regime: “Whenever a single political movement corners power, we find ourselves in the realm of totalitarian kitsch ... what I mean is that everything that infringes on kitsch must be banished from life: every display of individualism ... every doubt, all irony ... In this light, we can regard the gulag as a septic tank used by totalitarian kitsch to dispose of its refuse” (245-46).

Kundera pursues his investigations of the various incarnations of political kitsch — from the vantage point of the migrant’s ‘double vision’ — via his two above-mentioned characters: the Swiss, Franz, and the Czech, Sabina, the latter living in self-exile in Franz’s country. The two differ greatly as to their perceptions of the political realities in the East and West. For Franz, presented as the typical western Marxist of the 60s and 70s, Sabina’s attractiveness is strongly linked to the aura of her old country with its evocations of pain and political persecution: “Superimposing the painful drama of her country on her person, he found her even more beautiful” (98). Subconsciously, Franz is kitschify-ing Sabina and the real pain of her country, whereas for Sabina: “[t]he only word that evoked in her a sweet nostalgic memory of her homeland was ‘cemetery’ ... For Franz, [on the other hand], a cemetery was an ugly dump of stones and bones” (100). It was as uncomfortable as non-kitsch: “as soon as kitsch is recognised for the simulacrum that it is, it moves into the context of non-kitsch, thus losing its authoritarian power and becoming as touching [and heavy] as any other human weakness” (249). When spending time in cemeteries, therefore, Sabina was actually trying “to escape the kitsch [and melodrama] that people wanted to make of her life” (248), the unbearable lightness of being.

Kundera’s anti-kitsch stance could be interpreted as an anti-essentialist challenge to meta-narratives that force individuals into “the categorical agreement” with [the status quo] (250). The title of the chapter, “The Grand March”, is used ironically. Progressive ideas can easily become ossified, as metaphorically represented in the May Day parade in Sabina’s country, “a parade of people marching by with raised fists and shouting identical syllables in unison” (97). Kundera is particularly vehement in his attack on the Grand March of the Left, whether the corrupt one in the East or the naïve one in the West. Again, the ‘double vision’ of his being an émigré in France allows him to position himself in the in-between space and destabilise many comfort zones on both sides of the spectrum. His attacks on western Marxism — which he came to know intimately while in exile in France — are as fierce as his attacks on its East European counterpart. His attack on
the former is personified in the figure of the naïve Franz, who cannot accept that the Communist meta-narrative has failed. Franz, like many other western idealists, is shown to have been unable to understand that “neither [the kitsch of] frozen time nor the illusion of absolute space behind the Iron Curtain could deliver salvation” (Krasztév in Cornis-Pope 2004: 73). In his desperate need to believe in the ‘grand utopia’, Franz follows many prominent intellectuals of the Left to Cambodia, in what proves to be a futile protest march of misguided idealism: “When the crimes of the country called the Soviet Union became too scandalous, a leftist had two choices: either to spit on his former life and stop marching, or to reclassify the Soviet Union as an obstacle to the Grand March, and march on ... But because what makes a leftist a leftist is the kitsch of the Grand March ... it is impossible to shout ‘Down with Communism!’” (254). Even as he remains faithful to his own kitsch, Franz pays for this fatal attraction by way of a futile death: he is robbed and killed by a Cambodian Communist!

The other two main characters, Tomas and Tereza, are also made to exit the stage. Kundera removes them from the flux of city events to the social timelessness of the Czech countryside, where the peasants — whose land had been nationalised — have become pauperised and deracinated: “The country offered them nothing [but generalised apathy] ... a farmer who no longer owns his land ... has nothing to lose, nothing to fear” (274). Living a simulacrum of freedom and autonomy also means living in the everlasting present. As Annus and Hughes have pointed out, Jameson’s insights regarding the disappearance of a collective sense of history also holds true for the ‘cultural logic of late socialism’: “The Soviet order was experienced, by most people, as a boundless, everlasting curse, a present with no way out” (in Cornis-Pope 2004: 59). This then, in the form of the remote village, is where Kundera dumps Tomas and Tereza. Is their sense of uprootedness and exhaustion a postmodernist, a postcolonial, or an East-European postmodernist anti-Paradise?

Kundera ends his novel with a sense of ‘arrested time’ in the aftermath of the 1968 Prague Spring. The atmosphere of timeless space and its accompanying affectless exhaustion is masterfully presented in the last chapter. Kundera’s anti-Paradise is eventually “man’s longing not to be man” (288). Shifting the gaze from people to animals (the couple’s dog) implies a painful absence of human desire, with Tomas himself becoming a helpless rabbit in one of Tereza’s dreams. Although “Tereza and Tomas had died
under the sign of weight” (265), being literally crushed under the weight of a truck, Kundera actually lets them dissolve into social non-being, in the village where time stands still; he allows them to lose their individuality and become “free of all missions” (305). What I am trying to suggest here is that the ‘lightness’ of their social existence-cum-annihilation is ‘unbearable’ because it ends as a simulacrum of normality. But, paradoxically, a simulacrum not detached from the material effects of a totalitarian regime.

In offering an interstitial reading of a major postmodernist writer, I hope to have suggested a template for the analysis of other writers who cross the boundary between the postmodern and the postcolonial as, for example, the South African novelist, Breyten Breytenbach, who — like Kundera — does not reside in any single category of understanding. He could also be referred to as an ‘interstitial’ or ‘liminal postcolonial’ writer and/or a ‘postmodernist of resistance’.

Like Kundera, Breytenbach can be found as both claiming and disavowing affiliation to any locality, while journeys between existential ‘lightness’ and ‘heaviness’ are also this writer’s concern. *Memory of Snow and of Dust* (1989), for instance, is written from the vantage point of the migrant’s double vision that focuses on ‘home and exile’ not as fixed entities, but as processes in endless metamorphosis. As a writer in exile, Breytenbach is preoccupied with defining his self and displays what Said refers to as the “metaphysical” condition of the intellectual, that sense of “constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others” (1994: 39).

From one perspective, *Memory* is a good postmodernist illustration of its author’s inner journey across worlds, during which he attempts to make sense of his nomadic self, his “collection of impressions, sentiments and afterthoughts”, as he says (1989: 74). Breytenbach has developed his own theory of life in exile, his own ‘nomadology’, or Middle World, which is situated somewhere “between East and West, North and South” (1996: 4), and which is inhabited by culturally hybrid beings, who are both citizens and “un-citizens” everywhere (1996: 3). As he has said elsewhere, nomads are also translators of self: “When you are in exile, you will always be a translated version of yourself: it is you sensing yourself as an exile, but it is also others looking at you as an exile. There will be translations of normality. You become your own Other” (Dimitriu 1996: 98).
The protagonist, Mano, a South African of mixed race — become “a stateless unemployed marginal, a shifter” (1989: 6) — is also a nomadic being, an invisible translator of his own self: “a situation of view, a transit point, an impersonation, better still, a translation” (24), a man whose “memory is amputated, the stump of whose tongue is bleeding ... sucking and masticating the stale bread of exile, and taking refuge there as in a home away from home” (61). However, he is not alone in his exile, but shares his new status with Meheret, an Ethiopian journalist, another exile. The couple are often presented in conversation on issues of exile and home, centre and margin, “their exile being the living proof that death does-not kill” (25).

In postmodernist or self-referring vein, Breytenbach, via the character of the ghost writer, Barnum, reveals the plot of the novel, Memory of Snow and of Dust. At the same time, the postcolonial intrudes: the story of love and betrayal is set in politically over-determined times. Mano, the restless exile, “is bleeding of a distant and ancient wound, Azania” (87). He will have to leave Meheret: “he will have to slip away into the water, for an exile lives abroad as a moon does in a lake” (23). Mano will be sent to South Africa — “the dog with bloody sores” (63) — by a secret and powerful organisation. This is the end of Part One, which is mainly Meheret’s récit, tellingly titled “Utérotopia”, a semantic contact zone of hybridity, for “it contains in it both ‘Europe’ and ‘Ethiopia’ [Meheret’s home country], ‘uterus’ [suggestive of her lonely pregnancy], all of which can perhaps be understood as pointing towards a world beyond ‘heterotopia’” (Coullie and Jacobs 2004: 167). The section “Utérotopia” is a good example of Breytenbach’s mastery of postmodernist heterogeneity and polyphonic discourse. The various discourses include musings on fictional experimentation, as seen from the vantage point of home-in-exile.

So, is the description of this hybrid anti-narrative also postcolonial? As pointed out in relation to Kundera, it is the material heaviness of the locality, its “geo-political edge” (Gaylard 2005: 36), that identifies the postcolonial, and also the profound sense of a momentous historical configuration about to be born. From a postcolonial perspective, the focus will be on the migrant’s desperate sense of impotence vis-à-vis his native margin, which remains a faraway place in dire need of change. The margin is South Africa in the 1980s — during the State of Emergency — both Mano’s and Barnum’s home country. As a man of mixed race, Mano finds South Africa to be a
heartland of spiritual exile, “that horrible country in his mind … a geography of absence” (6), a place of contrasts: “that ungodly mixture of revolution and repression and mysticism and cynicism” (59). Through this character, Breytenbach’s love/ hate relationship with the country he has left behind is insistent and takes on a multitude of other metaphorical forms of expression. Breytenbach envisages escaping the perverse power game of apartheid via cultural hybridisation, or what he also repeatedly refers to as ‘bastardisation’: “Our bastardisation was our most potent antidote to apartheid. In fact, one could say that apartheid was the horrible fever accompanying the slow forging of a new identity culture … We are awareness rubbed raw, and we try exactly to supersede the iniquity of the system and its dogma, and its dogs, by our expanded cultural awareness” (163).

Mano, in exile, becomes even more aware of his otherness and feels an urge to leave Europe, for he perceives the centre’s simulacrum of home as increasingly unbearable in its ‘lightness’: “The centres have become too self-absorbed, harried, imploding to madness and soot and broken bottles. Edges are more authentic” (24; my emphases). Carrying forged documents, Mano is taken for white, and arrested for a crime he did not commit. Like Tomas and Tereza, who leave behind them France and the bustle of urban living to settle and then die in a remote East European village, where time stands still — an expression of affectless exhaustion — Mano returns to apartheid South Africa from Paris, only to land in a prison of arrested time, a labyrinth of death and dying. And just as Tomas and Tereza die in an accident under the sign of weight, under the belly of a truck, so Mano dies, also by accident, being sentenced for a crime he did not commit. Both Kundera and Breytenbach take their protagonists from the centre (the heart of Europe) back to their native peripheries, where — like many other returning migrants everywhere — they are unable to reconnect to their roots. Such comparisons, I reiterate, are illustrations of Quayson’s idea that in a postcolonial project, it is important to “perceive cognate or parallel realities within seemingly disparate contexts” (2000: 10).

Breytenbach’s No Man’s Land — the prison house, but also the larger prison house that was South Africa under apartheid — has the mental structure of a labyrinth, which ironically bears all the marks of the Kafka-esque universe described by Deleuze and Guattari as a “a machinic assemblage of desire” that has the power “to make men and women to be part of the machine” (1986:82). Kundera, in his *Art of the Novel* (1988), has also point-
ed out that in Kafka’s world people live in a “boundless labyrinthine institution they cannot escape and cannot understand [for] the institution is a mechanism that obeys its own laws” (1988: 101). Having become unintelligible, the Kafka-esque institution acquires the features of a penal establishment, where instead of “the offense seeking its punishment … the logic is reversed. The person punished does not know the reason for the punishment ... and needs to find a justification for his penalty: the punishment seeks the offense” (103). Having been arrested and sentenced to death, as I have indicated, for a crime he did not commit, Mano, while in prison, desperately seeks to understand the internal structure of No Man’s Land, “the place … between nothing and nowhere” (280). Much like in his attempts at fictionally coming to terms with his own incarceration as a political prisoner in his autobiography, *Confessions of an Albino Terrorist* (1984), Breytenbach here invests Mano with the dignity of searching for the meaning of the trap his life has become.

Breytenbach suggests that the labyrinth should not be understood metaphorically, but rather as a process of ‘metamorphosis’ or ‘becoming’ — thus, once more echoing Deleuze and Guattari’s insights into the Kafka-esque universe where “there is no longer any figurative sense, but only ... a circuit of states that forms a mutual becoming” (1986: 22); ‘becoming’ or the ‘art of walking’ one’s way around the maze, as Breytenbach puts it. Walking through the labyrinth is likened to poststructuralist interpretations of fact and fiction: “You play the Game, are played by it … exactly for the sake of Structure” (251).

Even in this prison space with its “simulacrum of inherent structure” (213), Breytenbach suggests the need for investigative agency and action. The whole of Part Two is, in fact, an exercise in “the noble art” of translating the hostile prison environment into a place of inner growth. Thus, Mano continues his process of “editing his long walk to nowhere” (223) and finds out more and more that, although “it is not possible to walk away from prison ... you are free because you have interiorised death” (258), having developed “the faculty of letting go of the self in a specific environment” (273).

As in the Kafka-esque tradition — which Breytenbach shares with Kundera — and as Camus said about Kafka, “the absurd is recognised, accepted ... and from then on we know that it has ceased to be the absurd ... [thus becoming] the moral value of lucidity” (Camus 1962: 153). Towards
the end of the novel, Mano, the man of mixed race, succeeds in finding a sense of belonging in South Africa, when he fully identifies with the plight of a black man, a fellow prisoner on Death Row. It is during such an epiphanic moment of solidarity that he finally transforms the absurd into meaning: “What a fury of freedom I felt ... No, I was not a common murderer of old women — my life had a political meaning — my death would be seeding the future!” (284).

To end my comparative considerations of what in the case of Kundera and Breytenbach we may refer to as ‘postmodernism of resistance’, I have invoked Kafka, the master interpreter of absurdity. I acknowledge, accordingly, that both Kundera and Breytenbach meditate on the trap of “larger systems, which only accentuate the frailty of human needs in all life” (Misurella 1993: 2); such an existential concern is explored through several fictional and metafictional devices — narratives within narratives, and various shifts of generic conventions that have come to delineate the postmodern condition. What then prompts simultaneously a postcolonial reading of such global — postmodernist — tendencies? It is the fact that the metaphysical is provoked not in individualistic isolation (as a strand of the postmodern). Rather the postcolonial is invoked by the “impersonal, uncontrollable, incalculable, incomprehensible monster of History” (Kundera 1988:11), usually emanating from oppressive regimes — which are “prosaic and material hyperboles [of bureaucratic tyranny], boundless labyrinths” (107) — desperate to simulate normality: that geographical edge which manifests itself as an ‘unbearable simulacrum of being’.

References


FROM BRICK LANE TO ALENTEJO BLUE: CROSS-CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS IN MONICA ALI’S WRITINGS

ELISABETTA MARINO
University of Rome “Tor Vergata”

Abstract: This paper focuses on the different ways in which Bangladeshi-British writer Monica Ali deals with cross-cultural encounters. While in her debut novel she concentrated on the secluded British Bangladeshi community in East-End London, in her second novel, set in Portugal, she approaches the theme from a wider perspective, breaking through the invisible walls of the ethnic niche.

This paper sets out to explore the way the pivotal, often exploited and certainly much debated issue of “cross-cultural encounters” has been dealt with by British Bangladeshi writer Monica Ali in her two books: her 2003 debut novel entitled Brick Lane, (a poignant, albeit not always truthful, insight into the problematic life of London Banglatown immigrants, which secured her name among the top twenty young British novelists according to Granta Magazine), and her latest effort, Alentejo Blue (2006), set in fictional Mamarrosa, in the Portuguese rural region of Alentejo, where the paths of native villagers, tourists, and expatriates apparently cross, without really touching one another.

Most critics and journalists lamented a fracture, a disappointing lack of continuity between Ali’s first and second novel. To mention just a few, Sean O’Brien remarked in The Independent that “Ali has declined to satisfy any expectation that [in her next book] she would offer more of the same” (http://enjoyment.independent.co.uk/books/reviews/), while Liesl Schillinger pointed out in The New York Times that Alentejo Blue “has so different a voice, tempo, mood and theme from […] Brick Lane, that the two seem to share no family resemblance, no authorial DNA. It’s almost as if they were produced by different writers” (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/books/review/25schillinger.html). Conversely, this paper aims at showing that beyond the obvious external differences in setting, plot, choice of characters and even technique employed by the writer, the two volumes stem from similar reflections on cross-cultural encounters and, therefore,
share the same core: both focus on the theme of displacement (and the consequent feelings of imbalance on the part of the characters, often associated with their physical and mental derangement, with their incapability of expressing themselves through language), and the resulting urge — often not successfully fulfilled — to re-define and negotiate one’s identity. One difference is that in Alentejo Blue, by means of wide-angle and magnifying lenses, Monica Ali seems to have broadened her perspective beyond the boundaries of a specific ethnic group. She even seems to encourage the reader to look at the same phenomena she had previously dealt with from different points of view, by staging a “role reversal play” which, as this paper will highlight, powerfully challenges and displaces the center, thus undermining the very concepts of “center” and “periphery” the asymmetric relationship between colonizer and colonized, domineering and dominated has often been grounded on.

Brick Lane follows the development of three main characters, whose life is led within the invisible but apparently impenetrable borders of London Banglatown, along Brick Lane: Chanu, a fat, middle aged, highly cultivated Bangladeshi, who moved to London many years before the beginning of the story (whose time-span stretches between 1985 and 2002); Nazneen, his much younger and subjugated Bangladeshi wife, who met him for the first time when she arrived in England; the second generation immigrant Karim who, later on in the plot, turns into Nazneen’s lover and becomes progressively involved in defending Muslim communities across the world after 9/11 and its backlash connected with the outbreak of “the American War against Islamic terrorism”. One of the most striking elements of the plot - which Monica Ali probably derived from the The Power to Choose by Naila Kabeer (2000), a book that provided the novel with a solid sociological framework - is the absence of a real encounter between the mainstream and the ethnic community, which remain mutually segregated, thus highlighting the character of “encapsulated” and “closely knit” that, according to literary critic and sociologist John Eade (1997), is one of the most remarkable traits of the Bangladeshi enclaves in the UK. The world of Brick Lane is therefore thoroughly monocultural, with virtually no mention (or just a few hints) of anyone who does not share a Bangladeshi background. Moreover, the protagonists appear to be entirely absorbed, almost obsessed with the problem of finding their “location” in the world, which almost never coincides with the place they live in, and often identifies with
their re-imagined mother-country. Chanu, for example, nurtures together with many Bangladeshi immigrants the dream of making enough money to “go back home”, build a big house and live comfortably, and of being regarded by his fellow countrymen as one of the “Londhoni”, those wealthy men who ‘had made it’ in the mythical land of riches ‘across seven seas and thirteen rivers’ (besides being the first, tentative title of Monica Ali’s debut novel, this is the way the Western world, especially the UK, was commonly called by the Bangladeshi immigrants). He is affected by what, in the novel, he himself humorously calls “going home syndrome”. Chanu’s degree of displacement undermines his identity formation process so dramatically that, when he eventually decides to indulge, for the first time in the thirty years of his life in Great Britain, in a family tour of the center of London, he cannot but reply they are from Bangladesh to the man who asks him where they are from while taking a picture of Chanu and his family (Ali 2003: 296). At the end of the novel, after losing his job and still unable to cope and fit in, Chanu surrenders and goes back to his land of origin, poor and lonely, the way he had left, and probably even suspended in a vacuum of place and time, since the Bangladesh he knew many years before had certainly undergone many transformations.

Chanu’s wife, Nazneen, the only character that at the end of the story manages to find a balance in her liminal position between countries (she eventually succeeds in setting up her evocative business of “fusion” — Asian/Western — clothes), shares for most of the novel the same displacement as her husband, further problematized by her lack of proficiency in English, by the fact that the only meaningful things she can say in the host language are “sorry and thank you” (19). When Nazneen first ventures into Banglatown, outside the claustrophobic setting of her council house, she gets lost; she is too shy and folded into her world of silence to ask for help or information; it is only by allowing the familiar memories of her life back home to overlap the strange and hostile environment she is confronted with that she manages to recover her sense of orientation. The horns of the cars, therefore, blare “like […] ancient muezzin[s]” (54), the screaming school-children are probably just emitting their normal cries “as loud as [those of] peacocks” (55), “to get to the other side of the street without being hit by a car [is] like walking out in the monsoon and hoping to dodge the raindrops” (54).
Even Karim, the young activist Nazneen had fallen in love with - since he seemed to possess what everybody was looking for, “a place in the world” (264) - ends up deranged in another country, probably “go[ing] for jihad in some far away place” (486), keeping his meaningful stammer in both English and Bengali, signifying his actual incapability of establishing a real contact with the world outside of himself. As Nazneen remarks at the end of the book:

He was who he was. Question and answer. The same as her. Maybe not even that. Karim had never even been to Bangladesh. Nazneen felt a stab of pity. Karim was born a foreigner. When he spoke in Bengali, he stammered. Why had it puzzled her? She saw only what she wanted to see. Karim did not have a place in the world. That was why he defended it (449).

In Alentejo Blue (2006), the village of Mamarrosa — where even the local internet café is strikingly isolated and does not have any internet connection — becomes the setting where the Portuguese seemingly meet people coming from Holland, England, and Germany. However, a close reading of the novel reveals that there is no actual exchange nor sharing between the characters, and the very structure of the volume — a fragmented collection of individual stories, loosely connected with one another, and narrated either in the third or in the first person — turns the writing into a scattered mirror, into a “heap of broken images” that reminds the reader of T.S. Eliot’s Waste Land (1976: section 1, line 22), where communication is no longer possible (be it said incidentally, Ali openly quotes T.S. Eliot’s Ash Wednesday in the epigraph of the book). Similar to the Bangladeshi immigrants of Ali’s first volume, every character in Alentejo Blue appears to be displaced, his or her mind lost somewhere else. Among the Portuguese characters, Vasco, the bartender, decodes reality through the filter of his long-lasting experience in America, and so does Teresa Ervanaria, whose mind is stuck in Paris, where she spent fifteen important years of her life. Young Teresa, the would be au-pair in London, closely resembles many Asian immigrants about to move to Western countries when she imagines that, despite her poor English, she will definitely succeed; she often re-creates in her mind the country of her future settlement, has “vision[s] of London” (Ali 2006: 141), fills the imaginary space with commodities, with all the hopes and expectations that are frustrated in her mother-country: “In London, thought, she would have her own television. Her room would be modern, perhaps
with fitted wardrobes. She was to have her own bathroom” (154). Like the Bangladeshis, the Portuguese also cherish the myth of the person who acquires a huge fortune abroad and then comes back home, as in the character of Marco Alfonso Rodriguez, the man everybody talks about and whose amazing fortunes are probably just a hoax.

Even the “foreigners” share the abovementioned feelings of uneasiness and imbalance, besides mentally projecting the lands they know to fill the gap of what they ignore. The German Dieter lives somehow “suspended”, as a misfit; he remarks on any event with the sentence “in Germany …”; however, when he is asked the reason why he does not go back to his motherland, since he seems to admire it so much, he simply replies with “if I never see that country again so long as I may live, so much the better for me. Germany? No, never” (65). After a few chapters the reader gathers that Dieter is going to move to India, in what appears to be a perpetual quest for himself, for his ‘place in the world’. Henry Stanton, the English writer, experiences analogous feelings: he seems to be unable to mix with anybody but English expatriates, thus mimicking the same clustered, tightly interwoven community within the wider community that is typical of the Bangladeshi immigrants. Besides, he experiences analogous problems at expressing himself, even in his own language: he’s entangled in his own words and knowledge and cannot proceed with the writing of his book because he knows so much about the subject that he cannot communicate it. At the very end of the novel, this character also drifts away to another country, without completing his volume, without being able to bridge the gap between himself and the rest of the community.

Monica Ali, however, reaches the apex of her critical strength when she describes Mr & Mrs Potts’ dysfunctional family of British expatriates, and middle-aged Eileen and her husband, a couple of English tourists. The reader is introduced to the Potts through the words of a new Melvillian Ishmael (the name “Ishmael” is mentioned by Mrs Potts later on in the story): Mr Michael Potts, a former drug dealer whose nickname tells about distant countries and almost betrays his conception of a life adrift, “on the run” (61): “Everyone calls me China” — Mr Potts remarks in his “broken English” — “Call me whatever you like. Who said that thing about a name being like a torch?” (46). His “unattractive, uneducated, disabled” (31) daughter Ruby lives her life incommunicado, in a muffled world her “prehistoric hearing aid” (31) and her “congested vowels and macerated diction” prevent her
from understanding and interacting with. She is always by herself, even when she is surrounded by people (37), and sex, followed by miscarriages and abortions, becomes her only way of establishing the simulacrum of a contact with the world outside. The little Jay Potts (whose name in slang means “joint”) plays the part of the second-generation immigrant of the Bangladeshi communities across the UK, thus resembling Chanu and Nazneen’s two daughters in Brick Lane. He questions himself on the puzzle of his identity, when he asks his mother whether his knowledge of the host language will turn him into a Portuguese (101) and, just like the children of immigrants, acts as a translator when his mother is accused of murder because she helped Ruby to get rid of the baby she was expecting, in a country were abortion is still illegal. This is probably the most important scene of the whole novel, where Christine Potts, a plain woman who used to get attached to single words without being able to deliver a proper speech, openly mentions for the first and only time in the volume the problems immigrants have to grapple with, and seems to invite the reader to look at the same phenomena from a different, overturned perspective:

[The policeman] started talking then. I wasn’t listening properly, I was thinking about when you see the Asian kids translate for their mums. The mums wear saris or baggy coloured pyjamas or sometimes a big black bag that covers everything except their eyes, so you don’t really expect them to understand anything much. I was thinking I’m like that now. I’m the bloody foreigner (204).

Eileen and her husband, the English tourists, develop two different strategies of “encountering the other”. The husband perfectly embodies the stereotype of the “sedentary traveller” who, according to critic Syed Manzurul Islam (1996), never really crosses petrified thresholds and mentally remains in the familiar environment back home, while employing the same logic of a colonist in his relationship with the country he is visiting. As Ali points out, he “buries the dining-room table with maps and leaflets and brochures and books while he plans the invasion strategy” (2006: 113). When he ventures outside, however, just the way it had happened to Nazneen in Ali’s first novel, he is confronted with and overwhelmed by too different and unrecognizable an environment, and therefore he has to go back to his hotel room. As he tells his wife, “I’m sorry […] but I am turning the car around as soon as I can” (113). Conversely, Eileen sees in the foreign
country a possibility to escape from the miseries of her marital life, dominated by an impenetrable lack of communication. She is another character “on the run”, trying to find her ‘place in the world’, although she is aware she will fit in only if she wears the mask of the fool:

I could run away and be here. I could be one of those English women with fat ankles and capillaried cheeks and hair coming down from under a tattered hat who set up in places like this, to keep bees or grow runner beans or save donkeys. [...] everyone would know me and say in a fond sort of way, ah, there she goes, the crazy English woman. (115)

One more element needs to be explained: the reason why Monica Ali chose Portugal as the setting of her second novel. Apart from personal reasons (Monica Ali owns a place in the Alentejo region), Portugal seems to strikingly join the opposites. It is a former colonial empire (as the reader is reminded of with the mention of Salazar and territories such as Angola and Macau), but also, in China’s words about Alentejo, “the poorest region in the poorest country in the European Union. Until all them eastern monkeys climbed on board” (118) — the last part making reference to contemporary migratory fluxes. By being once the domineering and now, somehow, the dominated, by being the “centre” and the “periphery”, Portugal seems to be the perfect setting for Monica Ali’s re-telling, from a different perspective, of her previously told story of cross-cultural encounters since, as one can read in the very final words of the novel, “there’s more than one way to look at [a story]” (299).

Internet References

http://enjoyment.independent.co.uk/books/reviews/article623356.ece

References


PROTEAN IDENTITIES AND INVISIBLE BORDERS IN HARI KUNZRU’S THE IMPRESSIONIST

DANIELA ROGOBETE
University of Craiova

Abstract: The paper analyses some strategies of legitimating national (postcolonial) identity in the context of globalization and of the new socio-political changes. It focuses on India as a model of a pluralistic nation prone to cultural inclusiveness and eclecticism, where the negotiation of identities is in full swing, operating through post-representational techniques and functioning according to the politics of post-ethnicity. The text chosen to illustrate all these aspects is Hari Kunzru’s The Impressionist.

Starting from Derrida’s famous pun which plays with the French homophones hauntology vs. ontology and focusing upon the ‘ghostly absences’ of the past coming back to haunt and infect the present, this paper attempts a revaluation of the debate concerning authentic colonial/postcolonial identity as illustrated in Hari Kunzru’s novel The Impressionist (2002). Issues such as authentic indigenity vs. inauthentic cosmopolitan hybridity, the project of nationalism and the complex process of negotiating cultural, political and national identities are once more brought forth and rediscussed from different perspectives.

Belonging to the young generation of Indian writers and enjoying a huge success, Hari Kunzru seems to have brought a breath of fresh air into the realm of what is generally called Indian literature in English by offering startling interpretations to traditional debates. He has a particular way of exploring and analysing the ghostly remains of the imperial mechanisms of power, of getting down into the essence of both Westernness and Easternness, of demolishing stereotypes so that, for instance, Westernness acquires the gloss of exoticism that for long time belonged exclusively to the Orient, of demonstrating the devastating effects of colonial inheritance and present-day globalization upon individual identities.

Quite often compared to Salman Rushdie for his critical bitterness, linguistic playfulness and subtle humour, and to Zadie Smith for the unexpect-
Hari Kunzru’s rise to fame occurred as an expected event, anticipated by critics and reviewers, but culminated in a literary scandal. His warmly received first novel *The Impressionist* (2002), highly acclaimed in India and generally praised in Europe, was immediately shortlisted for numerous prizes and actually won one of the most prestigious literary prizes in Britain. His novel was declared the winner of John Llewellyn Rhys Prize for the best debut novel but Kunzru, convinced that “questions of literary value are inseparable from politics”, turned down the prize as a form of protest against the racist politics of its main sponsor *The Mail of Sunday*. He rose against the newspaper’s “editorial policy of vilifying and demonizing refugees and asylum seekers” (The New York Times 23 May, 2004) denouncing its “extremely xenophobic” position and demanding that the money should be given to the Refugee Council.

All the initial extremely favourable publicity turned into criticism mainly directed against the novel’s protagonist, Pran Nath, half-Indian, half-English, a character that never comes to life fully and is too shallow and too sketchy to inspire the reader to empathize and identify with him. Generally praised for its subtle humour and cool mockery of the ‘imperial machinery’, for its wit and spontaneity, *The Impressionist* has, since its release, been criticized for promoting an amoral, goalless character always drifting among places and identities. He has been accused of being a symbol rather than a living character, of contradicting some of the already established postcolonial truths and of revealing himself, in the eyes of many critics, as hollow and emotionless and refusing empathy. In spite of all criticism, Kunzru’s novel reopens old debates and tackles traditional postcolonial issues from new angles.

Hari Kunzru seems to start from the recurrent postcolonial treatment of identity and from the Christian idea of an immortal soul, an immutable essence always the same in every possible circumstance, and arrives at a real dilemma: immutable essence or context-dependent character? The way in which Kunzru deals with this problem — by creating a character continuously reinventing himself as an Impressionist on a stage — relies upon many theoretical debates related to the most stringent issues of Postcolonial Studies. Appiah’s description of postcolonialism as a “condition of pessimism” (Appiah 1991: 353) is recognizable here in the initial series of traumatic events both preceding and following Pran’s birth, events
which shatter his cosy reality, deprive him of the urge for self-analysis and endow him instead with an excessive eagerness for metamorphosis.

Pran is conceived in the middle of a monsoon flood by an idiotic Indian beauty and a white English forester. From their brief, illicit encounter the mother, sent to become the wife of an important person in Agra, gives birth to a child and dies. The child’s fair complexion is taken at first as a sign of purity and superiority (purity becomes one of the obsessions in the text):

Pran Nath is undeniably good looking. [...] Pran Nath’s skin is a source of pride to everyone. Its whiteness is not the nasty blue-blotched color of a fresh-off-the-boat Angrezi or the grayish pallor of a dying person, but a perfect milky hue, like that of the marble the craftsmen chip into ornate screens down by the Tajjganj. [...] It is proof, cluck the aunties, of the family’s superior blood. Blood is important. (Kunzru 2002: 7)

The importance of blood in judging and labelling people, the stereotypical descriptions isolating individuals into strict categories, reversing binary oppositions and celebrating impurity are recurrent themes in the novel, illustrated by Pran’s multiple impersonations and anticipated from the first pages of the novel: “Fire and water. Earth and air. Meditate on these oppositions and reconcile them. Collapse them in on themselves, send them spiraling down a tunnel of blackness to reemerge whole, one with the all, mere aspects of the great unity of things whose name is God” (Kunzru 2002: 2). This extreme chameleonic malleability enables Pran to embrace different identities in order to stay alive or to adjust himself to the new realities he is forced to inhabit. When this orphan boy is driven out of his father’s home after the secret of his birth is revealed, he grows up to be the perfect impersonator who accumulates layer upon layer of fake identities. Born as Pran but later on metamorphosed into Rukhsana, Pretty Bobby, Jonathan Bridgeman — Colonized and Colonizer —, Kunzru’s hero is free to reinvent himself at the same time casting a fresh glance upon the realities he encounters. Perspectives are continuously shifted, boundaries are destroyed and identities, caught in the process of negotiation, are turned into nothing else but mere spectral selves haunting “ghostly locations”. Derrida’s spectral entities might work here too towards a possible explanation of the tendency to accumulate fake identities: “Facing up to the others, before the others, its fellows, here then is the apparition of a strange creature: at the same time Life, Thing, Beast, Object, Commodity, Automaton — in a word, spectre. This Thing, which is no longer altogether a thing, here it
goes and unfolds, it unfolds itself, it develops what it engenders through a quasi-spontaneous generation, it gives birth through its head, it extracts from its wooden head a whole lineage of fantastic or prodigious creatures, whims, chimera, non-ligneous character parts" (Derrida 1994: 156).

Kunzru’s concern in tackling the problem of negotiating identities is to avoid “strategic essentialism” rejecting both a too positive and a too negative treatment of the Third World. He also rejects traditional ideas related to the tight connection established between location and identity, adopting instead a skeptical position focused upon relativisation and miscegenation. He contradicts Jameson’s theory upon the equation between personal and national identity (Jameson 1986: 65) taking Aijaz Ahmad’s side in the debate, i.e. his rejection of this equation, as presented in his article “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the National Allegory” (1987). The question raised by Pran Nath’s adventurous play with identities is whether a newly assumed identity can completely erase all traces of the previous ones. The apparent answer is “yes” and it is supported by the way in which the narration is built up to the final episodes of the novel when repressed identities come back to haunt.

The recurrent device seems to be the narrative absence since once a new identity is adopted nothing more is mentioned about the old one; once a new name is taken, all others seem to be forever forgotten and never mentioned again. Quite frequently, a certain amount of doubt is cast upon the whole narration and the reader can never be entirely sure whether the new impersonation belongs to the same character or whether it is a new one altogether. Pran himself finally appears as a huge ‘identity gap’ where an inflation of too many fake identities and phony masks transform him into a ‘cardboard self’. In order to make his point about the dangers of treating identity as a pure, immutable entity, Kunzru relies upon what Gayatri Spivak (1987) established as main surviving methods of the subaltern: invisibility, mimicry and othering processes. Kunzru’s character makes use of all these things turning them into advantages and reminding of Appadurai’s reaction against the “fetishisation of identity” (Appadurai in Dayal 1996: 134).

The process of de-fetishisation of identity can also produce, according to Diana Brydon, a “counter-cult of authenticity” (qtd. in Dayal 1996: 123) by applying deconstructive and transgressive strategies focused upon the “hyphenated character” of identity as theorised by Appadurai in what he called the “formula of hyphenation” (Appadurai 1993a: 803) emphasizing
the alternative tradition of cultural plurality, hybridity and impurity. Invisibility becomes a strange counterpart to multiplicity as Pran, alias Bobby, can make himself invisible to “others, shape-shifting, changing names and keeping his motives hidden. […] Bobby’s skin is not a boundary between things but the thing itself, a screen on which certain effects take place. Ephemeral curiosities. Tricks of the light” (Kunzru 2002: 250)

Pran’s exquisite art of dissimulation and mimicry helps Kunzru bring up the problems of perception and politics of representation as the major hero is transformed into everything the beholder wants to see. The readiness with which Pran assumes a new identity, first obliged by external circumstances, later on by free will, turns him into “somebody who is not available to himself” (Kunzru 2002: 250). Pran’s peregrinations in life along a diversity of roads and identities, among people and social environments provide enough points of discussion and give rise to theoretical speculations about the best way to envisage identity as an unstable social construct rather than an innate datum. His meandering life could be analysed by means of what R. Radhakrishnan (1993: 755) calls the politics of transgression translated through a complete fluidity in representing personal and national identities, beyond boundaries of nationalism and nativism. This post-ethnic approach seems to perfectly suit Hari Kunzru whose hero belongs to no place in particular yet all these “ghostly locations” haunt and shape his personality.

The same considerations can be applied when issues such as home or homelessness as opposed to belonging are brought up. ‘Home’ appears in The Impressionist as a social and emotional construct with no particular location. ‘Homelessness’ is metaphorically turned into an emblem of the human condition whereas the problem of belonging becomes a tricky matter going back once again to identity and spatial politics. Kunzru seems to share Pico Iyer’s opinion that “nowhere was home and everywhere” (Iyer 1989: 24).

The continuous coming back to the problems of mimicry reopens the discussion upon simulacrum versus authenticity. Transparency becomes the key word of the elusive fictional universe of the novel, perpetually sought after but never really achieved even if Pran is constantly treated as “tissue paper held up to the sun” (Kunzru 2002: 250). The kaleidoscopic identities displayed by Kunzru’s novels are caught between the Western reign of the simulacrum and the Eastern “reflective immediate mimeticism”
(Dayal 1996: 123) totally demolishing the bogus of authentic postcolonial identity.

The main question raised by Kunzru’s *The Impressionist* in the matter of authenticity is related to where it lies precisely. The same question has long preoccupied the world of Postcolonial Studies. Authenticity has often been sought in the indigenous purity advocated most of the time by cultural nationalism or in the modernist project of diasporic postnationalism. Aijaz Ahmad was one of the theorists of what was perceived to be the conflicting binarism opposing indigeneity (equated with unspoilt tradition) and modernity in the context of the Third World:

> Used in relation to the equally problematic category of ‘Third World’, ‘cultural nationalism’ resonates equally frequently with ‘tradition’, simply inverting the tradition/modernity binary of the modernization theorists in an indigenist direction so that ‘tradition’ is said to be, for the Third World always better than ‘modernity’ which opens up a space for defense of the most obscurantist positions in the name of cultural nationalism. There appears to be, at the very least, a widespread implication in the ideology of cultural nationalism, as it surfaces in literary theory, that each nation of the ‘Third World’ has a ‘culture’ and a ‘tradition’, and that to speak from within that culture and that tradition is itself an act of anti-imperialism” (Ahmad 1992: 9).

In Kunzru’s case, the protagonist of his first novel strives to achieve or prove his authenticity by trying to convince the others of his perfect whiteness or by trying to conceal his imperfect brownness. He challenges the artificial construct of Britishness and conducts a personal search into the essence of Englishness. His perfect art of dissimulation, his extraordinary intuition and chameleonic adaptability make him imitate the English people around him in a continuous search for “an organ of whiteness” that could turn him into the perfect Englishman. His capacity of mimicry is materialized in the imitation of behaviours, accents and mentalities which provide him with a ghostlike identity which perfectly deceives the others: “They hear an accent and see a face and a set of clothes, and put them together into a person” (Kunzru 2002: 245).

Pran’s odyssey takes him from the man he calls his father and from a childish arrogant and superior identity to the most unexpected places. As Pran, he is envied for his white complexion and high birth even if the astrologer summoned to read his future is unable to disentangle the intricate threads of the boy’s life placed under the sign of “impurity”: “The boy’s
future was obscure. The astrologer could predict none of the usual things — length of life, marital prospects, wealth. Patterns emerged, only to fade when another aspect of the conjunction was considered. [...] Clusters of possibilities formed, then fell apart" (26). This also seems to be the way in which the narration is built. The initial admiration for a line of pure blood is automatically turned into despise and hatred when the secret of his humble, illegitimate birth is found out. His arrogance and boyish naughtiness are now accounted for through his “bad blood” which becomes a good reason for driving him out of his house right after his father’s death. “Impurities, blendings, pollutions, smearings and muckings-up of all kinds are bound to flow from such a blend of blood, which offends against every tenet of orthodox religion” (39).

Once in the street he starts thinking for the first time about race, colour and miscegenation as he realizes that the source of his humiliation is his half-Indianness, half-Englishness. His attempt to find help results in his being sold and tricked into entering a brothel where, against his will, he is transformed into Rukhsana. Here he is permanently under drugs and cannot analyse his situation too lucidly, but even so he tries to discover what he could use to his benefit. The occasion appears with Major Privett-Clamp and Pran's new impersonation as his lover — Pretty Bobby. Their first sexual encounter is ironically presented as the prototype of any colonial encounter: “Some may be tempted to view this as primarily a political situation. It is after all, Pran’s first direct contact with the machinery of imperial government” (98).

As Pretty Bobby, the Major’s pupil and protégé, he is turned into a silent witness of backstage political maneuvers and learns his lesson. During a chaotic hunting party he escapes and creates a new life and a new identity for himself. Until coming out of the new cocoon under a new identity he goes around Amristar as The White Boy. His new persona is Robert and he finds refuge in the house of Reverend MacFarlane, who had become a passionate anthropologist once his missionary duty in India seemed to have failed. Robert finds himself caught in domestic dissentions, finally playing the role of an intermediary when the household gets divided mainly by different attitudes towards the Indian experience. The reverend, narrow-minded and unconvincing in his apostolic mission, fails to come closer to the people because of his aversion for everything Indian. India becomes for him "lack of limit. Blending. Multiplicity. To him these were just other names for
Doubt” (227). On the contrary, Elspeth, his wife, Scottish by birth, gradually falls in love with India and what she discovers of it, “another way of thinking” and the “mystic synthesis of things” (223).

In the meantime Robert spends his time in expensive night clubs making his apprenticeship in mimicking and trying to be an Englishman.

Stick a personality together. Calico arms. Wooden head. A hat and a set of overheard opinions. […] Nevertheless, as Bobby builds and inhabits his puppets he grasps that there is something marvelous about English people. Their lives are structured like pieces of engineering, railway engines or streamers unpacked and bolted together at the heads of new rivers. Each one is rigid and assured, built according to blueprints of class and membership that are almost noble in their invariance, their stern inflexibility. Noble, at least, in the manner that a suspension bridge or a viaduct is noble” (251).

Pran’s next identity is stolen from a friend who dies in a riot. He takes his papers and plane tickets to England and assumes his identity wondering “how easy it is to slough off one life and take up another. Easy when there is nothing to anchor you. […] He feels he has nothing of the earth in him at all. When he moves across it, his feet do not touch the surface” (285). His new life as the orphan Jonathan Bridgegeman familiarizes him with the real experience of living in England and London. He discovers that his new existence is a puzzle whose pieces he has to place in order and whose gaps he has to fill with family memories, a past and a present. During this stage he almost reaches perfection in his imitative skills. The ultimate “chameleon-ism” in his case represents his becoming one with his shadow. Falling in love with the daughter of his Professor of anthropology at the University, he tries harder than ever to cast away any possible traces of Otherness so as to become the perfect Englishman and thus Astarte’s best suitor.

The engagement that follows, first considered an unexpected bliss which blinds him into following his fiancée’s father to Africa, turns in the end into a huge deception when he finds out that Star was cheating on him with a black person, “somebody black as night, as tar, coal, pitch, liquorice and the suits of funeral directors” (413). She seems to appreciate everything Pran alias Johnny has been struggling to banish from his life. “This is what happens. This terrible blurring is what happens when boundaries are breached. Pigment leaks through skin like ink through blotting paper. It becomes impossible to tell what is valuable and what is not” (417).
The journey to Africa is an unexpected encounter and offers a reenactment on a smaller scale of the traumatic experience of colonialism; instead of the virgin land unspoilt by civilization they find a troubled reality where civilization threatens to engulf the last remains of a traditional lifestyle. Natives are turned into slaves and cheap workers and forced to toil on foreign land and to abandon their traditions, customs and beliefs. Instead of finding a friendly environment they come against very aggressive people who finally burst into violence completely destroying and annihilating what they consider to be the evil spirit of Europeans. The tribe’s communal struggle is directed against the European spirit deemed to have brought evil changes and a lot of damage. All members of the expedition are killed except for Johnny in whom the African discover the “black” essence of his being. The savages keep him unconscious for a couple of days performing a purifying ritual of exorcising the white spirit in him and reveal his inner spirit for such a long time stifled under the burden of self-imposed Englishness.

His art of mimicry constantly reminds us Baudrillard’s (1988) theory of simulacra and his dichotomy copy/original. With Kunzru, the boundary between the two is extremely difficult to establish as sometimes the copy becomes more real than the original or some other times the copy displays so many ‘ghostly’ original traces that the original itself loses authenticity. “Everywhere Jonathan finds the originals of copies he has grown up with, all the absurdities of British India restored to sense by their natural environment. […] Jonathan understands for the first time the English word ‘cosy’, the need their climate instills in them to pad their blue-veined bodies with layers of horsehair and mahogany, aspidistras and antimacassars, history, tradition and share certificates. Being British, he decides, is primarily a matter of insulation” (300).

Kunzru’s hero uses his body as a perpetual negation of the idea of non-hyphenated identity. He acts according to the idea that a monolithic, unitary identity is absurd, conceiving it instead as an accumulation of “heterogeneous selves and subjectivities” (Radhakrishnan 1993: 752). Kunzru’s protagonist thus accumulates an impressive number of shapes and identities that transforms him into a “facsimile person”, a “creature of surface” (250) with no apparent depth or roots. Using Elleke Boehmer’s theoretical approaches, Kunzru’s novel could be considered a “narrative of transfiguration” (Boehmer 1993: 269) where mutilation becomes a metaphorical way
of speaking about the attempt of erasing part of one’s personality in order to introduce new identity features in the gaps thus created. Self-representation seen as “writing the body, splicing the self” (275) finds particular means of expression which include legitimisation of hyphenated identity through mimicry and dissimulation and elements of “postnational imagery” (Appadurai 1993b: 428). Pran’s constant transfiguration and self-replication transform his body into a palimpsest where he inscribes ghostly successive traces of identity. His body, “as complex as a palimpsest of different symbolic layers — land, mother, scored flesh — is disclosed, opened out and ultimately divided up into multiple constituent narratives of bodily/national investment” (Boehmer 1993: 275). As long as all these ghostly traces are kept hidden the betrayal is complete and Pran succeeds in deceiving both himself and the others but strange circumstances dig up all the silenced identitarian layers which start taking revenge.

At the end of his journey, after he has embraced so many identities and inhabited so many lives, Pran is led to the conclusion that “becoming someone is just a question of tailor and remembering to touch the bottom lip to the ridge of teeth above. Easy, except when that becoming is involuntary, when fingers ease their grip and the panic sets in that nothing will stop the slide. Then becoming is fight, running knowing that stopping will be worse because then the suspicion will surface again that there is no one running” (463). What he was so careful in hiding and dissimulating comes now to haunt and take revenge. His non-whiteness comes up from under layers of fake Englishness to save his life. Derrida’s definition of the specter might be useful once again: “The ‘Proper’ feature of spectres, like vampires, is that they are deprived of a specular image, of the true, right specular image (but who is not so deprived?). How do you recognise a ghost? By the fact that it does not recognise itself in a mirror. [...] All the spectres which have filed before us were representations. These representations — leaving aside their real basis — understood as representations internal to consciousness, as thoughts in people’s heads, transferred from their objectality back into the subject, elevated from substance into self-consciousness, are obsessions or fixed ideas” (Derrida 1994: 160-161). In the end all this vain struggle to appear different turns out to be a mere commuting between realities and identities; Pran’s predicament is transformed into a postcolonial human condition, that of a perpetual outsider for ever drifting in search of authen-
ticity as he remains “a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradic-
tory) plurality of relevant determinations interact” (de Certeau 1984: xi)

Pran realizes his ambiguous condition when he is in Paris and he wit-
tnesses the show of an impressionist upon a stage, selling miracles and
offering illusions; the magician changes faces and modifies his body in a
perfect display of impersonations and shapes until everything is blurred and
reality escapes into illusion. Pran has the same experience on the stage of
life and his entire journey along the meandering path of self-legitimation
and authentication faces him with the impossibility of coming back to a
pristine, unspoilt endemic authenticity. And in the end this is Hari Kunzru’s
conclusion upon a postcolonial authentic identity. The reader cannot sym-
pathize with Pran as there is no coming back to a pre-postcolonial era that
could be deemed as authentic. After that everything is a game of spectral
identities. “There is no escaping it. In between each impression, just at the
moment when one person falls away and the next has yet to take posses-
sion, the impressionist is completely blank. There is nothing there at all”
(419).

References
Ahmad, A. 1987. “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the National Allegory”, in
_Social Text_, no. 17, pp. 3-25.
Society for Transnational Cultural Studies_, 11, pp. 411-429.
_Critical Inquiry_, No. 17, pp. 336-357.
University Press.
268-277.
Berkeley: California University Press.
Dayal, S. 1996. “Postcolonialism’s Possibilities: Subcontinental Diasporic
Intervention”, in _Cultural Critique_, No. 33 (Spring), p. 113-149.
Derrida, J. 1994. _The Specters of Marx — The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning,


AN ARTIST OF FLOATING WOR(L)DS

MARIA ȘTEFĂNESCU
University of Alba Iulia

Abstract: The paper discusses the various forms of narrative unreliability which occur in Ishiguro’s An Artist of the Floating World. It also compares and contrasts these different strategies with those present in The Remains of the Day.

Kazuo Ishiguro’s description of his first three novels — A Pale View of Hills (1982), An Artist of the Floating World (1986) and The Remains of the Day (1989) — as “three attempts to write the same book” (quoted in Lewis 2000:133) may be understood as indicative both of an underlying thematic unity and of a similar narrative strategy used to create the three fictional worlds. Regarding this latter aspect, the fact that each novel foregrounds a first person narrator who attempts to recount and assess some significant moments of his/her life enables Ishiguro to explore the complexity of homodiegetic narration and exploit, in particular, its potential susceptibility to various forms of unreliability. In order to support their view that Wayne C. Booth’s concept of unreliable narration (1961) needs further enlargement, James Phelan and Mary Patricia Martin (1999: 89) find their cue, and “a lesson in sophisticated homodiegesis and its relation to the ethics of reading”, in The Remains of the Day. In the present article, I attempt to argue that, while sharing a number of narrative features with Ishiguro’s subsequent novel, An Artist of the Floating World introduces the readers to an even more unsettling instance of unreliability, in which the final éclaircissement — in the form of the protagonist’s eventually having his moment of non-deceptive self-knowledge — is permanently deferred.

When, in the early 1960s, Wayne C. Booth describes the various kinds of distance which may separate the implied author from the narrator of a story — on the axis of either facts or values, or of both — his terminology indicates two narrative possibilities which, between them, cover the full extent of this distance:
“I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author’s norms), unreliable when he does not” (1961: 158-59).

In a recent attempt to revise the concept of unreliable homodiegetic narration, James Phelan and Mary Patricia Martin (1999) explore the challenging narratological complexity of K. Ishiguro’s *The Remains of the Day* in order to make the case that “unreliability occurs not just along the axes of facts/events and values/judgments but also along the axis of knowledge/perception” (Phelan & Martin 1999: 88). Broadening Booth’s initial classification, Phelan and Martin argue that narrators may deviate from the implied author’s views in their role as reporters and evaluators, as well as in that of readers or interpreters of the circumstances of which they provide an account. According to Phelan and Martin’s extension of the concept of unreliability,

unreliable reporting occurs along the axis of facts/events; unreliable evaluating occurs along the axis of ethics/evaluation; and unreliable reading occurs along the axis of knowledge/perception (1999: 94).

Given the fact that the authorial audience’s response to a fallible narrator can be twofold — either blunt rejection of the teller’s words or a supplementation of his/her account —, Phelan and Martin go on to identify six kinds of unreliability: misreporting, misreading, misregarding, underreporting, underreading and underregarding.

As pointed out in a number of recent studies (Phelan & Martin 1999, Cohn 2000, Zerweck 2001), diagnosing unreliability is an effect of interpretative strategies prompted by the readers’ growing increasingly suspicious of the narrator’s account of the story. However, since homodiegetic narration cannot, by definition, leave room for an omniscient (and therefore fully reliable) exposition of fictional facts and values, the readers are bound to consent to an initial “willing suspension of disbelief” in the narrator’s words, as a necessary starting point for the coagulation of the fictional world. As their reading progresses, a process of repeated negotiations and reassessments may take place, in which the narrator’s statements are verified against independent textual evidence and/or background information and regarded as more or less reliable, with the consequence that the readers’ own understanding of the fictional situation may undergo significant revisions.
Although on their first contact with K. Ishiguro’s second novel, *An Artist of the Floating World*, the narratologically-minded readers are likely to be alert to the potential pitfalls of first person narration, early in the story they will find no reason to doubt the protagonist’s account of some past or more recent circumstances of his life. Masuji Ono emerges as a retired elderly painter who takes little interest in his considerable social prestige, reminisces about past events and acquaintances and appears keen on securing a successful marriage for his younger daughter, Noriko. It is only after Ono mentions his contribution to the opening of the Migi-Hidari inn (almost one third through the novel) that the readers become aware of the protagonist’s active involvement in Japan’s nationalist and expansionist policies in the 1930s. This fictional fact enables them to re-process preceding information and, with the aid of background historical knowledge, recognize several previous instances of underreporting: Ono’s material circumstances improve in the 1930s as a result of his political allegiances, his elder daughter feels impelled to advise that “precautionary steps” (Ishiguro 1987: 49) should be taken during Noriko’s marriage negotiations because of Ono’s compromising past, and Ono’s paintings are all “tidied away for the moment” (32) presumably on account of their no longer desirable ideology.

Besides, the Migi-Hidari episode introduces the readers to the first conspicuous instance of the narrator’s misreading certain past circumstances of his life. Ono’s interpretation of the authorities’ enthusiastic response to the project of opening an establishment which pledges to be “a celebration of the new patriotic spirit emerging in Japan today” (63) as a deferential acknowledgement of his own growing influence is clearly misguided. As the readers cannot but suspect that any such establishment would have been warmly welcome owing to its customers’ political agenda, they are also likely to conclude that Ono is a fallible commentator of his own life, at least in the sense in which his (by now obvious, although unconvincingly denied) infatuation with his social prestige and professional achievements prevents him from interpreting past occurrences in other than self-congratulatory terms.

As successive layers of memory unfold in Ono’s narrative, the readers are presented with further evidence that the protagonist’s account of himself is subjected to continuous adjustments intended to reconcile, if at all possible, actual behaviour with an ideal of conduct which commands deference and admiration. Identified with hindsight, Ono’s repeated mis-
and/or underreporting concerning his former favourite pupil, Kuroda, and the circumstances of their acquaintance and subsequent estrangement point to a disguised but compelling urge to obliterate a pre-war episode which the protagonist feels he cannot avow because of its incompatibility with his notion of self-esteem. A similar impulse can be recognized behind Ono’s rationalization of his sense of guilt over his past as a peculiar form of manifestation of the generation gap: young people, like Setsuko’s husband or Noriko’s former fiancé, “harbour such bitterness for [their] elders” (59) and are ready to denounce their political allegiances, whereas the elders themselves (among whom Ono and Matsuda, his ideological mentor from the 1930s) hope, in the latter’s words, eventually “to see [their] li[ves’] efforts vindicated” (94) and, by way of implication, warranted.

Later in the novel, on the occasion of Noriko’s *miai* (the formal meeting of the prospective spouses and their close families during traditional Japanese marriage negotiations), the protagonist feels that circumstances impress upon him the “prudence” (124) of making an unequivocal statement about his past ideological commitments. The Saitos mention the acquaintanceship between Ono and Kuroda intending, very likely, nothing further than to be casually polite, but Ono reads threatening undertones into their reference to his former pupil, which prompts him to what he claims (and, possibly, genuinely believes) to be an honest acknowledgement of “responsibility for his past deeds” (124). However, when the confession is actually made, the readers remain as mystified as the Saitos themselves as to the true nature of some of the mistakes Ono blames himself for. Since the protagonist avoids any reference to his denunciation of Kuroda to the police and the latter’s subsequent imprisonment for political reasons (an episode only to be recalled at the end of the third section of the novel) the conflict between teacher and pupil — of which Ono supposes the Saitos to be aware — is presented as only incurred because of irreconcilable differences in their respective views on art. In marked contrast with his obvious (in retrospect) reluctance to admit guilt about an instance of particularly reprehensible behaviour in his past, Ono appears to be surprisingly willing to claim a general, diffuse culpability on account of the fact that

> it is people like myself who are responsible for the terrible things that happened to this nation of ours […] mine was part of an influence that resulted in untold suffering for our own people (123).
It is this last, and most cherished, of Ono’s self-portraits — reflecting back to him the image of a man and artist who rose “above the mediocre” (134) and made a decisive, if on occasion flawed, contribution to the history of his own times — that comes under suspicion and is ultimately refuted in the concluding section the novel. After Ono’s denunciation of Kuroda is revealed, several significant counterstatements enter his narrative, to the effect that the readers are likely to locate the protagonist’s story considerably further towards the “unreliable” pole of an imaginary axis of reliability. Taro Saito, now Noriko’s husband, politely declines to confirm that his father, an outstanding art critic, had long been aware of Ono’s reputation as a painter and wood-block printer, thus calling into question Ono’s own opinion of his professional prestige. Setsuko denies having ever prompted her father to take “precautionary steps” in the early stages of Noriko’s marriage negotiations, thereby pointing to the possibility that Ono has projected his own unacknowledged worries and sense of guilt onto his daughter’s thoughts. Moreover, in reply to her father’s claim that “I too was a man of some influence, who used that influence towards a disastrous end” (193), Setsuko remarks on the importance of seeing “things in a proper perspective” (193) which, in Ono’s case, appears to be that he was “simply a painter” whose work “had hardly to do with these larger matters of which we are speaking” (193). A most significant corroboration of this last point comes from Matsuda who, shortly before his death, describes himself and Ono as merely “ordinary men with no special gifts of insight” (200) whose contribution to the history of their times “was always marginal” (201) and therefore of little consequence to anybody else but themselves.

Whereas all homodiegetic narratives increase the difficulty of the readers’ ethical positioning (Phelan & Martin 1999), unreliable homodiegesis tends to complicate matters still further, as any ethical response needs to be cautious of the narrator’s deliberate or unintentional manipulating strategies. Throughout the four sections of An Artist of the Floating World, the readers are invited to address the issue of loyalty — towards one’s artistic mentor, towards one’s country and family and/or towards one’s self — but they find themselves equally required to read through, and beyond, Ono’s own assessment of his ethical decisions. About to leave his first apprenticeship place, the Takeda studio, Ono forcefully makes the point that “loyalty has to be earned” (Ishiguro 1987: 72) and, in subsequent recollections of the episode intended to benefit his own pupils, he expostulates on the les-
son that one is “never to follow the crowd blindly” but to consider carefully one’s choices and “rise above the sway of things” (73). However, when the pattern of artistic ‘betrayals’ multiplies in the novel (Sasaki betrays Mori-san’s artistic principles and so does Ono, only later to find his own realist painting creed betrayed by Kuroda), Ono becomes considerably more inclined to empathize with the feelings of the ‘wronged’ master, for whom “it is difficult to see any such maturing of talent as anything other than treachery” (142).

Although individual readers are perhaps likely to hold conflicting views as to how issues of loyalty and artistic freedom are to be settled in the novel, they will have to make their ethical judgements with a full awareness of the fact that Ono’s own are distinctly biased. The protagonist’s tolerant understanding of Mori-san’s rejection and sarcastic remarks, following his decision to abandon the Floating World school of painting, clearly appeals for the readers’ tolerance towards Ono’s own rejection of Kuroda, subsequent to the latter’s choice to no longer follow social-realist principles in his art. Moreover, by juxtaposing the two accounts, Ono contrives (possibly subconsciously) to equate not only the two instances of artistic ‘betrayal’, but also the respective responses to them. It is mainly with this other aspect that the readers are likely to take issue, given that, in actual fact, the two characters act very differently on their feelings of disappointment. Whereas Mori-san’s attitude probably remains regrettable but is not ultimately conducive to major harm, Ono’s decision to denounce Kuroda to the police places him in an entirely different sphere of moral responsibility and personal guilt, as he deliberately allows a private matter to be settled, with dramatic consequences, by the brutal intervention of a repressive political apparatus.

In case they are intent on exploring further the ethical dimension of the novel, the readers may wish to pay closer attention to what appears to be the protagonist’s own core moral concern, expressed with perhaps spurious assurance as “there is surely no great shame in mistakes made in the best of faith” (125). The readers’ personal ethical beliefs are yet again likely to interfere with their decision concerning whether or not blame should be attached to an individual’s willingly becoming a propaganda artist when this amounts to a principled option (and Ono’s words to Mori-san do seem to indicate this is his case:
Sensei, it is my belief that in such troubled times as these, artists must learn to value something more tangible than those pleasurable things that disappear with the morning light. [...] My conscience, Sensei, tells me I cannot remain for ever an artist of the floating world (180).

However, in view of Ono’s having turned his new artistic allegiances to political ends (he agrees to serve on the arts committee of the State Department at a time of governmental control of artistic expression) and perhaps to personal advantage as well (he buys the Sugimura house after his material circumstances have improved in the 1930s), the readers may feel inclined to give less than full credit to the protagonist’s account of a genuine and totally disinterested artistic conversion. Indeed, they may prefer to assume that Ono misreads once more the true rationale behind his decisions, which might in fact be that, in Matsuda’s words, he “wanted so badly to make a grand contribution” (199) and was prepared “to risk everything in the endeavour to rise above the mediocre” (204).

When read against the background of Ishiguro’s previous ‘Japanese’ novel, The Remains of the Day does appear as “an alternative English ‘remix’ [...] of attitudes and situations present in An Artist of the Floating World” (Lewis 2000: 133). Both novels foreground first person narrators whose accounts of their lives are constantly hampered by failures of memory and self-flattering misrepresentations, and both elicit (and depend on) the readers’ progressive awareness that the protagonists’ narratives are less than entirely reliable. In each novel, the frequent misreadings, misreportings, displacements, and rationalizations to which Stevens and Ono tend to be prone are likely to be recognized as resulting from their respective mistaken value systems — Stevens’ belief that the dignity of his profession is incompatible with any display of personal emotions (Phelan & Martin 1999) and Ono’s conviction that rising above mediocrity represents a worthy achievement in and by itself. The ethical questions triggered by the two novels finely echo and mirror each other, and the core issue of whether one can still justify one’s existence when it has been misguidedly devoted to fallacious ideals is raised either explicitly, in the concluding chapter of The Remains of the Day, or as part of the unspoken mental background of Ono’s reflections.

However, Ono’s moment of insight, unlike Stevens’ “anagnorisis” (Phelan & Martin 1999: 106), ultimately fails to materialize: there is nothing in An Artist of the Floating World comparable to the climactic Weymouth...
episode from *The Remains of the Day*. At the end of his day, Ono does not allow the signals coming from those around him to penetrate the protective shield of his self-constructed image, nor is he prepared to let go of the conviction, impersonally phrased, “that one has achieved something of real value and distinction” (Ishiguro 1987: 204) in life. In his own manner, Ono needs the illusions of his private world as much as Gisaburo-san does, and appears as willing to indulge in whatever game of self-delusion becomes necessary for their preservation. As they grow increasingly aware of this aspect, the readers may surmise, and indeed receive confirmation at the end of the novel, that the particular form of unreliability exhibited by Ono’s narrative will never be resolved into a final episode of crucial apprehension. Unlike *The Remains of the Day*, where, “[a]s the trip has progressed […], Stevens has gradually, albeit inconsistently, moved toward what we know” and eventually “comprehends more about his situation than we are likely to do in the “moment or two” he takes “to fully digest” Miss Kenton’s speech” (Phelan & Martin 1999: 98-99), *An Artist of the Floating World* does not provide the readers with any definite confirmation, from within the text, of the validity of their interpretative conjectures. The floating words of Ono’s self-definitions gather profusely, and sometimes painfully, but never solidify into the fixture of a single authenticated fictional world.

References:


Abstract: The paper focuses on Margaret Atwood’s novels The Edible Woman, Cat’s Eye, and Lady Oracle. It investigates the metaphors of cannibalism and the role they play in the female protagonists’ reconsideration of their identities.

Cannibalism may essentially be described as an uncontrollable hunger, which, similarly to vampirism, sets a boundary between prey and predator, us and them. Cannibalism has been one of the essential features used by Europeans in their representations of the colonized — the Other(s) — who were frequently described as child-like or animal-like and presumed to eat the flesh of their own kind, i.e. other humans (Valsiner 2000:89-90). Images of cannibalism have been used ever since to demonize those who are different culturally, racially, and even sexually.

If we are to consider cannibalism as a semiotic tool in establishing relations and apply the ‘us-them’ criterion to contemporary society, then the social Other would be the woman. As I have argued in a previous paper (Șerban 2007a: 120-121), although women are fascinating, they have always been considered inferior to men one way or another, and defined in relation to them, first the father and then the husband. Biological determinists have claimed that biology grounds and justifies the social norms, i.e. men’s superiority over women. In other words, the social differences between men and women stem from the physiological differences.

In our consumerist society, women are trapped within and defined through their bodies or in relation to men, they are objects of consumption, characterized by passivity, emotions and dependency (on men) (Moi 2005: 15-21, 103) and, above all, by “to-be-looked-at-ness” (Mulvey 1975) — which turns them into “bodies of desire” (Davis 2002:41) to be devoured by the assessing and ranking male gaze. Having been attributed specific gender roles by the patriarchal society, women are more important for what they
inspire in the active and energetic men (Mulvey 1975), rather than through themselves.

In terms of symbolic/ metaphorical cannibalism as consumption of what is ‘other’, psychoanalysis offers a new insight into the matter. Freud (1938: 563-564) discusses sexual intercourse in terms of a union which is less than perfect since it does not lead to total satisfaction which may subsequently be obtained through fantasies of cannibalism — an expansion of sexual interests to other parts of the body — suggesting a symbolic swallowing of the other to make up the (mythical androgynous) whole. Sceats (2000: 34), too, defines cannibalism as “an extreme desire to devour” the loved one, to incorporate him/ her, and as “a lust for total possession” in an attempt of achieving “the mythical state of oneness”. Incorporation is, however, ambivalent: union is indeed achieved, but the gratification of desire leads to the destruction of the object. It can, therefore, be argued that cannibalism has associations of dismemberment or fragmentation, since the object can never be restored to its original shape.

Atwood’s Cannibals

Cannibalism, as well as the related myth of vampirism (in its reading as absorption of vital energies), relies on becoming stronger by literally or metaphorically consuming the others. If one’s body is cannibalized/ vampirized, i.e. fragmented, the power and energy of the individual are also fragmented. In Margaret Atwood’s novels, cannibalism, as well as vampirism, prevail in their symbolic meanings and play an important role in terms of power relations between the characters. All Atwood’s protagonists are initially fragmented, victimized, cannibalized, but they gradually transform into stronger individuals through eating — becoming predators — or metaphorical touching (writing/ narrating or painting). In other words, edible victims become inedible consumers.

In the society of Atwood’s novels, it is the laws of nature that apply in terms of power relations, namely ‘eat or be eaten’, where the prey is the social other. In this respect, I have identified three types of metaphorical cannibalism which are illustrated in the three novels under discussion: hetero-cannibalism (different sex — i.e. male — predators), in which case the cannibals are men, who fragment women’s bodies by imposing on them stereotypes of femininity or what they consider to be ‘healthy eating’ — The
Edible Woman (1978) and The Handmaid’s Tale (1993); homo-cannibalism (same sex — i.e. female — predators), with women causing the dismemberment or amputation of other women’s bodies by perpetrating the patriarchal stereotypes of femininity, as in Lady Oracle (1977), for example; and finally, self-cannibalism, where women act as cannibals against themselves in their attempt to cope with a harsh reality, as in Cat’s Eye (1989). In what follows, I will discuss these types of symbolic cannibalism with special emphasis on the body parts that suggest fragmentation, amputation, dismemberment, erasure of identity. As Wilson (2005: 122) also remarks, Atwood’s protagonists symbolically lose sensory organs such as mouths, tongues, hearts, hands, feet, or eyes only to become stronger individuals in the end with new voices, visions and ways of touching of their own.

Women’s cannibalization or, in other words, the amputation of their identities is primarily suggested through images of mouths and teeth, and speech implicitly. Marian, the protagonist of The Edible Woman (1978), seems mouthless in the sense that we never hear her agree to Peter’s marriage proposal. Moreover, she has a rather feeble voice since the second and largest part of her story is narrated in third person singular (as opposed to the first and third part of the novel which are first person narrations), suggesting the distance Marian takes both from herself and from society. Elaine Risley (Cat’s Eye, 1989) becomes the victim of the girl-friends she has longed for when she travelled through the wilderness with her brother and parents and, even though they torment her and continually try to regulate her appearance and behaviour by constantly criticizing her, she cannot bring herself to talk about her victimization. Desperately wanting the girls’ approval and affection, but having been labeled as “wrong”, “sinful” and “heathen”, Elaine resorts to self-cannibalism, using her teeth to tear off the skin from her heels, to chew her hair or nibble at her fingernails in an attempt to preserve her integrity and sanity, which seem to be dissolving.

In the endless time when Cordelia had such power over me, I peeled the skin off my feet. […] I would begin with the big toes. I would bend my foot up and bite a small opening in the thickest part of the skin, on the bottom, along the outside edge. Then, with my fingernails, which I never bit because why bite something that didn’t hurt, I would pull the skin off in narrow strips. […] The pain gave me something definite to think about, something immediate. It was something to hold on to. I chewed the ends of my
hair [...] I gnawed the cuticles off from around my fingernails, leaving exposed, oozing flesh which would harden into rinds and scale off (Atwood 1989: 120, my emphases).

Similarly, Joan Foster, the protagonist of Lady Oracle’s (1977) , cannot bring herself to talk about her multiple identities (fat unpopular child, lover, poetess, popular gothic writer, assumed terrorist) to her husband. She only informs him about her poetry volume when the book is under print and only in the end of the novel does she take the decision of letting him know about her writing gothic romances. Throughout the novel, her motivating force seems to be fear (Howells 2005: 58) of being found out, of people discovering the truth about her fat childhood self, about her writing both poetry and popular gothic fiction. But unlike Elaine, Joan falls victim to homo-cannibalism, with her mother (embodying society, the ‘others’) trying to inflict society’s ideals of femininity on her daughter and control her body through eating, through what goes into Joan’s mouth. Desperate for her mother’s love and unable to obtain her approval, Joan begins to eat out of panic and her body swells like dough. Eating becomes not only a form of self-mutilation, a paradoxical self-cannibalism and erasure of one’s identity through deforming flesh, but also a valuable weapon against her unloving mother: “I ate to defy her, but I also ate from panic. Sometimes I was afraid I wasn’t really there, I was an accident; I’d heard her call me an accident” (Atwood 1977: 78, my emphases).

As a child, Joan is often invited to watch her mother put on make-up, a ritual she secretly enjoys.

In the image of her that I carried for years, hanging from my neck like an iron locket, she was sitting in front of her vanity table, painting her fingernails a murderous red and sighing. Her lips were thin but she made a larger mouth with lipstick over and around them [...], which gave her a curious double mouth [...] (Atwood 1977: 65, my emphases).

The mother’s double mouth, which she creates with red lipstick, as well as her red fingernails, vividly remind us of cannibals’ blood-dripping mouths or blood-thirsty vampires who have recently fed themselves on human victims to acquire their powers and assert their own control. Looking forward to escaping her authoritarian mother, Joan gives in to society’s indoctrinating models of femininity and, stimulated by Aunt Lou’s inheritance, she loses weight much to her mother’s spite, who feels her
control diminishing. Even though Joan has rejected beauty stereotypes as a fat child and teenager, she has internalized her mother’s control and ideology, and will remain their victim throughout her adult life as a slim woman.

In order to reconsider her situation, the mature and slender Joan stages her death and leaves for Europe. With the mock suicide, she almost succeeds in completely erasing at least one of her multiple identities (that of Joan Foster), but will have to return to Canada to save her ‘accomplice’ friends from prison. In Italy, after she dances on shattered glass, symbolic of her split selves, and gets her feet minced, Joan decides to try to reconcile her multiple identities and tell her husband about her writings so that she may live without fear of being discovered.

Just like adult Elaine of *Cat’s Eye*, whose speech is controlled by her lover Josef, who tells her when to speak and when to keep quiet, trying in this way to assert his power and control over her, Marian MacAlpin from *The Edible Woman* succumbs to Peter’s authority and does not have a say even in what concerns her appearance. After the engagement, Peter flaunts Marian in front of his friends and colleagues, and wants her to change her haairdo and buy more feminine clothes instead of the greyish ones she usually wears as a sort of camouflage to pass unnoticed. This only emphasizes once more Marian’s being an object of consumption, a doll-like creature with no will (or mind) of her own:

*Peter had suggested* that she might have something done with her hair. *He also hinted* that perhaps she should buy a dress that was, as he put it, “not so mousy” as any she already owned […] she could smell the sweetly-artificial perfume of the hairspray he had used to glue each strand in place. […] They treated your head like a cake: something to be carefully iced and ornamented (Atwood 1978: 216-217, my emphases).

Eating and teeth denote a voracious appetite and Atwood uses such images to overlap physical and sexual appetites. Thus Arthur (*Lady Oracle*, 1977) grinds his teeth during sexual intercourse, while Peter has “teeth-gritting moods” (Atwood 1978: 61), bites Marian’s shoulder during sex and finds her perfume appetizing. He also enjoys kissing her on the neck, a very vulnerable place, which reminds us again of blood-thirsty vampires and which transforms Peter into a blood-sucking creature, highlighting his need to feel in control (especially of Marian’s body): “Inside, Peter took off her coat for her. He put his hands on her bare shoulders and kissed her lightly on the
back of the neck. ‘Yum yum’ he said, ‘new perfume’” (Atwood 1978: 237, my emphases).

With respect to hetero-cannibalism as dismemberment, Atwood draws a parallel between courting and hunting with a focus on the predatory aspect of both rituals. In the restaurant scene before the marriage proposal, Peter describes his hunting and gutting of a she-rabbit.

So I let her off and Wham. One shot, right through the heart. [...] I picked it up and Trigger said, ‘You know how to gut them, you just slit her down the belly and give her a good shake and all the guts’ll fall out’. [...] A group of friends [...] were gathered around him, their faces clearly visible in the sunlight [...] splashed with blood, the mouths wrenched with laughter. I couldn’t see the rabbit”. (Atwood 1978: 65-66, my emphases).

Marian identifies with the rabbit, subconsciously feeling trapped and in danger of being split in halves. This sensation of having her body dismembered and cannibalized grows in intensity even more as she has dreamt about her body dissolving, “turning transparent” (Atwood 1978: 38) and vanishing into thin air as an indication of her own identity being amputated by Peter’s authority and wishes. When Marian offers Peter a heart-shaped cake as a belated Valentine gift, he devours it voraciously. If we consider the pink cake a symbol of Marian’s own heart, then Peter is nothing but a hetero-cannibal who absorbs his fiancée’s vital energy and gains more and more power over her.

The day before had been Valentine’s Day and Peter had sent her a dozen roses. She had felt guilty, thinking she ought to have given him something but no knowing what. [...] It was a heart with pink icing and probably stale, but it was the shape that mattered. [...] She shuddered and spat the cake [...] ‘I really worked up an appetite’, he has said, grinning at her (Atwood 1978: 215-216, my emphases).

While Marian’s body begins to have a will of its own and reject food, Peter has no such problems and metaphorically devours the heart-shaped cake in a possible attempt to incorporate Marian and achieve the perfect union Freud (1938: 563-564) was referring to, which will only enable him to assert his will and better control her.

Atwood’s protagonists’ search for selfhood is — as Parker (1995: 349) points out — usually accompanied by a search for food or by eating itself. While Marian’s (The Edible Woman) body gradually rejects food, Joan
(Lady Oracle) takes her decisions at the table while eating junk food, Elaine (Cat’s Eye) abuses her body with a poor diet. It is through food association and eating that the protagonist of The Edible Woman also takes her life into her own hands. Finally acknowledging her victim position, Marian rejects it and bakes a woman-shaped cake to serve her fiancé. The cake thus stands for artificial womanhood, a substitute victim for Marian. When Peter refuses to eat it, she incorporates it herself in an act of self-cannibalism, regaining control over her own body and asserting a new identity as a stronger woman who has rejected the stereotypes of femininity that society in general and Peter in particular have sought to impose on her. In an analogous way, Joan Foster’s (Lady Oracle) attempt to take control and assume responsibility over her life is accompanied by eating: “I sat at the white table with my hot cup, adding another white ring to the varnish, eating a package of rusks and trying to organize my life” (Atwood 1977: 21).

As we have seen so far, Atwood’s protagonists learn the lesson of assertiveness through consumption. No longer consenting to their cannibalization, they turn from prey to predators. Nevertheless, apart from the powerful images of eating, mouth and teeth discussed above, another way of amputating or dismembering women’s identities is through images of eyes and seeing.

Being primarily sensory organs, the eyes are the ones that establish a direct contact with the viewer and with the world in general. Through the eyes, a person witnesses and learns about the world. If we link seeing to knowing which, in its turn, suggests power, then Atwood’s handmaids of The Handmaid’s Tale (1993) are the epitome of women as objects of consumption, symbolically cannibalized by men’s devouring gaze. As I have argued elsewhere (Șerban 2006: 110), handmaids are under constant monitoring by male eyes — even the spies of Gilead are suggestively called Eyes — and have their identities deleted on several levels. They have no name of their own, but a combination of the possessive particle ‘of’ and the name of the commander they service, they have to look up at men in authority, but are looked down on as women whose only purpose is to bear the commander’s child. Furthermore, the symbol of the Giledean extremely patriarchal state is tattooed on their ankles, mirrors are denied to them — an essential element in establishing one’s identity — and even speech is strictly controlled, as handmaids can only utter fixed set phrases devoid of emotions.
Atwood makes use of the mirror as a symbol of split identities in *Lady Oracle* (1977), with reference to surface and depth images of the same character. Bearing in mind that the eyes are gateways to one’s soul (Nanu 2001: 94), staring in the mirror induces a hallucinatory state in which the soul seems to exit the body and get in touch with the other world. During such trances in-between dream and reality, the protagonist Joan practices automatic writing; in other words, travelling through the mirror establishes the connection with inspiration or the creative subconscious. Simultaneously, the mirror is indicative of Joan Foster’s multiple identities, in particular of her real name and of the pennames she uses for her writings: she is Lady Oracle as a poetess and Louisa K. Dézacour (her aunt’s name) for her gothic romances.

Similarly to Offred the handmaid, who initially colludes in her fragmentation — blinding and gagging — the protagonist of *Cat’s Eye* (1989) has her speech controlled by her first lover and art teacher Josef, who tells her when to speak and when to keep quiet, and who delights in rearranging her in order to match his own ideal of the beautiful female body, completely submissive and complying with the norms of patriarchy.

*Josef is rearranging me.* [...] *He places me* against the twilight of the window, *turns me*, stands back a little, *running his hand up and down my side*. [...] But I catch a glimpse of myself, without expecting it, in the smoked-mirror wall of the elevator as we go up, and I see for an instant what Josef sees: a slim woman with cloudy hair, pensive eyes in a thin white face. *I recognize the style: late nineteenth century. Pre-Raphaelite.* I should be holding a poppy (Atwood 1989: 323-324, my emphases).

The reflection Elaine glimpses in the mirror is nothing more than a mask, an image imposed on her by male stereotypes of the female body, highlighting once more Elaine’s fragmentation and erasure of her true self. Moreover, through its ability to induce sleep and hallucinations, the poppy she thinks she should be holding brings about connotations of sleep walking, manipulation, and even death (through its red, bloodlike colouring).

If the handmaids (Atwood 1993) are under constant surveillance by male eyes, the *Cat’s Eye* protagonist is closely watched by women-to-be who have internalized the patriarchal norms. As a young girl, Elaine Risley is put under a ‘magnifying glass’ by her so-called friends, whom she had so much longed for when she was in the wilderness. Grace, Carol and Cordelia gradually turn into Elaine’s tormentors, constantly criticizing her
appearance and behaviour and absorbing her vital energies. Having settled in the city due to her father’s profession as a biologist, Elaine has to “camouflage” herself (Culpeper 1989) by adopting girls’ clothes and girly manners in order to survive in this ‘new wilderness’, where the rules are made by men, and obeyed and enforced by such women as Mrs. Smeath. Brought up in a patriarchal society with certain ideals about the female body and behaviour, the three girls only apply these internalized stereotypes.

However, Elaine’s self-cannibalization as an attempt to preserve her sanity goes beyond the physical level of shredding, fragmenting herself — as we have already seen — and she loses her emotions as well. The cat’s eye marble that Elaine considers to be her protective charm seems to enter her body after her first descent into the ravine. She now assumes what Wilson (2005: 304) calls “cat’s eye vision”, in the sense that she no longer allows the others’ opinions of her as guidelines in life. As argued elsewhere (Șerban 2007b: 80-81), this is the moment when Elaine begins to grow stronger as an individual and exchanges power roles with Cordelia who will, however, haunt her throughout her life and whom she will always consider as her Other, her own reflection in the mirror. The mirror — reflecting a distorted or a fragmented image of things — connects Elaine’s outer search for Cordelia with her inner search for selfhood. Remembering her past and succeeding in removing the glass from her eye — once she finds the cat’s eye marble in the basement of her parents’ house — Elaine can finally rid herself of the ghosts of the past and regain emotions by learning to forgive. It is her artistic vision that finally helps her re-assert her identity as a stronger woman, no longer cannibalized or fragmented. The painting of the Virgin of Lost Things holding a huge cat’s eye marble is then, possibly, the best illustration of both the protagonist’s symbolic amputation and loss of emotion, and of her ability to finally learn to use the others’ ‘visions’ of her to transform herself.

If in the beginning, all of Atwood’s protagonists are edible prey, lacking such body parts as mouths (and implicitly speech) or eyes (and implicitly sight), they finally transform themselves and by rejecting their victim positions, they re-assert their identities as stronger individuals — they become predators, i.e. inedible consumers — with a voice and a vision of their own.
References


TWO INSTANCES OF THE FRAGMENTARY
IN THE POSTMODERN NOVEL: ITALO CALVINO’S IF ON A
WINTER’S NIGHT A TRAVELER AND ANNIE PROULX’S
THE SHIPPING NEWS

ANDREEA TEREZA NIȚIȘOR
University of Iași

Abstract: The paper examines fragmentariness in terms of (subversive) narrative and narratological strategies, thematic material, style, theoretical assumptions, and ideological implications in two very different novels - Italo Calvino’s “hypernovel” If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler (1979) and Annie Proulx’s The Shipping News (1993).

An impressive number of scholarly studies on the fragment, published fairly recently, have revived interest in these fertile yet problematic and elusive topics. Traditionally treated as part of a whole, as remnant, debris, incomplete or “unfinished” text (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988: 42, Harter 1996: 124, Nochlin 2001: 56, etc.), the fragment has undergone a postmodernist re-evaluation. Abandoning the restrictive connotations of its etymology, some scholars analysed the fragment for its own sake, for its intrinsic value, focusing on the fragment as “a determinate and deliberate statement, assuming or transfiguring the accidental and involuntary aspects of fragmentation” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988: 41). Consequently, the fragment has come under scrutiny from a double perspective: as part of a whole — whether lost, extant, or planned — and as non-subordinated (or insubordinate) to a whole — the fragment proper.

Thus, in Lire les formes brèves, in the chapter dedicated to fragmentary forms, Bernard Roukhomovsky (2005: 89-109) opens his analysis with the romantic distinction between the fragment-ruin (fragment-débris) and the fragment-project to proceed to an investigation of l’écriture fragmentaire that includes the essay, the note, the sketch, the draft, autobiography, memoirs (formes du moi), and Pascal Quignard’s “small” treatises, identifying an ordre fragmentaire. Roukhomovsky (2005: 94) traces both the essay
tradition and the practice of “broken” writing (écriture brisée) back to Montaigne, whose Essays he sees as un nœud complexe, an assortment of articles décousus, fragments of a discourse which ne peut se dire à la fois et en bloc. Montaigne articulates a dynamics of textual proliferation by means of successive additions and expansions (aditions et gonflements), which he termed allongeails and farcissures. According to Roukhomovsky, the peculiarity of this “dispositif”

qui associe le bref et le prolix, la fugacité du coup de sonde et la multiplication des coups d’essai, tient non seulement à la conception même du discours essayiste, mais également à la texture de l’objet qu’il s’assigne ...

En d’autres termes, cette infinité diversité d’approches et d’éclairages qui constitue l’écriture essayiste en un dispositif optique répond à la structure même de son objet (2005: 96-97).

Roukhomovsky extends the correlation between fragmentary form and composite or broken texture of the content to a relationship of consubstantiality between the writing and the fractured self, idea acknowledged by Montaigne himself: “Je suis moi-même la matière de mon livre”; “Je n’ai pas plus fait mon livre que mon livre m’a fait, livre consubstantiel à son auteur” (qtd. in Roukhomovsky 2005: 94). The author of Lire les formes brèves identifies the same type of intrinsic motivation for the fragmentary form in Blaise Pascal, who spoke about an ordre du cœur — discontinuous, repetitive, and incantatory — and an ordre de l’esprit — linear, deductive, and discursive, two divergent forces whose tension gives birth to what Roukhomovsky calls l’ordre fragmentaire (2005: 100-101), perfectly exemplified by Pensées. “Car il y a chez Pascal”, notes Roukhomovsky, “un veritable — et d’ailleurs un imaginaire — de la dislocation” (2005: 103), and this imaginary of dislocation will become paramount in Laurence Sterne, in Romanticism, in the majority of modernist and postmodernist writers.

Many postmodernist authors either write fragments as parts of a theoretical discourse, or elaborate fragmentary fictions contributing to the development of a theory of the fragment, or produce fragmentary theories which “can be enacted in and as fragments” (Elias 2004: 22). Although insightful, Camelia Elias’s recent study The Fragment: Towards a History and Poetics of a Performative Genre does not deal with fragmentariness as a key-concept and discursive formula in postmodernist theory and, like all other theoretical works on the fragment published so far, does not even mention writers such as Italo Calvino, Fernando Pessoa, or Annie Proulx.
What Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy called *l'exigence fragmentaire* (1988: 39-58) — concept appropriated from Maurice Blanchot —, indicating “a persistent unsettling of intellectual and artistic territories and ideological positions — even of freedom itself” (Strathman 2006: 31), and which the two philosophers perceived as one of the distinctive features of the German Romanticism, becomes the trademark of postmodernist theory and literature. Thus, in “Towards a Concept of Postmodernism”, Ihab Hassan argues that “postmodernism veers toward open, playful, optative, provisional (open in time as well as in structure or space), disjunctive, or indeterminate forms, a discourse of irony and fragments, a ‘white ideology’ of absences and fractures, a desire of diffractions, and invocation of complex, articulate silences” (1993: 154).

In a similar vein, though with a different end in mind, David Lodge lists five strategies — contradiction, discontinuity, randomness, excess, and short circuit — by which postmodernist writing seeks to elude the choice of one of the two poles of metaphoric (modernist) or metonymic (antimodernist) writing (McHale 2003: 7). The common denominator of all theories of postmodernism, which sometimes border on cultural paranoia, is the re-situating, re-examining of the notions of reality, self, individuality, and identity in terms of fragmentation, dissipation, and even dissolution.

From an ideological standpoint, the proliferation of narratologies — Formalism, Marxism, Reception Theory, Deconstruction, New Historicism, Postcolonialism, etc. — prompts Mark Currie to conclude that “Jakobson’s structuralist dream of a global science of literature has yielded to an uncontrolled fracturing of the narratological method” (Currie 1998: 14). Under these circumstances, fragmentariness as transgressive notion permeating and, at the same time, providing the basis of all types of discourse — critical, literary, philosophical, cinematic, cultural, etc. — may be hailed as the true “postmodern condition”.

Apart from the ubiquity of the fragment in postmodernist theory, what has remained largely unexplored is the fragment as narrative, fictional, or cinematic topos and/or strategy. This is all the more surprising since a novel such as Italo Calvino’s *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler* fully exploits the potential of fragmentariness as narrative strategy, while Annie Proulx, in *The Shipping News*, takes to an extreme the use of *l’écriture brisée* in a fragmented narrative teeming with lacunae, turning fragmentariness into a trademark of her style.
As self-confessed intention, narrative mechanism and subversive strategy in Calvino’s postmodern metanovel *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler* (1979), the fragmentary destabilizes (parodies) the narrative construction of a unitary-finite type, i.e. the novel characterised by continuity, coherence, and closure. At the same time, the proliferation of narrative fragments and loose threads mystifies the reader. The narrator himself draws attention to “how much the word contains and conceals: “you cut your way through your reading as if through a dense forest” (Calvino 1993: 40). Fragmentariness frustrates the readers’ expectations (both intradiegetically — the Reader as protagonist — and extradiegetically — the real reader), as the narrator casually points out by means of an ironic metanarrative observation: “here is a trap-novel designed (...) with beginnings of novels that remain suspended” (Calvino 1993: 122).

Consequently, fragmentariness works here on the two levels (or “poles”) identified by Iser in *The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach* (1972), namely the “artistic” and the “esthetic”. In Iser’s view

the artistic refers to the text created by the author, and the esthetic to the realization [Konkretisation] accomplished by the reader. From this polarity it follows that the literary work cannot be completely identical with the text, or with the realization of the text, but in fact must lie halfway between the two (1972: 105).

Thus, at first glance, fragmentariness at the “artistic” level is achieved by means of an intricate pattern of suspended incipits embedded in the frame story of the Reader caught up in an impossible quest for the missing narrative fragments. At the “esthetic” level, that of the “realization” of the text effected by the reader, fragmentariness appears as an inherent feature of the reading process, as it depends on time and is subject to interferences and intrusions from the world outside the book, a fact duly noted by one of the anonymous reader-characters in the novel: “Reading is a discontinuous and fragmentary operation” (Calvino 1993: 248). At a closer look, however, the choice of narrative fragmentariness appears motivated by both the parodic key in which the text is written and the postmodernist mélange of fiction and narratology. Calvino’s novel becomes a *metanovel*, a compendium on how to write novels and an accurate description of the act of reading, in other words of the “reception” process, highlighting the open tension between the “artistic” and the “esthetic”: “In reading, something happens
over which I have no power”, confesses the writer-character Silas Flannery (Calvino 1993: 234).

If parody, metatextuality (self-referentiality) and intertextuality are the "grounds" for understanding fragmentariness in Calvino, pseudo-realism and paratextuality are the “keys” for interpreting Annie Proulx’s fragmentary novel. Perhaps one of the most disconcerting and highly unusual paratextual features of *The Shipping News* (1993) is the (mock-)disclaimer written in small print on the copyright page:

This is a work of fiction. No resemblance is intended to living or dead persons, extant or failed newspapers, real government departments, specific towns or villages, actual roads or highways. The skiffs, trawlers and yachts, the upholstery needle, the logans, thumbies, and plates of cod cheeks, the bakeapples and those who pick them, the fish traps, the cats and the dogs, the houses and seabirds described here are all fancies. The Newfoundland in this book, though slated with grains of truth, is an island of invention (Proulx 2002: iv).

The paratext of Proulx’s “work of fiction” offers vital information for the reception process at the same time providing a useful insight into the novelist’s unique style. The title page features an apparently cryptic illustration of a coil of rope, whose meaning becomes somewhat clearer when the reader proceeds to the motto page, right after the dedication page. The motto is taken from *The Ashley Book of Knots* (1944):

“In a knot of eight crossings, which is about the average-size knot, there are 256 different ‘over-and-under’ arrangements possible…. Make only one change in this ‘over-and-under’ sequence and either an entirely different knot is made or no knot at all may result” (Proulx 2002: vii).

Puzzling as it may be, the motto is semantically related to the title, *The Shipping News*, and to the illustration. Moreover, at least to a more “experienced” reader (such as Ludmilla from *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler*), it tells a cautionary tale of possible “arrangements”, i.e. of an *ars combinatoria* that should not be randomly made; on the contrary, there is only one particular “sequence” that is necessary in order to make the desired “knot”. The meaning of this motto unravels itself gradually, in the process of reading. As Varvogli puts it (2002: 71), the epigraph speaks of narrative strands, permutations and variations, and in so doing it paints a picture of the book it introduces. It warns the readers that this will be a story made up of frag-
ments which have to be arranged in a certain manner, but which could equally be rearranged in order to produce different versions of the story.

The next unusual paratextual element is the *Acknowledgments* page, which is not a standard feature of fiction books. The manner in which Proulx’s gratitude is expressed is no less unusual: “The Newfoundland wit and taste for conversation made the most casual encounters a pleasure”; “Canadian Coast Guard Search and Rescue personnel, the staff of the *Northern Pen* in St. Anthony, fishermen and loggers, the Atmospheric Environment Service of Environment Canada all told me how things worked”; “Walter Punch of the Massachusetts Horticultural Society Library confirmed some obscure horticultural references” (Proulx 2002: ix-x). Not surprisingly, Aliki Varvogli notes that “the excessive and meticulous listing of so many people who helped the author with her research verges on parody” (Varvogli 2002: 14). Varvogli goes on to contend that a possible explanation of Proulx’s “extensive credits” is that they “are meant to suggest that no amount of factual information can fully account for the genesis of a work of art. Given that these extensive lists appear in the beginning of the book, Proulx should perhaps be understood as a magician who reveals the secrets of her art, and then goes on to trick the reader all the same (14).

Another explanation might be a playful shredding of the *illusion réalististe* by means of an overwhelming accumulation of realistic details reaching a saturation point, thus triggering an attitude of disbelief. As Calvino in *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler*, Proulx “bears the device”, but she chooses a different strategy: paratextual instead of meta- and intertextual.

Parody is a key-element both novels share and the highly original opening of each is a significant clue in this respect. Calvino’s novel features a frame story, narrated in the second person, the protagonist being none other than the Reader himself, farcically addressed in the famous metaincipit of the book: “You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler*. Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought” (1993: 3). By emphatically “laying bare the device”, the novel flaunts its own artfulness, and becomes a vivid example of how “the realisation of the form constitutes the content of the work” (Harland 1999:151). From this viewpoint, *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler* is a postmodernist metafiction — or, “theoretical fiction” in Mark Currie’s terminology (Currie 1998: 52-53). By conveying an uncanny feeling of *unheimlich* familiarity in the real readers of *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler*, who begin reading the
story of a fictional Reader who begins reading *If on a Winter's Night a Traveler*, Calvino’s novel successfully stages “a confrontation between the world of the text and our own” (Butler 2002: 70), thus enacting “a disturbingly sceptical triumph over our sense of reality” (Butler 2002: 70). Calvino himself said that his original intention was to write “a book in which the reader would not be reading the text of a novel but a description of the act of reading *per se*” (du Plessix Gray 1981: 22).

The opening of *The Shipping News* is no less peculiar. Chapter I, entitled *Quoyle*, features two epigraphs: the former explains the title — “Quoyle: A coil of rope” — while the latter, taken from *The Ashley Book of Knots*, is a bit more mystifying, at least at first sight — “A Flemish flake is a spiral coil of one layer only. It is made on deck, so that it may be walked on if necessary” (Proulx 2002: 3). The first four paragraphs of the novel, less than half a page, encapsulate thirty-six years of the protagonist’s life in a hundred and thirty-six words:

Here is an account of a few years in the life of Quoyle, born in Brooklyn and raised in a shuffle of dreary upstate towns.

Hive-spangled, gut roaring with gas and cramp, he survived childhood; at the state university, hand clapped over his chin, he camouflaged torment with smiles and silence. Stumbled through his twenties and into his thirties learning to separate his feelings from his life, counting on nothing. He ate prodigiously, liked a ham knuckle, buttered spuds.

His jobs: distributor of vending machine candy, all-night clerk in a convenience store, a third-rate newspaperman. At thirty-six, bereft, brimming with grief and thwarted love, Quoyle steered away to Newfoundland, the rock that had generated his ancestors, a place he had never been nor thought to go (Proulx 2002: 3-4).

This atypical narrative gambit, introducing the protagonist as a “slightly grotesque” (Varvogli 2002: 33) anti-hero, relies on both conventional techniques — third-person (heterodigetic) narrative, omniscient narrator — and unconventional discursive strategies, namely, 1) elliptical information imparted matter-of-fact-ly, 2) structural irony, noticeable especially in the relation between the paratext and the main body of the text (for instance, the coil of rope that “may be walked on if necessary”, described in the second epigraph is a metaphor for Quoyle, who is indeed walked on for the most part of the novel), and 3) what Ian Watt calls *delayed decoding* (qtd.
in Varvogli 2002: 20) - showing the effects before mentioning the cause. “Delayed decoding”, Varvogli explains, “is also an indication of the fact that the author has control over her creation, and chooses to manipulate her material in such a way as to suggest that characters’ lives are unfolding in front of our eyes, when the truth is that their fate had been decided before the author began to write” (Varvogli 2002: 20).

Laconic information and the “syncopated language” (Varvogli 2002: 35) bestow a fragmentary quality on the narrative, fragmentariness which is reinforced both in terms of temporal shifts and abrupt dislocations, and in terms of characters. Quoyle is essentially a fragmentary man (his father’s “failure”, short-term husband, father, widower, orphan) who “abstracted his life from the times” (Proulx 2002: 15), whose “earliest sense of self was as a distant figure” (4), and who gets into the habit of condensing his life and impressions of others in deprecatory headlines: “Man Dies of Broken Heart” (21); “Stupid Man Does Wrong Thing Once More” (106); “Man Sounds Like Fatuous Fool” (137); “Newspaper Reporter Seems Magnet for Dead Men” (249); “Man Escapes Endless Song” (368). As Varvogli points out “Quoyle, like the reader, is an outsider, and just as he only gradually understands the import of other people’s stories, and the extent of his relations to the world, so the narrative reveals itself to the reader in enigmatic fragments that have to be pieced together” (Varvogli 2002: 42-43).

“Enigmatic fragments” also constitute the core of Calvino’s convoluted novel — “we cannot love or think except in fragments of time” (Calvino 1993: 8), remarks the narrator in Chapter One. These chapters perform multiple functions with multiple theoretical implications. From the first paratextual elements, Calvino’s novel appears unusual and baffling. The “Contents” are positioned before “Chapter One” and inform the real readers of the existence of twelve numbered chapters and ten intercalated titled “chapters”, which turn out to be ten embedded fragment-stories written in ten different styles and belonging to ten different literary forms and genres, including a mystery, a Bildungsroman in the realist tradition and rich in sensory details reminiscent of Proust, a mock literary biography, a war story doubled by a tangled love story, a gaucho story, a political satire, and a Japanese narrative imbued with delicate eroticism and seasonal references made in haiku style.

Iser’s observation from “The Reading Process”, which stands as a motto for this paper, is particularly relevant in Calvino’s case, as if on a
Winter's Night a Traveler is "so fragmentary that one's attention is almost exclusively occupied with the search for connections between the fragments". This certainly holds true both for the Reader-protagonist and for real readers. As a result, we-as-readers experience a similar frustration at the taunting incompleteness of the fragment-stories as the Reader-protagonist. Practically, fragmentariness in If on a Winter's Night a Traveler has a unique effect: it reduces to a minimum the distance between the "real" world and the fictional one by means of this mirroring or mimicking of the circumstances of the reading process.

Calvino's novel offers an unexpected theoretical twist, a kind of "turn of the screw" in this highly intricate "network of lines that intersect", or a deeper walk into Umberto Eco's "fictional woods", in that If on a Winter's Night a Traveler becomes ever more self-referential: the titles of the fragment-stories embedded in the Reader's story converge — in chronological order — in Chapter Eleven, making up yet another fragment-story that metafictionally turns upon itself by means of mise en abyme:

"If on a winter's night a traveler, outside the town of Malbork, leaning from the steep slope without fear of wind or vertigo, looks down in the gathering shadow in a network of lines that enlace, in a network of lines that intersect, on the carpet of leaves illuminated by the moon around an empty grave — What story down there awaits its end? — he asks, anxious to hear the story" (Calvino 1993: 252).

The final sentence of this paragraph ("He asks, anxious to hear the story") is the title given by the Reader to an "interrupted book" from childhood, whose actual title he had forgotten, and condenses the general mood of the protagonist of Calvino’s novel, in frantic search for an ending. The discussion between the Reader-protagonist and the other readers at the library is, of course, a representation of a possible conversation between the writer and his actual readers (again, the addressee is the second person):

"Do you believe that every story must have a beginning and an end? In ancient times a story could end only in two ways: having passed all the tests, the hero and the heroine married, or else they died. The ultimate meaning to which all stories refer has two faces: the continuity of life, the inevitability of death" (Calvino 1993: 253).

The illusion of real-life conversation is, however, quickly dispelled by the next paragraph, which concludes Chapter Eleven, another ironic exam-
ple of playfully “baring the device”, exposing the condition of artifact — “You stop for a moment to reflect on these words. Then, in a flash, you decide you want to marry Ludmilla” (Calvino 1993: 253) — and parodying one of the conventional narrative closures, the traditional happy ending. Chapter Twelve, which consists of only seven lines, is the excipit of *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler*, in perfect symmetry with the incipit of the novel: “And you say, ‘Just a moment, I’ve almost finished *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler* by Italo Calvino’”.

Fragmentariness is motivated in the récit by “the translator’s machinations” (Calvino 1993: 154), i.e. Ermes Marana’s, who is possessed by a compulsive need, borne out of jealousy, to “affirm his presence” (155) in every book by altering it, insinuating himself into it, subverting the very idea of authorship. The archetype of traduttore traditore, a quintessential trickster, the “archenemy of reading” (Weiss 1993:174), Marana is “a serpent who injects his malice into the paradise of reading” (Calvino 1993: 122), “no doubt a Calvino incarnation of deconstruction” (Weiss 1993: 176), a “treacherous translator” who dreams “of a literature made entirely of apocrypha, of false attributions, of imitations and counterfeits and pastiches” (Calvino 1993: 155), hoping to shake the very “foundations” of literature, “where the relationship between reader and text is established” (155).

The translator “injects his malice” into the books of the Irish novelist Silas Flannery, the writer who has come to be at a loss of words, producing only fragments, and blaming the language itself for this fragmentariness: “I do not believe totality can be contained in language; my problem is what remains outside, the unwritten, the unwritable” (Calvino 1993: 177). Flannery is responsible for the narrative incompleteness as he experiences writer’s block, being unable to go beyond the incipits of the sundry novels he has begun writing. In his eclectic diary — the only thing he is still able to write — Flannery glosses on reading, assigning the reader a central role and going as far as to eliminate the figure of the author from the equation — a form of radical depersonalization — replacing the Cartesian “I think therefore I am” with “I read, therefore it writes” (172): “If you think about it, reading is a necessarily individual act, far more than writing. … Only the ability to be read by a certain individual proves that what is written shares in the power of writing … The universe will express itself as long as somebody will be able to say, ‘I read, therefore it writes.’"
It is Silas Flannery, “Calvino’s obvious alter ego” (Weiss 1993: 176), who offers a “perfect iconic double” (McHale 2003: 126) of *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler* in his diary, by means of *mise en abyme*:

I have had the idea of writing a novel composed only of beginnings of novels. The protagonist could be a Reader who is continually interrupted. The Reader buys the new novel A by the author Z. But it is a defective copy, he can’t go beyond the beginning. ... He returns to the bookshop to have the volume exchanged. ...

I could write it all in the second person: you, Reader ... I could also introduce a young lady, the Other Reader, and a counterfeiter-translator, and an old writer who keeps a diary like this diary (Calvino 1993: 193).

Giorgio Bárberi Squarotti sees the novel as “a discourse, conducted with a margin of irony and playfulness, concerning the dissolution of the forms of literature. The work which is sought in the book is always different from the one which keeps presenting and revealing itself” (qtd. in Weiss 1993: 180). Ultimately, however self-referential and self-subverting the novel may be, *If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler* is successful at least in deconstructing all modern and postmodern theories of fiction. Calvino anticipates all possible readings and (mis)interpretations and discards them one by one, transmuting what one of his fictional *persona* says (another self-reflexive discourse) into fact:

It is my image that I want to multiply, but not out of narcissism or megalomania, as could all too easily be believed: on the contrary, I want to conceal, in the midst of so many illusory ghosts of myself, the true me, who makes them move. (…)

I would like all the details that I am writing down to concur in creating the impression of a high-precision mechanism, but at the same time of a succession of dazzles that reflect something that remains out of eyeshot. (Calvino 1993: 158-160)

A “high-precision mechanism” with different intricacies and challenges is the main text of Annie Proulx’s novel. The thirty-nine titled chapters of *The Shipping News* abound in narrative and graphic knots, both literally — a knot signals the end of an episode, at the same time “tying” the story together — and figuratively, rendering the image of story as fabric, of writing as both *techne* and *poiesis*, and of the writer as *creatrix*. Not incidentally, two types of narrators associated with the realist tradition — omnis-

"POST"-DILEMMAS
cient narrator and intrusive narrator — are used by Proulx in order to manipulate the character’s destinies and the course of events whose “arrangement”, as the epigraph of the novel states unambiguously, is pre-established. In this sense, Proulx makes ample use of analepsis and prolepsis, fragmenting the linearity of the narrative and forcing readers “to re-enact Quoyle’s own gropings, hesitations and false starts as he attempts to build a new life” (Varvogli 2002: 39).

All three literary devices — analepsis, prolepsis and delayed decoding — are employed to fragment the story-time (Chatman 1980: 62), a narrative disjunction of time that parallels the “syncopated language” based on broken sentences or verbless clauses —“Voices over the wire, the crump of folding steel, flame” (Proulx 2002: 22); “Ice welding land to sea. Frost smoke. Clouds mottled by reflections of water holes in the plains of ice. The glare of ice erasing dimension, distance, subjecting senses to mirage and illusion. A rare place” (249). Dismembered time and language echo, in turn, the protagonist’s initial feelings of displacement and alienation, and the characters’ fragmented lives made up of stories tied in knots.

After the suicide of both his parents and the loss of his wife in a car accident, Quoyle moves with his two daughters, Bunny and Sunshine, and his aunt, Agnis Ham, to Killick-Claw, in Newfoundland, his ancestral homeland, to “start anew”. He gets a job at the local newspaper, Gammy Bird, where he is given the duty to cover car crashes. At first reluctant, Quoyle gradually understands that confronting his fears is part of the recovery process, and that everyone has a hidden trauma to overcome.

Quoyle’s healing process, which can be seen as knotting together disparate fragments of selfhood, is assisted by the other members of the community who gradually accept him by sharing fragments of their life-stories. If the family knots cannot be untied and the past cannot be changed, coming to terms with one’s life is possible by tying friendship knots. In this sense, Louise Flavin (qtd. in Varvogli 2002: 44) argues that Chapter 1 introduces Quoyle as a piece of rope without a knot (“Quoyle: A coil of rope”), a man with no connections. Furthermore, he is coiled around himself, which suggests that he is isolated, self-absorbed, or incapable of forming relations (Varvogli 2002: 44). The positive symbolism of the knots would therefore refer to the ties between members of a family and the community as a whole, and stories are the catalyst of this bonding. It is through telling stories that Quoyle earns respect and builds his self-esteem: in charge of the
"shipping news" he starts to investigate the history of each vessel, connecting history to people’s stories, creating a sense of identity.

Storytelling and fragmentariness are the focal points of The Shipping News. Proulx uses fragments of research — her academic background enabled her to peruse materials with a keen eye for details —, fragments of experience and imagination to sew a story-quilt. At the same time, the narrative discourse itself is fragmented, full of information gaps, deliberate omissions, elliptical language, “staccato rhythms and stylistic tics” (qtd. in Varvogli 2002: 73), while the story recounts a broken, fragmented man’s unlikely quest for completeness which he founds by means of storytelling. In this sense, The Shipping News is self-reflexive and self-conscious, but also self-undermining. The excipit of the story correlates with the disclaimer featured on the copyright page, converting the narrative discourse into metadiscourse.

This conventional happy ending is ironical, validating the self-subverting aspects of The Shipping News, the idea of craftiness and artificiality, "baring the device". Annie Proulx claims that she decided to give a “happy” ending to this novel in response to readers’ comments on her previous works of fiction. “I was so tired of people saying Postcards was dark,” she confessed, “and after I’d heard it for the 900th time I thought — OK, so a happy ending is wanted, isn’t it. So I thought I’d have an amusing time writing a book with a happy ending. Although the happy part of The Shipping News was the absence of pain, so it’s a sort of happiness by default” (qtd. in Varvogli 2002: 64). Like Italo Calvino, Proulx assigns readers a central role: “However you read it that’s how it is” (qtd. in Varvogli 2002: 65), she replied to a female reader who was disappointed to learn that the happy ending was ironic and contrived to meet readers’ expectations. Thus, in The Shipping News, the closure is, in Roland Barthes’ expression, à la fois posé et déçu (qtd. in Kermode 1983: 62), “erasing” or cancelling itself.

Both Calvino — in rejecting or resisting completeness — and Proulx — in parodying the conventional ending — deconstruct the very notion of closure, of what Kermode calls “one of the most powerful of the local and provincial restrictions”, the narrative “tabu” “that a novel must end” (Kermode 1983: 56), assigning fragmentariness a subversive role.

The questions regarding the nature of fiction, the violation of boundaries between worlds, the relationship between reader and text, etc. raised by both If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler and The Shipping News, and bear-
ing “either on the ontology of the literary text itself or on the ontology of the world it projects” seem to support Brian McHale’s thesis according to which “the dominant of postmodernist fiction is ontological” (McHale 2003: 10-11). The strategy both novelists adopt in order to posit such questions is pervasive fragmentariness. In this sense, both novels can be seen as pertaining to what Roukhomovsky called l’ordre fragmentaire as both of them are built on the tension between continuity and discontinuity, between inclusion and omission, between completeness and fragmentariness.

L’exigence fragmentaire as “persistent unsettling of intellectual and artistic territories and ideological positions” (Strathman 2006: 31) appears correlated in If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler and The Shipping News with the problem of reading. Calvino playfully frustrates readers’ expectations while Proulx, equally playfully, meets them and in so doing cancels them. Both writers thus literally reassert the point made by Ford Madox Ford in The Good Soldier, a point brilliantly summarized by Frank Kermode in the chapter on “recognition and deception” in The Art of Telling:

We are in a world of which it needs to be said not that plural readings are possible (for this is true of all narrative) but that the illusion of the single right reading is possible no longer (Kermode 1983: 102).

References


DEARLY BELOVED:
TONI MORRISON’S RESURRECTION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN NARRATIVE

CRISTINA CHEVEREŞAN
University of Timişoara

Abstract: In a contemporary American society that prides itself on multiculturalism, the rise of strong ‘minority’ voices seems only natural. Toni Morrison takes it upon herself to use the language of literature as an exquisite means of recreating history. This paper views Beloved as a creative transcript of African-American experience, as high-quality fiction meant to capture the essence of traditional story-telling.

Winner of the 1988 Pulitzer Prize for Fiction and a key element in Morrison’s successful claim to the 1993 Nobel Prize in Literature, Beloved is probably one of the most generously acclaimed novels in recent American and world fiction-writing. Its surface-level seems to classify it as a thriller centered upon a typical poltergeist-case: Sethe’s house is literally inhabited and, at a certain point, run by a ghost. However, the actual story behind this hallucinating atmosphere runs a lot deeper, the novel putting forward, in fact, a skilful reconstruction of black history in America during and after the Civil War.

Beloved is a tale of tales. Its intricate web of fragmented personal narratives gives the impression of recreating the main characters’ individual identities. However, apart from a painful re(dis)covery of the self, the book offers a spectacular resurrection of a larger-than-life ghost: that of slavery itself. What the writer does is to rewrite the factual experience of an oppressed minority by means of unleashing its demons, by means of giving a voice to the people whose version of the truth has always been subject to that of the more coherent, more literate and therefore more credible master-narratives.

Toni Morrison’s Beloved reconceptualizes American history. Most apparent in the novel is the historical perspective: Morrison constructs history through the acts and consciousness of African-American slaves rather than
through the perspective of the dominant white social classes. But historical methodology takes another vital-shift in *Beloved*; history-making becomes a healing process for the characters, the reader, and the author (Krumholz in Andrews & McKay 1999: 107).

The whole novel is structured around the characters’ recollections of a repressed past. Each of the individuals whose destinies intermingle has a particular relationship to the traumatic events everybody seems to think are better left unspoken. The reincarnation of a dead child, a direct victim to the horrors of slavery, is a narrative pretext. The accompanying shock within the community triggers a memory-wave. While attempts are made to find out and accommodate the truth about Beloved as a person, what actually happens is a re-shaping of stereotypical perceptions of the effects and repercussions of slavery as a general process.

“To Sethe, the future was a matter of keeping the past at bay” (Morrison 1998: 45). This is one of the first indications that the return of the past into the protagonist’s life will equal a journey into dark territories. It is out of these ambiguous regions of the human psyche that Beloved’s ghost ominously surfaces. Her appearance is rather symbolic: it is not she who haunts her mother’s consciousness, it is the inherent cruelty of a life without a self, without the right to own anything (own progeny included).

Taken at face value, the novel could be superficially dismissed as the story of a murderous mother hiding from the consequences of her infanticide. What the book actually deals with is the dramatic experience of a mother forced into believing that death was a better option for her children than life at the mercy of the unmerciful. At the narrative core lie the voices of the insignificant — the children, the women, the blacks — who come to contradict the white elitist assumption that the only way to ultimate knowledge is the written word. Morrison’s initiative is rather of an anthropological nature, a minute recording of life-stories as means of recreating historical truth.

Mae G. Henderson’s article on *Re-Membering the Body as Historical Text* makes a fairly convincing point in this respect, resorting to the writers’ own statements:

In a 1989 interview, Morrison tells us that *Beloved* is a book ‘about something that the characters don’t want to remember, I don’t want to remember, black people don’t want to remember, white people don’t want to remember.’ The author’s remarks speak to a public desire to repress the
personal aspects of the story of slavery. Returning to Morrison’s role as historian and analyst, however, we see that her accomplishment in this novel is precisely not to allow for the continuation of a ‘national amnesia’ regarding this chapter in America’s history […] The importance of our private memories becomes, ultimately, the basis for a reconstructed public history (1991: 83).

Private memory is the mechanism that fascinates both writer and reader in *Beloved*. Its sinuous workings, its emotional response to pressure are all things to be translated into Morrison’s account of tales. What the Nobel-prize winner does is to dwell upon the essentially oral tradition of the black community in order to reconstruct its history. Her approach is one that employs artistic creativity as an effective tool directed at exploring the cultural heritage of one of America’s most vibrant minorities. Talking about the fate of African-Americans whose access to literacy and therefore public recognition was constantly denied for ages, she gets even. As an accomplished 20th century writer, she uses the master-power of the written word in order to glorify the importance of verbal art.

Morrison claims that it is precisely because the black oral historical tradition is now a thing of the past that the African-American novel is so necessary: ‘the novel is needed by African Americans now in a way that it was not needed before… We don’t live in places where we can hear those stories anymore; parents don’t sit around and tell their children those classical, mythological, archetypal stories that we heard years ago’. Those stories must have a place in African-American culture, and they have found their place in the novel. The novel becomes for Morrison what Aunt Sue was for Langston Hughes — the site of an oral history passed from generation to generation (Rushdy 1999: 56).

Viewed through this particular lens, Morrison’s characters in *Beloved* are all storytellers, starting with Baby Suggs, to whom the art of preaching is a way of communal action, a ritual means of preserving and reviving tradition (cf. Harris 1999: passim). While she seems to be the priestess of absolution, she is also the one that sets things in motion, the one with an amazing, almost supernatural power. “Why is she always the center of things? How come she always knows exactly what to do and when? Giving advice; passing messages; healing the sick, hiding fugitives, loving, cooking, cooking, loving, preaching, singing, dancing and loving everybody like it was her job and hers alone” (Morrison 1988: 144).
One can easily notice in this particular passage the parallelism between the vital collector of other people’s narratives and the tradition of story-telling itself. Just as Baby Suggs occupies a central place in the community, equally translating its ecstasies and its anxieties into poetry, storytelling lies at the heart of the novel as a primordial way of giving advice, passing messages, suffering and rejoicing. Relying upon ritual practices of psychic healing, both the character and her method respond to “the necessity for a psychological cleansing from the past, a space to encounter painful memories safely and rest from them” (Krumholz 1999: 110).

The insertion of Dearly Beloved’s ghost into Sethe’s life is meant as a persuasive moral obligation for her to face her shameful, bitterly repressed memories. The entire string of personal and collective discourses that surround her exemplifies the way in which the burden of personal and historical consciousness can be made bearable by means of directly addressing the troubling issues. From this point of view, Paul D, the male protagonist, is probably the most coherent investigator, the alert consciousness, the camera eye that records reality.

During, before and after the War he had seen Negroes so stunned, or hungry, or tired or bereft it was a wonder they recalled or said anything. Who, like him, had hidden in caves and fought owls for food; who, like him, stole from pigs; who, like him, slept in trees in the day and walked by night; who, like him, had buried themselves in slop and jumped in wells to avoid regulators, raiders, patrollers, veterans, hill men, posses and merrymakers. Once he met a Negro about fourteen years old who lived by himself in the woods and said he couldn’t remember living anywhere else. He saw a witless coloredwoman jailed and hanged for stealing ducks she believed were her own babies. Move. Walk. Run. Hide. Steal and move on (Morrison 1988: 70).

In such passages, Morrison uses the third person omniscient narration to render experiences too hard to voice for Paul D. or any other black fugitive for that matter. The writer makes her readers witnesses to the minority’s humiliation by the dominant white culture. Clear references to oppression and segregation are embedded into the narrative. Morrison resorts to silent memory rather than to outspoken testimonies since language stands rebuked in a world in which free speech is annihilated. The overflow of stories in the novel, the gradual growth of the past out of dismantled narratives marks a particular form of rebellion, a subversion of the silent pattern.
The War had been over four or five years then, but nobody white or black seemed to know it. Odd clusters and strays of Negroes wandered the back roads and cowpaths from Schenedtady to Jackson. […] Configurations and blends of families of women and children, while elsewhere, solitary, hunted and hunting for, were men, men, men. Forbidden public transportation, chased by debt and filthy ‘talking sheets’, they followed secondary routes, scanned the horizon for signs and counted heavily on each other. Silent, except for social courtesies, when they met one another they neither described nor asked about the sorrow that drove them from one place to another. The whites didn’t bear speaking on. Everybody knew (56).

This is the confusing, contradictory background against which Sethe’s story unfolds. After the end of the Civil War, the whole ‘order’ of things is disrupted. Reconstruction brings about hope and disillusionment, theoretical changes and ruthless practices, the glamorous perspective of equal rights projected against the dark screen of exploitation and unforgettable mistreatments. Beloved offers a crash-course in black history as seen through the eyes of its characters: the abolitionist frenzy and the (physical and mental) torture that prevents them from clearly articulating their memories.

No more discussions, stormy or quiet, about the true meaning of the Fugitive Bill, the Settlement Fee, God’s Ways and Negro pews; antislavery, manumission, skin voting, republicans, Dred Scott, book learning, Sojourner’s highwheeled buggy, the Colored Ladies of Delaware, Ohio, and the other weighty issues that held them in chairs, scraping the floorboards or pacing them in agony or exhilaration. No anxious wait for the North Star or news of a beat-off. No sighing at a new betrayal or handclapping at a small victory (181).

To the reader who is at least briefly acquainted with the realities of American history during the 19th century, each of the aforementioned words and images recalls particular realities of the time. The factual frame used in Beloved can be easily recognized. The point of view, however, is one that imposed illiteracy and fear managed to silence back when black and inexistent were synonymous. As Dana Heller (1994: 105) puts it, “that picture is the historical process of American social and economic development. Its organizing principle is racial oppression, or more specifically the dynamic of relations of domination perpetuated by the institutional enslavement of Africans who were brought to the American colonies as indentured servants as early as 1619”.

From this particular perspective, *Beloved* is a restoration of order, a balancing of the discursive scale. The reconstruction of a denied self and of its relationships to alterity (family, community, society) is undertaken through *re-memorising* in the act of storytelling. While Mae G. Henderson talks about “the notion of ‘literary archaeology’ — the imaginative and reconstructive recovery of the past which characterizes Morrison’s fictive process” (1991: 66), Sethe, the novels' protagonist herself warns from the very beginning against the overwhelming power of remembrance and the powerlessness of humans to sever connections with an uncomfortable past:

Some things go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my rememory. You know. Some things you forget. Other things you never do. But it's not. Places, places are still there. If a house burns down, it's gone, but the place — the picture of it — stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in the world. What I remember is a picture floating around out there outside my head. I mean, even if I don't think it, even if I die, the picture of what I did, or knew, or saw is still out there. Right in the place where it happened (Morrison 1988: 38).

This function of this passage is premonitory, since Sethe will find herself swallowed by her dead daughter’s ghost, by the reincarnated past, by the embodied memory that literally feeds on her. “It became a way to feed her. Just as Denver discovered and relied on the delightful effect sweet things had on Beloved, Sethe learned the profound satisfaction Beloved got from storytelling. It amazed Sethe (as much as it pleased Beloved) because every mention of her past life hurt. Everything in it was painful or lost” (62). One of the main assets of Morrison's prose is the play upon ambivalence, the paradoxical, mixed nature of remembrance. The sharing of stories can be salutary, life-supporting, but at the same time it may have a destructive effect. It is through them that the hurt comes alive once more, it is through them that it can finally be put to rest.

Sethe’s story is one of merciless dispossession. She has undergone the dreadful experience of not owning anything, not even herself. She has been somebody’s property, she has been treated as merchandise, like so many of her kind. Her sickly attachment to Beloved is strictly connected to trauma. The feeling of free ownership of her own flesh and blood is what Sethe desperately needs to compensate for the loss of her milk and her baby — a
woman’s most intimate ‘belongings’. Her frame of mind is shaped by the master-narrative, in which the blacks are depicted as trading objects.

Shackled, walking through the perfumed things honeybees love, Paul D hears the men talking and for the first time learns his worth. He has always known, or believed he did, his value — as a hand, a laborer who could make profit on a farm — but now he discovers his worth, which is to say he learns his price. The dollar value of his weight, his strength, his brain, his penis, and his future (238).

Sethe’s inner struggle in the novel is that of breaking free. The official threat of slavery has been removed. The scar that remains is primarily mental. While the tree on Sethe’s back, the physical proof of her past, has caused the skin to go numb, the woman’s mind and heart cannot remain frozen. Morrison’s skillfully rendered message is conveyed by means of the voices: Sethe’s own, trembling, stuttering, growing stronger in time, Paul D’s, the voice of reason (“me and you, we got more yesterday than anybody. We need some kind of tomorrow”) and, louder than any other, Baby Suggs’, holy’s. The ultimate lesson is that of self-respect and love as opposed to practical and mental enslavement. The way in which it is phrased, its vivid orality, its incantatory form, makes it probably one of the most powerful messages in American literature:

Here, she said, in this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in the grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not love your flesh. They despise it. They don’t love your eyes; they’d just as soon pick em out. No more do they love the skin on your back. Yonder flay it. And O my people they do not love your hands. Those they only use, tie, bind, chop off and leave empty. Love your hands! Love them. Raise them up and kiss them. Touch others with them, pat them together, stroke them on your face ‘cause they don’t love that either. You got to love it, you! And no, they ain’t in love with your mouth. Yonder, out there, they will see it broken and break it again. What you say out of it they will not heed. What you scream from it they do not hear. What you put into it to nourish your body they will snatch away and give you leavins instead. No, they don’t love your mouth. You got to love it. This is flesh I’m talking about here. Flesh that needs to be loved. Feet that need to rest and to dance; backs that need support; shoulders that need arms, strong arms I’m telling you. And O my people, out yonder, hear me, they do not love your neck unnoosed and straight. So love your neck; put a hand on it, grace it, stroke it and hold it up. And all your inside parts that they’d just as soon slop for hogs, you got to love them. The dark, dark liver — love it, love it, and the
beat and beating heart, love that too. More than eyes or feet. More than lungs that have yet to draw free air. More than your life-holding womb and your life-giving private parts, hear me now, love your heart. For this is the prize (94).

References


UNDEAF YOUR EARS: WHAT THE TRAGEDY OF RICHARD II GIVES US TO HEAR

JACQUES RAMEL
Université Lumière-Lyon 2

Abstract: In Shakespeare’s Richard II, the theme of death is present not only through the vocabulary, but also through the sounds that are used, and especially the rhymes. It could be argued that the play that you hear is more of a tragedy than the play that you read. The present paper examines these sound patterns and the way in which they enrich the meanings of the text.

The Tragedy of Richard II by William Shakespeare narrates the deposition of the last Plantagenet King of England, Richard II, by a usurper who also happens to be his cousin, Bolingbroke, later King Henry IV. The play is both a history play and a tragedy. I would like to argue in favour of the tragic reading of the play, and I will base my plea upon patterns of sounds in the play, upon the oral rendering of the play rather than upon the written text.

Richard II is a play about nothing and nothingness — just as the Tragedy of King Lear is. It is a play about absence, about hollowness — “the hollow crown” of course, which is the illustration most commonly chosen for the covers of editions of the play; but also the hollow of the grave, an image that recurs in an obsessive way, in the form of the “hollow ground” (Scroop, 3.2.140), or more strikingly as the “hollow womb” (Gaunt, 2.1.83) — those graves that men keep digging tirelessly, sometimes even with their tears as Richard suggests in 3.3.

Hollowness is linked with death in the image of the skull, with its main characteristic, “the hollow eyes of Death” (2.1.270), and the skull is multiplied in “the field of Golgotha and dead men’s skulls” (4.1.145) — the name “Golgotha” itself being derived from a word meaning “skull” in the Aramaic language. All those hollows are clamouring to be filled by dead bodies, by Death himself who leads the dance from the central hollow of the crown: “For within the hollow crown / That rounds the mortal temples of a king / Keeps Death his court” (3.2.160-2).
Interestingly 7 of the 25 occurrences of the word “nothing” in Richard II are to be found in one passage in 2.2: King Richard has just left England for war in Ireland, and the Queen remains alone with the King’s favourites. These repeated occurrences of the word “nothing” make this passage remarkable, even to non-Shakespearean scholars, such as Slavoj Žižek who has entitled one of his books Looking Awry (1991), a quotation from this passage.

At first the Queen willingly admits that her grief is in excess of the event that causes it — that is Richard’s departure for the war in Ireland. She is aware of that excess of grief as she tells us, about her own soul, that “at something it grieves / More than with parting from my lord the King” (2.2.12-3). But at the same time, paradoxically, she admits that this “something” may be “nothing”: “…methinks / Some unborn sorrow, ripe in Fortune’s womb, / Is coming towards me, and my inward soul / With nothing trembles” (9-12): what saddens her is “nothing” because it is yet “unborn”.

Bushy, who is one of Richard’s favourites, then attempts to comfort the Queen by showing her that her sorrow is merely grounded upon illusion, and he does this by using the optical games that were fashionable in those days, first the multiple refraction of images by a block of glass cut with several facets, and then anamorphosis. We are easily convinced by Bushy’s use of the image of the cut block of glass: by multiplying the reflexions of one object, the numerous facets make this one object appear more threatening than it really is.

Then, Bushy proceeds to use the optical trick of anamorphosis. Bushy seems to be explaining the basis of anamorphosis: he tells us that there are two ways of looking at an anamorphosis: either it is looked at a right angle to its surface, that is “rightly gazed upon” (18); in this case, it is “nothing but confusion”. On the contrary, you can only “distinguish form” (20) if you look at it from one side, that is, if it is “eyed awry” (19): this is a classic definition of anamorphosis.

But it is obvious that for Bushy, the main meanings of the words “rightly” and “awry” are not geometrical, but figurative, we could almost say moral. For Bushy, looking at the painting “rightly”, that is squarely, with the direction of your gaze at a right angle to its surface, is the only normal and acceptable way of looking at it, whereas eyeing it “awry” is felt to be an abnormal, or deviant, way of looking at it.
What Bushy is advising the Queen to do goes against pictorial orthodoxy. In his interpretation, the Queen is wrong because she is eyeing the situation “awry”, that is not “rightly”, which leads her to misunderstand it. In this speech Bushy actually describes the current situation is terms of anamorphosis, but nevertheless pleads in favour of looking at it as if it were not so.

This leads us to wonder what it is that Bushy is trying to hide from the Queen, and perhaps even from himself. What is it that becomes visible if you look at the situation “awry”? What Bushy does not want to see is obviously the “nothing” that the Queen sees and that makes her sad, that “unborn sorrow” which is soon to come to life. The Queen has caught sight of that growing “nothing”, which must not be seen, and which is nevertheless about to be born — and which can only be death, the central hollow around which the whole of the play is organized, death the unmentionable — death which must not be mentioned, but which must not be seen either.

The anamorphosis that Bushy is thinking of could well be, actually, *The Ambassadors* by Hans Holbein the Younger, painted in 1533, probably the best known of the Renaissance anamorphoses, which is displayed at the National Gallery in London.

When “rightly gazed upon”, this painting shows us two richly-clad young men, two French ambassadors to the Court of England, with symbols of crafts and arts in the background; critics have shown that the choice of symbols in the background makes this a very complex work of art, and I will not go into that. What I am interested in is the anamorphic part of it, which is not the whole of the painting but only the long ivory-coloured shape across the foreground of the canvas. When “eyed awry”, that is by an observer who puts his eye against the bottom left corner of the canvas, this shape appears to be a skull.

Whatever the primary reading of the painting is, this hidden skull turns this work into a vanity, that is the category of works of art that brought together symbols of life, of success, of greatness, of pleasure, and of human knowledge, with a *memento mori* under the form of a skull: “*vanitas vanitatis, omnia vanitas*”.

Actually, just for the record: there may be another, lighter, meaning of this skull: it may also be an in-joke on the name of the painter, Holbein, *hohl Bein*, hollow bone — a sort of signature. But nevertheless, a skull.
If we come back to the text: it may be possible to hear like an echo of this *memento mori* in the repetition of the word “more” in the passage. The word “more” sounds like the first syllable of words such as “mortal” or “mortality”, and is repeated like a tolling knell, first by the Queen (13), then three times by Bushy (22, and twice in 25). Speakers of any language of Latin origin, such as Romanian, are of course more readily aware of the overtones of the word which reminds us of “mort” in French, “moarte” in Romanian.

When Bushy declares, “More is not seen / Or it if be, ’tis with false Sorrow’s eye”, the sentence assumes a very explicit meaning if we accept that behind the word “more” lurks the *memento mori*: what Bushy is telling us is that we do not see the skull, or if we do, it is only because we have allowed sorrow to make our sight false — that is, because we have allowed sorrow to make us look “awry”. In other words, Bushy denies the presence of death, and yet he cannot erase it from his speech.

In the dialogue between the Queen and Richard’s favourite, the Queen comes out as the one who is willing to look straight into what she cannot comprehend, into this “nothing” which is at the same time “something”, which is the hollowness of death. This paradox, which cannot be uttered clearly in words, is conveyed through a series of oppositions and of oxymorons which reaches their climax just before Green enters the stage, with the phrase “Tis nameless woe, I wot” (40), a sentence that places side by side knowledge and ignorance through the similarity between the two words “woe” and “wot”, that bring together two irreconcilable truths: the truth that you can see when you look at the painting squarely, and the truth that can only be seen when you eye it awry: the Queen knows that she does not know.

The unnamed terror that the Queen has sensed is suddenly embodied by Green who is coming towards her, and who enters the stage to give shape to the hollowness by lamenting the vacuum that was created as the King left: emptiness clearly is the absence of the body of the King.

As to Bushy, his deliberate blindness in this passage cannot save him long from seeing what he refuses to see here; in act 3, scene 1, he is finally made to stare his own death in the face as he is sentenced to death by Bolingbroke and led to the executioner.
The articulation of death and hollowness is nowhere more obvious than in the very last scene of the play, which takes place around the coffin of Richard within which lies the body of the dead King. There are two good reasons why the King's body should be visible in this scene. First, Shakespeare follows the original narration by Holinshed throughout the play, and there is no particular reason why he should not have done so in this scene — and Holinshed explicitly states that the body of the King was visible. The second reason is that a visible corpse is much more theatrical than one within a closed coffin.

Exton, the murderer of the King, naively believes that the vacuum can be filled, that the hollow coffin, or the hollow grave, can be satisfied, that it can be sated just by burying in it the body of the dead King: “Great King, within this coffin I present / Thy buried fear” (5.6.30-1): for Exton, the fear that King Henry IV entertains for his own life can be allayed by filling the coffin with another body, thus putting an end to the hunger of the grave.

But the hollow grave is bottomless, and Bolingbroke himself is now aware of that, as the end of the play is decidedly more sombre and more reflective than the first acts. The play ends on a couplet by the new King, with “here” rhyming with “bier”, that is death articulated with the present: “Grace my mourning here / In weeping after this untimely bier” (51-2). The very last word in the play is “bier”, as if death had been the ultimate purpose followed by Richard.

We are reminded once more that the only truth of drama is to be found in words, in sounds, especially at a time when, as you know, Shakespeare’s contemporaries did not go to the playhouse to “watch” a play as we do nowadays, but to “hear” a play, as the phrase was then.

Just as Bushy unknowingly announced the coming death of Richard through his repetition of the word “more”, similarly the “here / bier” rhyme in the final couplet of the play forces us to apprehend the play as a tragedy more than as a political drama. But, more interestingly, this final couplet also forces us to look closely at the occurrences in the rest of the play of words that rhyme with “bier”, and particularly of the words “ear”, the organ, and “to hear”, the function.

My attention is first attracted to the dialogue between York and Gaunt, two uncles of the young King, which opens the long first scene of act 2. Both of them are typified as old men, and Gaunt is dying; and not surprisingly for
us, we hear the word “more” four times within the first few lines that he speaks (twice in 9, then 11, 14).

Whereas York advises Gaunt to stop any attempt at advising Richard, “for all in vain comes counsel to his ear” (4), Gaunt replies that more weight is attached to the words of a dying man, such as he is: “Where words are scarce, they are seldom spent in vain” (7). It may well be “in vain” that these two old men, figures of mortality, try to talk to this “vain” young man, who is associated with the notion of vanity by both his uncles (24, 38). Gaunt nevertheless decides to speak to Richard, convinced that, as a dying man, he can make Richard listen, whereas he would not be heard while living: “Though Richard my life’s counsel would not hear, / My death’s sad tale may yet undeaf his ear” (15-6).

But it is just as impossible to make Richard hear the words of death as it is to make Bushy see death in the first passage that we studied: death cannot be heard any more than it can be seen. The vanity (etymologically meaning “vacuum”, from the Latin “vanus”, hollow) of Richard closes his ears to the message of death, whereas they are wide open to the “lascivious metres” of life (19), just as much as Bushy closes his eye to the anamorphic “vanity” in the scene that we studied first. Richard will not hear, just as Bushy will not see.

The speech in which Gaunt conveys his confidence that he can open the ears of Richard is composed of twelve lines, ten of which are rhymed. After the opening couplet (7-8), the next four lines have rhymes following an a-b-b-a pattern, and are followed again by two rhymed couplets. The final rhyme that brings together “hear” and “ear” sounds like an announcement of the final rhyme in the play, “here / bier”, and therefore like an announcement of Richard’s coffin. Richard’s closed ear announces the final coffin just as much as Bushy’s closed eye announces his beheading. The importance of this “hear / ear” rhyme is shown by it being announced a few lines earlier (“For all in vain comes counsel to his ear” 4), and then recalled a few lines later (“...quickly buzzed into his ears” 26).

My hypothesis is that, in this fundamental scene, a network of echoes is initiated, that will be followed up right to the end of the play, to the final “bier”, and to the achievement of Richard’s destiny. The ear of the spectator, or rather that of the listener that the Elizabethan theatre-goer was, has now been alerted to a phonematic chain whose recurrence he can follow right to the end of the performance.
After he has returned from Ireland, Richard is a changed man, and open to the truth. When Scroop comes to inform him of the catastrophes that have occurred while he was away, Richard describes himself as ready to hear the worst: “Mine ear is open”, he says (3.2.93), in contrast to his earlier deliberate deafness.

The change that has happened to him is highlighted in act five when, now a prisoner of Bolingbroke in Pomfret Castle, Richard hears music poorly played, and, in a passage starting with the word “here” (45), he contrasts the current fineness of his ears, which now makes him aware of any musical discordance (“And here I have the daintiness of ear / To check time broke in a disordered string”, 5.5.45-6) with the deafness that was his in the recent past, when he was king (“for the concord of my state and time / [I] had not an ear to hear my true time broke”, 47-8), and when his uncle’s words of advice were unable to “undeaf his ear”. When he has lost everything, a state of things that is described in the play with numerous verbs starting with the prefix “un-”, Richard has not only been “unkinged” as he describes himself, but also “undeafed”.

Once he has come back from Ireland, Richard not only accepts death, but also seeks it, urged forward by his death drive. Richard is then constantly tottering on the verge, standing on the walls of the castle at Flint ready to fall to the ground like Phaeton, picturing himself on the margin of a well or on the rim of a grave, fascinated by those hollows and by the vacuum to which he aspires. This rush towards the grave is what makes his ears open wide, and ready to absorb any news that announces death now.

Now he would be ready to imbibe Gaunt’s threatening advice, or to see the skull with hollow eyes that Bushy refused to imagine. This rush towards the final “bier” is the form that the tragic takes in this particular tragedy.

That Richard II is, deep down, a tragedy, is of course not a surprise. Nevertheless, I have the impression that the sounds, the assonances, and especially the rhymes of the text focus our attention relentlessly upon the tragic aspect of the play, whereas perhaps the written text keeps a more even balance between the political and the tragic. In other words, the play that we hear may not be exactly the same as the play that we read; the text, when spoken, may make us hear something slightly different from what we read.
Not only have we, spectators, had our eyes opened by the text that forces us to eye the play "awry", but, more powerfully, we have also had our ears “undeafed”.

References


INSCRIPTION AND ENCRYPTION:
DAPHNE DU MAURIER'S *REBECCA*

KLAUDIA PAPP
University of Debrecen

Abstract: Drawing upon Silverman's and Kristeva's ideas on melancholia, the paper claims that du Maurier's *Rebecca* dramatizes Silverman's thesis asserting that women are constitutively melancholic: having to renounce the mother as a devalued object of desire, but also required to identify with her, daughters tend to encrypt the mother's imago, an abject that will inhabit (haunt) the boundaries of their egos.

In her outstanding book on Hitchcock and feminist film theory, Tania Modleski begins the chapter devoted to the reading of Hitchcock's filmic adaptation of Daphne du Maurier's enormously popular novel *Rebecca* by quoting a critical remark according to which “the film fails either to assimilate or to vomit out the indigestible novelettish ingredients of Daphne du Maurier's book” (1988:43). She goes on to add how Hitchcock himself dismissed his own film for not being a truly Hitchcockian picture due to its "novelettish" features that he directly associated with the fact that the book belonged to the school of feminine literature written at that period. As Modleski concludes on the same page, the novelettish aspects of the film are clearly related to the essentially feminine aspect of the book, “a femininity that remains alien and disturbing, neither expelled nor ‘digested’ in the course of the film”.

Such critical comments seem to echo the novel’s central male character, Maxim de Winter’s puzzlement as regards the alien and disturbing nature of femininity. He attests himself to be similarly intrigued by femininity’s clandestine character, when — using his customary paternal tone — he lectures his young wife on the basic differences between the sexes. In his educational speech he delineates a clearly oppositional, binary structure for the masculine and the feminine: “If I told you I was thinking about Surrey and Middlesex I was thinking about Surrey and Middlesex. Men are simpler than you imagine, my sweet child. But what goes on in the twisted tortuous
minds of women would baffle anyone” (du Maurier 1992: 210). Maxim’s choice of words here makes it immediately apparent that there is more at stake in his words than the mere verbalization of the enigmatic nature of femininity. Dictionaries invariably provide the following entries for the words “twisted” and “tortuous” respectively: “twisted” means (1) wound or wrapped around something, (2) strained or wrenched out of normal shape, and (3) having an intended meaning altered or misrepresented. “Tortuous” denotes (1) full of twists and turns, but also connotes the meanings (2) not direct or straightforward, and (3) deceitfully indirect or morally crooked. Accordingly, what seem to be contrasted in the binary pattern Maxim sketches here are a simple and straightforward masculinity that has a primal relation to meaning, truth(fulness) and authenticity, and a grotesque, abnormal, deceptive, morally inferior femininity, alien and threatening for its capability of distorting, manipulating and misrepresenting (intended) meaning and truth.

To Maxim femininity (associated with his late first wife Rebecca) is threatening and deceitful as it fails to function as a screen reflecting back the masculine fantasy of self-sameness and as such it challenges the authority of the male subject. The only way to eliminate this threat is through acts of violence: by silencing feminine difference for good (around the middle of the novel the reader is informed that Rebecca did not drown but Maxim shot her) and by forcefully substituting this otherness with the fantasy of an idealized, tamed femininity (associated with the narrator). Yet, in the course of the novel, this femininity refuses to be suppressed and contained very easily: it returns to haunt the characters and Manderley, jeopardizing the conventional, normative resolution of the novel’s romance plot. As Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok claim, when haunting occurs in the psychoanalytic sense of the word it is always already textual and intersubjective: the “phantom” that returns to haunt the subject is “the ‘unsaid’ and the ‘unsayable’ of an other, [t]he silence, gap, or secret in the speech of someone else” (qtd. in Castricano 2001: 24). In the novel this “phantom” haunting the narrator is Maxim’s secret of the threatening femininity and female sexuality embodied in the spectral image of Rebecca, kept “alive” by Rebecca’s devoted surrogate Mrs. Danvers. Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnik, two of du Maurier’s best-known critics, note how the text abounds in references to secrets, locks, keys and knowledge barred from the narrator (1998:103). Maxim’s reading of the riddle of femininity and sexual difference
is clearly based on his belief in the idea of an omnipotent male mastery of meaning and knowledge. The fantasy of man’s exclusive access to proper meaning includes the fantasy of his privilege to create meaning and monitor the knowledge of that meaning, to decide what is right and what is wrong, what is the truth and what is only a distortion of the truth. His wish to control the narrator’s access to prohibited knowledge is made evident in one of the most frequently quoted passages of the text in which, after witnessing his young wife’s unconscious momentary identification with Rebecca, he accuses her of having had “a flash of knowledge in [her] eyes. Not the right sort of knowledge” (du Maurier 1992:211), because it made her look “deceitful” (210). Then, in the voice of an authoritative father figure, who has every right to decide what is the right and what is the wrong kind of knowledge his daughter can or cannot get access to, he claims: “Listen, my sweet. When you were a little girl, were you ever forbidden to read certain books, and did your father put those books under lock and key? […] Well, then. A husband is not so very different from a father after all. There is a certain kind of knowledge I prefer you not to have. It’s better kept under lock and key. So that’s that” (211).

Interestingly, and in sync with Abraham and Torok’s theory of intersubjective haunting that is always already textual, Maxim links the site of the forbidden/secret knowledge of threatening female sexuality to locked-up books, that is, to textuality. This move, however, instead of distancing the narrator from forbidden knowledge by referring it to the realm of “inaccessible” textuality, seems only to facilitate her better understanding of it, as Manderley is made a haunted place exactly by those objects and sites that conflate writing and textuality with aspects of Rebecca’s uncontainable femininity. Thus, to the narrator, Rebecca’s body and sexuality are most closely accessible through an obsessive reading of her omnipresent handwriting, signature and initials, all of which function as indelible traces inscribing her seductive corporeality.

Compared to the shy and inexperienced heroine’s childish handwriting, Rebecca’s writing is powerful and confident, described by the words “strong” (du Maurier 1992: 37), “bold” (48), “assured” (48), “alive” (62), “full of force” (62), a “symbol of herself” (48). On her first morning at Manderley the butler informs the narrator that the late Mrs. de Winter used to start all her days in the morning room, where she “did all her correspondence” (87). The orderliness of her writing-table clearly associates Rebecca with a
highly competent, experienced writer. In her dedication to Maxim on the flyleaf of a book, she calls him “Max” (37), indicating her “power to name and possess” (Horner and Zlosnik 1998:113). As the narrator ponders upon coming across this dedication: “Max was her choice, the word was her possession” (du Maurier 1992:48).

The letter “R” in her signature and initials, so powerful that it “dwarfs” (37) the rest of the letters and is impossible to erase since it resurfaces as embroidery, writing or engraving on various objects scattered in the house, is another textual trace that invites an association with feminine corporeality and sexuality. As some critics of the novel observe, the capital “R” can also be read as the graphic imitation of the curved lines of an overly sexual female body (see Horner and Zlosnik 1998: 110, Lloyd Smith 1992: 302). The uncontainability of femininity that Modleski attributes to both the novel and Hitchcock’s filmic adaptation of the novel can best be grasped in how it manifests itself through Rebecca’s signature and script. Elizabeth Grosz contends that “there are ways in which the sexuality and corporeality of the subject leave their trace or marks on the texts produced” and so “the signature not only signs the text by a mark of authorial property but also signs the subject as the product of writing, […] of textuality” (1995: 21). What Rebecca’s corporeal presence through her script makes explicit is how the body and sexuality are not fixed and pre-given biological entities but are always already defined by textuality and come into being as a result of a process of discursive production. According to Grosz, signature “is the condition for endless repeatability […], perpetual openness to repositioning, […] capacity to be continuously re-read, re-written” (1995: 23). By telling a different story about their “author” every time, Rebecca’s signature and script comprise diametrically opposed extremes: they present her as the ideal and loving wife, the perfect mistress of Manderley, the embodiment of propriety and proper femininity, but at the same time they also inscribe her overwhelming confidence, strength and autonomous sexuality, all of which refer her more to the masculine pole in the binary structure of gender roles. The femininity that haunts the novel and the film, Rebecca’s femininity, is uncontainable because it is uncanny. As Shoshana Felman argues in her seminal article “Rereading Femininity,” when femininity is uncanny “it is not the opposite of masculinity but that which [uncannily] subverts the very opposition of masculinity and femininity” (1981: 41). Rebecca becomes a liminal figure because she “deals in undecidability” (Derrida 1981), flaunt-
ing the fictionality, textuality and consequent fluidity of gender categories and sexual identity.

Her liminality and spectrality links this reading back to Abraham and Torok's notion of the "phantom" that they define as the unwitting reception of someone else's secret, an unsayable gap in another person's speech that works "like a stranger within the subject's mental topography" (qtd. in Lloyd Smith 1992: 281, also see Abraham and Torok 1994: 168). Rebecca does indeed figure as an inarticulable void in Maxim's speech: her name is a "forbidden word" (du Maurier 1992:42), and "he never talk[s] about Rebecca, [...] he never mention[s] her name" (282). Such a gap, such a discontinuity of meaning in one's speech naturally invites a compulsive wish to know and generates an interpretative frenzy in others. Rebecca might actually be called a reading effect: she becomes a haunting presence as a result of the narrator's desperate attempts to give meaning to Maxim's secret. Due to Maxim's silence as regards the true nature of his marriage to Rebecca and the ambiguity of the traces she can fall back on to decipher his secret, the narrator understandably does her best to be able to refashion herself as the ideal object of Maxim's desire she assumes Rebecca used to be. Finally, in the novel's highly memorable costume ball scene, Rebecca's phantom, behaving like an incorporated "stranger" in the narrator's "psychic topography," gets virtually reanimated in and through the narrator's body. With Mrs. Danvers's "kind" help the narrator unwittingly chooses to wear the replica of the dress Rebecca wore at her last ball at Manderley. When, all dressed up and ready to go down to meet the guests, the narrator takes a final look at herself, she catches sight of a "stranger" in the mirror: "I did not recognize the face that stared at me in the glass. The eyes were larger [...], the mouth narrower, the skin white and clear? The curls stood away from the head in a little cloud. I watched this self that was not me at all and then smiled; a new, slow smile" (222).

In *Women Who Knew Too Much* Tania Modleski was the first critic whose reading of *Rebecca* was based on the thesis that the story plays out the "oedipal drama from the feminine point of view" (1988: 46), that is, it dramatizes a woman's problems of "overidentification' with another woman" (1988: 44). The female oedipal trajectory can be described as follows: for little girls (as well as for boys) the first object of desire is the mother. However, at the onset of the castration complex the mother would undergo a devaluation (because she is castrated) and the little girl is expect-
ed to relinquish her mother as a desired object and to displace her desire on the father, but at the same time she is required to identify with the now devalued mother figure. For the novel's narrator this powerful centre of homoerotic desire and subsequent object of identification is obviously Rebecca, often mediated through Mrs. Danvers (for an impressive reading of the narrator's oedipal trajectory through same-sex desire to identification see Bronfen 2004: 37-48, Harbord 1996: 95-103).

Modleski's insight, read parallel with the opening dream sequence of the novel, which makes it unmistakable that the rest of the text is a nostalgic recollection of painful and traumatic events of the past, facilitates the possibility of introducing the concept of melancholy into the present reading. Kaja Silverman argues (and with a slightly different emphasis Judith Butler too) that women are constitutively melancholic. Caught in the double bind of simultaneously having to renounce (that is, lose) the mother as a devalued (because castrated) object of desire, but also having to identify with her, the daughter encrypts the mother's imago that will continue to inhabit and haunt her ego (Silverman 1988: 156-157).

The introduction of the concept of melancholy into this reading makes it possible to bring together the various strands the paper has been focusing on so far (unassimilable femininity, writing/textuality, identification/encryption). In the final dream of the novel the narrator dreams about herself writing as Rebecca:

I was writing letters in the drawing-room. I wrote them all myself with a thick black pen. But when I looked down […] it was not my small square handwriting at all, it was long, and slanting, with curious pointed strokes. […] I got up and went to the looking-glass. A face stared back at me that was not my own. It was very pale, very lovely, framed in a cloud of dark hair. The eyes narrowed and smiled (du Maurier 19992:396).

The narrative frame constituted by the opening and concluding dream scenes of the novel attests to the fact that the older, melancholic narrator has not abjected the figure of Rebecca. While Maxim is described as a dull invalid consumed by mourning for the loss of his beloved Manderley and England, the narrator, having been empowered by the incorporation of Rebecca and her textual confidence and skillfulness, writes the secret, “forbidden [text] [she] was always looking for” (Horner and Zlosnik 1998: 127), that is, the novel itself. And since her production of this melancholy text is not only a means of dealing with melancholia by sublimating her loss aes-
theoretically but also an act of allegiance to the mother by way of inscribing her, it guarantees that Rebecca’s uncontainable feminine spirit will not be repressed and laid to rest.

References


WILLIAM MORRIS'S
CHILD CHRISTOPHER AND GOLDFIND THE FAIR:
MEDIEVALISM AND THE ANTI-NATURALISM OF THE 1890S

CLAUDIA IOANA DOROHOLSCHI
University of Timișoara

Abstract: The paper examines the relationship between William Morris's Medievalist aesthetics and the other anti-naturalist trends at work in the 1890s, by looking at his fantasy writing, particularly Child Christopher and Goldilind the Fair. The way in which his text makes use of the generic markers of the fairy-tale, its treatment of closure and of authorship and the use of ornamentation all connect Morris's writing to fin-de-siècle experimentation.

William Morris's work holds a paradoxical place within the Late Victorian environment. In the early 1890s, he was affiliated with a still very much active second generation of Pre-Raphaelites, together with his friend and collaborator Edward Burne-Jones. They were both advocates of an anti-industrialist stance — the first promoting the work of the craftsman to beautify an everyday life which was more and more damaged by the influence of industrialization and the machine; the second seeking refuge in medievalism and the legends of the Arthurian cycle. Morris's aesthetics is socialist, and, at least theoretically, it bestows a very utilitarian mission upon literature and the arts. It argues that art is called upon to embellish the life of the ordinary worker, which can have numerous benefits — among them, better productivity. However, William Morris cultivates a medievalist aesthetic language which is at best escapist, if not downright anti-Victorian. Both his literature and his designs are heavily aestheticized and formalized, and promote a fin de siècle primacy of ornament which brings him closer to the anti-referential stance of an Aubrey Beardsley than to the moralist and realistic works of his generation of Pre-Raphaelites.

Thus, both his fiction and the work he produced in the field of arts and crafts display this overlap between a Medievalist socialist aesthetics and the anti-naturalist formalism which was to become one of the important sources of the innovative vocabulary of forms of the 1890s. Morris's fantasy
writing, particularly *Child Christopher and Goldilind the Fair* (1995, first published 1895), illustrates this ambivalence. A Medievalist utopia, it makes use of textual strategies which distance it from the conventions of Victorian realism and move in the direction of anti-naturalism and aestheticizing artifice.

In William Morris’s work, nature is seen almost exclusively through the lens of medieval legend. He considers the Middle Ages a period that “stands alone triumphant, the loveliest, brightest, and gayest of all the creations of the human mind and hand” (Morris 2002), one to which he intriguingly ascribes the status of an unlikely Socialist Golden Age, in which man, not yet subject to the tyranny of the machine, was “not FORCED to work for another man’s profit” and “was living in a society THAT HAD ACCEPTED EQUALITY OF CONDITION” (Morris 2002). This freedom made the medieval craftsman produce art for pleasure rather than commercial purpose — and Morris gives this aesthetic pleasure a crucial role in his view on the function of art. Art is called upon to embellish everyday life — and it does so by projecting the worker (for it is the working classes that Morris’s aesthetics persistently focuses on) outside his imperfect everyday environment. This is why the socialist Morris produces not narratives of social decay like Dickens, but fantasy stories and poems set in Chaucerian times; not paintings of street urchins and working class quarters, but elegant book bindings and wallpaper designs.

The story of *Child Christopher and Goldilind the Fair* is a fairy-tale of admirable princely characters facing vicissitudes that eventually resolve into a classical happy end. The two protagonists, orphaned and tricked out of their fortunes and kingdoms, come together and find fulfillment in marriage and in becoming enlightened rulers after regaining their castles and their titles. The theme, but also the characterization and treatment of the plot emulate medieval romances — or at least the Victorian fantasy of a medieval romance. The book is not a militant socialist piece in disguise, at least not in the sense in which Victorians conceived of social involvement. Instead, it constructs a perfect escapist fantasy that projects the reader outside contemporary historical time, and into the *illo tempore* of the fairy tale.

The reader’s entry into the text is mediated by markers of the genre. The story thus begins like a tale of Chaucerian times: “Of old there was a land which was so much a woodland, that a minstrel thereof said it that a squirrel might go from end to end, and all about, from tree to tree, and never touch the earth: therefore was that land called Oakenrealm” (Morris 1995).
The time and space are established conventionally: “of old”, “there was a land...,” unambiguously marking the story as a tale. Such markers occur at various points in the text as well: from time to time, new events are introduced by “Tells the tale that...”; shifts in the focus of the narrative or flashbacks are also not camouflaged for the sake of illusionism, but pointed out for the sake of generic suggestiveness: “now the tale leaves telling of Goldilind, and goes back to the matters of Oakenrealm, and therein to what has to do with King Christopher and Rolf the Marshal” or “Goes the tale back now to the time when the kingship of Child Christopher was scarce more than one month old” (Morris 1995).

William Morris’s treatment of closure is also in consonance with what readers would have expected from the genre. *Child Christopher and Goldilind the Fair* ends with a restoration of the order initially perturbed by betrayal and usurpation — the happiness of wealth and marriage is bestowed upon the characters, together with a suggestion of a conflict-free ever-after. This sets the moral record of the story straight, so to say, by confirming right and wrong through suitable retribution. The story wraps up in the last paragraphs the rest of the protagonists’ lives, and ends with their death in old age — in a manner which implies not the sadness of their passing, but the logical, natural closure of the narrative.

Consequently, the tale emphatically labels itself as a tale, laying bare its scaffolding so that the reader may easily identify it as belonging to its genre. The intertextual dimension is also clear; Morris’s aesthetic return to the past is done in all earnestness and with no parodic intention, in an attempt to offer an aestheticized, beautified fictional alternative to his contemporaries, presumably assaulted by the ugliness of everyday life. In this sense, *Child Christopher and Goldilind the Fair* is about other stories more than it is about the world or human nature — it is literature about literature, intertextual rather than referential.

Another interesting dimension of Morris’s anti-realism is the way in which his story encodes the position of the author. Roland Barthes noted in *The Death of the Author* (1967) that “the author is a modern figure, produced no doubt by our society insofar as, at the end of the middle ages, with English empiricism, French rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the individual, or, to put it more nobly, of the ‘human person.’ Hence it is logical that with regard to literature it should be positivism, resume and the result of capitalist ideology, which
has accorded the greatest importance to the author’s ‘person.’” When William Morris advocates socialism and a return to an idyllic classless society based on a fantasy of the Middle Ages, he proposes a model of the artist-craftsman whose humanism is less individualistic, and voice far less assertive than that of the Mid-Victorian writer. Morris’s craftsman is neither the inspired genius of the Romantics, nor the professional truth-giver of the Realists; neither the exceptional man (aristocrat or outcast) of the former, nor the middle-class gentleman of the latter. Instead, he is a worker whose increased time for leisure allows him to dedicate himself to the pleasure of artistic expression (Morris 2002). Morris expects the ‘ordinary workman’ to engage in artistic creation ‘while he is about his ordinary work,’ thus replicating what Morris believes is the democratic and quasi-spontaneous ‘Popular Art’ of the Middle Ages, one that ‘no longer exists now, having been killed by commercialism.’ Artistic ability is supposed to be universal, and equated with skill which can be fostered through education.

As a consequence of this theoretical position, in Morris’s literary and visual work there is a traceable attempt at replicating the medieval model of collective authorship, in which the artist perceives himself at most as a craftsman whose personal identity is unimportant, and who frequently works together with other craftsmen. Thus, at Morris’s workshop and printing press several artists-craftsmen often contribute to the same object, with Morris himself usually in charge of the medieval-inspired decorative pattern, be it on a bookbinding, wallpaper, or piece of furniture, and other artists contributing other elements. Morris worked closely with Burne-Jones in illustrating the books his printing press produced in the 1890s, with the former producing the ornamental borders and initials, and the latter usually in charge with the illustration itself. Moreover, although Morris’s name features prominently in medieval-looking font on the frontispiece of his literary works, and as a brand name on the books produced by his printing press, many of the objects remain unsigned. Authorship is a collective effort, one which idealistically brings together the creative efforts of equals. That the Morris brand achieved such fame and that, instead of vanishing behind his craftsmanship, ‘Morris’ eventually became a name used on mass produced objects more than a century later betrays just how idealistic Morris’s theory was.

As for Morris’s literary work, it is hardly surprising that he turns towards the folk tale and legend as a favoured genre, especially in what his 1890s fic-
tional work is concerned. In *Child Christopher and Goldilind the Fair*, he replicates the neutral voice of the folk tale, whose shared authorship gives it a collective, traditional authority — not one based on the genius or truthfulness of one single writer, but one that sounds as if legitimized by having been told and retold by a community of storytellers over centuries. Morris as a Victorian vanishes entirely behind the medieval mask, with hardly any authorial intervention in the text. On the one or two occasions when authorial intrusion does occur in the narrative, Morris suitably employs the first person plural, just like Hopkins’s journalists who replace a weakened individual authorship with the more legitimate authority of the editorial ‘we’ (DaRosa 1997: 829): “But now leave we Christopher and these good fellows of the Tofts and turn to Goldilind…” (1995, Ch. 11), in a way which once again suggests that the author is blending in with the whole community of storytellers. It also signals complicity with the reader, but one which is less the complicity that comes from shared moral values, as it used to be for the earlier Victorians; instead, it seems to involve the reader in the same story-sharing community, in which the voice that tells the story is less important than the story itself.

Moreover, one of the instances of authorial presence in the text is one that actually weakens rather than strengthens the position of the author, by emphasizing, in the same first demure first person plural, a limitation in knowledge: “Now as to Squire Simon, whether the devil helped him, or his luck, or were it his own cunning and his horse’s stoutness, we wot not” (Ch. 9). The text is pervaded by a lack of authorial assertiveness, although this weakening of the authorial position does not dramatically disrupt the Victorian complicity between author and reader. Although the authorial presence is discrete and muted, the story still unfolds against the backdrop of shared values, with no ambiguity as to what the moral stance towards characters and situations should be. The fairy tale structure serves Morris’s socialist ideas in that it allows him to make his statement in a way which seems natural, commonsensical, and universally recognizable. The author is not needed in the text, as he speaks with the voice of communal tradition. He does not need to be an assertive presence, as the text stands on its own, as if ready to be perpetuated by the next generation of storytellers.

This weakening in authorial position is a feature omnipresent in the work of the more experimental writers of the 1890s. What Oscar Wilde achieves through self-contradiction and Max Beerbohm and Aubrey
Beardsley achieve through irony, William Morris achieves through his recourse to the medieval model: an authorial voice which is no longer that of an ultimate authority. This is a significant development in 1890s fiction as it moved away from Victorian realism, and is symmetrical in later authors with a movement towards ambiguity and towards encouraging a more active, imaginative role of the reader in the process of meaning creation.

But perhaps the most striking anti-realist element in the story is Morris’s use of ornamentation. Victorian novels and paintings, with their commitment to realist principles, have little space for ornament. Narrative elements are subordinated to a goal, more often than not fulfilling a structural function, or contributing to a common effect. Function and ornament are separate entities, which undermine each other in both art and day-to-day activities. In Ruskin’s words, “you would not put rings on the fingers of a smith at his anvil” (1991: 247).

For Morris, on the other hand, ornament is essential in creating a necessary aesthetic dimension for everyday life. In *Signs of Change*, he gives a reading of the dichotomy between work and leisure that is radically different from Ruskin’s. He suggests that more leisure is essential for the welfare of the worker in a society based on socialist principles rather than on relentless pursuit of profit — and that more leisure means more time for education, and for artistic manifestations. Moreover, good working conditions, improved education, and sufficient leisure time would trigger pleasure in the work itself — and a desire to express it through art: “Then would come the time for the new birth of art, so much talked of, so long deferred; people could not help showing their mirth and pleasure in their work, and would be always wishing to express it in a tangible and more or less enduring form” (Morris 2002).

This is clearly a utopian vision of both society and the functions of art — but it provides the backbone of Morris’s conception of ornament and the Arts and Crafts movement, which, in their turn, have a determining influence on the later (far more gratuitous) use of ornament in the 1890s. Morris argues that “the material surroundings of my life should be pleasant, generous, and beautiful” — that beautifying the environment is a prerequisite of welfare. He dreams of the public buildings of the future, “unsparing of materials, generous in worthy ornament, alive with the noblest thoughts of our time, and the past, embodied in the best art which a free and manly people could produce” (Morris 2002). Ornament is “worthy” — an adjective that
combines the positive connotations of suitability and quality with a hint of the moral, yet a morality that does not reside as much in a sense of message as in beauty itself. Even if the social impact of this utopian art theory is questionable, the impact on later artistic developments, particularly Art Nouveau, is crucial. Moreover, the blurring of the boundary between ornament and function opens a range of new possibilities with structural experimentation.

The 1890s cultivation of ornament is in direct proportion with their rejection of realism. As Criticos (2004: 202) notices, “mimetic’ realism in an artistic or literary work usually appears in an inverse ratio to its ‘decorative’ character, manifested as formalism, stylization, abstraction or symbolism.”

Fin de siècle rebellions against mimetic referentiality are accompanied by a re-reading of the functional and structural role of ornament. If for earlier ages ornament (defined as structurally dispensable aesthetic add-on) was primarily a way of embellishing everyday objects and interiors, and giving stylistic unity and elegance to architecture, making occasional appearances in painting and in poetry, for 1890s artists (especially those of Art Nouveau sympathies) ornament became more and more integrated into the structure of architecture and objects, and penetrated graphic arts, painting, and even fiction, in unprecedented ways that allowed alteration of, and experiment with the very structure of the work, with narrative, spatiality, abstraction, symbol, and the centrality of subject matter.

For the average Victorian writer, literature is ‘about’ something, and it is this sense of ‘aboutness’ that ornament may have interfered with. For William Morris, on the other hand, ornament and beauty are almost synonymous, and an important means of connecting the work to the medieval aesthetic language — and simultaneously to the social utopia of the Middle Ages that he is attempting to project. His furniture, his wallpapers, the books that come out of his printing press are all heavily adorned with floral and geometrical patterns derived from those in medieval illuminated manuscripts or Gothic cathedrals. Interlacing tendrils, vegetal arabesques, ornate initials are omnipresent, building a visual bridge to the Golden Age of Morris’s theories. Their function is primarily to beautify the objects, while abstaining from any dramatic interference with their functionality. In everyday objects, as in drawings and fiction, ornamentation remains primarily aesthetic, and does little to disrupt conventional ways of constructing narrative and space. Thus, in book illustrations like the ones he produced with
Burne-Jones, the pictorial space is accompanied, framed, and qualified as medieval by Morris’s ornamental frame, but not modified structurally. Ornament does not interfere with the picture, but establishes a discrete dialogue with it. It is the case of the Kelmscott Chaucer edition (1896), in which Morris’s frame and ornamental initials and Burne-Jones’s illustrations cooperate in re-creating a suitably Medieval environment for the text to unfold, yet are kept apart in distinct fields on the page, echoing each other, but always respectful of boundaries.

More interestingly, in his fictional work, Morris uses stylistic ornament alongside theme and narrative pattern to anchor his work in the medieval tradition. The vocabulary he employs in *Child Christopher and Goldlind the Fair* is an entirely artificial invention, and functions as an ‘add-on’ to contribute to the ‘medievalising’ of the text: “Tells the tale that [the King of Oakenrealm] rued not his bargain, but loved [his wife] so dearly that for a year round he wore no armour, save when she bade him play in the tilt-yard for her desport and pride. So wore the days till she went with child and was near her time, and then it betid that three kings who marched on Oakenrealm banded them together against him, and his lords and thanes cried out on him to lead them to battle, and it behoved him to do as they would” (Morris 1995). The language is deliberately archaic, and clothes the text in a medieval-like surface, in which syntax (“rued not his bargain”), old verb forms (“betid”), and obsolete words contribute to reviving a lost world.

Morris’s story is a construct of great artificiality, which is in a sense mimetic — but mimetic of a former literature rather than of anything in the outside world. The narrative, constructed as it is according to patterns of tale and legend, and adorned with elements of an almost outlandish linguistic invention, is quite manneristic, and its flamboyant style is not dissimilar to what would have appealed to a Des Esseintes. However, ornament is still subsumed to the overall structural effect, acting in an additive rather than disruptive manner. It helps underline the archaic features of the story, but it does not change the way in which the story is told.

Typically fin de siècle artists such as Beardsley are different in the sense that ornament becomes the subject and interferes with the composition; Beardsley’s fiction (most significantly his unfinished novella *The Story of Venus and Tannhauser*, 1995 [1907]) is to a certain extent similar to Morris’s, in that it is an escapist fantasy that structurally and stylistically mimics the generic conventions of a previous age, and that it feels heavily
'adorned' with stylistic effects meant to enhance the atmosphere. But while in William Morris the ornaments are discrete, functional, and subsumed to the narrative movement, in Beardsley they acquire a life of their own, and a centrality which ultimately supersedes that of the characters and the plot.

Thus, even if it does not yet trigger any major disruptions in aesthetic language, William Morris's medievalism contributes to the experimentalist trend which culminates in the work of major 1890s innovators like Wilde and Beardsley, opening the path towards a hedonism of creation and towards an aesthetics of pleasure. The craftsman who takes advantage of the increased leisure brought by the age of machinery, and who thus produces art for his own pleasure, and that of his community, is one of several ancestors of the 1890s artist for whom aesthetic pleasure has become the sole purpose of art. If Morris's aesthetics of pleasure retains a utilitarian dimension, it helps provide the framework within which the fin de siècle arrives at the quasi-complete rejection of utilitarianism.

References


THE WHEEL OF DESIRE IN THE MILL ON THE FLOSS

ANNIE RAMEL
Université Lumière-Lyon 2

Abstract: The paper examines the way in which the wheel of the mill in The Mill on the Floss may serve as a metaphor to show how the text revolves around a core of darkness, the void of the Lacanian “Thing”. The revolutions followed by Maggie Tulliver make her pass imperceptibly from one type of jouissance to another, as on a Moebius strip, until she is finally precipitated into the central void.

It is evident that The Mill on the Floss is about a turning wheel: the wheel of the Mill turns ceaselessly, “sending out its diamond jets of water”. The story is about water, water which is channelled and diverted until the banks finally break, and the signifier used by the father to define himself — “I am nought but a bankrupt” (Eliot 1998: 261) — is taken to the letter. Such is, in a condensed form, my reading of the tragedy of Maggie Tulliver. Water, it seems, is immensely precious and desirable. Tulliver will never accept to lose one drop of it, and he will fight a losing battle in a vain attempt to keep entire his ancestral rights on it. True, water means life for the miller’s family. Yet it also means death, and most surprisingly, if we pay attention to the text, we find that death is precisely what is desired most. The narrator makes a strange confession in the first chapter: he is “in love with moistness”, he envies the white ducks “that are dipping their heads far into the water” (8), a fact which cannot fail to arrest our attention in a novel whose two main characters will be drowned in the final flood. The adjective “eager”, used in the first chapter (“their eager nostrils” 8) and again in the conclusion (“eager voices” 521), makes us hear two meanings simultaneously, one causing the other to resonate like an echo: “eager” denotes desire, but the word also calls forth its homonym “Eagre”, “the rushing spring-tide, the awful Eagre, come up like a hungry monster” (41), the devouring mouth of the furious stream that must needs swallow all living things like an ogre. Nothing could be clearer: the desire that is evinced in
this novel is the death-drive — the desire to be engulfed in the tumultuous waters.

The central question is, therefore, the question of desire. And, more importantly, the enigmatic question of a woman’s desire: what does a woman want? What does Maggie Tulliver want? One possible way of addressing the question is by looking at the scene in the final chapter when Maggie chooses between two options (to say yes to Stephen or to renounce happiness), just before water starts flowing into the house. Maggie’s choice is in fact between two voices, which are both silent “literary” voices: Stephen’s voice, heard by Maggie as she reads the letter he has sent her to urge her to accept him (“She did not read the letter: she heard him uttering it, and the voice shook her with its old strange power” 514), and a voice that returns to Maggie from the past, along with other memories, a voice “out of the far-off middle ages” (291) that proceeds from the reading of The Imitation of Christ (a book by the mystical monk Thomas-à-Kempis, which Maggie read assiduously and rapturously in adolescence). That second voice is far more difficult to define and situate, for it comes from no living human being, it is relayed to Maggie through another silent voice (the “strong pen-and-ink marks” made by “some hand, now forever quiet”, which had annotated the book and “pointed” at some key-passages). This voice, between the “low voice” of the author and the “quiet hand” guiding the reader, has an “in-between” quality, it cannot be properly subjectivized. And it is precisely that voice which is chosen by Maggie:

She sat quite still, far on into the night: with no impulse to change her attitude, without active force enough even for the mental act of prayer: only waiting for the light that would surely come again. It came with the memories that no passion could long quench: the long past came back to her and with it the fountains of self-renouncing pity and affection, of faithfulness and resolve. The words that were marked by the quiet hand in the little old book that she had long ago learned by heart, rushed even to her lips, and found a vent for themselves in a low murmur that was quite lost in the loud driving of the rain against the window and the loud moan and roar of the wind: “I have received the Cross, I have received it from thy hand; I will bear it, and bear it till death, as thou hast laid it upon me” (515).

The passage betrays the unquenchable desire which urges Maggie to act as she does. What the text says here is that confronted with a choice
between “passion” and the renunciation preached by the mystical monk Thomas à Kempis, Maggie chooses the second option, not out of a sense of duty or because it is more reasonable to do so, but because she follows her desire, because the force that impels her to sacrifice herself is much stronger than passion. The use of the word “quench” is extremely significant in this respect, for it implies a very strange hierarchy of desires, in which passionate love seems powerless to “quench” a desire of another kind, a much stronger desire: normally, it is the fire of passion that has to be “quenched” (one says “to quench a fire”). Here, it is the other way round, renunciation appears as that very irrepressible desire which passion is powerless to counteract. This strange inversion of common logic shows that Maggie’s line of conduct is not produced by the repression of her desire.

Another point has to be made: for the voice which makes itself heard to Maggie penetrates her until the words rush up to her lips and become her own voice: in the final quotation, the shifter “I” refers either to Maggie, who accepts to bear her cross, or to the speaker in The Imitation of Christ (whoever he may be). Maggie’s murmur becomes one with the sound of the driving rain and the “moan and roar of the wind”—and isn’t the word “vent”, in its French sense, an echo of “wind”? The murmur has turned into a floating, spectral voice, totally untraceable, impossible to subjectivize, a correlate of the “voix acousmatique” spoken of by Michel Chion in film theory:

The voice which transgresses the boundary outside/inside, since it belongs neither to diegetic reality nor to the external vocal accompaniment, but lurks in the in-between space, like a mysterious foreign body which disintegrates from within the consistency of “reality” (Žižek 2001: 120).

This voice, chosen by Maggie in preference to the human voice inviting her to some earthly form of happiness, this flux of sound-waves which works as a prelude to the gushing forth of destructive waters, is inextricably bound up with the death-drive at work in the novel. It tells us that the innermost desire of the heroine is to erase all borders, to break the banks so that the daughter of a “bank-rupt” father may be engulfed in the tumultuous waters in an embrace never to be parted.

Let me hasten to add that this reading of the resolution of The Mill on the Floss is anything but orthodox. Critics have almost unanimously seen the end of the novel as an illustration of “The Religion of Humanity” in which Eliot believed, a religion inspired by Feuerbach’s Essence of
Christianity (which Eliot had translated into English in 1854) and by Auguste Comte’s positivism (in which, by the way, Virgin and child form a central figure). In this perspective, Maggie’s renunciation springs from a “Christ-like, self-sacrificing love” (Paris 1965: 167-68), it may be called sublime in the sense that it represses the passion she feels for Stephen, and denies the desire that might have found consummation in marriage. In Kantian terms, the meaning would be that a supreme moral law triumphs over the drives of an individual. I wish to take issue with this interpretation, and argue that the “oblatory sacrifice” Maggie agrees to is a choice prompted by her own desire — a woman’s desire.

Another passage may help us go a little further on this question: the one that relates the legend of the Virgin of St Ogg’s. The Virgin of St Ogg’s is depicted as a woman in rags carrying a child in her arms, a woman emblematic of lack and desire. She entreats the boatmen to ferry her across to the other side of the river. What is her desire? Why this stubborn desire to cross the river though night is falling and the winds are high? That is the question the boatmen ask her: “Wherefore dost thou desire to cross the river? Tarry till the morning, and take shelter here for the night: so shalt thou be wise, and not foolish.” (Eliot 1998: 116) The woman in rags chooses not to listen to the voice of reason, she will be unreasonable, she goes on entreating the boatmen to ferry her across: “Still she went on to mourn and crave.” The surprising thing is that her desire is a desire without an object: to the question “wherefore dost thou desire...”, she gives no answer, she cannot tell what is so desirable on the other side. What does she want? Nothing (rien in French, from the latin rem, the thing). Her desire is desire in the pure state, the desire for nothing. Could it be the desire for the lacanian Thing? A few lines further, “Ogg the son of Beorl” accedes to the request of the Virgin: “I will ferry thee across: it is enough that the heart needs it” (116). What a strange use of the pronoun “it”, which has no antecedent, which refers to nothing. The antecedent of “it”, which is missing in the syntax, opens a hole in the text, and bears witness to some irreducible opacity. Could that woman’s desire (“the heart’s need”) be a heart of darkness? A sudden metamorphosis turns the woman in rags into a resplendent vision of the Virgin and Child:

And it came to pass... that her rags were turned into robes of flowing white, and her face became bright with exceeding beauty, and there was
a glory around it, so that she shed a light on the water like the moon in its brightness (116).

"It" has ceased to be the unrepresentable of a woman's desire, but it now stands for the Virgin's face surrounded with her glory, shedding all around a light like moonshine.

It, a figure of mystery, a heart of darkness or a celestial body encircled with a halo, is the pivot around which the text revolves: it may be heard again in "thou... wast smitten with pity" (117), then the vision vanishes when lack and desire are restored. The Virgin has blessed the boat of Ogg, the son of Beorl, and promised that whoever steps into his boat "shall be in no peril from the storm"; but when Ogg dies the blessing is ended ("But when Ogg the son of Beorl died, behold, in the parting of his soul, the boat loosed itself from its moorings, and... was seen no more" 117). The signifiers of the text speak of parting and severance ("parting", "loosed"), the vision is now seen only intermittently, and loss is conveyed to the reader through a poetic play on words which substitutes "moorings" and "no more" for the plenitude of "moon". This surprisingly poetic passage seems to proceed through paronomasia, shifting from "moaning", "morning", "mourn", at the beginning, to "moon" (the luminous disk which comes to mask "it", the heart of darkness around which the text is organized), then on to "moorings" and "no more" through which return to lack and desire is achieved. The story, after all, is only a legend, i.e., something "legible", something that may be read, and it is but the reflection of some unbearable brilliance: "this legend, one sees, reflects from a far-off time the visitation of the floods." Access to the heart of darkness ("it") is given indirectly, obliquely. We have revolved around a void, and the poetic resonances of the text may be due to the proximity of the void — for, as Žižek (1996: 93) argues, "resonance always takes place in a vacuum."

Let us now turn to a definition of the sublime object given by Slavoj Žižek:

The possibility of positioning an object relative to the drives arises because of what Lacan terms "The Thing". The Thing is a pressure-point that lies just outside the symbolic and imaginary orders, where the weight of the real is sensed. It is a place of menace, because it is where the deadly impulses of the drives are gathered... An object aligned with this point is said to be raised "to the dignity of the Thing". Rather like an eclipse, when
a heavenly body becomes positioned between us and the sun, and appears surrounded by an aura of light so intense that we could never look directly at it, an object located in this way between us and the unsymbolizable Thing becomes as though irradiated by the drive, bathed in jouissance, transfigured, spiritualized and resplendent. Objects positioned in this way are referred to as “sublime” (Kaye 2003: 53-54).

When the Virgin’s face becomes “bright with exceeding beauty”, with a halo surrounding it, she becomes exactly this: an object aligned with the pressure-point of the Thing (figured in the text by the pronoun “it”), that is masking the Thing, but also producing spectral effects all around, “in the likeness of one of these misty haloes that are sometimes made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine” (Conrad 1990: 138). Similarly, in the drowning scene, the personal pronoun “it” — “It is coming, Maggie!” (Eliot 1998: 521) — has no clearly identifiable referent, and the plu-perfect narrative carefully skirts round the extatic moment that unites brother and sister in death — the vanishing point between a before and an after. The keel appears after the boat has capsized: “the boat reappeared, a black speck on the golden water” (521). All around this “black speck”, this “pressure point” with the water is suffused with golden light. Žižek’s definition of the sublime object seems most relevant in this passage, which calls up again the vision of the Virgin of St Ogg’s surrounded with her glory. Maggie, who in the rescue scene is identified with the Virgin of St Ogg’s, is indeed a “sublime object” in Žižek’s sense.

That The Mill on the Floss is constructed around a void is a reality that may be apprehended by resorting to the image of a wheel, a wheel of desire. Nestor Braunstein uses a similar metaphor (1992: 83) to describe “the eternal return of the drive” around the central void of the Thing. The area of the Thing is the locus of the unnamed jouissance, “the fascinating and dangerous seat of a lethal enjoyment”, the place where “the empire of Thanatos lies, where eagles fear to venture, into which Antigone steps down to find her grave, the life in her still palpitating” (Braunstein 1992: 83-85). I wish to show how in The Mill on the Floss the drive revolves around this central void, until the heroine, like Antigone, makes the tragic choice of a descent into the abyss. For if we consider the novel as a whole, we see that the narrative follows a circular movement around a heart of darkness.
The starting point of the novel is the paradise of childhood — the daisied fields where brother and sister are supposed to roam together. Then this paradise is lost when Mr Tulliver is ruined, and then Maggie discovers the asceticism preached by Thomas-à-Kempis in *The Imitation of Christ*. Reading this book causes Maggie (like George Eliot) to go through a mystical crisis as she enters adolescence. She has somehow replaced her brother with Thomas-à-Kempis, whose name is conveniently the same as Tom’s, and who is a “brother” too because he belongs to a religious order (Eliot 1992: 291). Then Maggie meets Philip, another brother figure, who convinces her to renounce the asceticism of Thomas-à-Kempis, but whom Tom sees as a rival and banishes from his sister’s life because he is the son of Mr Tulliver’s mortal enemy. Book V ends with Mr Tulliver’s death and a reconciliation scene between Maggie and Tom (“Tom, forgive me — let us always love each other”; and they clung and wept together” 359).

Book VII (the beginning of volume III in the Victorian three-decker) takes Maggie into a totally different adventure: for this time it is love for a man (not a brother) that is felt by Maggie, a mad passion for a fairly colourless character, Stephen. Eliot was much criticized for this episode which seems to come out of the blue, and which the novelist seems to handle with very little conviction. The true state of the case is, in my view, that Maggie’s true desire is for something else than the consummation of a marriage that would stem the tide of *jouissance*. Maggie’s final choice is the choice of a *jouissance* beyond the phallus — beyond phallic enjoyment. Her choice is a woman’s “act” as defined by Žižek:

Woman, taken “in herself,” outside the relation to man, embodies the death-drive, apprehended as a radical, most elementary ethical attitude of uncompromising insistence, of not “giving way as to” [her desire]. Woman is therefore no longer conceived as fundamentally “passive” in contrast to male activity: the act as such, in its most fundamental dimension, is “feminine.” Is not the act *par excellence* Antigone’s act, her act of defiance, of resistance? […] Men are “active,” they take refuge in relentless activity in order to escape the proper dimension of the act […] the death-drive as a radical ethical stance (Žižek 2001: 156).

After her escape with Stephen down the river, borne along by the tide, Maggie refuses the young man’s offer of love and marriage. She makes a clear choice, sacrificing her happiness (and Stephen’s) for a tragic destiny
that takes her “beyond the pleasure principle”, a destiny that she hopes she
will be able to share with her brother — that irreplaceable being who is
most dear to her: dearer than Stephen, dearer than Philip, dearer than Lucy
(for whose benefit the sacrifice is apparently made). She flees to Tom, but
he rejects her violently. And it is at this very point that another form of enjoy-
ment returns: the mystical jouissance experienced in adolescence when
she read The Imitation of Christ. This “resurgence” of her religious feeling is
immediately followed by the overflowing of the river, for the flood happens
at the very moment when Maggie remembers the words of Thomas-à-
Kempis. It brings about the tragic dénouement, the reunion of brother and
sister in a deadly embrace. We have passed from Thomas to Tom, we have
come full circle, the return to the daisied fields of childhood is fully realized
in death. In fact, the narrative has followed a circular course from the first
to the last chapter, finally doubling back upon its beginning, after a number
of loops that have taken the heroine from Tom to Thomas, then from
Thomas to Philip (Tom’s double), with a return to Tom, a detour via Stephen
and a failed return to Tom, followed by a return to Thomas-à-Kempis, which
leads to a return to Tom. It seems we have done nothing but move in circles
in this untiring quest for the object of desire, which ends with Tom.

Once Maggie has renounced earthly happiness, the novel wavers
between two forms of enjoyment. The first is mystical enjoyment— for the
mystical experience lived by Maggie in adolescence is in essence a form of
the mystical jouissance that Lacan wrote about in Encore, that enjoyment
“beyond the phallus” that some women (like Teresa of Avila) can experi-
ence and yet know nothing about, a feminine enjoyment that could well be
the foundation of belief in God (Lacan 1975: 71). There is no doubt that the
reading of The Imitation of Christ sends Maggie into raptures, an ecstasy
from which she derives ineffable joy. If we read the text carefully, we can-
not fail to understand what feelings are expressed:

In the ardour of first discovery, renunciation seemed to her the entrance
into that satisfaction which she had so long been craving in vain. She had
not perceived — how could she until she had lived longer? — the inmost
truth of the old monk’s outpourings, that renunciation remains sorrow,
though a sorrow borne willingly. Maggie was still panting for happiness,
and was in ecstasy because she had found the key to it. She knew nothing
of doctrines and systems, of mysticism or quietism, but this voice out of
the far-off Middle Ages was the direct communication of a human soul’s
belief and experience, and came to Maggie as an unquestioned message (Eliot 1998: 291, my italics).

“Panting for happiness” leaves us in no doubt as to the kind of emotion involved. Strangely enough, the verb “to pant” reappears in the final scene where it is associated with “joy”: “with panting joy she was there at last — joy that overcame all distress — Maggie neared the front of the house” (519).

It is very striking how the novel leads us imperceptibly from one type of jouissance to the other, from mystical jouissance to tragic jouissance — the absolute realization of desire “in the pure state” in the final deadly embrace. In the last chapter, the flood seems to be caused by a “resurgence” of the mystical experience, as the “fountains of self-renouncing pity and affection” turn into flooding waters. When water suddenly gushes forth, it seems to spring from Maggie’s very body:

At that moment Maggie felt a startling sensation of sudden cold about her knees and feet: it was water flowing under her. She started up — the stream was flowing under the door that led into the passage. She was not bewildered for an instant — she knew it was the flood! (515).

The continuity is metaphorically represented by the image of flux. Tragic jouissance “springs” from mystical jouissance, which comes as no surprise, for the pages about the mystical experience in adolescence have insistently described the teachings of Thomas-à-Kempis as fountains (515), as outpourings (“the old monk’s outpourings” 291), and Maggie’s experience as a stream (“an experience springing from the deepest needs” 292). So, analysing the structure of The Mill on the Floss leads us to conclude that the narrative both “turns”, ie moves in circles, and “flows” like the Floss, by which I mean that mystical jouissance flows imperceptibly into the tragic jouissance that engulfs brother and sister in the same fate.

Speaking of these two forms of enjoyment, Nestor Braunstein, argues that “each is the other’s reverse side” (1992: 154). Although they have both (rather misleadingly) been called “Jouissance de l’Autre” by Lacan, they should be distinguished, and opposed to the third form, phallic enjoyment. Admittedly, in the pages about Maggie’s mystical experience, we can see that her desire is oriented toward “sublime heights”: “here was a sublime height to be reached without the help of outward things” (Eliot 1998: 290);
“to mount onto this height” (289); “too high a flight” (292). Conversely, tragic jouissance is oriented downwards, and draws Maggie towards depths where she will finally be engulfed (“he fancied Maggie was slipping down a glistening, green, slimy channel of a waterfall” 427; “brother and sister had gone down in an embrace never to be parted 521”). Though mystical jouissance and tragic jouissance are oriented in opposite directions, the narrative makes them continuous, flowing from the former into the latter, in a circular movement that goes from the one to the other, then returns to its starting point, to be set off again on another revolution around the void of the Thing. The topological figure of the Moebius strip is relevant here (a Moebius strip being a loop whose outer and inner faces are in continuity with each other, Braunstein 1992: 156-160). Tragic jouissance can be seen as the inner face of the strip, which revolves around the central void — the Thing — and feels its irresistible attraction; mystical jouissance is the outer face, which is drawn not inwards to the centre, but outwards, being subjected to centrifugal forces that tend to carry it away from the centre. Though oriented in opposite directions, the two faces form a unilateral surface.

Similarly, the wheel of Dorlcote Mill turns ceaselessly, moved by the water of the human drive. Its revolutions are like those that the finger could describe along a Moebius strip. When the heroine reaches the end of her journey, tragic jouissance finally prevails, and she is precipitated into the abyss, the void in the centre of the wheel of desire. Comic reintegration is achieved in the conclusion, which restores the phallic order that the Victorian age did not know how to do without. Catharsis has purged us of our passions — of that Other jouissance whose effects may sometimes prove destructive. Yet a few fragments of it are left for us to enjoy, or rather a few droplets: the “diamond jets of water” sent out by the unresting wheel of the Mill in its ceaseless revolutions, a metatextual representation of the literary text, the little “surplus of enjoyment” which is both a precious jewel and an object that is thrown out and lost, “floatsam and jetsam” scattered abroad to the four winds. In The Mill on the Floss, these diamond jets of water form like a misty halo, a luminous and tremulous shimmer around the dark sun of the Thing.
References

BARRY UNSWORTH AND THE HISTORICAL NOVEL TODAY

DANA PERCEC
University of Timișoara

Abstract: The paper looks at the evolution of the historical novel from the romantic period to the contemporary age, observing the shift from the national to the international, from local colour to diversity, from a nostalgic view of the past to a touch of exoticism. The analysis of Barry Unsworth’s The Ruby in Her Navel is trying to identify both the traditional elements of the genre and contemporary tendencies displayed by it.

The success of Barry Unsworth’s latest book, The Ruby in Her Navel (2006), a historical novel set in 12th century Sicily, during the Second Crusade, draws special attention to the status and reception of historical fiction today. Its popularity seems to have been growing during the last decade, with authors famous for other genres turning to history (John Grisham or Amy Tan, for instance) or with Hollywood productions reviving the public’s taste for historical drama (films like Gladiator, Shakespeare in Love, Alexander the Great are only some of the most famous examples). Moreover, a large number of historical novels have become best-selling books all over the world in a very short period of time, confirming this tendency: Tracy Chevalier’s Girl with a Pearl Earring (1999, set in 17th century Holland), Arthur Golden’s Memoirs of a Geisha (2005, set in early 20th century Japan), Charles Frazier’s Cold Mountain (2006, set during the American Civil War), etc. Most of them have become even more appreciated after the box-office success of their first-class, Academy-Award-winning film adaptations. Last but not least, the historical novels currently written are so numerous and varied that sub-genres have been identified to deal with the trend: historical thrillers (Arturo Pérez-Reverte’s The Flanders Panel, 2003), pseudo-histories (Umberto Eco’s Island of the Day Before, 1995), multiple-time novels (Michael Cunningham’s The Hours, 2000), time-slip novels (Barbara Erskine’s Lady of Hay, 2000), to give only a few examples.

On the other hand, a critical opinion that has persisted over the decades is that historical fiction is only a third-rate genre and this is why
there are many authors who refuse to be called ‘historical novelists’ (this may be, perhaps, an explanation for the numerous other names received by this type of fiction, as mentioned above). Literary reviews labelling a novel or its author as ‘historical’ may, more often than not, mean to be over-critical and use the term in a negative, ironic sense. The same novels quoted above would, then, be announced by critics as ‘literary fiction’ or ‘contemporary women’s fiction’ when the intended verdict is a positive one. Good plots set in the past are, therefore, rarely associated with the historical genre as such even though — literally and not only — this is where they belong. Nowadays, despite the growing public appeal, the genre’s respectability has not changed substantially, the misconception being that historical fiction is rarely done well, its reputation being rather one of costume melodrama, with a crammed plot that lacks minimal verisimilitude, offering its readers textbook knowledge rather than a wealth of imagination.

A possible way to account for this negative perception of historical novels is the fact that, although writers have been dealing successfully with the genre ever since the Romantic period, it has not, to the present day, received a clear definition. Sir Walter Scott, the father of the genre, considered that novels had to be set at least two generations in the past for them to be included in this category (Lukács 1989). Contemporary critics seem to agree with Scott when expecting a book to be set fifty or more years before its moment of publication in order to deem it historical. Despite the apparently unequivocal nature of these definitions, notions get more blurred when a series of justifiable questions arise (Johnson 2004). For example, what happens to novels which are partly historical, partly contemporary, including a past and a present moment? Or what about a novel labelled ‘contemporary’ when it was published, which, a few decades later, should, according to the same definitions, become ‘historical’? What about novels in which fact and fantasy are blended: how much distortion of ‘real’ history should be accepted for a story to become more ‘fantastic’ than ‘historical’? Or what about a book whose action takes place in a moment that a certain generation may regard as past, but another generation may not — such as the Second World War? And what happens to novels set in a remote enough past, but which are regarded by literary criticism and theory as (more) illustrative of another genre? And the list of questions could continue, increasing the confusion.
In this context, the task of a writer choosing to produce high quality historical fiction may seem completely unrewarding or, at least, a challenge that may not necessarily be worth the trouble. Unlike other contemporary authors who have signed books whose plot is set more than fifty years in the past, but who claim to have written another type of fiction or accept the critics’ evaluation of their novels as other than ‘historical’, Barry Unsworth is very determined both to acknowledge his fiction as historical and to continue to create new frames for this genre. The British writer already has a tradition in historical fiction, after he has signed a novel set in 14th-century England (Morality Play, 1996), one dealing with the Atlantic slave trade (Sacred Hunger, 1993), or one focusing on the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century (Pascali’s Island, 1993). He is known for the solid research work he is doing before embarking on the mission to write a new historical book, research doubled by the experience gained from extensive travelling (to France, where he completed his education, to Greece, Turkey, or the US, where he taught for while, or to Italy, where he is currently based).

The Ruby in Her Navel (2006) tackles a subject which may have a rather disquieting relevance nowadays, in the context of the rising tensions in the Middle East and of the West waging war against Islamic terrorism — the shameful defeat of the Christian crusaders in front of the gates of Damascus, in Syria, and the effects of this failed Second Crusade on the political and cultural relations that had been established in the Mediterranean region in the 11th and 12th centuries. The action is set in Sicily, an island that had been conquered by the Normans, the most successful and efficient European warriors of the time. Upon their arrival, the Normans found a territory divided between the Arabs and the Greeks, whom the knights were practical enough to employ in crucial positions in their new government: sea trade and art for the Byzantines, accountancy, science and fashion for the Saracens. Latin, Norman French, Greek and Arabic were all official languages in the state that became a kingdom under Roger II, a nobleman whose personal history was one of multiculturalism (born in Palermo of a French father and an Italian mother, he had been educated from an early age by both Greek and Muslim tutors). His artistic taste and political vision soon transformed Sicily into a model of ethnic and religious tolerance, as well as one of cultural renaissance, after the centuries of darkness and confusion that followed the fall of the Roman Empire and the
barbarian invasions. An example for the entire European continent, the kingdom of Sicily, Calabria and Apulia lasted for 64 years, before it was included in the Holy Roman Empire, soon after the death of the last legitimate Norman king, William the Good (Drimba 1990).

For the contemporary reader, the history of Sicily is probably reduced to the 19th century moment of the Italian unification, the Risorgimento, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s posthumous 1958 novel The Leopard (1991), and, of course, in a different, though more notorious register, the birth and development of the Mafia. The history of Norman Sicily is completely forgotten. Barry Unsworth revives it in a flamboyant story — romance and thriller at the same time — retelling the exploits of a young Norman nobleman, Thurstan Beauchamp, in love with an Anatolian belly dancer, Nesrin. The most powerful metaphor of the Sicilian model of tolerance and multiculturalism — one of the novel’s most important motifs — is the chapel of the Royal Palace, commissioned by Roger II, under construction as the plot of The Ruby in Her Navel unfolds. The church seems to be the best visual expression of the Norman advancement and the cosmopolitan project it proposes: the architecture is Romanesque, as in the case of most basilicas in the Western European territory during that time; the decorations are Byzantine, with richly coloured, fine mosaics, encrusted by the best Greek craftsmen, brought here by King Roger himself and generously rewarded for their skill; the wooden roof and ceilings are in the purest Islamic style, designed by famous Arab architects (“In the dimness above me, hardly visible now but closely familiar from previous visits, was the Arab stalactite ceiling in carved wood, with its painted scenes and Kufic inscriptions. Latin, Byzantine and Saracen had worked together here to make a single harmony, to make this, though still unfinished, the most beautiful church ever before seen in Palermo. There had been times when the interior had sounded to their separate languages and the chopping and hammering and scraping of their work”, Unsworth 2006: 27). Another mise en abyme of the Norman ruler’s visionary, pluri-cultural policy is the Diwan of Control, a sort of ministry of internal affairs, where Thurstan Beauchamp himself works. Run by a Sicily-born Saracen, Yusuf Ibn Mansur, the Diwan employs Arabs and Italians, Greeks and Normans, northern and southern Europeans, papists and Byzantines, his scribes copying Latin, Greek and Arab manuscripts (“his Douana, a model of races and creeds living in harmony”, 125).
This unprecedented cultural, political and religious opening is brutally terminated when the Franks are defeated at Damascus, all European rulers seeing the clash of civilizations following this defeat as a necessity, if not a reality. The Byzantines and the Arabs are expelled from Sicily and the existing rivalries between Latin and Greek, Christian and Muslim are exacerbated as never before. The decades of lively cultural exchange are over when the Saracen and Byzantine scholars, so far admired and respected by the Westerners, are forced to leave, taking their art and knowledge with them. It will take a few more centuries for the Arab wisdom to be reintroduced in Europe — through the Italian connection again — during the Renaissance (Burke 2005).

Unsworth focuses on this moment of radical political transformation at the level of the entire continent in a brief scene he sets, at the beginning of the novel, in the chapel of the Royal Palace. Thurstan, a great admirer of the Byzantine mosaics and their creators, pays regular visits to the church and is quite close to Demetrius, the master mosaicist, who has arrived in Palermo by personal invitation of King Roger. On one such occasion, he learns from Demetrius himself that the Greek carvers will be replaced by French and Italian craftsmen. The aesthetic despondency that seizes both the Norman viewer and the Byzantine artist anticipates the political desolation that is to come, the acknowledgement of the advantages of multiculturalism being replaced by the awareness of the way in which cultural differences become manifest: “There is much to do still, but it will not be my people to do it, new people will be coming. We will finish the mosaics in the sanctuary and the crossing because they do not want so evident a mixture of styles, but we will be leaving before the end of the year. […] They are Latins from the north, Franks. […] We have the wrong liturgy, the Latin Christians will take our place. […] In all the time to come, while this church stands, they will see where our work ended and their coarser work began. That is a consolation to me, that it will be seen and known through all the ages. […] You will have the decoration of the nave arcade, on both sides. You will be obliged to keep to the Book of Genesis — that was agreed on all hands when we started our work here. But you will turn it into stories. It is all that you of the West know how to do. You go from left to right, from one scene to the next, in a line. You have no understanding. God’s Grace is not different from His power, they fall from above to below, one face of splendour, like the light. And this grace and power, what do you do with it? You
The cosmopolitan touch of Barry Unsworth's novel is apparent from the very first page, in the international echo of proper names and locations, unlike the traditional historical novel — such as Sir Walter Scott's, again — where the local colour prevails, justified by the romantic need to stir the public's patriotic feelings and instruct the masses about their ethnic heritage. The simple experiment of comparing the introductory chapters of Unsworth's *The Ruby in Her Navel* and Scott's *Ivanhoe* and of drawing a list of names would bear out this assumption. Therefore, on the one hand, in the 2006 novel, we read about: Nesrin, the courts of Europe, Roger of Sicily, the Caliph of Baghdad, the Great Khan of the Mongols, Palermo, Yusuf Ibn Mansour, Corfu, Epirus, the Byzantine Fleet, Conrad Hohenstaufen, Manuel Comnenus, Norman knights, a Saxon mother, the eunuch Martin, a palace Saracen, Coloman, King of the Hungarians, Calabria, a Muslim lord (Unsworth 2006: 1-2). On the other hand, Scott evokes an Anglo-Saxon territory that could be easily identified and mapped by his contemporary English readership. Clichés about Englishness and superlative evaluations of places, events and people abound: "In that pleasant district of merry England which is watered by the River Don, there extended in ancient times a large forest, covering the greater part of the beautiful hills and valleys which lie between Sheffield and the pleasant town of Doncaster. The remains of this extensive wood are still to be seen at the noble seats of Wentworth, of Wáncliffe Park, and around Rotherham. Here haunted of yore the fabulous Dragon of Wantley; here were fought many of the most desperate battles during the Civil Wars of the Roses; and here also flourished in ancient times those bands of gallant outlaws, whose deeds have been rendered so popular in English song" (Scott 2000: 1).

Another challenge Unsworth is prepared to face in his novel is his choice of a first person narration. In the case of a Sicilian, 12th-century setting, the regular intricacies of the point of view are multiplied infinitely. The author has to be very careful with the register, but also with a series of every-day details that would be naturally expected in any narrative and that, in this particular case, would be completely unfamiliar to the contemporary reader. As far as register is concerned, Unsworth succeeds in offering a chronicle-like voice, due especially to a peculiar word order he uses, which,
still, keeps the text quite easy to follow and the reader’s mind alert: “When
Nesrin the dancer became famous in the courts of Europe, many were the
stories told about the ruby that glowed in her navel as she danced. Some
said it had been stolen by a lover of hers — who had gone to the stake for
it — from the crown of King Roger of Sicily, others that it had been a bribe
from Conrad Hohenstaufen for her help to kill the same king. […] Neither
of these two ever told the truth of it, no matter who asked, whether prince
or peasant. I am the only one who knows the whole story. I, Thurstan.”
(2006: 1)

Unsworth’s taste for colourful décors, as well as his vocation of an avid
researcher, can be easily detected in the descriptions that help us visualize
— often even smell and touch — objects, gestures, clothes, rooms, dishes,
urban designs completely unknown to the modern reader. This is, for
instance, a street in Palermo, whose depiction has a clear biographical
touch, being inspired by the author’s direct contact with the rural commu-
nities still unaffected by globalization, in the 60’s and the 70’s, in the
Mediterranean or oriental cultures he visited: “The water-sellers were call-
ing with their high-pitched cries, their pails and dippers swinging from the
yoke and scattering drops that flashed as they fell and dried before the
marks could show […]. There was the smell of spilled water round the
troughs of the pump near my house, a strangely strong odour, though made
from nothing but slaked dust and hot stones […]. This was the time of day
when the street-sweepers came into their own; sweepers they called them-
selves, but they were scavengers in fact. They were out now in force, sacks
roped across their bodies” (2006: 19-20).

Especially keen on vestimentary details, Unsworth spends a lot of
energy describing clothes, haircuts, fabrics and shades of colour, the result
of a mixture between research on the period’s documents or drawings and
his own creative imagination: “Certainly he had dressed with care for the
visit: red tiara-shaped silk cap with a jewelled clip, pale blue wide-sleeved
silk gown, slashed at the shoulders to show the embroidered linen of his
tunic below. But this finery served only to emphasize the grimness and stiff-
ness of his face, with its small, deep-set eyes and long nose and a mouth
that was like a thin cut in a lemon.” (129) Or: “I did not realize at once how
apparent it must have been to them that I was a stranger and more prosper-
ous than those I stood among, did not realize how my tallness and my
clothes marked me out: I was dressed for traveling and so not richly, and I
wore no jewellery or fine brocade, but my pelisse was of black velvet and
my hat was one such as the Franks wear, of velvet too, and flat, worn low
over the brow” (68).

On other occasions, Unsworth’s evocations are plausible adaptations
of contemporary aspects to 12th century realities. Such an example could
be the description of the goldsmith’s shop: “These fruitless thoughts occu-
pied my mind until I came to the little square close to the Buscemi Gate
where the goldsmith had his furnace. I watched him work for a little while,
hammering out softened gold to thin leaf on his anvil. […] He had a glass
counter with the things for sale in boxes below the glass, so that they could
be seen but not touched until he took them out. After some hesitation I
chose a garnet stone with a painted foil on the underside to make it glow. I
thought Sara could wear it on a chain round her neck, or have it set in a ring
if she chose. He asked three silver ducats for it” (21).

Unlike the traditional historical novel, the last lesson taught by
Unsworth’s The Ruby in Her Navel is one that has nothing to do with histo-
y and politics, but with aesthetics and artistic creation. In a world which,
 Despite the numerous centuries separating them, is not very different from
our own, where betrayal, cowardice and fear dissolve the vows of love and
honour, the only enduring value is art, the medieval hero finding his only sol-
ace in it after he has lost everything he ever deemed important in life. This
is the art of light and depth in the unfinished Byzantine mosaics, the art of
combining skill and imagination in the Arabic twin mirrors on the King’s
hunting island, or the art of eroticism and subtlety in the graceful moves of
Nesrin, the Anatolian belly dancer.

References
Johnson, Sarah. 2004. “What Are the Rules for Historical Fiction?”, on www.histori-
calnovelsociety.org
NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE IN THE EARLY NOVELS OF
PIERS PAUL READ

TERESA BELA
Jagiellonian University, Cracow

Abstract: The paper deals with the narrative methods and the role of the narrator in three novels by P. P. Read: Game in Heaven with Tussy Marx (1966), The Junkers (1968) and Monk Dowson (1969). The general analysis of the texts is meant to illustrate how the changes in narrative method and perspective help to unveil some of the main ideological issues of the twentieth century, as well as the dilemmas of the modern man, caught between the dangers of ideological commitment and moral nihilism.

The name of Piers Paul Read is not widely known to the reading public even in Britain, although his debut, regarded as both provocative and promising, was very close to that of David Lodge. Since that time — i.e. 1966 — Read has written 14 novels, 3 works of non-fiction, one authorized biography (of the actor Alec Guinness), many TV plays, articles and essays, as a contributor to The Spectator and other periodicals. He was also a sub-editor of TLS in the late sixties. The reasons for his limited popularity as a novelist in Britain are a separate and complex issue, not relevant here. Still, it is appropriate to say a few things about him to contextualize the man and his work, before the main topic of the present paper is dealt with.

Born in 1941 as one of the four children of Sir Herbert Read, the poet and critic, Piers was educated in a Catholic boarding school in York, then studied modern history at Cambridge and received a lot of ‘practical education’, travelling and working during and after his studies in various places in Europe (France, Germany), America and the Far East. Quite early in his writing career he was given several ‘labels’, which have proved harmful to his reputation as a novelist. The most important of these is that of ‘a Catholic writer’. Although it is true that Read himself is a practicing Catholic and discusses the problems of faith and the Church in interviews (e.g., in Rowland 1999: 8) and personal essays (Read 2006: 13-146), and that some of his novels deal with problems related to Catholicism, in his work he has always
tried, successfully in my opinion, to be objective in the treatment of religious faith as such and tolerant of other beliefs. He comes from a family where religious differences were ‘daily bread’: his mother (who was of German blood) was a Catholic convert, his beloved father was an agnostic. He and his siblings are Catholic, but none of their children, although brought up as Catholic, adhere to the faith of their parents, which is for Read the sign of widespread religious indifference in Britain (in Rowland 1999: 8). Read’s novels do not take a ‘moralising’ or ‘didactic’ Catholic stance, even though they undoubtedly address problems related to serious moral matters.

Another label that has stuck to Read and has made him not very interesting to critics and publishers, is what is perceived as the traditional form of his books, the lack of experimental literary technique, although it is admitted that he can tell a good story, is “an entertaining storyteller” (Riley 1975: 380). In most of his novels there is a third-person omniscient narrator; although not of an ‘intrusive’ kind, as was the case in the novels of the great realists of the 19th century, e.g., in Tolstoy’s or George Eliot’s work, where the omniscient narrator “offered further comments on characters and events, and sometimes reflected more generally upon the significance of the story” (Baldick 1990: 112). It is true that Read’s greatest novels are the sagas covering large areas of 20th century history, whose objectivity and stable point of view may seem old-fashioned to contemporary readers with postmodern tastes. Some of his other novels, e.g. The Married Man (1979), which look like bitterly satirical novels of manners, are also generally traditional in their narrative technique. Another kind of the novel that Read has practiced is a sort of thriller, often combining morality and politics, for instance, espionage during the Cold War, as in A Patriot in Berlin (1995), or Israeli attempts to discredit and destabilize the position of Palestinians and Christians in order to achieve some national goals in On the Third Day (1990). Such novels employ the first-person narration, since, obviously, the narrator cannot be omniscient when the secrets of the plot and character are not revealed until the end.

Although he is now seen as a ‘traditional’ writer, in his first three books he used a conspicuously different narrative technique, perceived as either ‘experimental’, as was the case with his debut (Halio 1983: 623), or at least as formally interesting. Apart from Game in Heaven with Tussy Marx (1966), the next two novels that he wrote before he was 30, i.e., in the 1960s, combine the first and third person narration, introducing an unreliable narrator
who tries to be objective (but he cannot, which is an important point for the theme of the novel).

At this point the inevitable question arises: Was this interest in form to do with the ambition of a young writer who wanted to be seen as an experimental author in the late sixties, the time when structuralism was becoming a fashionable critical method, drawing the attention of both writers and critics to such issues as, for instance, narratology? Although such personal reasons of the author cannot be entirely excluded and should be seen as natural, it seems that there was more to it than the young man’s attempt to please the critics and the reading public. The aim of this paper is to find this additional factor; in other words — to address the problem of the narrative technique in Read’s first three novels, all published in the 1960s. My claim is that the choice of narrative technique in these novels is used as a means of hiding the author’s own position in terms of beliefs and opinions, thus helping him to deal more objectively with difficult, complex or controversial issues which were topical at that time. The three novels deal, respectively, with the problem of Marxism and social revolution (Game in Heaven with Tussy Marx, 1966), the problem of post-war Germany and its two radically opposed political systems (The Junkers, 1968), and the problem of individual vocation in the light of the changes introduced to Catholicism by the Second Vatican Council (Monk Dawson, 1969).

The story of Game in Heaven with Tussy Marx unfolds on two levels: on the earth and in Heaven in the second half of the 20th century. The three ‘heavenly’ observers of the situation on the earth are a dowager duchess, a young modern Englishman (who is the narrator), and Tussy (Eleanor) Marx (1856-98), the youngest daughter of Karl Marx. They represent three different generations and outlooks upon the world. Tussy is the most serious about social problems and the question of revolution. As she says herself, her early life had been dedicated to two causes: the revolutionary socialism of her father and the emancipation of women. Later she fell in love with Edward Aveling, an English socialist, who drove her to commit suicide by poisoning at the age of 42 with his constant infidelities and unbelievable cruelty. (In the novel it is suggested by the narrator and Tussy herself that she — although an atheist when she was on earth — is allowed to be in Heaven because she had strongly believed in the ideas of revolution and because she died of love.
The young Englishman, “an ordinary bourgeois cad,” as Tussy calls him (1966: 11), is the real narrator of the story which he tells at Tussy’s request. The starting point of his narration is the scene they see on earth: a long procession of people of all walks of life and all ages, somewhat like the ‘fair field of folk’ in Langland’s “Vision of Piers Plowman”. The people in the procession are waiting and calling for a hero who would lead them to a revolution, a hero with a Saxon-sounding name — Hereward (‘historically a leader of the Saxons against William the Conqueror’ [Halio 1983: 623]). The people are:

[All sorts whose lives have no aim; but they have the capacity to hope for an idea in which to believe...They may not know what they want — their instincts are clogged by customs no longer related to the form of their society — but know that it is time for a change, time to shed one skin and grow another [...] they need a revolutionary hero, one appropriate for the time they live in (Read 1966:15).

The hero does not exist yet, people are shouting into thin air. There is no sign of any Hereward, but, as Tussy suggests, “we can pretend that he exists.” She tells the narrator: “You can invent him. It will be a game for us to play. It will be a story for me...” (8).

In this novel Read introduces themes which will mean much to him in later work, too: the emptiness of secular society, the danger of general acceptance of sexual permissiveness, the importance of marital fidelity, as well as a strange connection between Communist and Christian ideals — hence the opinion that the novel is a “Catholic Marxist” one (Woodman 1991: 97). What is characteristic, however, of this narration is its ironic tone, which is made possible by the employment of the unusual narrative technique: the story taking place in Heaven (mostly commentaries and memories of the three characters) and the omniscient narration about Hereward’s life, his corruption by another socialist leader and evil character, George Watkins, the later experiences of this ‘revolutionary’, and an almost comic happy ending: Hereward’s re-union with his wife who, unaware of many marital betrayals which constituted the essence of her husband’s frequent ‘revolutionary’ trips all over the world, is proud to be his wife: “Would I have married you, I wonder,’ Miranda asked Hereward, ‘if I had known you were a revolutionary? [...] Now that I know, I imagine that I would have done. I cannot remember when I was not the wife of an English revolutionary” (Read 1966: 151).
A lot of space for irony is created just by Read’s sophisticated narrative technique in this novel. The nameless English narrator — who had died in a car crash, but is in heaven since he, as he says, “went to Church on Sundays,” (7) — has to explain things to Tussy, who is very serious and idealistic about revolutionary matters and does not understand that there are no parallels between her world and the world of the English ‘conventional revolutionaries’ of the second half of the 20th century. On the other hand, the narrator has to also enlighten the Duchess, who in her social blindness did not and does not see any need for social changes: “Life seemed all right to me” (15); “We treated our tenants very well” (152). Her remarks, however, are useful as a satirical tool since she is usually quite commonsensical and assertive in her opinions, e.g., “An English revolutionary is an improbability” (151). Both she and Tussy, although for different reasons, disapprove of the way Hereward behaves as a revolutionary — he marries a rich girl, becomes the father of a few children, and, like a typical ‘English revolutionary,’ is constantly on the run from home, having many affairs with married and unmarried women and using political jargon most of the time: “Why must he hide his feelings like that?”, [the duchess asks the narrator who replies]: ‘He has to use the idiom of his time; otherwise no one would understand him; he will seem ridiculous” (21).

On the other hand, the narrator points out a very important message for the modern age: “If the times reduce Hereward to speaking the truth in tones of irony, cynicism and contempt, he will still be speaking the truth.” (21). This remark may be the answer to the question why Read himself speaks of such important matters in an ironic, or even frivolous way. To speak about the issue of revolution and of Marx’s daughter in serious tones in the 1960s would be propaganda for some and gospel for others, and the majority would hiss at the author with dissatisfaction. Perhaps this is the reason why in this and in his later novels of the 1960s Read, like Hereward, did adopt the idioms of his times, making his narrators resort to the ways and expressions of cynicism, nihilism, social and biological determinism, thus keeping all his options open and playing games with his readers. In this way — mainly thanks to his narrative techniques — he veils both fiction’s truth and his own truth about the matters that were important to him and his generation in the 1960s, the time of the social unrest of the young people in the West.
Read’s second novel, *The Junkers* (1968), is an ingenious study of the 20th century’s great symbol of evil, i.e., Nazism. Its special quality is that it also “plays upon a paradigm of comedy” (Halio 1983: 624) with the love story and a happy ending after many obstacles that the lovers have to overcome. However, the narrative technique allows the author to make it a very serious story as well, “a complex horror story,” as Halio calls it (1983: 624). The narrator, also a nameless Englishman, similar to Read in age (the novel begins in 1963), takes pride in stereotypical English virtues like fair play and open-mindedness, even about the elder generation’s concerns with the horrors of World War II, but it is obvious that he is a rootless hedonist, an aesthete and sensualist at the same time, and an unconcerned expert in German finances and history, who works as an advisor to the British commander in Berlin. His job is to investigate the past of Klaus von Rummelsberg, one of the group of Pomeranian Junkers, who, although an ex-Nazi, is becoming a political leader, which worries the Allied authorities. The research into the past of the three Rummelsberg brothers and their friends constitutes a separate, ‘historical’ level of the narrative dealing with the past before and during the war and has “the format of the intelligence dossier” (Halio 1983: 624). The narrator changes in the course of the novel because of his love for Susi (who first seems to be a mysterious daughter, ward or mistress of Helmuth von Rummelsberg) and the knowledge that the historical research gives him (Susi’s father is a wanted war criminal). The Rummelsbers, a decent, if naïve, Pomeranian family, got into the clutches of history with one of the brothers becoming a Nazi, the second, indifferent and apolitical hedonist, trying in a cunning way to steer away from the openly ideological position of his countrymen, and the youngest, Edward, a soldier who had defected to the Russian army and remained a Communist idealist, living now in East Berlin. The possible message of the narrator seems to suggest that even the story of one family is not simple in moral terms. It demonstrates the well-known truth (earlier shown in *Game in Heaven*) that evil is often connected to the best intentions of human beings — e.g., patriotic attempts to save a country by adopting such ideology as Nazism, or to save Europe by adopting communism. On the personal level it can take the form of saving oneself or one’s family by cheating and doing things that should not be done, such as help the former SS sadistic murderer (Strepper — Susi’s father) escape punishment. The suggestion that can be made is that, perhaps, from a historical perspective, the mod-
ern world is not much better than the world of the Nazis, and war crimes against civilians on both sides bring acute suffering no matter who started it all. On the other hand, the narrator is not entirely reliable: in spite of his belief in British superior honesty and fair-mindedness, he cheats his authorities and hides a part of the truth about the Rummelsbergs, thus helping to save Susi and her relatives. Is the narrator, then, converted to the side of the Junkers who cared more about family and friends than about Hitler’s global plans? Or is he still deeply bothered by the presence of his father-in-law, a figure of evil he got to know from the Rummelsberg dossier, at his wedding? The ending of the novel is ambiguous on this point: the young couple on the way to their honeymoon place talk about Strepper and the briefness of Susis’s comments and apparent indifference of the narrator leave a question mark at the end of this study of the ex-Nazi world, leave “the readers — if not Read — in a position of doubt” (Halio 1983: 630) about how to treat the past that is still so closely bound to the present and to family loyalties:

“When we were on the Olympiastrasse I said to her: ‘Who was the man in the blue jacket, the one who couldn’t speak? Was he your father?’

‘Yes,’ she said after a short silence. Then, after another pause, she said: ‘I wanted him to be there....’

I tried, with my tongue, to get a piece of chicken out from between my teeth.

‘I’d never seen him before,’ Susi said. ‘I didn’t think he looked very nice, did you?’ She screwed up her nose and smiled at me.

‘I don’t know,’ I said and smiled too but kept my eyes on the road.”

(Read 1968: 314)

As in the case of Game in Heaven, it seems that the narrative technique in The Junkers allowed Read to pose a number of disturbing questions that would not have been possible to raise in the 1960s without the serious risk of committing oneself to a definite political and ethical option.

The third novel, which deals with the subject of Catholicism before and after Vatican II, is the story of Edward Dawson, a Catholic boy educated in a Benedictine school, a great idealist who wants to serve other human beings and who becomes victim of the secularization of the Church’s concerns after Vatican II. The story is told by his school friend, an agnostic, who
reconstructs Dawson’s life on the basis of what the latter as well as other of his friends and acquaintances have told him. Like in the previous novels, the motif of disillusionment and frustration of one’s highest hopes plays a very important part. The fact that the narrator is an agnostic makes it possible for a lot of criticism of the Catholic Church to be included in the book and given to the reader, so that they can decide whether the charges are justified. Irony plays again a crucial role and is, this time, revealed through the structure of the story, particularly towards the end of the novel. Dawson, aspiring to great things and desiring to be a saint, sins through a lack of charity: he who wanted to help other human beings, causes the death of his wife who, unloved and neglected, commits suicide.

The narrator does not comment on this event, he simply relates what has happened, but does not seem to understand the woman’s motives. He is also — like Dawson’s other friends — puzzled by Edward’s decision to go back to what the latter had seen in his youth as his vocation. There is no clear explanation given, but apparently it is the suffering Dawson experiences after his unlucky attempt at a relationship with the woman he loves (Jenny) and the pain and guilt he feels after the death of his wife that bring him back to religious life and to the same Trappist monastery in which he has before lost his faith. His friends, the narrator among them, are confused, angered and doubtful whether Dawson has done the right thing and is happy now that he understands — as he tells his agnostic friend - the confusion the modern world experiences between social and religious morality, “between the exigencies of human life and the deference due to God” (Read 1980: 181). Again, like in the previous novels, the narrator, knowledgeable about facts but ignorant about motives and feelings which he does not share, opens up possibilities of reflection on the life of the title hero and saves the novel from easy didacticism. The final conversation between the narrator and Jenny, on their way back from the Trappist monastery, is again cryptic and ambiguous, although Jenny — in search of great ideas, always in her case somehow mixed up with sex, wants to be assured about Dawson’s emotional and intellectual position:

“She [Jenny] sat back and was quiet for a few more minutes: then she leaned forward again.

‘What do you think, though?’

‘How do you mean?’
‘Was he mad or sane?’

‘He wasn’t mad. Not at all.’

‘But broken?’

‘I don’t know. It depends.’

‘On what?’

‘I don’t know… on whether you believe in God or not.’

‘Then he was sick…’

[Jenny] ‘You said…you said it was the school that buggered him up.’

...

‘I suppose so. But now he seemed…I don’t know…so much at ease with himself.’”

(183-4)

Summing up the above discussion on Read’s early novels, it should be repeated that the narrative technique used in them helped, in an ingenious way, to introduce the most topical themes of the 1960s avoiding any clear didacticism and providing the author with a comfortable distance from which he could practice his satirical approach to modern reality. However, as is usually the case with Read’s fiction, which is never openly moralistic, the political and social issues in the three novels still have a metaphysical dimension, which, paradoxically, is both concealed and enhanced by his narrative technique.

References


WHAT IS “ALMOST TRUE”: LARKIN AND KEATS

ISTVÁN D. RÁCZ
University of Debrecen

Abstract: The paper offers a parallel reading of Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn” and Larkin’s “An Arundel Tomb”. The close reading of some relevant sections of Keats’s poem (particularly the last two lines) tries to show that the poems mutually read each other and, moreover, they offer a better understanding of the two poets.

One of Philip Larkin’s most often quoted texts is his famous and infamous “Statement” confirming his disbelief “in ‘tradition’ or a common myth-kitty or casual allusions in poems to other poems or poets” (1971: 79). This is a manifesto of his anti-modernism, which provoked Charles Tomlinson’s well-known neo-modernist attack in “The Middlebrow Muse” accusing Larkin of “intense parochialism” (1957: 214). One should notice, however, that Larkin used the word “tradition” in inverted commas. This suggests that it was not tradition in general that he rejected; breaking with tradition would have conflicted with his conservatism. What he rejected is Eliot’s traditionalism, his programme of self-sacrifice and his principle of intertextuality.

But even intertextuality is much more important in Larkin’s poetry than he would ever have admitted. Many of his poems can be read as palimpsests, re-writings of other poems. To mention a few examples: “Coming” echoes Thomas Hardy’s “The Darkling Thrush”, “Days” is a parody of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s poem with the same title, and “Dockery and Son” is a radical re-thinking of Dickens (deconstructing both the imagery and the ideology of Dombey and Son). In this paper I will attempt to discuss how John Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn” (1974: 191-192) and some poems by Larkin, particularly “An Arundel Tomb” (1988: 110-111) read each other.

Romanticism is a key word if one wishes to interpret Larkin’s life work as an organic whole: the ambivalent attitude that he showed to romantic writers and texts is the source of a tension which proved to be extremely fruitful and led to some of his best poems. One basic question implied in
Larkin’s poetry is this: which are those values that the poems should preserve? Does experience mean the reality we perceive or another reality behind it? Larkin’s attitude to transcendence creates a philosophical dimension in his poetry (which, ironically, is often seen as anti-intellectual). Whether a world of transcendence exists or not is a fundamental but never answered question in his verse. Significantly, Seamus Heaney has written:

...while Larkin is exemplary in the way he sifts the conditions of contemporary life, refuses alibis and pushes consciousness towards an exposed condition that is neither cynicism nor despair, there survives in him a repining for a more crystalline reality to which he might give allegiance (qtd. in Regan 1997:24).

This “on the one hand ... on the other hand” pattern is very frequent in Larkin criticism, and the controversy it implies can well be seen at least at three levels. What Heaney has referred to is the ontological level: the duality of materialism and transcendentalism. At an aesthetic level the same duality is manifest in the antagonism between a romantic and an antiromantic Movement poet. Finally, if one considers Larkin’s work as a part of literary history, the emphasis will be on the rivalry between Yeats’s and Hardy’s voices. Larkin never ceased to search for answers to the fundamental questions of human existence, but in this quest he polarized his view of the world and created binary oppositions.

Although these controversies are inseparable from each other, in this paper I will focus on the second of these: the ambivalence of Larkin’s attitude to the romantics in general and Keats in particular. Larkin’s life work can be read as a twentieth-century re-writing of Keats. His repeated supercilious remarks make the link between the two poets even more interesting, and possible parallel readings more meaningful. In 1945, still at the beginning of his career, he wrote to Kingsley Amis: “...it never does to write things you think are true. Only things you think are beautiful. Keets [sic] was a silly Bum” (Larkin 1992: 108). The overacted exasperation and the misspelling of the name reveals that the young poet is having a quarrel with a father figure. He is trying to fight against his dominance, but he will feel his overwhelming presence and authority all his life. He certainly did feel it when writing “An Arundel Tomb”.

*
Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn” is one of the most widely anthologized poems in British literature. As Helen Vendler has pointed out, the preposition on (instead of the to that he uses in four other odes) implies the idea “that art tells us a story” (qtd. in Motion 1997: 389). This is further developed in the first line: the phrase “still unravished bride” suggests that the bride will be ravished, but there is no story in which it could actually happen. (In Earl Wasserman’s words: what we see on the urn is “a ravishing that can never become ravishment” [1964: 17].) If there is any story represented by the urn, it is hidden from the speaker. Neither the girl, nor the boy speaks to him: they are a “bride of quietness” and a “foster-child of Silence”. As a result, all the implied poet knows is a series of questions.

These are not answered in stanza two; instead, the speaker celebrates “unheard” melodies. (One is tempted to say that the privative modifier both in this word and in unravished is very Larkinesque; he is famous for his words with negative prefixes, such as unignorable, unarmoril, or the innovative word unspent). This lack of a story (which could be signified by the temporality of a heard melody) dominates the whole stanza. The vocabulary of these lines is predominated by words such as not (used five times, including the word cannot), no, nor and never (repeated in line 7). The gap between the girl and the boy makes it impossible for any story to progress; likewise, the gap between the musician and the listener makes music impossible. As Larkin wrote in “I Remember, I Remember”: “Nothing, like something, happens anywhere.” The lack of an experience is the most perfect experience, and it forms the basis of ideal poetry.

The story that can never be told haunts the whole poem. In stanza four, after describing an ancient Greek town, the speaker concludes:

And, little town, thy street for evermore
Will silent be; and not a soul to tell
Why thou art desolate, can e’er return.
(Keats 1974:191)

What does the speaker celebrate in the famous closure of the poem? Is it the story that can never be told? Can one interpret it as the beauty and truth of atemporality? “Such absences!” — as Larkin exclaims in a poem. Larkin’s absences read Keats’s. The ecstasy of some parts of the poem and the unsurpassable pleasure felt at viewing a Greek masterpiece are contrasted with the ambiguity of the closure. What is all we “need to know”? Does this refer to the main clause of the previous sentence (the statement
that the urn is eternal) or to the quotation (“Beauty is truth, truth beauty”)? What we need to know is either that art will survive us, or that ethics and aesthetics are mutually dependent upon each other. In both cases, the reader of this poem can ask: if this is all we need to know, are we excluded from other forms of knowledge? Should we let ourselves be deceived by this aphorism and this way make our lives bearable? Or does the closure mean that there is no further truth? Not surprisingly, Keats’s ode has a formidable amount of comments, often contradictory. This follows from the above-mentioned ambiguity; each reader is invited to construct her/his own reading.

Larkin’s “An Arundel Tomb” can be read as a re-writing of the “Ode on a Grecian Urn”. The similarities between the two poems are striking. Both poems are based on the description of an object that contains dead bodies, but represents life on the outside: Keats constructed an image of an ideally beautiful vessel, whose function is to contain human ashes. (The first OED meaning of the noun urn is this: “An earthenware or metal vessel or vase of a rounded or ovaloid form and with a circular base, used by various peoples esp. in former times (notably by the Romans and Greeks) to preserve the ashes of the dead. Hence vaguely used [esp. poet.] for ‘a tomb or sepulcher, the grave.’”) Larkin created a vision of a tomb in Chichester cathedral. On the Greek urn the speaker perceives the vitality of life; more precisely, the implied poet constructs it within the text. I fully agree with Andrew Motion’s suggestion that the urn is Keats’s “own invention” whether he had a particular urn in mind or not (1997: 91). On the tomb represented in Larkin’s text the two figures are static and de-faced, but the touch of the two hands indicates life.

The urn and the tomb signify not only the past itself, but also the tension between the past and the present. In Keats this is suggested by the multitude of questions: as they all remain unanswered, no continuity is established between the life in the pictures and the act of perception in the present. We are excluded from the knowledge of the past, since history is discontinuous. Although many readers would see a completely different meaning in Keats’s poem, Larkin’s text gives evidence that the reading I have just outlined is possible.

In Larkin the time of history becomes a void: the two effigies are shown “in the hollow of / An unarmorial age” (stanza 6, lines 2-3). This image also establishes a link with the penultimate poem of The Whitsun
**Weddings**, “Afternoons”: “In the hollows of afternoons / Young mothers assemble” (Larkin 1988: 121). (“An Arundel Tomb”, it will be remembered, is the last poem of this volume.) Not unlike in Keats’s ode, in Larkin’s poem mortality is contrasted with the apparently eternal vision of a man and a woman: the earl and the countess. They “lie in stone” (stanza 1, line 2), and have become signifiers in the semantics of an age different from that of their lifetime. Having lost their identities, now they are objects used by subjects in the present: the visitors of the church and the poet implied in the poem. The unasked question hidden in the text is: what will remain of the two hands gently holding each other? To put the question in Keats’s terms (since Keats also reads Larkin): does an “unheard melody” still have significance for the twentieth-century poet?

Larkin, however, does not ask any question overtly. Instead, he confirms the difference between the intention of the two long-dead people (the meaning they attributed to themselves) and the way we gaze at them today (the meaning we construct and impose on them): “They would not think to lie so long” (stanza 3, line 1), “They would not guess...” (stanza 4, line 1), “They hardly meant...” (stanza 7, line 3). The visitors of the tomb are shown in the context of natural processes. The slow devastation by snow, sunshine and birds is followed (and intensified) by an endless line of people “Washing at their identity” (stanza 6, line 1). As James Booth has pointed out, this is an echo of Hardy’s “During Wind and Rain” (1992:43). The metaphor recalls the small but steady destruction of a coast by the sea (like the image of a coastal shelf in “This Be The Verse”), and is followed by the vision of time as a void:

> Now, helpless in the hollow of  
> An unarmorial age, a trough  
> Of smoke in slow suspended skeins  
> Above their scrap of history,  
> Only an attitude remains:  
> (Larkin 1988: 110, stanza 6, lines 2-6)

This colon at the end of the penultimate stanza calls the reader’s attention to the last lines, which function as a closure not only to this poem but the whole volume. The implied poet seems to be taking a deep breath before attempting to find an answer to the question mentioned above: what has been preserved of the two hands touching each other?
Time has transfigured them into
Untruth. The stone fidelity
They hardly meant has come to be
Their final blazon, and to prove
Our almost-instinct almost true:
What will survive of us is love.
(stanza 7)

The signification of the two figures has been changed by time, which
was represented earlier both as a void and as a devastating power in nature.
The result of their transformation is “untruth”, a condition that was antici-
pated by the punning use of the verb *lie* in stanzas 1 and 3. But “untruth” is
not exactly the same as a lie: the prefix, by modifying the word “truth”, sug-
gests that truth was originally there. In other words: truth has been lost in
the void of time.

The next sentence presents what this “untruth” is: “The stone fidelity /
They hardly meant has come to be / Their final blazon...” The effigies are
used to signify fidelity; this is the meaning of the sign they have become.
Andrew Motion tells us how Larkin found the relevant word: it was his part-
ner, Monica Jones, who “provided the word ‘blazon’ for ‘An Arundel Tomb’
when he called out to her that he needed ‘something meaning a sign, two
syllables’ (1993: 275). This sounds, almost unpleasantly, like Larkin doing
his crossword. It still deserves attention that he wanted a word “meaning a
sign”, and surely he would not have used it in the final version if it had not
been the word he needed. The primary meaning of *blazon* in present-day
English is ‘coat of arms’. It is a French word, therefore it distances the dead
bodies from their own Englishness the same way as the Latin words do in
stanza 3, but also finds a place for them in European cultural heritage. Julia
Kristeva has enlarged on the historical significance of this word in her fun-
damental study on intertextuality, “The Bounded Text” (1980: 3, emphasis in
the original):

...laudatory utterances, known as *blazons*, were abundant in France dur-
ing the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They come from a communica-
tive discourse, shouted in public squares, and designed to give direct infor-
mation to the crowd on wars (the number of soldiers, their direction,
armaments, etc.), or on the marketplace (the quality and price of mer-
chandise). These solemn, tumultuous, or monumental enumerations
belong to a culture that might be called phonetic. [...] The blazon lost its
univocity and became ambiguous; praise and blame at the same time. In
the fifteenth century, the blazon was already the nondisjunctive figure par excellence.

The touch of the two hands has become an icon in heraldry, but also something that has been preserved “from oblivion” (to use Larkin’s phrase) and a “nondisjunctive figure” (to use Kristeva’s). The countess and the earl have become signs. What happens in “An Arundel Tomb” is the opposite of prosopopeia as described by Paul de Man in his essay on autobiography (1984: 76): instead of evoking the two dead people (and reconstructing them by using the trope of personification) the visitors of the grave (including the persona speaking in the poem) symbolically close the dead into their own effigies. The dead are not allowed to speak; posterity will speak for them.

The final aphorism both in Keats and in Larkin is presented as a fictitious quotation. Keats introduces the direct quotation with the phrase “thou say’st”. Larkin is more enigmatic, but it is clear that the last line is a subordinate clause. In John Bayley’s reading (1984: 4): “What remains of us is love’ in the sense that love equates with self-extinction”. But in the penultimate line Larkin says that it is “almost true”, that is not true. We should not believe what the urn said to Keats’s admiring spectator (or what the spectator thought the urn said).

*Almost* is a centrally important word in Larkin’s vocabulary. A later poem, “The Trees” (1988: 166), starts with these lines:

The trees are coming into leaf
Like something almost being said;

The function of *almost* is the same here as in the closure of “An Arundel Tomb”: on the one hand, it means that the trees say nothing; on the other hand, it suggests that the implied poet wants them to speak. Consequently, this word reveals a romantic poet, who has a strong desire to find meaning in an archetypal image, but also an agnostic poet, who has given up the hope that any meaning can be found in it. The trees are like Prufrock’s mermaids: they will not speak to him (Eliot 1946: 15). The same applies to cultural icons representing death: an urn or a tombstone. Death is not only the ontological end of human life, but also an epistemological end. Burial places are silent.

This silence in Larkin’s poem is the quietness of two effigies representing both life (through the touch of the hands) and death (through lying, in
both senses of the word). In Jim Crace’s novel *Being Dead* the same dual symbolism is constructed in the image of the dead bodies of a man and a woman, husband and wife, brutally murdered on a sea coast:

Joseph’s grasp on Celice’s leg had weakened as he’d died. But still his hand was touching her, the grainy pastels of her skin, one fingertip among her baby ankle hairs. Their bodies had expired, but anyone could tell — just look at them — that Joseph and Celice were still devoted. For while his hand was touching her, curved round her shin, the couple seemed to have achieved that peace the world denies, a period of grace, defying even murder. Anyone who found them there, so wickedly disfigured, would nevertheless be bound to see that something of their love had survived the death of cells. The corpses were still a man and wife, quietly resting flesh on flesh; dead, but not departed yet (2000:12).

Although Crace was not conscious of any influence when writing this part of the novel (as he told me in conversation, he realized the similarity only after completing the text [7 May 2002]), this image is still a reading of “An Arundel Tomb”, in which the effigies are transformed into dead bodies: two people who have become statues of themselves. This is one meaning of “being dead”. Another is that the bodies are exposed to the gaze of the living. Like Keats and Larkin, Crace also constructs a situation in the text in which the banal idea of love surviving bodies becomes an indirect quotation: “Anyone who found them [...] would nevertheless be bound to see that something of their love has survived the death of cells” (2000:12). The example of these three texts shows how a cliché is constantly re-written in literature.

Anyone could argue that the last sentence of Larkin’s poem is still there, and it will surely linger on in the reader’s memory. (Not unlike Keats’s and Crace’s sentences about transcendental survival.) The closure of the poem (also the last line of *The Whitsun Weddings*) is highly ambivalent. Larkin is fully aware that we are all deceived if we believe the attractive banality of this line, but he also knows that we are tempted to believe it. (John Carey, 2000: 63, has identified these two conflicting attitudes as the male voice of scepticism and the female voice of belief.) We remain “less deceived” in this interim position between a desire for eternal love and the consciousness of mortality.

If there are two voices in Larkin’s verse (a female and a male, a Yeatsean and a Hardiesque, a romantic and an anti-modernist, etc.), this
also means that there was an ever-present longing in him to find transcen-
dence. He never found this realm, as he refused to be deceived. He faced
his own alienation and the limits of human existence. Following in Keats’s
wake in “An Arundel Tomb” he created a “universe” in which beauty is
almost true.

References
Houndmills: Macmillan, pp. 51-65.
Abstract: Parallels between Woolf’s novel and Porter’s novella include the Great War as both background and foreground, the intensely reflective woman character, a critique of patriarchy, and experimentation with language. Both works explore intensities of consciousness, in which a continuum from dream to delirium to delusion suggests an effacing of boundaries, including that between sanity and madness.

The chiming of Big Ben which punctuates and permeates the hours of Clarissa Dalloway’s day, “first a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable” celebrates, in part, the recovery of Londoners from the Great War (Woolf 1925: 4). Its following sound, the ringing of the bells of St. Margaret’s, as conceived by Clarissa’s old suitor Peter Walsh, “glides into the heart and buries itself in ring after ring of sound, like something alive which wants to confide itself, to disperse itself, to be, with a tremor of delight, at rest – like Clarissa herself” (1925: 50). The bells embody for Peter a moment of closeness with Clarissa in their youth. But if Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway is in part a celebration of life and recovery, it is as well a conversation with death. Thus, for Peter the “languish [ing]” of the bells brings a sense that “the sound expressed languor and suffering” and finally, recalling that Clarissa has been ill and has a weakened heart, “the final stroke tolled for death in the midst of life” (1925: 50). Katherine Anne Porter’s “Pale Horse, Pale Rider” might well serve as a companion piece for Mrs. Dalloway, even to the detail of Miranda, a newspaper writer in a mountain town in the United States, waking to the “gong” of war at the start of the story.

Mrs. Dalloway and “Pale Horse, Pale Rider” have in common an exploration of intensities of consciousness, including a continuum of delusions, dreams, and moments of integrative, euphoric vision, which in Woolf’s work have been much discussed. Both works contain the seeds of a cri-
tique of patriarchy and a condemnation of the kind of masculinist quasi-logic which would legitimate, even privilege, the horrors of war. A soldier is offered in each – explicitly by Porter – as an innocent “sacrificial lamb.” Embedded in both works are attempts to critique and even bridge the binary oppositions evident when war and peace, male and female identities, logic and feeling, sanity and madness, language and the unspeakable are thrown into relief by the circumstances of the Great War. The attempt to force language past its logical limits, a key phenomenon of High Modernism, represents in these works, then, an attempt to create, ephemeral as it may be, what we might now call a sort of “third term” which offers an alternative to the limitations of subject and object.

To suggest how these women writers attempted to efface these binaries is of course to participate in these cultural assumptions to some extent, and thus to implicate one’s own thinking. Yet not only the innovative, non-hierarchical and unifying vision expressed in both works, but also the exploration of a fluid, perhaps fragmented self and the suggestions of androgyny in the works serve to interrogate then-current notions of patriarchy, sanity, heterosexuality, and logic, as if to point up the inadequacy of established binary thinking from within the restrictions they impose. Perhaps most interestingly, the intense, unifying vision as expressed in Septimus’ delusions, Miranda’s delirium and near-death experience, and both Miranda’s and Clarissa’s ultimately coherent identities insist upon a continuum in such areas as logic, sanity, sexual identity, and power, rather than culturally designated polarities.

As *Mrs. Dalloway* begins, the war is, of course, over; emblematic of this relief and recovery is the excitement that unites people in the street as Clarissa walks through London to buy flowers for her party – first all attention turned toward a royal car moving through the street, but superseding this, a small plane spiraling above the heads of passersby, skywriting a message which everyone tries to decipher – and which turns out to be an advertisement for toffee. If the toffee is both trivial and pleasurable, it may be a fitting emblem for everyday renewal after war. But Woolf describes as well a sort of transcendence in her distinctive descriptions of the connectedness of everyone. The playfully swooping plane creates a shared silence, as “All down the Mall people were standing and looking up into the sky. As they looked the whole world became perfectly silent, and a flight of gulls crossed the sky... and in this extraordinary silence and peace, in this pallor, in this
purity, bells struck eleven times..." (1925: 21). In descriptions such as these, Woolf attempts – as Porter will in Miranda’s delirium – to force language to get at meanings which defy and expand ordinary logic.

While critics like Kathryn Stelmach, for example, discuss Woolf’s writing in terms of the rhetorical device of ekphrasis (2006: 304-326), and others cite Joyce’s “epiphanies” or elements of mysticism in Woolf’s prose (Kane1995: 328-349), or comment upon the interplay of Kristeva’s “semiotic” and “symbolic” in sections of Woolf’s novels (Garvey 1991: 60), this essay skirts these detailed but potentially reductive analyses in favor of a respectful distance from Woolf’s linguistic and semantic intricacies, and attempts to point up as well the parallels evident between Mrs. Dalloway and “Pale Horse, Pale Rider.” Interestingly, in his “Afterword” to the 1962 edition of the title story of the collection, Mark Schorer avers that “Pale Horse, Pale Rider,” is “so subtle and complex” that he is “unwilling to try to take it apart in any detail,” that it is “really about the birth of an artist, the one who has suffered everything, including death, and comes back from it, disabused, all-knowing, or knowing at least all there is to know” (1962: 175).

Many observant readers of Woolf might concur with Woolf biographer Phyllis Rose that “there is no way fully to explain or analyze the lift of spirit that occurs when one reads certain parts of Mrs. Dalloway” (1978: 128).

Earlier on the walk that opens Mrs. Dalloway, Clarissa has, in fact, contemplated dying and felt the conviction, despite her avowed atheism, that she would live on, that people like her and Peter would “live in each other,” in “the trees at home,” and that she herself will be “laid out like a mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees lift the mist...." (1925: 9). But if Clarissa espouses an affirmative, even transcendent view of death, the character of Septimus Smith, the shell-shocked soldier whose suicide will be revealed at her party, seems to confirm Peter’s notion after hearing the bells, that death inescapably permeates life. As Clarissa thinks about her life, she sees that, although she feels “very young,” and that her mind “sliced like a knife through everything” she also feels “unspeakably aged” and outside of life, “out, out, far out to sea and alone” (1925: 8). Despite her vitality and her sense of a shared love of life, a connection between people of all classes on the street, a Modernist sense of a sort of redemptive act of artistic clarity, Clarissa “always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day” (1925: 8). Thus Woolf links Clarissa and Septimus in the first pages of
the novel, establishing the self-educated, would-be poet as a sort of alter
ego to Clarissa, both an opposite and kindred spirit. Septimus, haunted by
the death of his officer, Evans, for whom he may have eroticized feelings,
and suffering from delusions, has the thought as he stands on the sidewalk
while the royal car passes, that he is the cause of a traffic jam, and further,
that “the world wavered and quivered and threatened to burst into flames”
(1925: 15). Yet, since he has lived through just such conflagrations,
Septimus’ perception is not entirely illogical; the time and place are wrong,
but the event can be said to be real. The “unspeakable” experience of sac-
rificial males like Septimus in wartime, Woolf here links to Clarissa’s
redemptive vision of the inexpressible. This near-meeting of Clarissa and
Septimus sets the stage for a novel in which, according to Woolf’s original
plan, Clarissa herself was to commit suicide. Interestingly, Katherine Anne
Porter’s Miranda will meet a kind of alter ego in “Pale Horse, Pale Rider,” not
her soldier Adam, but a bitter hospitalized soldier who reflects her own
state of mind.

If in Mrs. Dalloway Woolf establishes an atmosphere of sometime
euphoria, memory, and connection punctuated by reminders of the imma-
nence of death, Porter offers only a circumscribed time and space for
Miranda and her lover Adam in “Pale Horse, Pale Rider” within a general
atmosphere of war and pestilence. Miranda’s sense of the war is of it not
just permeating, but poisoning everything; as surely as Clarissa Dalloway’s
day of preparations for her party is divided by the tolling of London’s bells,
the young reporter Miranda’s time with her soldier Adam is punctuated by
her awareness of funerals passing in the street, funerals for deaths caused
not by battle wounds but by influenza.

As the novella opens and Miranda, presumably already ill with influen-
za, dreams of selecting a horse for a race with death, she catalogues her
losses: “Where is that lank greenish stranger I remember hanging about the
place, welcomed by my grandfather, my great-aunt, my five times removed
cousin, my decrepit hound and my silver kitten?” In a house where they are
“all tangled together like badly cast fishing lines,” the dreaming Miranda
asks, “What else besides them did I have in the world? Nothing. Nothing is
mine, I have only nothing but it is enough, it is beautiful and it is all mine”
(Porter 1937: 114). As a young woman of twenty-four who in an earlier
Miranda story had escaped from a Catholic boarding school through a brief
marriage, the young writer wryly questions her identity as a coherent self:
“Do I even walk around in my own skin or is it something I have borrowed to spare my modesty?” (1962: 114). Porter’s interest in the notion of the permanence or fluidity of the self, even before she slips into delirium, seems to parallel Woolf’s examination of this idea both in her essays and in novels such as *Mrs. Dalloway*, *To the Lighthouse*, and *The Waves*.

In her dream, Miranda outraces death who “regarded her without meaning, the black stare of mindless malice.” She rises in her stirrups and shouts, “I am not going with you this time – ride on!” With this evidence of self-assertive, coherent self, she awakens. It is here that the “gong” of war sounds in her mind, as “slowly, unwittingly, Miranda drew herself up ... from the pit of sleep, waited in a daze for life to begin again. A single word struck in her mind, a gong of warning, reminding her for the daylong what she forgot happily in sleep, but only in sleep. The war, said the gong” (1962: 115).

Porter joins then, from the vantage point of a writer in the mid-thirties, in Woolf’s Modernist project of making language both express and fail to express nuances of human experience, letting an undefined sound resonate in readers’ minds in a way not entirely dissimilar to Woolf’s descriptions of the bells of London, whose effect on people can not be reduced to words. If the “gong,” the “pale rider,” Miranda’s near-death perception of unity and restoration of lost friends, the bells and the sky and trees above Clarissa’s London function as symbols, they are symbols for complexes of thought and emotion which cannot be thoroughly, logically, defined. Johanna Garvey’s assertion in a 1991 article about Woolf may be applied to Porter as well, that she uses a “narrative strategy that refuses to dominate, conquer, and contain” (1991:60), in effect subverting hierarchies and binaries.

What Woolf, and Porter as well, are attempting, however, defies categorization; minute analysis may have a reductive effect. In a delirious or a delusional state, language attempts to describe the intuitive, illogical, or spiritual insight that the logic of literary criticism itself, or the quasi-logic of the war machine or of modern medicine, as Woolf felt, does not acknowledge. Woolf’s defiance of linear logic also defies what the villain of *Mrs. Dalloway*, Sir William Bradshaw, the doctor who would incarcerate Septimus, will call a “sense of proportion.”

The various shapes into which the war has formed an intrusion into Miranda’s mind become clear in her memories of the day before. Two men had greeted her at her office, enforcers for the War Bond Committee, bul-
lies who quote jingoistic rhetoric and tell her she is the only person in her office who hasn’t bought a $50 war bond, a bond she cannot afford.

Their lie is revealed almost immediately when Miranda finds her colleague “Townie,” sobbing in the cloakroom, having been similarly intimidated. She will hear the rhetoric of war propaganda repeated later at a performance she attends for her work. Since she has been “demoted” to the theater and society pages for failing to reveal a juicy scandal about a disgraced young girl in an article, she no longer is permitted to write news stories. She must mingle with well-off young women who attend dances for the soldiers but earn Miranda’s scorn for their disdain for the enlisted men, and an odious task of the day is Miranda’s joining in bringing gift baskets to hospitalized men. Paralleling Clarissa’s near-meeting of Septimus on the London streets, Miranda has a fleeting vision of a sort of double for herself, a bitter soldier upon whose bed she sets down her basket and flowers, embarrassed at “the idiocy of her errand” of joining in trying to cheer up the soldiers:

He was lying with his eyes closed, his eyebrows in a sad bitter frown.... It was like turning a corner absorbed in your own painful thoughts and meeting your state of mind embodied, face to face, my own feelings about this whole thing, made flesh....Of course I would pick him out.... (1962: 122).

Porter’s Miranda rails against the bullying and propaganda in the United States, citing not only the inflated rhetoric that describes “those vile Huns,” the “Boche,” bayonetting babies – an image that will occur in Miranda’s delirium when she is at her most gravely ill – but she also describes the “guarded resentment” and defensive attitude of men who cannot fight, like her fellow reporter Chuck, with his bad lungs (1962: 136). And she sees housewives collecting peach pits, thought to contain useful materials for explosives, as hoodwinked by the designers of the war effort:

It keeps them busy and makes them feel useful, and all these women running wild with the men away are dangerous, if they aren’t given something to keep their little minds out of mischief... Keeping still and quiet will win the war (1962:136).

Porter unearthed a neat irony in the pacification of potentially “wild” women by having them collect peach pits which will in turn become to explosives. Adam, the innocent soldier about to be shipped out, signed up
as a sapper instead of a flier to placate his mother, who was unaware that the work of handling explosives is far more dangerous than flying.

Adam and Miranda, who have met ten days earlier, both recognize that Adam will die in the war. Adam, who is thought to be a somewhat idealized depiction of the young soldier Porter fell in love with in 1918, who nursed her through influenza but died himself, is called by Mark Shorer “the beautiful original innocent” (1962: 175). Miranda describes him in his officer’s uniform as looking “like a fine healthy apple” (1962: 125); Adam nonetheless shares her sense of irony about the war. The two joke about smoking, with Adam saying, “‘Does it matter so much if you’re going to war anyway?’” and Miranda retorts, “‘No...and it matters even less if you’re staying at home knitting socks’” (1962: 125). Adam says “matter-of-factly” that, “‘If I didn’t go... I couldn’t look myself in the face” (1962:141). Rather than logically sorting out the reasoning behind the war, Adam seems drawn to it by a destiny that he knows will end with his death. Miranda thinks, “it was not good even imagining [a future with Adam}, because he was not for her or for any woman, being beyond experience, committed without any knowledge or act of his own to death” (1962: 129). Adam, with good health, his engineering training, and his love of cars and boats, is the quintessence of good-hearted manliness. Yet his choice is not free, but rather pre-determined by the social structures that shape and define masculinity. Miranda thinks of him as “pure, all the way through, flawless, complete, as the sacrificial lamb must be” (1962:141).

Adam’s unreflective masculinity, then, suggests the cultural assumptions that justify male sacrifice; Porter exposes the false logic, not just of the bullying or propaganda, but also of gender-inflected definitions of cowardice and heroism. In England, for example, the large numbers of emotionally damaged men returning from the horrors of trench warfare, so well depicted in Pat Barker’s contemporary novel *Regeneration*, as well as by Woolf, initially provoked proposals that they should be shot for cowardice. However, with over 80,000 incapacitated soldiers, rhetoric in military and medical circles developed to replace the term “hysteria,” associated with women, with the more manly term “shell shock” (Childs 2000: 164).

Woolf’s views on the war are well known, but in *Mrs. Dalloway*, the destructive patriarchal structures she describes are not so much those of the government or the military – men like Richard Dalloway and even Peter Walsh, who has been an administrator in India, unquestionably (and per-
haps unquestioningly) attempt to do good. When Peter sees a group of young soldiers marching to place a wreath on a monument, he sees in their uniformity that “Life, with its varieties, its irreticences, had been laid under a pavement of monuments and wreaths and drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse by discipline” (1925: 51). Yet, Peter thinks, “One had to respect it; one might laugh; yet one had to respect it” (1925: 51). In *Mrs. Dalloway* the clearest evil lies in the medical profession and its essential arrogance, particularly in the person of Sir William Bradshaw, a more refined and powerful version of Porter’s War Bond enforcers. Rich, honored, and entirely certain of the rightness of his reasoning, he is intensely phallocratic and aligned as well with the imperialist mission of Britain. For Sir William worships “proportion,” and,

worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalized despair, and made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of proportion (1925: 99).

This bullying Woolf labels Proportion’s sister, “Conversion,” which “feasts on the wills of the weakly” (1925: 100). Woolf, having suffered from mental illness from a young age, has given Septimus some of her own delusory experiences, like hearing the birds sing in Greek.

Clarissa’s own characterization of Sir William, watching him at the party, is excoriating. He was “a great doctor yet to her obscurely evil, without sex or lust, extremely polite to women, but capable of some indescribable outrange – forcing your soul, that was it” (1925: 184). She imagines that, “If this young man had gone to him, and Sir William had impressed him, like that, with his power, might he [Septimus] not have said... they make life intolerable, men like that?” (1925: 184-5).

Woolf returns to the notion of the indefinable nature of the self when she has Clarissa compare her own experience with Septimus’ act of defiance, in these terms: “A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life....This he had preserved” (1925: 184). A motive for suicide, Clarissa muses, is found in “people feeling the impossibility of reaching the center which, mystically, evaded them; closeness "drew apart; rapture faded, one was alone” (1925: 184). Clarissa feels a kinship with Septimus; “She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away. The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. He made her feel the beauty.” Woolf has Clarissa immediately drawn
back to life after this flirtation with suicide: “But she must go back. She must assemble. She must find Sally and Peter” (1925: 186).

If Clarissa returns from connection to a suicide to a connection with people she has cared for, and to her party, Miranda, disconnected from her family and past, finds connection as well with those around her. She records her habit of turning and looking back when leaving any friend, regretting the “snapping of even the lightest bond” (1938: 129). Only Adam, in her experience, when she looks back, is still following her with his eyes. So does Woolf try to get at the sense of connection, not only in Clarissa’s identification with Septimus or the early scenes in Bond Street and Regents’ Park, but also in the “thread” that the powerful, elderly, and androgynous Lady Bruton imagines binding her to her luncheon guests, Hugh Whitbread and Richard Dalloway. It is “as if one’s friends were attached to one’s body, after lunching with them, by a thin thread” which would get thinner as they walk away, becoming “hazy with sound of bells ... as a single spider’s thread is blotted with raindrops, and burdened, sags down” (1925: 112). Richard himself feels at the same moment an impulse of love for Clarissa, perceived also as a spider’s thread that draws him to go home and tell Clarissa that he loves her. “The time comes,” Richard thinks, “when it can’t be said; one’s too shy to say it”; he thinks of the War and “thousands of poor chaps...shovelled together, already half forgotten,” and thinks of Clarissa and their life together as “a miracle.” He brings Clarissa roses, and, unable to say he loves her, sees that “she understood without his speaking: his Clarissa” (1925: 117).

Paralleling Clarissa’s understanding of Richard’s gift is the wordless communication of Adam and Miranda. Dancing, they “said nothing but smiled continually at each other, odd changing smiles as though they had found a new language” (1962:142). But their most transcendent moments are spent when Adam has recognized that Miranda is very ill, and has taken on the androgynous nurturing role of nurse. He sits on her bed, and they think of prayers, at first rather jokingly, establishing that she is Catholic and he is Presbyterian. Their mutuality is celebrated when they find that they both know a Negro spiritual, “Pale Horse, Pale Rider,” and they sing alternate verses: “‘Pale horse, pale rider, done taken my lover away.’” After mammy, pappy, brother and sister have been taken, verse by verse, Miranda sings the last, “‘Death, oh leave one singer to mourn’” (1962:150-1). That
mourner, as foreshadowed in her early dream, will not be the healthy Adam, but the recovered Miranda.

In Miranda’s dream delirium, Adam is shot with arrows, a ship sprouts wings, and the kind doctor Hildesheim becomes a German soldier bayoneting babies. She is aware of her mind tottering and her “reasoning coherent self” splitting off. Her very identity seems lost with “no multiple planes of living, tough filaments of memory and hope pulling taut backwards and forwards holding her up between them” (1962:151) Porter describes how “both reason and desire fall away” from Miranda, but there remains “only a fiercely burning particle of being...a will to live” (158).

Miranda’s vision as she nears death is one of restoration and completeness, as well as a lack of a need for ego or identity:

[Through he shimmering air came a great company of human beings, and Miranda saw in an amazement of joy that they were all the living she had known. Their faces were transfigured, each in its own beauty, beyond what she remembered of them...They were pure identities and she knew them every one without calling their names or remembering what relation she bore to them. (159)

What is missing from Miranda’s transcendent vision, however, is the presence of those who have died, the ones invoked as the novella opens. Coming back to life in search of what she had “forgotten” – the dead – she finds that Adam is among them. Like Woolf, then, Porter examines the apparent split between the reasoning, seemingly essential self and the fluid self whose boundaries seem permeable. The reasoning self is able to “balance” on the continuum of delirium and sanity, in Miranda’s case as well as in Clarissa’s.

One aspect of the argument that Woolf’s work effaces binary oppositions is found not only in the attempt to speak the unspeakable, but simply in the continuum between Clarissa’s thoughts and those of Septimus. In her essay, “A Room of One’s Own,” Woolf ponders “what does one mean by the ‘unity of the mind’...for clearly the mind has so great a power of concentrating at any point, at any moment that it seems to have no single state of being” (1929: 51-52). Woolf’s argument here for the fluid self has an unperturbed tone, and it is this very tone which seems to make Clarissa’s musing sane rather than delusional. And when Miranda emerges from her days of illness and delirium, she arms herself to face a life without Adam in a way that suggests a triumph of clear-eyed saneness over delirium and loss.
Additionally, if Miranda’s independence, intellectual work, and questioning of the War imply a degree of androgyny, the novella’s ending reinforces this idea. After Miranda has survived only to find that Adam had died early in her own illness, she hears the celebratory sounds that cancel out the “gong” of the War: the Armistice. Now that there is nothing to live for, Miranda, feeling like “an alien who does not like the country... does not understand the language nor wish to learn it,” now arms herself with a cologne and lipstick, “a walking stick of silvery wood with a silver knob,” and grey “gauntlets,” to re-enter life. Her last thought, after allowing herself one last vivid fantasy of Adam, is that she must face “the dead cold light of tomorrow. Now there would be time for everything” (1962: 165).

Miranda has faced terrifying delusions in her illness, yet she emerges from her delirium to face life and loss sanely. Further, when near death, she has felt one with others, perceived as “pure identities,” but not needing to be named; this notion of not requiring language in order to be one with others touches more on the transcendent than on the delusional.

Writing about Woolf, James Naremore has discussed the psychological aspects of Woolf’s attempts to get at “life itself,” an impulse which he says is “increasingly adapted to the blurring of subject object distinctions” (Naremore 1972: 132). The sense of a character’s separateness juxtaposed with a desire to “merge with the world” is identified, as Naremore notes, by R.D. Laing with schizophrenia. Merging with, or being engulfed by the world, may result in “terror.” Laing describes a young man’s fear as debilitating because “he knew of no halfway stage between radical isolation... or complete absorption into all there was” (Laing 1970: 91) The terror is of “the loss of identity involved in this merging or fusing of the self” (Laing 1970: 91).

In Miranda’s heaven and Clarissa’s imagined afterlife there is no identity and no need for one. Both Miranda and Clarissa might be distinguished by the ability of both to hold Laing’s two impulses in balance, even in the face of the loss or imperfection of love. Fighting her way back from death for Adam’s sake, Miranda finds herself alone, but a “salvaged” rather than shattered self.

In the end, female androgyny, achieved in some aspects of Miranda’s and Clarissa’s experience, can enrich the female “branch” of the male-female binary, but its creativity has no power to alter the powerful grip of patriarchal forces of domination. So Sir William will go on enforcing “proportion”; men like Adam will offer themselves in an unreflective response.
to male destiny; Septimus will throw himself onto the palings. Yet sanity and madness are presented as a continuum, not a polarity, and in Woolf’s and Porter’s use of language, their forcing of its logic, even in language’s failure to represent, a sort of effacing of binaries occurs. Richard fails to tell Clarissa he loves her, but brings flowers, strands of thought and affection bind friends and strangers in London, Miranda finds restoration and transcendence as well as loss in the embrace of death; Clarissa confirms her life even in the moment of admiring Septimus’ act of suicide. Thus in both works, through moments of intensity, whether delusional or not, the unspeakable is expressed, and the inexpressible is spoken.

References

CULTURAL SPECULATIONS
“THE GREAT GOD PAN IS DEAD!” THE ECOLOGICAL ELEGY OF WILLIAM BURROUGHS’ GHOST OF CHANCE

CHAD WEIDNER
The Roosevelt Academy University Honors College
Utrecht University

Abstract: The paper explores some of the profound political strains that work throughout William Burrough’s fiction. Many of the investigations done to date about William Burroughs are sentimental and nostalgic rather than scholarly. Now that Burroughs’ oeuvre is complete, it is time to reflect on the entirety of his work. This analysis will attempt to reveal some of the codified ideology in Ghost of Chance, a novella published many years after the publication of Burrough’s most controversial work.

Introduction
William S. Burroughs was a core member of the Beat Generation. Scholars and critics have described his novels (as well as the wider work of the Beat Generation) as a reaction to mid 20th century consumerism and the Cold War uncertainties. Jeffrey Falla has previously suggested a possible relationship between the Beats and the agrarian West of America, “Beat philosophy centers on a return to an American individualism which had as its core the myth of the pioneer” (2000: 24). Can parallels between the politics of seemingly antipatriotic Burroughs and the original patriot Jefferson be found? What might such a revelation tell us about Burroughs’ views on government and ecology? Critics have long wrestled with the problem of pinning Burroughs down as a conservative — or radical — or art revolutionary. Many believe that his work defies genre (was he a narrator of the grotesque, black comedian, absurdist?) Literary agrarianism places Burroughs in the long tradition of rural American thinkers, especially Thomas Jefferson.

Literary Agrarianism
I posit that a new conceptual model can be created from elements of anarchy, classical Marxism, and Jeffersonian ideas of government and agrarianism. Literary agrarianism attempts to place a given work into histor-
ical and political context by measuring it against the agricultural and political origins of the United States. This model is limited to American literature. According to agrarianism, farming is a righteous occupation. It considers the city, money, and the church as potentially evil in that they limit natural human freedoms. Agrarianism, though, tries to flesh out the contextual relationship between a given text and American notions of agriculture and government. In effect, I have pressed together three different ideological concepts, in varying degrees, to create a new lens to examine texts.

Agrarianism recognizes the importance of nature. In this respect, it could be described as having similarities to ecocriticism. The goal of the concept, however, is different. As classical Marxism tries to put a given text into the context of class revolution, ecocriticism (and environmental criticism) seek out the relationship between texts and environmental praxis. Literary agrarianism is interested in fleshing out an ideology of agronomy, and as such examines a text in a more theoretical way.

Now that Burroughs has been deceased for nearly a decade, perhaps it is time to reexamine his work in a new context. Burroughs greened as he grew older. His late works especially move towards an environmental consciousness. In *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Florian Vetsch (2003) argued that in *Ghost of Chance*, Burroughs has moved in the direction of politically engaged ecological writing, “Burroughs' trickreich mit Synchronien arbeitende Prosa legt neben der ökologischen auch eine hellsichtig wahrgenommene politische Dimension frei...ein brandaktuelles, wundersam komponiertes Alterswerk gelungen, ein verwuchert glühendes Plädoyer für die Formenvielfalt der Natur.“ Others have described Burroughs’ feelings of absolute hopelessness at imminent environmental catastrophe. As Shirlaw (2002) argues, “*Ghost of Chance* is alienating. Burroughs seeks to retrieve the irrevocable, the futility of which leaves the novella with a sadness bordering on elegy.” If others have already argued that Burroughs’ writing contains an ecological component, then what is the point of this study? What is new here? I respectfully submit that the concept of literary agrarianism can provide even deeper historical and political meaning into Burroughs and his writing than simply placing him into the same tent as fellow Beat Gary Snyder.

William Burroughs’ *Ghost of Chance* is a novella, containing just 58 pages. It appeared late in Burroughs’ career. It was published in 1991, some 32 years after the publication of the influential novel *Naked Lunch*. The dis-
tance between the two books is in some ways larger than the three decades that separate them. *Naked Lunch* is wholly scatological. It is difficult to read as there are no customary notions of plot, setting or theme. The work can hardly be described as a novel. It might be more appropriate to describe it as a series of sketches, some satirical, but most revolving around descriptions of paranoid visions, homosexual promiscuity, and the quest to acquire and use drugs. *Ghost of Chance*, on the other hand, while still displaying Burroughs fascination with a derangement of the senses, though, is softer in its tone. The book is overall much more accessible than *Naked Lunch*. Literary agrarianism puts the two books in the same class, however, as they both promote lesser control from ruling forces. Both books are critical of the church and promote broad individual liberties. While *Naked Lunch* could be described as an anti-urban book, *Ghost of Chance* can be described as ecologically conscious.

After the novella was published, many of the same old criticisms were made: Burroughs was still a literary idiot, an obscene and hackneyed recycler of used images. Will Self (1995) criticized Burroughs’ uneven use of footnotes and citations in a review in *The Guardian*, “[M]uch of what Burroughs says in the lively and idiosyncratic footnotes to this text is hideously unpalatable”. Admittedly, Burroughs does try to bring a scientific and impartial approach to the novella, an approach that is perhaps less than fully successful. This attempt at journalistic detachment and objectivity is common even in Burroughs’ early work.

*Naked Lunch* is written in a chaotic, freecutting style that is more muted in *Ghost of Chance*. If *Naked Lunch* is chaotic, then *Ghost of Chance* is at times coherent. Both books seem to be a kind of warning in support of individual liberties against monolithic forces. Some critics find Burroughs’ style flawed or even silly. As Kalka (2003:36) writes, “Hier jedoch erscheint es nicht als Strategie, als literarische Form, sondern als kunstlose, bare Albernheit.” Throughout Burroughs’ career, he was criticized time and time again for not fitting into established genres. It is not surprising that some critics found his work indigestible, as it does not easily fit into their notions of genre.

**Libertania**

The setting of *Ghost of Chance* is a settlement called Libertania. It is located on the West coast of Madagascar, far away from the developed
world and its emphasis on consumption and hurried production. Burroughs provides the reader a version of an apparently failed historical attempt by a group of pirates to create a free and independent state. The choice of using former pirates as settlers in a utopian setup is important in the agrarian context. Pirates are certainly those who live outside established laws. Burroughs’ employment of pirates as ideological pioneers would suggest that Burroughs at least believed that those who have lived outside established social structures have an appreciation for personal liberties that those who have not.

The protagonist of the book is Captain Mission, a name that could have been drawn from a comic book. The protagonist’s mission here is not to defeat Godzilla but to establish a new world. In the story, the settlers draw up a limited constitution based on respect for both nature and individual freedoms. The establishment of a perfect place, away from old corrupt and oppressive systems mirrors the founding of the American colonies. Just as the American colonies sought refuge from oppressive monarchical and religious institutions, Captain Mission seeks refuge for his band of liberty loving pirates from the overwhelming and encircling power of the developed world. The emphasis in this settlement, though, is not religious freedom, but freedom from economic pressures and ecological contamination.

There is serenity in the rural community that Captain Mission and his ex-pirates have founded. “He saw the settlement, the freshly molded red bricks and thatch already timeless as houses in fairyland” (Burroughs 1991: 3) History tells us that Utopia is impossible, and the hint that the settlement is a fairytale land makes the temporary balance clear to the reader. For a short time, it does appear that humans are able to live in equilibrium with nature. The community works together to solve the most basic of human problems, the need to eat, “A reed…a loaf of bread…A bird wheels in the sky. A woman plucks feathers from a fowl, takes a loaf of bread from an adobe oven.” (13) The basic social code of the settlement is do as you please, as long as it does not harm anyone else or the animals that also inhabit the area.

In the book, as was not so uncommon during the late 18th century in America, disagreements that could not be resolved through debate are settled by duel. In Ghost of Chance, this practice was spelled out in Article 23 of the settlement’s constitution. The article describes how if no resolution to a disagreement between two individuals in the settlement can be found,
that the issue could be settled in a fair duel (1991: 7). Captain Mission challenges Bradley to a duel after he kills a lemur for a mango. Bradley, who was purportedly a very bad shot, had the right to refuse the duel, which he did. This refusal, according to custom, grants Captain Mission the victory, and the losing party must depart from the camp before sunset. In the context of literary agrarianism, the idea of the duel as a means to resolve disagreements is significant in that by having a duel provision in the settlement's constitution, both parties did not need to rely on a magistrate or court to resolve the disagreement.

Early in the story, Burroughs describes the relationship between the protagonist, Captain Mission, and those who lived as equals in the community, “He picked up his staff and walked out through the settlement, stopping here and there to talk to the settlers” (1). Thomas Jefferson would have appreciated the limited formal authority of the local government. The rules of the colony are described in a concise constitution, which is widely recognized and understood by all who live in the settlement. Jefferson would have also respected the attempt to balance progress in such things as vaccines with a rural concern for keeping the region uncontaminated by industry. There are no apartment blocks in Libertania, nor are there convenience stores. Instead, villagers make clay bricks or even inhabit ancient cave dwellings.

People live alongside a diverse (but threatened) group of passive lemurs. The group has realized a new Eden. Predictably though, the social order breaks down. Captain Mission begins to have terrible nightmares prophesizing the coming slaughter. When describing a gloomy encounter between Captain Mission and a lemur deer, Burroughs writes, “Slowly the animal raised one paw and touched his face, stirring memories of the ancient betrayal. Tears streaming down his face, he stroked the animal’s head...There is always something a man must do in time. For the deer ghost there was no time.” (5) Soon thereafter, Bradley kills a lemur for stealing a piece of fruit. This one killing starts a terrible chain of events.

In the end, humans follow and brutally slaughter all of the remaining lemurs. It seems that nothing can placate the human lust for the blood of the lemurs. A black monkey creature “sings a black song, harsh melody of a blackness too pure” (18). Human brutality is not limited to the destruction of the lemurs, however. In their killing frenzy, the humans go on to slaughter all animals, and in doing so extinguish most animal life, “The last
Tasmanian wolf limps through a blue twilight, one leg shattered by a hunter's bullet" (18). In their unchecked slaughter, the humans have in effect opened a Pandora’s Box in the Museum of Lost Species. Captain Mission is informed that “a joint French and English expeditionary force was on the way to attack his free pirate settlement” (20). He understands the coming doom.

The Museum of Lost Species is a depository of all the earth’s extinct biological organisms, including long forgotten, but terribly potent bacterial and viral diseases. Once the museum is cracked open by reckless human violence, it unleashes brutal retaliation on all of humanity. A disease spreads from the African mainland to Europe and America. “[T]heir veins were filled not with blood but with a yellow-green ichor that gave off a horrible stench” (33). Quickly, tens of millions succumb to what is called the ‘Christ Sickness’. After everything that humanity has accomplished - from ancient Babylonian rhetoricians to space travel, all that remains is “rotten urine, the reek of man’s sojourn on earth” (33).

Subsequently in the book, in a pseudo-scholarly exposition, Burroughs traces the origins of the current ecological crisis to the rise of Christianity over pantheism. His attempt at academic writing includes the use of ineffective footnotes and citations. The book might have been more powerful had he not tried so hard to inject factual support into the piece, evidence which seems more peculiar and make-believe than convincing. In the novella, Christ himself returns to pass his final judgment of humanity, and the four horsemen of the apocalypse destroy almost all of the peoples of the earth with resurrected primordial diseases. I posit that the novella was a warning from an elderly man who was not only concerned about the environment, but was likely reflecting on his own mortality when writing the book.

Literary Agrarianism acknowledges a debt to classical Marxism in that it sheds light onto economic pressures and the consequences of private enterprise on normal humans. One can find evidence of class-consciousness, or at least repulsion of unbridled capitalism in Ghost of Chance. Burroughs describes what he calls the Board — a shadowy organization of men who dictate global social and economic policy. He writes about the way they distract the populace from real issues by fabricating problems where, supposedly, they do not exist, “To distract their charges from the problems of overpopulation, resource depletion, deforestation, pandemic
pollution of water, land, and sky, they inaugurated a war against drugs. This provided a pretext to set up an international police apparatus designed to suppress dissidence on an international level” (29-30). Burroughs makes a link between profit mongering, environmental destruction, and the attack on personal liberties in one massive swoop.

Burroughs goes on to describe the death of entire species at the hand of money grubbing men. “The last deer lemur falls to a hunter's arrow. Passenger pigeons rain on the plates of fat bankers and politicians with their gold watch chains and gold fillings. The humans belch out the last passenger pigeon” (18). Burroughs was opposed to all forms of oppressive institutions, and as one such force, capitalism was an adversary. In his later work, Burroughs seems to associate profit with mindless environmental destruction. In *Ghost of Chance*, Burroughs traces the folly of the Board. Shortsighted and focused only on profit, the Board overlooks and ignores the need to keep the Museum of Lost Species sealed. “The Board had indeed lost interest in…the Museum of Lost Species” (29). Throughout Burroughs’ career, he routinely railed against banks, insurance companies, and debt collectors. He viewed such organizations as selfish and aggressive, and advocated economic fraud as a legitimate form of civil disobedience. In *Ghost of Chance*, Burroughs writes that after the four horsemen destroy a world built on exploitation and profit, “[The board's] power, which depended on manipulation through money and political contacts, is gone” (54). Interestingly, Burroughs’ suspicion of business was shared by Jefferson.

Thomas Jefferson was obsessed with debt. In a letter he wrote to James Madison (1789), he advocates the abolition of intergenerational debt, “[T]he earth belongs in usufruct to the living…the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.” Richard Latner (1997: 883-84) has argued that the federalists had a decidedly different view of debt than Jefferson and Madison, and that Jefferson saw the federalist economic plans as tantamount to support for a new kind of monarchy.

**Is Christianity a Virus?**

According to the tenets of Literary Agrarianism as I have put forward, the church is potentially evil in that it limits natural human freedoms. Certainly one could argue that organized religion has caused and continues to cause great suffering throughout the world. Certainly the origins of the
religion are obscure at best, and at worst the creation of a few men long after the death of Christ. Thomas Jefferson certainly had suspicions of organized Christianity. Jefferson pondered the uncertain origins of the Bible in a letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush (1803), and remarked that the Bible was written by "the most unlettered & ignorant men".

In *Ghost of Chance*, Burroughs repeatedly denounces Christianity. He first describes the ability of Christ to heal others, "With the fingers of his right hand he touches the wound, which knits and seals under his touch. Not even a scar remains" (23). Burroughs then describes the hypocrisy of only healing those *with faith* — while not healing suffering animals, like lemurs and cats. When the Museum of Lost Species is opened, terrible and ancient diseases are unleashed upon all of humanity, not just those guilty of ecocide. Burroughs describes the diseases in terrifying detail and counts the deaths by the multitudes, "It is estimated that a hundred million died of the Christ Sickness" (35).

Literary agrarianism suggests that the church is potentially evil. In the book, "The four horsemen ride through ruined cities," (54) harvesting ripe human lives with cruelty and cool indifference. Only in the countryside are there some who survive the slaughter, and people in the great empty spaces (who live closer to nature) must defend themselves against the vociferous hoards fleeing urban death, "Outside the compounds, total chaos reigned as the plagues raged unchecked, and all pretense of law and order had long since been abandoned. The country was dotted by fortresses, to ward off foraging bands from the starving cities" (54).

Burroughs explains the almost absurd notions of forgiveness inherent in Christian belief, specifically the idea of turning the other cheek. Burroughs writes, "The teachings of Christ read like biological suicide. Shall the deer seek out the leopard and offer its throat to his fangs? Shall fish impale themselves on hooks and into nets? No animal species could survive by seeking out and loving its enemies" (26). Indeed it is difficult to turn the other cheek if one is lying in a pool of blood. In the book, after Burroughs goes after a key principle of Christian doctrine, he does concede the difficulties of forgiving others and that, "There are few things more difficult than loving your enemies" (26).
A Contradiction of Arms

As in Burroughs other books, guns are still a central element in Ghost of Chance. Firearms hold a special place in American culture. How could the American insurgency have succeeded against the British without the small arms of farmers? Thomas Jefferson often carried a small pistol, and hoped to never be forced into using it. He was a firm believer in the right to bear arms, and even tried to get second amendment-like legislation drawn into the Virginia State Constitution. It is no surprise then, that guns are viewed as such a fundamental and central place to American ideas of liberty. William Burroughs carried this tradition throughout his wider work, as well as in Ghost of Chance.

Burroughs’ description and admiration of guns, while consistent throughout his works, is at times paradoxical. It is no surprise that in an ideal community such as Libertania, the right to have, own, and carry weapons is essential. “Captain Mission strapped on his double-barreled flintlock, which he kept loaded with shot charges, and thrust a scabbarded cutlass under his belt” (1991: 1). I believe that Burroughs attempts to provide us humans with an ecological warning in the novel, a warning to restrict harmful activities. Do not weapons, then, represent the qualities of perfect human technological destruction?

Burroughs himself makes reference, “Beauty is always doomed. ‘They evil and armed draw near.’ Homo Sap with his weapons, his time, his insatiable greed, and ignorance so hideous it can never see its own face” (17) If, in Burroughs’ eyes, humans should be allowed to own weapons, then why not allow them to have larger, more efficient weapons? When does the right to bear arms become secondary to the needs of the collective to be safe from random acts of violence? When does the right to own weapons become superseded by the needs of the environment? If guns are allowed, then why not machine guns, grenades, or even neutron bombs? This apparent contradiction is not resolved in the novel.

Conclusion

In previous novels, Burroughs perhaps focused more on the struggle between the individual and oppressive controlling forces in the state, the church, and banks. Burroughs mellowed. He no longer rolls drunks on the New York subway or needs to pop heroin in the mainline. His main con-
cerns are animals threatened by human ignorance and irresponsible conceit.

The book as a whole is one of the more accessible Burroughs texts. In the literary agrarian context, is *Ghost of Chance* successful? It is, in the sense that Burroughs effectively dramatizes the environmental threats facing humanity. The book continues Burroughs' concern for continued human existence in an age of catastrophe — though the concern this time is not only political, but also ecological. In *Times Literary Supplement*, Isobel Shirlaw (2002) has argued that Burroughs is actually writing himself into a corner, "Burroughs seeks to retrieve the irrevocable, the futility of which leaves the novella with a sadness bordering on elegy." It is as if Burroughs has traveled to the future, and has come back with an obituary written about the earth. As Will Self described (1995), "[T]he generative force for the narrative (such as it is) comes from the author's own preoccupations with global environmental catastrophe." Near the end of the novella, Burroughs makes an impassioned plea for funding for the Duke University Primate Center, which breeds lemurs in captivity in an attempt to circumvent extinction.

In *Ghost of Chance*, Burroughs explores the logical end result of contemporary economic trends and suggests, persuasively, that a milder form of human existence would be preferable to current models of human economic and social structures. *Ghost of Chance* is one of his most compelling works, in that he has somewhat softened his dogmatic rebuke of all control systems to what could be described as a mournful reflection on the current environmental crisis. Was he trying to save humanity from its own, "vast mud-slide of soulless sludge"? (19) The book not only provides a black image of the future. After the plagues have reduced the potential danger of humanity in the book, "People of the world...at last [return] to their source in spirit, back to the little lemur people of the trees and the leaves, the streams, the rocks, and the sky." (54) As such, even in Burroughs' eyes, there is still a sliver of hope for humanity.

**References**


THE POWER OF ATTRACTION IN THE NARRATIVE OF SOAP OPERAS

MARIA BAJNER
University of Pécs

Abstract: The analysis raises several questions in relation to soap operas. What positions do readers, viewers, or listeners identify with, given that they are already socially conditioned men and women? What positions are available for the female (and male) audience? The answers to these questions are linked to broader gender divisions which soap operas both question and develop as a source of pleasure.

Soap operas are immensely popular cultural forms, attracting more than 2 million viewers each day in Hungary alone, the majority of whom are female, according to information available on www.mediainfo.hu. While the soap opera audience is both male and female, the soap opera genre carries heavily feminine connotations in contemporary culture, as it has been marketed and addressed to women since its early twentieth-century radio-broadcast origins. The soap opera continued the tradition of women’s domestic fiction of the nineteenth century, which had also endured in the magazine stories of the 1920s and 1930s. It also drew upon the conventions of the “woman’s film” of the 1930s. The primary target audience for soap operas — women working at home — was supposed to integrate the viewing of these shows into their daily routines. According to Ann Gray (1987: 48), soap operas form an important part of female viewers’ everyday lives and give focus to a female culture which they share. Such an approach either narrows its ramifications by specifying the kinds of women it describes (in terms of class, race, sexual orientation, nationality, age, etc.) or runs the risk of invoking a universalized “woman” whose affiliation with the codes of femininity is assumed as a norm. Watching soaps is as much a proof of femininity, as soap opera aversion is a sign of a Noble prize candidate. The real issue is not the individual or gendered difference in tastes, but rather the structural and ideological features that explain the genre’s unbroken popularity.
Although their consumer value is high, soap operas can boast little appreciation in academic circles. Scholars’ reluctance to soap operas arises from the marginal status of the genre itself. If we now have “gendered genres” in television studies, soaps are considered to be the most feminine of them all: Tania Modleski (1984) cites statistics showing that 90 percent of soap viewers in the early 1980s were women, and she and other feminist theorists have shown how the multiple climaxes, slow-paced, weak action, the lack of closure, the constantly shifting points of view, the priority of dialogues over action, and the depictions of female power so common in daytime soaps mark them as a specifically feminine alternative to masculine narrative traditions.

Moreover, soap opera texts continue to perpetuate such myths of the dominant culture as the primacy of heterosexual marriage, the irrevocability of blood-ties between mothers and children, and the priority of white upper middle class citizens’ concerns over those of other racial and ethnic groups. *Dallas*, the program that sparked the primetime soap boom of the 1980s in the US, not only borrowed the serial from daytime soaps, but also the structuring device of the extended family (the Ewings), complete with patriarch, matriarch, good son, bad son and in-laws, all of whom lived in the same Texas-sized house. The kinship and romance plots that could be generated around these family members were believed to be the basis for attracting female viewers, while Ewing Oil’s boardroom intrigues would draw adult males, accustomed to watching “masculine” genres (western, crime, and legal dramas).

Feminist recuperations of soap opera have most recently relied upon explications of how viewers use those texts for feminist ends: to satisfy unconscious drives towards female power, to serve as the focus for communities of friends whose conversations about the plots can be critical or carnivalesque, and hence subversive of the plots’ apparent ideologies. ‘Feminine emotional experience’ does not emanate from the female body or even from any given woman’s psychology. It is a process structured by culturally produced and received intensities. For some viewers, the intensity of emotions is a form of background noise in a life otherwise detached from the concerns of the soap opera plot, for others — particularly those who are moved enough by the storyline to want to write about it on-line — the intensities are more present, more vividly part of daily consciousness. To watch every day is to be carried on that wave of intensities, to experience
the build-ups, the crises, and the undertow of response as one of the structuring principles of daily life. To watch every day — to have your emotional life structured, however subtly, by that wave pattern — is to be continually re-gendered, whether you are male or female, whether you experience the feelings as “genuine emotions” or “intensities,” whether you view this process as part of the oppression of women or as an opportunity for celebrating white, middle class, feminine experience. In focusing on gender rather than sex in my analysis of soap opera viewing, I mean specifically to include those men who are as dedicated to watching soaps as their female counterparts, and who are, in that sense, full participants in this aspect of feminine culture.

Although soap opera texts are relatively open to different interpretations, they do require certain types of knowledge to draw on in order to make sense of the program. These include familiarity with the genre, with the history or the specific soap opera, and with the wider cultural competence of marriage, family and personal life (Dyer 1987: 14). This is a kind of competence that does not depend on gender.

The analysis of the narrative structure of soap operas reveals that they amalgamate elements of genres traditionally attracting male or female audience. *Dallas* is just about emotions. And as everything in Texas is always said to be larger, bigger and huger than life, so is Texas emotion. The narrative is defined by such an emotional wave pattern that gives rise to the story and satisfies the rhythm of both melodrama and whodunit. Before I analyzed and sketched the dominant emotions represented in individual episodes over five weeks (of Season 1), it had been my impression that particular episodes tend to be unified around the representation of certain sets of emotions: there are anxious scenes, angry scenes, jealous scenes, desperate scenes, etc. My analysis of all the scenes in those episodes indicates that this is generally true, that each episode is dominated by characters populating various subplots, expressing a particular subset of all the emotions available to soap opera diegeses. A typical example of that is the ‘anxious’ scene where Cliff Barnes (who is a constant loser) is discussing the latest news about his rival, JR, with his mother and where nine different emotions (nine different subplots) back up the leading emotion, his embitterment.

The five episodes are similarly dominated by the expression of angst, in the forms of worry, concern, tension, dread, suspense, depression, and unsatisfied sexual desire, except for the last episode that functions as the
crisis point in a particular storyline, where the dominant emotions are revenge, terror, and erotic gratification. The emotional wave pattern cuts across the familiar six-day pattern of a “mini-climax” each week, and a smaller “cliffhanger” every other week, in that it seems to function within a cycle of 23 to 29 episodes. (The first season was a pilot year with only five episodes). After two weeks of tension/worry/suspense/anxiety, one or more of the subplots will culminate in a crisis day of rage/terror/anger. Even the most intense of crisis days will be broken up by some brief scenes from other subplots reflecting happiness, warmth, or affection, scenes which are also always present during the days that build up to and recover from the crisis. This wave pattern contributes to the rhythm of suspense in the serial form, and results from the form’s radical resistance to closure: no subplot is ever really resolved as the undertow of emotional repercussion after the crisis keeps the pattern of affect constantly moving. In this important respect, soap opera is unique among melodramatic forms. Daniel Gerould, summarizing the Russian Formalists’ model of melodramatic structures, states that melodramas typically “move in tiers.” In Gerould’s opinion (1991), what is characteristic for melodramatic composition is not a straight rise to the culminating point and then a lowering of tension until the conclusion, but rather a movement in tiers by which each new phase of the plot with its new ‘obstacles’ and no ‘resolution’ gives rise to new degrees of dramatic intensity. The “movement in tiers” resembles the wave pattern in that there is never a single climax to a plot, as each new complication builds more “dramatic intensity.” But whereas the stage melodrama or its novelistic counterparts eventually will reach the final moments of the denouement, the soap opera text never does. The intensity continues unabated, each season finishes of with a highly dramatic cliffhanger, where one or several characters’ lives are left in the balance, for over 365 episodes throughout 14 years and more, (with the last episodes Conundrum 1 and 2) as the spectator’s heightened dramatic perception is never fully dissipated.

Another structural feature of soap operas comes into play here. Soap operas have no ultimate narrative closure, thus preventing viewers from forming long-term expectations for plots. While there are a number of ongoing subplots, conflicts are never totally resolved, given the ongoing nature of the program in which audiences can tune in at any time and understand the story. Soap operas have, according to John Fiske (1987: 180), an “infinitely extended middle,” in that they never end, and can never
be resolved completely. There is always the threat of change in the future. Events cannot be read in relation to a complete story, because soap operas do not end neatly. This makes soap operas unpredictable in the long run. One can, for example, anticipate that two characters may in the near future get together because of the daily development of their relationship, but one cannot foresee that they will still be together in ten years time.

Rather than concentrating on long-term goals and events, the soap opera narrative focuses on the reactions and emotions of characters as they live through constant change, disruption and temporary resolutions to plots that will eventually change and continue to develop in unexpected ways. In soap operas, life goes on after the happy ending. Because of this particular narrative feature, the soap opera text as a whole can be characterized as “open,” as opposed to “closed,” texts which have specific, predetermined paths and ways of reading and interpreting (Fiske 1987: 180). A widely distributed single program, such as *Dallas*, with ‘non-controversial’ contents may not be an agent of homogenization after all, for to reach its multitude of diverse audiences it must be an “open” text that allows for a great deal of cultural diversity in its readings, and thus provides considerable semiotic space for the receiving cultures or subcultures to negotiate their meanings, rather than the ones preferred by the broadcasters.

The narrative structure of soap operas gives some insight into how viewers can become involved in the program. Narrative structure and flow have often been regarded as chronological movements of actions in a text, but there is another axis of movement and action that is particularly relevant to soap operas. This axis is an associative one which moves the viewer through the network of characters, rather than forward in the sequence of actions in the plot of the program. Soap operas are complex, with large casts of characters and intricate, labyrinthine plot lines which develop slowly over large periods of time, sometimes measured in years. This type of structure helps make sense of these complexities by focusing on character and history instead of action.

Drawing on structural linguistics in its analysis of language and narrative, it is useful when looking at soap opera narrative structure to distinguish between the syntagmatic axis of structure, which is sequential, and the paradigmatic axis, which is associative (Allen 1985: 69). The syntagmatic axis in soap operas can be seen as the temporal sequence of events, the story lines and plot outlines. The paradigmatic axis, on which I will concentrate,
operates in a different manner, and is in fact one of the most significant features in soap operas (Allen 1985: 70-72). This axis of structure focuses the viewer’s attention not on the sequence of events, but on the reverberations of the event through the character network of the show. It is the discussion and interpretation of an action by various characters that amplifies its significance to all of their lives, and to future plot developments of these characters. I use Allen’s terminological distinction between the “naive” viewer, who tunes into a soap episode for the first time, and the “experienced” viewer, who knows the backstory. As Allen explains, the “naive viewer can only read syntagmatically, from event to event, whereas the experienced viewer performs a paradigmatic reading, recognizing the pattern among events that unfold over the long term. The experienced viewer attains a level of literacy in soap-opera convention that makes it possible to interpret the broad strokes of an episode of a soap he or she has never seen before, approaching one of his or her ‘own’ soaps, the experienced viewer has the competency needed to fill in the gaps that necessarily occur in the daily diegeses” (Allen 1985: 85).

Viewers themselves enter vicariously into the fictional soap opera community. There are many long-term viewers, some of whom have been watching soap operas for as long as 35 years. Soap operas are organized around the calendrical cycle of the ‘real’ world in which viewers live, i.e. Christmas on soap operas occurs at Christmas our time. The lives of characters thus run parallel to the lives of viewers in time. Thus, it is time, and not plot, which comes to dominate the narrative process (Geraghty 1991: 111). Feminist critics have shown how the conventions of daytime soap operas, their reference to ‘here and now’, their concern with relationships and reactions, the real-seemingness of the characters enable them to interact fruitfully and creatively with women’s gossip.

Dramatic events are built around talk: arguments, lies, shouting matches, accusations, false promises, and gossip, the most complex structural component of soap opera texts. Feminists have begun to reevaluate gossip as part of women’s culture and to argue that it can be both creative and resistant to patriarchy. The fact that men consistently denigrate it is at least a symptom that they recognize it as a cultural form that is outside their control. Bakhtin suggests that in an essentially literate society oral culture is necessarily oppositional, for it bears the traces of the political position of its subordinate subcultures. But it does more than this, it is one of the prime
media through which these subordinated groups have resisted incorporation, have maintained their social differences (Diaz-Diocaretz 1989).

The notion of gossip, normally carrying with it a negative connotation, can be usefully applied to soap operas on various levels. First, the specific narrative structures of soap operas allow for a concentration on character gossip that brings a paradigmatic depth and richness of time to soap opera viewing. Second, gossip between viewers allows for further delving into the histories of characters as well as providing viewers with a means of testing out attitudes about social norms and values that are difficult to discuss in ‘real’ life situations. This second level of gossip takes it outside the text into the lives of viewers, where it has an even larger significance. Gossip has important social functions amongst members of a group, however loosely associated those members may be. According to Gluckman, we all gossip, and “…every single day, and for a large part of each day, most of us are engaged in gossiping. I imagine that if we were to keep a record of how we use our waking-time, gossiping would come only after ‘work’ — for some of us — in the score” (Gluckman 1963: 307). The complexity of the narrative of soap operas generates gossip between viewers as they fill each other in on what has happened on the program and make predictions for possible resolutions of story lines. Soap operas are about domestic and personal problems: marriages, divorces, births, deaths, and all the problems involved in marital and family relationships. They provide a basis for family and neighborhood gossip. Through soap operas, viewers see other families on television to which to compare their own (Geraghty 1991: 33). The meanings that are generated on soap operas are not confined to the viewing context, but carry through to everyday activities. They provide a framework for talk for family, friends, neighbours, colleagues, even strangers (Morley and Silverstone 1990: 46-48). Soap operas extend their popularity even further than discussions between individual viewers. The concerns of soap operas can be perceived to be split between the public and the personal, with the private, personal sphere taking precedence. This recognizes and values the emotional work women are supposed to do in the domestic sphere (Geraghty 1991: 43). It is the personal relationships in soap operas that provide the dramatic moments. These moments provide areas that viewers react to and discuss as a way of testing out attitudes which could not have been so conveniently discussed had they occurred in ‘real’ life. What is important to note here is that all viewers are not in agreement as to how
soap operas should be interpreted. There is a good deal of negotiation going on when viewers discuss and disagree over these points (Geraghty 1991: 123). Soap operas in this indirect way provide material for discussions about social conventions and values. Finally, the wider popularity of soap operas extends discussions beyond the television and into the categories through which people live through the dialogue they stimulate in the media. In these ways, we see that the ‘idle talk’ generated by soap operas has a greater impact on our lives than previously envisioned.

In her book *Overhearing Film Dialogue* (2000), Sarah Kozloff reminds us that the women’s film, driven by emotional confession and talk, evokes melodrama’s paradox. Building upon the earlier work of Peter Brooks and Tania Modleski, Kozloff finds in the dialogue of women’s films an enduring enigma. While film melodramas are verbally overexplicit, they nonetheless “hinge around the not said, the words that cannot be spoken” (2000: 242). Like stage melodrama from earlier centuries, the women’s film relies upon the “melodramatic gesture” and scenarios of “tears and fainting” (240). On the one hand, melodrama unleashes “the desire to express all” and to “utter the unspeakable” (Brooks 1984: 4); on the other, it dramatizes “the repression of speech” and its consequence in hysterical signs (Kozloff 2000: 244). The 1950s confessional quiz program exposes exactly this “pressure between speech and silence” (247). Women are encouraged, indeed required, to tell their personal stories, yet their narratives are continually interrupted and reworked so as to emphasise the hysterical gesture and woman-as-spectacle.

A third level of gossip about soap operas is generated by the popular press. Magazines such as *Soap Opera Digest* and *Soap Opera Weekly* provide additional information and commentary about the programs. They can be a useful and enjoyable guide to fans as well as soap opera community websites with forums, chat rooms, news blog. They discuss aspects of production, and behind-the-sets politics. They have features on prominent relationships, interview actors, and keep track of what is happening with characters and actors. This provides background details for viewers to savour and enhances the pleasures of watching, helping to broaden the paradigmatic complexity. Viewers can exchange ideas about hit episodes, stars’ private lives, exclusive interviews with show’s characters, fashion, etc., while discussing their own experiences and finding new pals. Viewers can create their own story, and predict that something drastic will occur to a certain
character after reading in a magazine or hearing through the grapevine that a certain actor is quitting a role.

Some soap opera events reverberate even further. When *Dallas*’s J.R. Ewing was shot, it made the evening news worldwide. As Stuart Hall says, “At a certain point, the program attained a type of popularity that was not a popularity in terms of figures and ratings. The viewers’ involvements became something different. You couldn’t help talking about the popularity of Dallas, because people were starting to refer to categories taken from the serial in interpreting their own experience” (qtd. in Riegel 1996: 25). Soap opera characters and events have become cultural phenomena. Their enormous popularity has engaged the public in discussions of domestic and emotional issues which are normally deemed to be private (Geraghty 1991: 5). They have insinuated themselves into the categories through which people experience their everyday lives and conversations.

Women’s soap opera viewing has long been thought of by feminists and nonfeminists as an unproductive waste of time. Critics now commonly read soap opera as a feminist form. They point to its open-ended narrative, the shared experience of its female and male fans, the domestic space at the core of soap opera, and the medium’s attention to women’s experiences. Some critics go even further, arguing that women’s ‘indulgence’ in these programs is actually liberating. In overcoming the social opposition to the stigma attached to the feminine content and style, and engaging in soap opera viewing, women celebrate their femininity, particularly their gendered identification with romance, relationality, intuitiveness, talkativeness, and other aspects of emotionality. Over the last decade, most of the scholarship on soap opera’s gendered nature has repeatedly pointed out that daytime melodramas form an integral part of popular culture and should be seen as sites from which men and women understand the social concerns that predominate everyday life. What we can all learn from the texts of soap operas is how they reiterate patriarchal practices; the textual sites of pleasure and resistance they offer women viewers, and the ways in which they oppose and yield to the dominant practices of the male owned television industry.

References


THE PEDIGREE OF AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: 
AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

ERIC GILDER
University of Sibiu

MERVYN HAGGER
John Lilburne Research Institute (for Constitutional Studies)

Abstract: The paper explores alternative explanations to the origins of the American constitution. The authors’ first-hand experience in “pirate” radio broadcasting takes them on an unexpected research journey, which leads them to the discovery of an “alternative” figure that may have been at the basis of modern constitutional democracy.

At this time and in this forum, raising controversy over inspiration for the United States Constitution might appear to be somewhat puzzling, since it would seem that this matter was settled long ago. Therefore, any new answers to this question would appear to be better relegated to “fringe” discussions. However, in this instance the person who redirected the authors’ attention to reexamine this issue was a late United States Supreme Court Justice.

While traditional explanations for this Constitutional inspiration offer links to the Magna Carta of 1215; the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the contemporaneous works of John Locke (that were often referenced by Thomas Jefferson in his own writings), Justice Hugo L. Black offered an alternative and somewhat controversial pedigree worth considering (see Dillard 1963: 34-35).

Origins of this Present Work

Origins of the authors’ present work examining that pedigree are to be found in an unlikely chain of human events that began in Orwell’s year of 1984, for that is when news coverage of pirate radio engineers and broadcasters of the Twentieth Century briefly collided with the history of pirate printers and publishers of the Seventeenth Century.
Beginning in that fabled year of “Big Brother,” a series of international news stories about plans to revive a floating commercial offshore (“pirate”) station slated to broadcast from a ship anchored off the coast of southern England called “Wonderful Radio London International” (WRLI), appeared in both broadcast and print media, over numerous dates following March 1984 (e.g., on the ‘Media Network’ program of Radio Netherlands’ World Service; in Broadcast magazine on 23 March and in Hörzu’s radio section on 3 August in 1984, as well as on the front page of the Dallas Times Herald on 8 July, 1985). From the early 1980s onwards both Gilder and Hagger were to various degrees associated with the revival of the “Big L” station (see Gilder 2003: 100, fn 58).

The original demise of Wonderful Radio London took place on August 14, 1967. “On that day millions tuned in to the last few hours of broadcasting…” (Gilder 2003: 88). That station died as a result of a drought in advertising revenue that had been brought about by a new draconian censorship law which “made it a criminal offense for British citizens to work for, or to supply an offshore broadcasting station in any form or manner, whatsoever” (Gilder 2003: 106, fn 76). The station’s second coming had been heralded as though it was a new shoot from an old root attempting to break through the same parched soil that had killed the original venture. In the following years, however, that drought had only intensified and by 1985 it raised a basic WRLI question: “Why can you play rock and roll all day on the radio in America, but not in the United Kingdom?”

An Unexpected Education

During August 1985, this impromptu query soon turned into a casual comparative study of licensing history as it relates to the development of copyrights, publishing and broadcasting in the UK and USA (see Gilder 2003: 74-75). When Hagger randomly reached for the Book of the Year 1968 which happened to be located near to the control board in the WRLI project studio, he began thumbing through its pages and came across an article commissioned by the encyclopedia: “Democracy’s Heritage: Free Thought, Free Speech, Free Press” (Black 1968). The article had been written under the byline of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black, but had been actually penned by his wife (see Black & Black 1968). Hugo Black had given his wife “three or four very dull books to read to help me in my first draft …” (Black & Black 1968: 164.) She was prompted to become more interested in her
assignment when the yearbook’s publishers, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, offered her husband an additional $1,000 if he would expand his article (its eventual length was six encyclopedia pages) (Black & Black 1968: 165).

The essence of the Blacks’ combined recital is that the story of modern constitutional democracy really began with one John Lilburne, an Englishman who was born around the year 1617 to a family with roots in northern England but raised to the south within the shadow of Greenwich. Their completed article hailed Lilburne as America’s prototype ‘Founding Father’ who became clothed in the role of an activist fighting both inside and outside of the courtrooms of England on behalf of individual “freeborn rights”:

... his long fight with the government made him so much a public hero that his opponents could never secure his conviction by a jury, and after some of his parliamentary convictions, the officers holding him in custody had to be protected from the thongs of people who appeared to applaud him as a friend of the people because he was a foe of the government (Black 1968:40).

Prior to 1985, Hagger (who was born in England) had never heard of John Lilburne, but Black claimed that the views and activities of Lilburne and his associates:

... were the natural forerunners, if not the ancestors of the original written constitution of the American states, the U.S. Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. ... The claims of Lilburne ... were well known to Englishmen, their families and friends who left England to settle in the new land of promise in America (1968:41).

Sparked by Black’s introduction, Hagger adapted Lilburne’s “Freeborn” prefix to his own pen name of “John England” and, together with Gilder and co-founder Genie Baskir (who subsequently named her daughter Jane Lilburne), changed their WRLI project into a “Four Freedoms Federation” to continue this line of research. When the American Express Company sponsored a 1987 tour of the United States with an eighteen-wheeled truck emblazoned “Magna Carta to the Constitution — Roads to Liberty,” the Federation challenged that interpretation with the alternative explanation offered by Black, “Americans must know the true origins of their rights in order to ensure they will be preserved” (‘Federation tries’ 1987) and “Four Freedoms Federation says ... Roads to Liberty Tour does
not contain any of the works of John Lilburne” (‘Activist disputes’ 1987). One year later (31 October, 1988), *Newsweek* magazine contrarily referenced John Lilburne as their lead-in for “A Loss of Liberties: Britain’s War on Terror” (1988: 47). (The article was about a then-new British law based upon ending Lilburne’s hard-won right to remain silent when accused of a crime, because the British would be allowed to interpret the silence of Irish Republican Army detainees as an admission of guilt.)

By 1992 the fledgling Federation had folded, but not before its work had been aired on a weekly radio broadcast over an international network of stations for a period of several years, as well as on a daily cablecast within the U.S. State of Texas for over a year. It had also engaged in political activism in an attempt to modify Texas school history textbooks by offering challenges to their un-amended review for approval. Its work was then kept alive by an offshoot project known as the “John Lilburne Research Institute” (England 1992).

**How Hugo Black came to Embrace “Freeborn” John**

Hugo Black’s personal interest in John Lilburne had become manifest as early as 1947 within footnote 14 of his U.S. Supreme Court lengthy Dissent in *Adamson v. California*. In that opinion, Black’s focus was centered upon the origins of the Fifth Amendment, which he traced to Lilburne’s 1637 Court of Star Chamber trial in London where attempts had been made to force Lilburne to testify under oath against his own free will. Lilburne’s agitated response was to loudly proclaim his rights as a freeborn Englishman. Leonard W. Levy’s 1968 *Origins of the Fifth Amendment* supports Black’s interpretation of Lilburne:

> No one was a greater pamphleteer. Lilburne … was the catalytic agent in the history of the right against self-incrimination. He appeared at the right moment (1986: 273).

When he wrote his 1947 dissent in *Adamson*, Black was only partially aware of Lilburne’s contributions, but by the autumn of 1953 his interest had really become focused:

Black’s daughter JoJo was always looking for books or ideas that could be helpful to him. In one of her college courses, she read selections from the Levellers … (Newman 1994: 450).
The Levellers were Lilburne’s Seventeenth-Century associates. When Black read JoJo’s textbook about their proposed written constitution for England called an “Agreement of the People,” of which there were three major revisions and expansions, he came to regard them as “the first real constitutionalists” (Newman 1994: 450)). Black claimed in his “Democracy” article (1968: 41) that latter works by the Levellers were ancestors of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights.

Black’s consuming passion for Lilburne did not go unnoticed by other Supreme Court Justices or clerks. In 1954, Justice William O. Douglas wrote An Almanac of Liberty and devoted the dates of February 13 and 14 (pages 236-237), to a brief survey of Lilburne’s activities. When Black read Frank’s The Levellers in 1955, one of his U.S. Supreme Court law clerks remarked that:

it became one of the most marked-up volumes in his library. ... when he got started talking about the Levellers and especially their leader, John Lilburne ... it was hard to stop him. (Newman 1994: 450)

Towards the close of 1955, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Ullmann v. United States, and in March 1956, Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion with Black concurring:

Lilburn marshaled many arguments against the oath ex officio, one of them being the sanctity of conscience and the dignity of man before God. (Douglas also cited Lilburne’s 1653 publication The Just Defence) ... Another fundamental right I then contended for was that no man’s conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended to be so (350 U.S. 422).

In 1966, Justices Black and Douglas were joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren in reciting the works of John Lilburne. Between 28 February and 1 March of that year, Miranda v. Arizona was argued before the Court. On June 13 Chief Justice Warren gave the Opinion of the Court:

We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came, and the fervor with which it was defended. ... The lofty principles to which Lilburn had appealed during his trial gained popular acceptance in England. These sentiments worked their way over to the Colonies, and were implanted after great struggle into the Bill of Rights (384 U.S. 436).
In 1980, page 388 of William O. Douglas’ autobiographical account of *The Court Years — 1937-1975*, again focused attention upon Lilburne’s 1637 Court of Star Chamber fight for the same right that became known in America as the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

**Reinterpreted Transatlantic Confusion**

During the 1960s, the culture of youth began to flow back and forth like tides whose waves lapped against the shores of both Britain and America. With each wave came the byproducts of commercial consumerism. Just as Little Richard had influenced Paul McCartney, so too the collective sounds of the “British Invasion” influenced stations such as KLIF in Dallas, Texas, which, in turn, had influenced the creation of Wonderful Radio London funded by Texas entrepreneurs and broadcasting from offshore into England (Gilder 2003:82).

While these entrepreneurs were embracing the Americanized spirit of Lilburne, listeners were imbibing the Americanized spirit of Gerrard Winstanley’s Christian Communist Diggers (or the “True Levellers) of 1649 whose name and ideas had been hijacked by a consortium of Haight Asbury Hippies and Hells Angels in San Francisco (Grogan 1972: 237). Rather than continuing Black’s advocacy for inalienable human rights based upon the work of Lilburne and the Levellers, these Hippies were mimicking Winstanley’s theme in their own slogans of “free food”, “free radio” and free everything else in-between.

Yet the British “pirate stations” (which soon became known as “free radio stations”) were championing the sentiment of capitalist *laissez faire*, rather than communism tinged with anarchy (see Leonard 1996: 162-3 on formation of the Free Radio Association; Bernstein 2000, which places Winstanley and the Diggers in context with the development of Marxist communism]; and Hill 1984, which places Lilburne, the Levellers and Diggers in context of the seventeenth century]).

**Who was John Lilburne?**

John Lilburne came to the attention of the English Court of Star Chamber when he imported a book that had been printed and published in Holland, but not licensed by the English authorities. It was this act that resulted in his original arrest, trial and imprisonment of 1637. He would suffer many more arrests and terms of imprisonment throughout his life.
Lilburne fought with Parliamentary forces in the 1640s against the Royalist Cavaliers of King Charles I during England’s first Civil War, but he parted company when Oliver Cromwell attempted to turn the former kingdom into a republican military dictatorship. Lilburne reacted by joining with others who were accused by their adversaries of leveling laws so that they were applied equally and without favor. While imprisoned in the Tower of London, Lilburne became co-author of the third edition of a proposed written constitution for England. Cromwell reacted to Lilburne’s egalitarian overtures by exiling him from England and jailing him for life upon his return.

Lilburne was fiercely independent in both political thought and action which unsettled many in authority as well as his wife Elizabeth, who on one occasion rescued him from execution (Frasier 1984: 236). In the following century when Member of Parliament John Wilkes (1725-1787) was brought into court the magistrate exclaimed: “God bless me! Friend Wilkes, you are another John.” Wilkes asked if the magistrate was referring to John Hampden who Wilkes admired. The magistrate replied: “No, John Lilburne” (Williamson 1974: 67)

**Linking Thomas Jefferson with John Lilburne**

In his “Democracy” article, Black had linked the ancestry of Lilburne and his associates with America’s founding documents (1968: 41), and his claim raises the question as to where Thomas Jefferson fits into the ideological chain? A partial answer had been provided back in 1918 within William G. Stanard’s article, “Lilburne-Randolph-Jefferson” published by *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*.

Jefferson’s maternal grandfather was Isham Randolph and in 1717 at Shadwell Parish Church in London he married Jane Lilburne, a first-cousin descendant of Freeborn John. Isham and Jane had two daughters: one married Peter Jefferson (father of Thomas) who named his Virginia family home Shadwell. The house burned down in 1770 and it consumed most of Thomas Jefferson’s original books and papers. The second daughter of Isham and Jane married Charles Lewis who named a son Charles Lilburne Lewis. That son married Lucy Jefferson, sister of Thomas and they named a son Lilburne Lewis. Randolph Jefferson (brother of Thomas and Lucy) named a son Lilburne Jefferson.
In 1790, Thomas Jefferson’s daughter Martha (Patsy) married her second cousin Thomas Mann Randolph and they established their Virginia home at Edgehill. The house was named after the site of the first major battle in the English Civil Wars during which Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne fought (Frasier 1984: 236).

Unfortunately the two Jefferson nephews who carried the Lilburne name became engaged in a saga resulting in the murder of a slave, which resulted in the suicide of one and the flight from justice of his companion (see Merrill 2004). Aside from acknowledging the existence of his nephew named Lilburne, Thomas Jefferson did not insert any references to his genealogical and political Lilburne pedigree within post-Shadwell writings.

**Obfuscating Lilburne**

In 1988, American author Benjamin Hart wrote about Lilburne in his *Faith and Freedom: The Christian Roots of American Liberty*. While Hart clearly understood the differences between the Levellers and the Diggers and did not confuse the two, he nonetheless paved the way to creating a new religious interpretation of America’s heritage. Yet, by 2007, Hart’s interpretation (which linked the era of John Lilburne to the formation of America’s founding documents) was severed by U.S. author Michael Barone in *Our First Revolution*. Barone leaped over the Lilburne years to 1688-1689 (when Freeborn John and the English republic were both dead and the restored monarchy of England had been captured by the invasion of William of Orange during his so-called “Glorious Revolution”). Barone brushed aside the Levellers and Diggers as being one and the same:

> For much of the second half of the twentieth century, academic historians … have devoted … attention to the events of 1641-60 … that brought to the fore radicals who could be seen as ancestors of the Marxist revolutionaries of the Twentieth Century (2007: 2).

Using the pretext of suppressing future 9/11 terrorist acts, America’s inalienable freeborn rights are now being swept away with Cromwellian force, and Barone’s work seemingly provides academic cover for such political actions, ignoring the libertarian insights of Justices Black, Douglas and Warren (and, by extension, Lilburne). As a result, their names have become anathema in an age of “Big Brother” revisionism that pretends past freedoms had never been fought for nor achieved.
Note

Lilburne is currently spelt by most contemporary writers with an “e”, but most U.S. Supreme Court and historical works spell his surname without an “e”.

References


‘Pop und oldies aus der nordsee’ Hörzu (Hamburg) 3 August 1984, Radio-TV section 32/84.


‘The strife on the ocean waves’ Broadcast magazine [UK], 23 March 1984, p.52.


Abstract: The paper looks into the way in which the medieval society was organized as a vertical disposition of ordines complemented in the thirteenth century by a horizontal hierarchy of estates which accounted for the proliferation of more and more differentiated human types.

The main current of medieval thought up to the thirteenth century was predominantly Christian and Neoplatonic. It emphasized the prevailing belief that the whole created universe follows the plan of God who is at the apex of a universal hierarchy. Within this pattern of thought, it followed that God was the founder and the supreme ruler and the organisation of human society in its entirety was imposed from above, and was to be carried out in accordance with the revealed will of God. The divine order of the universe is paralleled by that of divinely ordered Christian society, which has been given temporal existence but draws its very nature from above. Since the divine ordering presupposes that human society is orientated heavenwards, then all the members of the community must observe the principles of right living as embodied in the Christian faith. Therefore, it is the element of faith and the constant reliance upon the divine will which determine social coherence and secure the viability of the human corporation.

Moreover, man’s relationship to the world is further conceived in terms of vocation and duty, and society is pictured as a huge organism in which each member is allotted an immutable place and a specific function which he/she pursues for the sake of the common purpose. The Pauline and patristic teachings demanding that one should remain in the calling to which one has been called assume as much a social as a political significance. Only when each member of society acts in his/her divinely commanded function will order and concord (*harmonia mundi*) be obtained. Transgression of one’s position in society, liminality or change were viewed...
as either anarchic or accidental. Society was thus highly static but not inert. The question of the right relationship of powers, so necessary for the maintenance of the *harmonia mundi*, became of prime interest in the age. Within a society founded exclusively upon faith, where each and every individual lives inside the boundaries of this *communitas omnium fidelium*, comprising all Christians alike whether members of the laity or of the clergy, and forming one body and “a single polity” (Wilks 1963: 50), a lawful partition of power is essential. In this respect, the appropriate separation of functions within the community of believers is that between the governors and the governed, between those who have special qualifications for directing the society and the rest of the Christian body, in other words, between the ordained and the unordained members of the congregation. Hence, the organic perception of society held that the Christian body was made up of two distinct orders, sacerdotal and laity, its spiritual and secular members which acted together to ensure the good functioning of the organism. Moreover, as Wilks (1963: 52) has noticed, the division of the two *ordines* is analogous to the separation of a man into body and soul meaning that the *ordo clericalis* is intrinsically superior and dominates the *ordo laicalis*: “Knowledge of the Christian faith became the supreme criterion for government, and since every act had to be a Christian act, that is to say, oriented by faith, it followed that only those who knew the content of the faith were entitled to rule, and in so ruling to dominate every aspect of human life. Direction and government by the *sacerdotium* becomes inevitable since they alone can tell what is and what is not Christian.”

This assumption is supported by a passage from Augustine’s *De trinitate* (available at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1301.htm). The Father of the early Christian Church believed that corporeal things are arranged in a hierarchy and are governed by spiritual things, also arranged hierarchically and reaching up to God. The hierarchy of the created Universe and all hierarchies are ultimately scales of perfection with the higher grades being inherently nobler, more worthy than the lower ones. Unlike God, who is the highest, noblest, has no beginning and no end, the angels still immortal entities, differ from God in as much as they were created by Him:

(…) angels… are created by God in eternal and immutable existence. Unlike God, they have duration, but not the mutable duration measured by time (Wood 1997: 9).
Saint Augustine defined them as God’s retinues, administrators of the entire universe, and conveyors of the divine will to humankind. A century later, Gregory the Great believed that man was summoned to occupy the positions left vacant by fallen angels and laid the foundation of the so-called “angelic anthropology” (Faure 2002: 369). Humans now played a greater role in the divine plan, not only as subjects for salvation, but as future ministers and angels of God. To achieve this status, they must not only prove exceptional but also worthy and pleasing in the eyes of God.

Angels were also perceived as epitomes of divinity that ought to be imitated. Even if these heavenly messengers were believed to lack substantiality since they were created exclusively as spiritual entities, whenever represented they were attributed an implicit corporeal dimension. This may be interpreted in the light of the 1025 dictum: *pictura est laicorum litteratura*. In an age of illiteracy, when visual representations functioned as the most important means of education and knowledge, the charismatic ‘body’ of the angel was conveyor of divine grace: “physical presence is accordingly the anchor of charismatic culture” and “the irreplaceable centre of the cult of charisma is the body” (Jaeger 1994: 8). Moreover, an angel needs a ‘body’ not only to be seen in a superfluous manner, but due to the deficiency of created matter in apprehending the invisible, the image of the Form expressed in Matter — to use a Platonic terminology — can be appreciated and acknowledged as making the Form only when similar to what is known and hence, identifiable from previous knowledge. Thus, the representations of angels as anthropo- or zoomorphic instead of ‘unbodied’ intelligence are necessary due to human shortcomings in conceptual contemplation. Even more, the depictions of angels through symbols, apart from being mere poetic imagery, are designed to appeal to the human mind. Using both similar and dissimilar symbolism, knowledge can thus be made available so as to uplift man with the help of those things he can understand.

Within the frames of a charismatic culture which stressed the importance of the body and of the real presence as mediators of cultural and theological values and which ascribed imitation the basic if not the most efficient mode of defining oneself *ad imaginem Dei*, the monastic ideal was perceived as the utmost form of living in the ‘body’ and the steadiest path one should tread in order to reach God. Among the community of believers, monks were said to imitate angels’ charisma to the full. It was through physical restraint, contemplation and continuous prayer that monks could reach
the celestial choirs of the angels. Moreover, the spiritual path of purification, illumination, and *theosis* (deification) and the subsequent virtues of humility, asceticism, selflessness, and loving compassion contributed to the crystallization of a special kind of ethical consciousness at the level of society, which Lanzetta (2003: 35) calls: an “ethics of perfection”. Born out of constant prayer and reflection on divinity, this ethics compelled the monk to participate in and imitate the qualities of being that were best revealed in the life of Jesus. Hence, imitation and participation in Christ’s divinity represented the foundation of moral perfection, for it was only through the development of selflessness and ardour for God that one could become deified, divine-like. And the promise of St. Athanasius (*De Incarnatione* 54, available at http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/history/ath-inc.htm): “God became man so that man might become God”, served as impetus for the spiritual quest.

As regards their social function, monks were supposed to act as mediators between God and humanity. While primarily focused on the inner life of prayer and virtue, monks were exhorted to practise perfection in order to mirror the divine in the world and elevate man to a God-like state. Evagrius Ponticus (Lanzetta 2003: 47) believed that:

> It is part of justice that you [monks] should pray not only for your own purification but also for that of every man. In doing so you will imitate the practice of the angels.

At this point, one cannot help but acknowledge the intimate bond which linked monastic life and secular culture, a bond which exceeded its solely spiritual limits and eventually led to the crisis of spirituality which shook western Christianity between the eleventh and the late thirteenth centuries:

Although monastic writers promoted a highly sacralized world view, monastic centres were actively involved in the training of theologians, administrators, and missionaries who served not only in the church but also in the courts and places of secular rulers. Monasteries also established charitable institutions which served a number of purposes: care of the sick, distribution of food and clothing to the needy, shelter for pilgrims and travellers. In addition, tax systems, juridical structures, and execution of legal decisions were often administered by the monks (Torvend 1983: 118).
Therefore, monks functioned not only as intercessors between mankind and divinity, but also between the central and the marginal social segments. Their role within the social organism resembled that of ‘blood’, nurturing and oxygenating all the cells of the ‘body’, a vital liaison for securing life to the organism.

Monks’ elitist mentality and their claim to social hegemony implied that secular society was undervalued to the point of total submission. The hierarchical scheme of the three *ordines* introduced by the ecclesiastical culture of the Carolingian tradition that divided society into *oratores* (those who pray), *bellatores* (those who fight), and *laboratores* (those who work) was revised in monastic circles to assign monks an exclusive, topline position:

> Among Christians of the two sexes we know well that there exist three orders and, so to speak, three levels. The first is that of the laity, the second that of the clergy, and the third that of the monks. Although none of the three is exempt from sin, the first is good, the second is better, and the third is excellent (Miccoli 1990: 53-54).

The lay power is thus effectively excluded from any major share in the direction and government of the *congregatio fidelium*. It was this conception of a corporeal society acting as a single political nucleus, *unum corpus* and *corpus Christi* and being rightfully led by the sacerdotal orders that provided the basis on which the entire hierocratic system rested. The hierocratic doctrine stipulated that the spiritual ruler, i.e. the pope, had both swords but gave the use of the temporal sword (not the temporal sword itself) to the lay ruler to exercise authority on his behalf. The secular ruler in this conceptualization of the medieval society was then simply an agent, an instrument through which the pope (at this point it is worth mentioning that all popes in the decisive half century of the struggle for reform from Gregory VII to Calixtus II had a monastic background, except for the last) implemented the programme of government which he had devised and authorised. Conversely, the anti-hierocratic thesis claimed that Christ himself had given one sword, the spiritual, to the pope and the other, the temporal to the secular ruler, emperor or king. Even the further acknowledgement of two distinct species of authority could hardly hope to place in the pope’s spiritual subordination the temporal, transient authority of the secular ruler. Hence, both in the High and Late Middle Ages incompatible versions of universal order supplemented by the growth of papacy as the dominant force in
Western society brought about division, incessant negotiation and clash of interests among spiritual and secular rulers (popes, kings, emperors, and bishops).

During the thirteenth century, the rediscovery of Aristotle and the advent of a pagan, materialistic conception of the universe, allowed for an alternative non-Christian system of thought to develop. In direct opposition to Christian beliefs, this new system stated the supremacy of the material over the spiritual, since matter was held to have existed before the creation of the world. According to Aristotelian standards, the whole conception of a divinely ordained universe, even the theory of creation, became doubtful. Frictions generated by these subversive beliefs culminated in one of the greatest conflicts during the High Middle Ages (c. 1050-1250): the struggle between ‘old’ and ‘new’ theologies — or ‘monastic’ vs. ‘scholastic’ theologies — a conflict in which logic played a key role.

Starting with the flourishing of anti-hierocratic doctrines in the eleventh century, this dual ideology reached its heights once Aristotelian teachings were employed. The ‘new’ school of thought tried to deprive the concept of Church of its earthly connection and maintain only its spiritual counterpart. Next to the Church, a mere mystical body with no political substance, there was another society or body politic which was autonomous, self-sufficient and independent. This was the human union, *societas humana*, the State, “a natural product with its natural propensities, natural aims and ends” (Ullmann 1988: 19). Society was no longer envisaged as a congregation of Christians: *congregatio fidelium* and *corpus Christi* but consisting of nothing else than human beings or ‘natural’ men; *homo* and not *christianus* becomes the leading feature within this new pattern of thought. Thereby, a new and better articulated dualism emerged. It was no longer the concept of faith that ensured homogeneity and endurance to an exclusively vocational society; natural man became its determinative principle and for the Christian there remained hardly any room. Moreover, within a purely mystical body, a purely spiritual entity allotted a limited sphere of authority, there was no need for papacy, at least not in the way it was conceptualized before. The pope and his bishops had nothing but spiritual authority, the power to give directions in matters of faith, as for those entrusted with political authority, lay rulers no longer needed either papal endorsement regarding their actions or any divine functional qualification at all. Now it was the lay ruler, not the pope or the bishops, who acted as
immediate source of power and the only true law was human law and not
divine commandment. Consequently, the papal claim on supremacy over
both religious and secular society (*plenitudo potestatis*) was perceived as
incongruous. The officers of the Church, and hence the pope, were entitled
only to give counsel or exhort and no longer decree or enforce their decrees
so as to produce results in the social life of the State. The supporters of the
anti-hierocratic doctrine could finally rejoice in the resounding victory of
Aristotelianism over theology and politics.

If the concept of an indivisible Christian society, acting as one single
body politic was gradually superseded by the belief within the existence of
a society of individuals (*humana universitas*) acting together in pursuit of
general happiness and well-being, other co-substantial, related concepts
were reversed too. First of all, this highly individualistic doctrine, in stark
contrast to the hierocratic view, no longer sanctioned the univocal dis-
course of the Church as the only reliable message-producer, but valued a
polyphonic discourse whose keynotes resided in the harmonization of
many individual voices, a gradual progression from dissonance to conso-
nance. To the self-assertive, dogmatic, insular and retrograde discourse of
the *sacerdotium*, the ‘new’ theology opposed a militant, open, incentive,
and multivocal sequence. However, it must not be imagined that there was
a sudden destruction of the papal-sacerdotal-hierocratic edifice. Nor can it
be said that the Christian ideal of conduct was abandoned in favour of a
pagan, hedonistic approach of Averro-Aristotelian ancestry. In spite of the
thoroughly secular ideals propounded by the ‘new’ scholars, they were
unable to totally overcome the strongholds of their faithful opponents. The
two systems of thought were functioning as alternative terms, complemen-
tary rather than mutually exclusive.

Secondly, the overemphasis laid on observation, on empirical and
inductive methods of reasoning changed the premises of knowledge that
was no longer divinely bestowed (passive) but tenaciously acquired
(active). Monasteries themselves were no longer perceived as the only
repositories of the truth and sole centres of education. As a response to the
monopoly exercised by *sacerdotium* over instruction, independent secular
schools emerged and later evolved into the institution of the university. The
system of education based on personal authority and *cultus virtutum* taught
within the milieu of cathedral or monastic schools was considerably altered
to mirror the shift that occurred in the course of the late twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries toward rational inquiry, debate and systematic critical thought.

At the same time, the growth of a new social segment the 'middle-class', whether urban burgesses or country gentry, wealthy enough to begin to have a say in the otherwise monovocal utterance of the Age hints at the democratisation of the discourse that allows for more than one voice to be heard. The alteration of the social life is not accidental and has its own impact on (against) the feudal system as a whole. The emerging money economy dramatically changed the status of aristocracy, whether lay or ecclesiastical. Starting with the thirteenth century, a power-centred opposition *potens/paupers* was being replaced by the binary rich/poor, a new dichotomy that reflected “the progress of a monetary economy and the promotion of wealth as the source or consequence of power” (Le Goff 1990: 29). Furthermore, the social hierarchic system, which relied heavily on the vertical disposition of *ordines*, was complemented by “a horizontal hierarchic of *estates*” and “with the thirteenth century, when society became more complex, *estates* proliferated, [and] human types became more differentiated” (Le Goff 1990: 34). This change was also encouraged by a rapid urban development which reached its apogee in the thirteenth century. And it was within the urban milieu that the new found bourgeoisie:

(…) toppled down the feudal, hierarchic system and established a new egalitarian order, or better, a horizontal rather than a vertical hierarchy (…) while the urban area became a space of exercising one’s liberty, or better, of one’s ‘franchises’ and liberties (Le Goff 2002: 56).

The new emphasis lay on money and easy-transferable benefits enlarged access of the low social strata to instances of power and decision. With the proliferation of new social roles and increasing social mobility, the divine message was leaving the consecrated space of the church or monastery to accompany the faithful on the roads of their worldly tribulations: ministerium verbi inter gentes (‘the ministry of the word among the people’). At the same time, the religious discourse was bound to adjust to an ever changing reality whose sole immutable reference remained Christ. Thus, as early as the thirteenth century, the most dynamic segments of the spiritual arm, the friars, were moving from city to city, practising extreme poverty and urging a more and more diversified population ‘to follow naked the naked Christ’ (sequela Christi). I believe that this gradual shift from obscurity to visibility and finally transparency illustrates both the dilution of
monastic spirituality in the Late Middle Ages and the attempts to regain the fullness of grace attributed to the early centuries of Christianity. Through the pursuit of vita apostolica popular movements offered an alternative to the traditional dependency of laity upon a contaminated religious segment who suffered greatly from its participation in the earthly affairs. Those aspects of Christian life that had been cherished in the monastic environment: fraternal charity, study of Scripture, voluntary poverty, active proclamation of faith were now promoted in the secular world and openly acclaimed by large crowds of worshippers gathered in the marketplace to listen to the preachers. The identification of vita christiana with vita monastica crumbled as western European culture moved from “the stability of vassalage and monastic religion” (Torvend 1983: 121) to the openness and polysemy of lay spirituality, from the obscurity of the cloister to the radiance of the world.

All in all, medieval man was obsessed with the idea of order, discipline, hierarchy. Nothing was randomized. Everything was systematically conceived as part of an ontological hierarchy starting from God, the absolute being in absolute perfection down to the composite world of substance and spirit and ending in formless matter which had the lowest degree of being and perfection. Thus, human society was perceived as a faithful replica of the divine and its history a linear progress from the time of Creation to the Last Judgment. The social structure was itself fully integrated within the divine scheme. Monks and ecclesiastics formed the spiritual arm; their joint function was to intercede for humanity and ensure its spiritual salvation. In return, the secular arm, knights and nobles, was supposed to protect the sacred from the perilous attacks of the infidel and the heretic. It was a collective effort inspired by divine love and human responsiveness, a collaborative working of the secular and spiritual (religious) powers to thwart the pernicious intrigues of the devil who envied the harmony of the world. Even if the rediscovery of Aristotle in the thirteenth century brought about a change in the conceptualization of medieval society, the shift from congregatio fidelium to societas humana did not aim at supplanting the former type of social organization with the latter but at offering a complementary solution to an otherwise unbalanced system of thought in which religion exercised an ideological monopoly over society.
References


THE END OF THE JOURNEY: BACK TO SCOTLAND

MAGDA DANCIU
University of Oradea

Abstract: The paper discusses those elements of national identity that persist and eventually shape one’s wishes within circumstances of accidental or deliberate exile. The more general considerations are illustrated by a closer look at James Kelman’s latest book, You Have to Be Careful in the Land of the Free, and Andrew O’Hagan’s first novel Our Fathers.

A closer examination of contemporary Scottish fiction will show how the old patterned constructions of the last three decades are being reconfigured and rejuvenated: fictional styles and narrative strategies are expanded and reshaped in the general attempt to cope with the new status of the country (an independent Parliament) and the new international situation (globalization, holistic inclusion etc.). The revival of the Scottish fiction in the 1980s was heralded as a long expected change and demonstration of creative potential and of a consistent maturity in “confronting and highlighting urgent sociocultural and aesthetic issues” (Wallace 1993: 2) by foregrounding cultural identity in its most complex representation.

Towards writing the Scottish

The most important concern at that initial stage of artistic rebirth seems to have been finding the way to reconcile and juxtapose, adapt and challenge, traditional views with new visions in a heteroglossic dialogical combination between inheritances of the past and pressures of the present-day generations. Its outcome is a kind of fiction that allows the reassessment of the value of myths and folk tales within the long history of storytelling tradition preserved throughout centuries by the inhabitants of these ambiguous landscapes of mystery and legends. Good illustrations in this respect are the novels of George Mackay Brown or Shena Mackay.

Most novelists show awareness of the Scottish archaic asset and of the need to reevaluate it within a larger context of experiment and innovation.
and are delighted to use Scottish material in a Scottish setting to work with general issues of postmodern inventiveness. It is the case of Alasdair Gray’s or Janice Galloway’s books in which the concept of the Caledonian anti-syzygy is re-processed in new versions of the classical fantasy of the divided self introduced by James Hogg in his *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner* (1824) and by Robert Louis Stevenson’s book, *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (1886), the two seminal texts that represent an overall pattern of rational/objective experience set against supernatural/subjective experience, the conflicting coexistence of good and evil, eventually a celebration of the multiplicity of the self in which “the person is simply a spectator and a social function” (Craig 1999: 114). The parodical and ironic reworking of the split self in the effort to question and answer the issue regarding the nature of identity, both social and cultural, foregrounds the inconsistency of the dominant discourse and demystifies the master codes in terms of postmodernism when pointing out that a unitary self is an impossible and dangerous illusion, especially in a country whose political and cultural history pinpoints the traditional doubleness and ambiguity of a history-less, marginalized nation.

Postmodern decentredness and the urge for valuing small narratives and the regional versus the global favour the Scottish writers’ constant search for ways of asserting Scottishness. This is clearly rendered in the books of the Glasgow novelists, or those of Ron Butlin and Brian McCabe, whose dealing with problems of language, class, politics is an attempt to negotiate “the space between centres and margins in ways that… challenge any monolithic culture” (Hutcheon 1988: 198). The Scottish identity finds at least two ways of featuring, that is, in terms of

a) language or narrative voice which is seen by most writers as the basis of the narrator’s search to define a different subjectivity and to thematize this difference as an ex-centricity emerging from “contextualization or positioning in relation to plural others” (Hutcheon 1988: 67). This is usually achieved by employing a Scottish speech and syntax in the dialectal space of the novel, thus challenging the standard English uniformity when conveying the actual texture of the life of ordinary people, who inhabit a fragmented linguistic community;

b) the setting selection, which ranges from denuded villages in the Orkney islands (George Mackay Brown) to Edinburgh’s “order and
elegance of the Scottish Enlightenment” (Daiches 1993: 86) and to Glasgow, “the magnificent city” (Gray 1981: 243) — an environment that best renders the apparent blankness of Scottish life, the sense of deprivation of a country that has “nationhood without statehood” (Morgan 1993: 86).

Now, about thirty years after the visible impetus of the Scottish fiction, one might ascertain that new changes are occurring on the domestic stage, changes meant to make peripheral Scottish voice and the Scottish dark land and its tradition a challenge for the future. These changes are embodied in the emergence of a generation of Scottish novelists who re-configure the present state of the novel by their contribution that comes from two sources:

• they came to live in Scotland and brought their personal and national heritage, thus enriching the creative potential and diversifying the local narrative voices by adding new tones to the plurality that has become common in most parts of Scotland nowadays (see the case of Regi Claire, a writer of Swiss origin who imbues her texts with the flavour of the Old Continent);

• they leave Scotland for a while and their exile becomes the very essence of their texts, which turn into places where they negotiate the identity and cultural challenges they encounter abroad (as in case of Alexander McCall Smith whose Botswana has traces of Caledonian education and culture).

The present paper examines the latter situation, which either the writers themselves or their characters go through as part of a process of cultural multiplication meant to salvage the previously damaged identity of a nation whose historical and cultural dimensions are permanently rediscovered and recombined as an attempt to escape the submissive picture that it was originally patterned on.

Caledonian identity

Identity in Scotland — especially in Glasgow, which represents a sort of radical aspect of national features — becomes a symptom of a deracinated nation emerging from “spiritual homelessness, as well as from the opinions and perspectives of a minority within a broadly-defined society” (Dunn 1993:156) and validating the Caledonian historical, cultural, ethical experience by exposing problems/tensions of language, class, politics and religion
that resulted from accumulated historical wrongs. “The Scottish nation exists insofar as many Scots believe that it exists”, claims Calder (1994: 52), consequently its writers feel bound to search to define this peculiar subjectivity and ethos, to focus on this difference and to position it in relation to others, to reconstruct tradition and history, and to grant Scotland cultural independence.

Representation and acknowledgement of Scottishness remain permanent issues for novelists today. They are fully engaged in foregrounding the creative potential of the country and eager to answer, in individualized ways, the question that Kate Atkinson postulates in her book Behind the Scene at the Museum (1995: 252): “What is Scotland? What is Scotland? Is it rain solidified into shapes of houses and hills? Is it mist, carved into roadside cafes with names like crofter’s kitchen? Who knows?”

The promotion of the Scottish image and the Scottish imagination consists of a kaleidoscopic combination of authentic subjects and genuine, inherited treasures represented by national symbols like Highland, thistle, heather, tartans, Whisky Fudge, Soor Plums, kilt, pipe, pubs, against domestic sceneries such as Edinburgh and its rock, its castle, its festivals, its hills; the Scottish lochs “trying to suck people into an endless blackness” (Atkinson 1995: 258) with its mysteries and legends; or magnificent Glasgow, so “distinct from other places” (McIlvanney 1987: 129), apparently embodying the Scottish spirit and history in terms of industrial conquest and the resistance to this phenomenon.

The Glaswegian novel emphasized the relevance, the pride and the burden of the Glaswegian identity when its representatives — Alasdair Gray, William McIlvaney, James Kelman — referred to its imagined community as emerging and being closely related to the state of the town, originally a big city with an impressive architecture, submitted to many changes for the last three decades as a result of capitalist industrial development. Consequently, Glasgow has become “the sort of industrial city where most people live nowadays but nobody imagines living” (Gray 1981:105), a place where “hope is scarce and dread is full” (McIlvanney 1977: 27), a zone that becomes the site of challenging events that cave everlasting memories.

**The Exiles, or the “Geography of Identity”**

A Scot is said to be “someone living in the area which comes under Scots law, so long as that person also supports Scottish athletes against...
those of other countries or identifies strongly with some other aspect of Scottish culture — our folk-music say. A Scot abroad is anyone who still fulfills the latter condition.” (Calder 1994: 52). James Kelman’s main character in You Have to Be Careful in the Land of the Free (2004), Jeremiah Brown, a ‘Skarrisch’, epitomizes the condition of a Scot, more precisely, a Glaswegian Scot, living in exile in the United States of ‘Uhmerika’, a country whose history differs so much from his own and where his great-great-great-granddaddy once passed along. His life comes to a critical moment when he decides to return to his motherland, “sunny Skallin”, where there is a chance “ye bump into one of yer ancestors, descendants, a long-lost cousin. What ye hope to discover is if ye are related to a clan chieftain, if ye are descended from royal blood and maybe own a mountain or something, if ye have any cheap servants at your disposal, with luck they’ll be wearing a kilt and sing praise songs for yer wife and family” (Kelman 2004: 13).

The difference aforementioned is the possible cause of his marginalization in a society that is essentially made up of differences, a paradox that does not help in understanding his doing “the wrong thing” in terms of religion, race, class, nationality.

Some might argue that a Celtic male with pink skin, fair hair (receding) and blue eyes (watery) should have been empowered to travel the world where ere he chose and dinae need no colour-coded federal authorization never mind the okay from stray true-born persons he met in bars. How can Aryans be Aliens?... It is a contradiction. This feller’s physicality and language are passport and visa. And then add to the tally that I was an ex Security operative, how Uhmerkin can ye get! (Kelman 2004: 20)

His failure to adjust and be accepted by the new country emphasises the persistence of those features that reflect one’s national affiliation and make the adoption of a new one impossible. He tries to quench his loneliness by drinking whisky in bars in a desperate need of a pub conversation and atmosphere: “lonely man is to go hame, lonely man enters bar, lonely man has a drink, lonely man has another drink; lonely man ponders a third drink; lonely man has that third drink; lonely man mulls over his present in terms of his past, then blows out his fucking brains” (Kelman 2004: 91).

His loneliness might have been induced by a self-centred environment, by a mutilated perception of the Other, and, generally, by a cultural difference negatively or neutrally recorded: “a non-assimilated alien, Jeremiah Brown, nothing to worry about, Class III Redneck Card carrier,
aryan, caucasian, atheist, born loser, keeps nose clean, big debts, nay brains, big heid” (Kelman 2004: 106).

After twelve years of living in the States, Jeremiah still enjoys spending time playing cards — “sentimental shite” — and betting in his own way: “I was a hopeless gambler and I don’t mean somebody whose bets were god-dam useless (...) [suh as] betting a drink to Boeing 73 if a star is going to fall out the sky”[

[...]

“A side of my so-called intellect knew I must lose these bets so I gamble the opposite” (Kelman 2004: 114, 228). This makes him an incomprehensible partner, a ‘no-gooder neer-do-well’(316) as a co-worker at Airport Security Service, a non-integrated citizen because “I didnay know how to do it properly, how to be it properly, be a human being” (120) [...]

“I’m an alien furnir, bastard John, the only card I got is a red Card, it’s Class III (...), registered fucking non-integritat with the wrong fucking politics, the wrong philosophy of life man, the wrong this and the wrong that. The red Card is a marked card. If I aint got cash in hand I aint got cash. That is how it is. All I have is money. Or else no money. I can go into a bank and gie in my dough or else I can take it out, but that’s that” (144).

Through all this he learns the lesson of deracination, an experience through which he creates his own imaginary homeland in a parallel time and space, a place he wants to go back to in order to see his mother but to which he is only genetically and genealogically connected, as his present life — Indian spouse, daughter, responsibilities, commitments — is in the States where people have little or no knowledge of his painful origin: “The idea of staying in Skallin Christ was unthinkable. Years ago my maw sent the occasional newspaper so I could keep in touch but later that was that, and ye never heard any news at all about the ol bonne place. If it wasnay for early morning screenings of *Braveheart* and *Graveyard Bobby* and the other yin where the ghostly wee town comes out the mist every hunner years then that would be that. In my last job the immediate superior was another of them that think Skallin is a wee town somewhere mainland Europe, perhaps to the ‘left side’ of Poland” (325).

Jeremiah also experiences a status of otherness through his match with Yasmina, a product of post-colonialism, a condition close to discrimination and marginalization which he feels quite familiar with, when considering the long history of his nation of sharing duplicity of mind and language, a schizophrenia dating back to the times of Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, persisting in the collective memory and profile: “the concept schizophrenia,
there is definitely an aspect of one’s personality, of my personality, an aspect that caves in for no one” (131). […] “We were known for wur paranoic tendencies and were constantly dealing with grounds for paranoia personally, or else we fucking suffered paranoia, to whatever extent. Try sticking a kilt and a turban and walking into yer average sports bar. Nay wonder we al sit talking to wurselves” (336).

He expresses his individuality by using a demotic dialectal language, rendered by an odd spelling that can typographically suggest the vernacular spectacular, echoing a community that is trying to make itself seen and heard: “My name is Jerry. I’m from Skallin, I’m flyin hame tomorrow and I’m just here for a couple of beers, well, and this wee uisghe… I havenay been hame for a long time.[…] You Skarrisch folk, yous are of the auld persuasion,[…] the bririsch monarquhy … we must consolidate the friendship between baith wur nations, bearing in mind wur respective histories.[…] Ye cannay go hame with nothing. I’ve never met naybody yet who went hame with nothing, if we dont take something hame Christ then what’s the point of gaun hame ? ye wouldnay want to go hame. No me anyway. […] This is Uhmerka, land of the free, ify ya didn’t notice; home from home for the dispossessed, the enslaved, the poor unfortunates; this is everybody’s goddam country” (393, 407).

**Highlander, or the Geology of Identity**

The legend/myth of Highlander, the time traveller, the symbol of innocence and justice, combines natural settings with supernatural happenings and renders the spatial and time eternity of the Scottish spirit, history, culture, foregrounding the constant features that make up Scottish identity, as well as the image, the fame and the reputation of the country and its people. James Bawn, Andrew O’Hagan’s protagonist in *Our Fathers* (1999), embodies the identity heritage passed along four generations. He is the last link of his genealogical chain, empowered to tell the story of how strongly rooted his Glaswegian origin was, how well preserved their family and national traits were, in spite of the hardships and deterioration they were submitted to throughout the centuries.

James Bawn is the offspring of a split family dominated by the figure of a father who has repeatedly failed to be a hero for his son. Most of their life together has been imbued with paternal hatred, violence, and aggression, an inescapable burden of the past, which he seems to be doomed to carry
on: “In my father’s anger there was something of the nation (...) His was a country of fearful men, proud in the talking, paltry in the living, and every promise another lie. My father bore all that dread that came with the soil — unable to rise, or rise again, and slow to see power in his own hands. They were sick at heart, weak in the bones. All they wanted was the peace of defeat. They couldn’t live in this world. They couldn’t stand where they were. (...) he was one of his own kind, bred, with long songs of courage, never to show a courageous hand” (O’Hagan 1999: 8).

The image that is left after Robert Bawn’s death recalls another Robert’s (Burns) fame and genius-like acknowledgment:

An alcoholic, the kind that rages and mourns.
He never meant well, and he never did well.
And yet he found himself trying.
(O’Hagan 1999: 228)

The mental trip deep inside the self, rather than the physical journey to the original places and times that shaped the generations of Bawn males, points to the way most men in Scotland are, that is, angry, hateful, aggressive, frustrated, lonely, sinful, sad, poor: “The world of my father was a thing to be hated (...) that’s why he drank(...) With can and bottle he fought the good fight, and kept himself from himself again” (10) [...] “He was generous in the pub; he believed in that sort of kindness, where near-anonymous men could think him free, and think him great[...] his people were always very heavily into politics and that” (24). The legacy of the past is passed on to each generation to come, to be memorized and to be reiterated, as Jamie himself feels bound to do as the last survivor of the Bawns’ dynasty: “Our fathers were made for grief. I could see it now. And all our lives we waited for sadness to happen. Their days were trapped in a golden shag box. Those Scottish fathers! (...) And how they lived in the dark for us now (...) And where were our fathers? We had run from them. We had run and run. My life had been miles and miles away [...] Out there, in the dark places, men and women died for Melville and Knox, and the ground was sewn with beliefs. And now it seemed but whispering grass. The old stories gone (...) Those fields of blood and carbon. They became the sites for the newer wars, our battles for houses and redevelopment (...) The names of the dead warriors Wallace and Eglinton, Maxton and Hardie, were known as streets on the council estates, the former glories of Androssan and Salcoats” (59).
O’Hagan’s text reflects on a state of mind of a community and a place that point to experience marked by cultural dislocation, familial displacement, historic isolation and peculiarity, to nostalgia for former landscapes and traditions: “It’s a place to be built (...) You begin by building it with your own hands in your own minds, in your own hearts. Our fathers wore themselves away to make this true. That is the history of this century, and of others before us, going back to the Industrial revolution, and further. And it must remain with us (...). The work of our fathers might give us hope” (29).

The two books reveal the two writers’ concern for the Scottish heritage, its preservation, its future. The question that one is left with is whether these issues have become stereotypes, whether there is any irony in tackling Scottishness in this millennium, or whether this is the right way to think of and treasure the past, whether there is a strong belief in the values of a nation or community.

References
TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES: ROMANIA AND EUROPEAN VALUES IN OFFICIAL VS. FORUM DISCOURSES

IRINA DIANA MĂDROANE
University of Timișoara

Abstract: The paper sets out first to identify the EU values present in the discourse of Romanian politicians and of Romanian citizens and, second, to establish which patterns of legitimising a transnational, European identity are specific to the two types of discourse. For this purpose, it examines the dialogicality and meaning relations of the texts selected for analysis.

Prior to 1 January, 2007, Romania was subject to radical reform and transformation on a social, economic, political and cultural level. The rescaling of Romania is, however, an ongoing process, requiring great sacrifices from the population. In order to motivate the citizens, politicians resort to the projection of a common ideal in which all the Romanians may take pride: the development of a European identity, to be added to the centuries-old Romanian one. The phenomenon is specific to all EU states, but may increase in intensity in the new member states, which have been through long-running campaigns that familiarize them with the European dream. But, ultimately, what does the label “European identity” stand for? What makes it a justifiable goal for so many people?

The present paper attempts to reveal tendencies in the discourse of Romanian politicians, on the one hand, and in the forum discourses of concerned citizens, on the other, in relation to European values and identity. It has three parts: an introduction into the theories about European identity, a brief presentation of the analytical framework, and two mini-case studies.

1. European Identity

The European identity, as a supra- or transnational identity, is the result of the activity and policies of European institutions, within the frame of cross-state cooperation, which is why it is widely assumed by political elites (especially those working for the EU) and not so much by the ordinary citizens of the EU (Laffan 2004, Wodak 2004, Bruter 2004, Meinhof 2004). The
Europeanization of the identities of EU member states is an elite-driven project, just like the creation of the Union. In other words, the European institutions have issued policies and treaties in order to lay the foundations of a common identity which is needed to gain the support and trust of European citizens (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 10). At the same time, the initiators of this process want to reassure all the member states that their national identities are not endangered in any way by the new ‘overarching’ construction; this has determined them to come up with the motto ‘Unity in diversity’ and to propose a core of mainly civic and political European values, instead of cultural ones. But how are the social identities of so many different nations to acquire the desired European dimension?

Social identities reflect ‘shared representations of a collective self’ (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 6). There are three aspects of the representation of persons in groups: ‘Who is us?’ (the members of the in-group and the boundaries of the in-group, i.e. ‘the composition of group identity’), ‘What are we?’ (characteristics, symbols and values, i.e. ‘the content of group identity’) and ‘the relationship between the in-group and out-groups within a structured network of social groups’ (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 6, original emphases). Social identities gain political significance once a relationship is established between these three aspects and the right of a state to sovereignty. It is the aim of European institutions to harmonise the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of national social identities with the EU membership and values; otherwise they might encounter problems on their way to common political and economic projects.

It is a general truth in social sciences nowadays that people have multiple identities, since they belong to multiple groups. Herrmann and Brewer present three systems of such multiple loyalties: (1) nested identities: the concentric circles pattern — local — regional — national — European identity, subsumed to each other in this order, with the European identity last in line; this model is revealed in Eurobarometer opinion surveys, due to the manner in which the questions are conceived by their authors; (2) cross-cutting identities: ‘some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group and so on’ (for instance, only some of the members of a nation may consider themselves European etc.); (3) separate identities: the person belongs to distinct groups, which are kept that way (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 8). Risse (2004) adds a fourth: (4) the marble cake model of multiple identities — ‘the various components of an
individual's identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels, they are blended or enmeshed in each other (Risse 2004: 251-252). The configurations of identities which best suit the concept of transnationalism are (1) and (4), the nested model leading to a rather supranational identity, while (4) ties in more with transnationalism.

The European institutions may influence identities in two main ways: by means of socialization (hence, socialization models) and of persuasion (persuasion models) (Herrmann and Brewer 2004). Socialization refers to the individuals’ experience with the institutions and their policies, as well as to the perceived advantages/opportunities offered by them, which would explain why Brussels elites are more willing to take on a European identity, while ordinary people show less empathy towards European values and policies, and sometimes may even feel threatened by them (due to the intervention of politicians of nationalist orientation or to certain representations in the media). The persuasion models, on the other hand, transform the institutions into 'active agents of change'. Thus, one may talk about a deliberate process aimed at gaining people over to the concept of a common European identity, which is then supposed to contribute to the legitimation of the rules and regulations set by the European institutions, sometimes against the domestic rules of the nation-states (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14-16, Risse 2004). The two models do not exclude each other, but often work together for the same objectives.

In the opinion of some researchers, the 'European identity' is an empty label (Breakwell 2004), or, at best, a vague one, since it does not contain well-defined values and allows the member-states to raise what they perceive to be European values (often their own national values) to a European level, discriminating by this procedure against any state that does not share them. The result would be the creation of a 'German Europe', a 'French Europe', etc. However, while some claim that the concept of 'European identity' should be defined better in order to avoid such a situation (Castano 2004), others claim that, on the contrary, it should be left open so as to enable the process of enlargement without any discrimination between the in-group values and the would-be members’ values (Mummendey and Waldzus 2004).

The EU borders remain open as long as the Union is ready to welcome new members. The EU consequently plays a great role in influencing state-identity: membership to this supra-regional institution becomes a matter of
prestige to any nation-state, due to the EU’s ‘successfully appropriating the term ‘Europe’ for itself’ (Laffan 2004: 79). At the same time, the EU is a global actor, so it also contains an element of global identity (Laffan 2004).

But what is European identity? The main values fostered by the European treaties and especially by the European Constitution (which sparked off many debates in 2005 around the issue of identity) are of a civic nature — peace, reconciliation, cooperation to regulate state power, democracy, justice, the rule of law, human rights, as well as freedom, tolerance, equality or solidarity:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women prevail. (The European Constitution, Article I-2)

These values represent most of the ‘what’ in the European identity framework. They are important for the status of member-state as well, since no state can join the EU without observing them and no state may remain a member of the European Union if it fails to respect them. Symbols were added to contribute to ‘a common framework of meaning’ (Laffan 2004): the flag, the common passport cover, the anthem, the Euro.

Nevertheless, civic and political coordinates alone are hardly enough to awaken the sense of belonging to the large European family among citizens of the continually expanding European club. Therefore, the EU space needs to be culturally and historically defined as well, to bridge the gap between most citizens’ identification of the EU in civic and political terms, and of Europe in cultural, historical and social terms (Bruter 2004). In spite of the efforts of some politicians to impose a joint model of European collective identity (civic, political and cultural), it would appear that the EU remains a civic construction, built around liberal values, with a strong impact on the concept of national state (Risse 2004).

In this paper my interest lies with the following research questions: what types of EU values are promoted in the Romanian politicians’ speeches and upon what forms of legitimation do they rely in order to win the population over to such values? What values, on the other hand, are recognized and embraced as European by Romanian citizens and what type of legitimation prevails among them? The case studies represent a first stage in a
larger project and no general conclusions are to be drawn at this moment. Rather, especially with respect to the Romanian political discourse, where I have dealt with one text only, my research attempts to establish existing tendencies.

2. Analytical Framework

I have chosen an approach which focuses on the orientation to difference of texts (Fairclough 2003), and which distinguishes between texts that are open to difference, at one end of the continuum, and texts that ‘suppress’ difference, at the other. The former are highly dialogical, in Bakhtin’s (1981) understanding of the concept, as an articulation in texts of different voices and viewpoints, competing for meaning. The latter exclude controversies and opposing definitions and promote an artificial consensus between the issuers of the text and its receivers. Undialogized language is, according to Bakhtin (1981), authoritative or absolute.

A text which is dialogical to a great extent is linguistically characterized by the inclusion of other voices, often under the form of reported speech, in a clash of ideas to be negotiated or debated with. On the contrary, a text which suppresses difference is based on assumptions, non-modalized assertions (categorical statements) and predictions (Fairclough 2003: 43). These textual devices lead to the projection as universal truths of opinions held by a particular group. Assumptions may be existential (about what exists), propositional (about what is the case) and value assumptions (about what is good or desirable) (Fairclough 2003: 55).

The degree of dialogicality is interrelated with the legitimation strategies used in a text. Such strategies are reflected in the semantic and grammatical relations between clauses and sentences. Texts may employ either an ‘explanatory’ logic, based on causal relations, dialogicality and elaborate explanation, or a ‘logic of appearances’, which takes the form of a ‘hortatory report’ (Faircough 2003: 94ff.). A report of this type presents a state of affairs or the solutions to a problem as given, not to be questioned or interacted with in other ways except for their acceptance: ‘description with a covert prescriptive intent, aimed at getting people to act in certain ways on the basis of representations of what is’ (Fairclough 2003: 96). 

*Rationalization* (van Leeuwen, in Fairclough 2003: 98) is a legitimation strategy which uses an explanatory logic, realized in semantic relations of causality and purpose and, syntactically, in hypotaxis and embedding.
Mythopoesis (van Leeuwen, in Fairclough 2003: 98) is a legitimation strategy specific to the hortatory report, which uses semantic relations of extension and elaboration, syntactically realized in parataxis; it also uses existential and propositional assumptions, predictions and value assumptions. Mythopoesis may combine with authorization, or ‘reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, and of persons in whom some kind of institutional authority is vested’ and all of them resort to moral evaluation or ‘reference to value systems’ (van Leeuwen, in Fairclough 2003: 98).

The types of logico-semantic relations mentioned in the previous paragraph stem from Halliday’s functional grammar (1994), which divides them into expansion and projection, which, in turn, have further subtypes:

1. Expansion:
   - (a) elaboration (‘restating in other words, specifying in greater detail, commenting, or exemplifying’);
   - (b) extension (‘adding some new element, giving an exception to it, or offering an alternative’);
   - (c) enhancing (‘qualifying it with some circumstantial feature of time, place, cause or condition’);

2. Projection:
   - (a) locution — direct or indirect;
   - (b) idea — direct or indirect (Halliday 1994: 219-220).

Grammatically, they are realized in syntax by parataxis, hypotaxis or embedding (which is considered less relevant in the analysis, due to its lower rank in the clause) (Halliday 1994, Fairclough 2003).

3. The case studies

3.1. Political discourse

The text I have selected for analysis is a political statement made by Roberta Alma Anăstase, Romanian MP (Chamber of Deputies), in the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on May 9, 2006, on the occasion of celebrating Europe Day. It is entitled ‘Europa și România’ ['Europe and Romania']. My reasons for choosing this text as relevant are its topic, namely European and Romanian values, and the activity of its author in a European Union-related frame: as member of the Commission for European Integration of the Parliament of Romania and of the Commission for European Affairs of the Parliament of Romania, and, at present, Member of the European Parliament for Romania, which indicates a high degree of contact with
European institutions. The text is, above all, illustrative of this particular MP’s public discourse on matters of European identity. It is impossible to accurately determine the degree of her actual identification with European ideals on the basis of merely one political statement. The text is, however, part of the persuasion strategy she employs to legitimise the EU and its institutions, in the eyes of her fellow MPs, as well as of citizens potentially interested in the transcripts of parliamentary meetings regularly posted on the Internet.

I shall present below my conclusions to the analysis, in terms of the framework introduced in 1.2 above. I have included in the Appendix paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the text, in my translation, as representative of the entire statement.

3.1.1. Dialogicality: The text is hardly dialogical. The only voices present are the voices of the ‘founding fathers’ of the EU, in particular that of Jean Monnet in Paragraph 3, as part of the legitimation strategy by authorization (van Leeuwen, in Fairclough 2003: 98). There is also an allusion to a hypothetical question asked by the people ‘What does it mean to be European?’, in Paragraph 2. However, there is no attempt to set the premises for a debate around this issue; all that the MP does is give it an answer rooted in a unique version of ‘Europeanness’.

One of the claims of the statement is the co-existence in the European identity of civic, political and economic values, on the one hand, and of cultural values (tradition and history) on the other. The absence of dialogicality is, from this point of view, remarkable, considering that there are staunch supporters of an exclusively civic and political European identity. The MP chooses nevertheless not to engage in a dialogue with them, but to ignore the existence of any divergent standpoints. She does not ‘explore’ conflicting opinions, but simply brackets difference and presents the audience with a view of the European Union based on consensus.

As a result, the text draws heavily on assumptions, such as the ones in Paragraph 4. In the brackets below I have highlighted in italics the textual triggers of the assumptions (see Appendix for the entire paragraph):

There exist a tradition and history that bind Europeans. (tradition and history which)
There are ideals and values rooted in the common tradition and history. (Tradition and history reflect ideals and values)
They were developed and pursued. *(the development and the pursuit of …)*
The EU exists due to them. *(…could not have existed without…)*

Since Paragraph 1 contends that the EU is desirable, it is implied, by extension, that such ideals and values are also desirable. The assumptions in the text are completed with assertions about a state of affairs that leaves the audience with no alternative but approval:

They [the values] have been spread in Europe and all over the world.
They have given the EU a cultural foundation.
They give the EU access to the citizens’ hearts.

The series of assumptions and assertions grows in the following paragraphs, projecting European values and identity as highly desirable and, actually, as the only path to take by Romania. I have used italics to point out the textual triggers of the assumptions:

**a) assumptions:**

Europe is something good, desirable *(the world needs it)*.
The EU is now the citizens’ home. *(has become)*
Democracy and opportunities are desirable *(certitude, strong, multitude, available)*.
There is a Romania which is not a European state *(Romania as a European state)*
The day of May 9 has a resonance inside of each of us. *(through)*
We are not aware of our status of European citizens. *(it makes us aware)*
European values are desirable. *(cherishing)*
We are not in Europe without them. *(return to Europe)*
There exist symbols of the EU.
There is a hierarchy of symbols. *(the most important)*
European values are desirable *(significance)*
European citizens acquire a status. *(the status that European citizens acquire)*
European citizens conform to European values. *(by conforming)*

**b) assertions:**

 — non-modalized:
The EU means democracy and opportunities.
We are citizens of the United Europe.
The meaning of Europe has been embedded in the meaning of Romania.
Romania means Europe.
European values are reflected in the status of European citizen.

 — modalized:
Each of us *may* feel at home…
3.1.2. Meaning relations: It is mostly elaboration and extension that are used, which present the EU as an epitome of shared cultural and social values, equivalent to Europe (as common cultural heritage), but also as an epitome of civic values (citizenship). A sign of equality is placed between the EU and democracy and opportunities, then between Romania and the EU and, by analogy, between Romania and democracy and opportunities:

the EU = traditions and history = cultural values and ideals = Europe = democracy and opportunities = home to its citizens = Romania as a European state

Consequently, if Romanian citizens do not embrace the European values highlighted in the text, Romania is not a European state and it cannot be said to belong in Europe. The conclusion the audience are faced with is that there is no other option. Romania must integrated into Europe, therefore Romania must live up to the European ideals. The text is a hortatory report, based on a logic of appearances, from which rationalization, as a legitimation strategy, is missing, being replaced mainly with mythopoesis, authorization and moral evaluation.

3.2. Ordinary citizens: forum discourse

The texts analyzed are answers to the two questions asked by the organisers of the forum ‘Ce intenţii aveţi odată cu aderarea la UE?’ (‘What are your intentions now that Romania has joined the EU?’), on the BBC Romania site — January 1, 2007 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/forum/story/2007/01/070101_ue_aderare_intentii.shtml). The questions are: ‘What changes will this event bring about in your personal life?’ and ‘Do you intend to look for a job in another EU country (if you live in Romania)?’

My research objectives are: (1) to establish whether the participants in the forum mention any envisaged changes of their identity; if so, whether they perceive them as desirable or threatening; (2) to establish what types of European values are mentioned (those in Article I-2 of the Constitution, mainly civic and liberal values, or others); (3) to determine whether the citizens’ discourse is dialogical or not and what types of legitimation strategies are used.

There are 60 entries in the forum, 2 by the same participants, out of which 55 are relevant to my research objectives. The forum boasts 58 participants, of whom 5 do not say where they come from, one decides to
remain anonymous, 1 comes from the Republic of Moldova, 27 from Romania and 24 from the Romanian diaspora — Canada, the U.S., the Netherlands, the UK, Italy, Spain, Austria and Japan. Three of the entries are euro-sceptical, most of the others euro-optimistic.

Below there is a table containing the European values as identified in the first part of the paper (See section 1), and a quantitative analysis of their occurrences in the participants’ entries. I have counted as one occurrence only a value which is mentioned several times in the same entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European values</th>
<th>Participants’ answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect for human dignity</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom of movement — 8 (labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom of movement — 6 (travelling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political freedom — 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>2 (equality with the other European citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-discrimination</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>1 (as ‘mutual respect’) + 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>1 (with member-states of the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality between men and women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other values</td>
<td>a more “European attitude”/a change of mentality — 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a new work mentality — 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>normality (of the ante-communism type) — 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economic growth/ higher living standards — 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western opportunities — 7 (1 for common market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>better education opportunities (both in Romania and abroad) — 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Euro — 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>access to information — 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>environmental protection — 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European tradition — 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most numerous occurrences registered in the forum discourse are the European values of freedom, economic growth and better living conditions (where we might also include ‘opportunities’).

The majority of the European values mentioned by the forum participants fall in the category of ‘things that are going to change in Romania from now on’, the assumption being that such values are not yet cherished or not cherished enough in the Romanian society. There are also two entries in which anxiety about losing something of the national identity or of the good aspects of living in the pre-EU Romania is expressed (entries 59 and 60): anxiety about having to eat only tasteless food, produced according to EU food regulations, anxiety about the disappearance of the archaic villages in Romania, about increased competition and even about European values, considered as responsible for colonialism, postcolonialism, two world wars, communism and a threat to national sovereignty (entry 60). There is also fear of the costs of integration and of the corruption of the political class, which will make life harder for ordinary Romanians (entries 59 and 52). Finally, there are nationalistic reactions, which are not targeted against the EU, but take the form of an urge for Romanians to stay at home and preserve the traditional Romanian values (entry 20).

Most of the messages are Euro-optimistic, even if few Romanians describe themselves as ‘European.’ There is in fact only one entry in which someone says: ‘It is my right as a EU citizen to work.’ This is understandable, however, considering that Romania had just become a EU member at the time of the forum. What the online messages show is openness towards embracing a European identity, and, most importantly, a desire to be treated in the same manner as other European citizens. The explanation for this attitude might be that, before January 1, 2007, Romania belonged to the out-group, it had the status of a would-be member, and was required to accept and enforce European rules and regulations. Citizens now expect the proper reward for their efforts.

The entries are dialogical to a moderate degree. First of all, there are other voices present in the entries: the voices of Romanian politicians in, for instance, ‘Years on end politicians have kept us in the dark about the side-effects of integration, and now they’ve started to talk about costs,’ as well as the voices of several of the participants — there are exchanges of ideas, agreement or disagreement on an issue, or polemics around nationalistic attitudes.
There is also a reversal of the official discourse on European integration — it is not only Romania that should join the EU, but it’s also the EU (and the world) that should join Romania:

Romania’s integration into the EU means Europe’s and the World’s integration into Romania. […] the World will see Romania’s true face… (entry 48)

My dream is for Romania to become a model for the rest of Europe and I am sure we will! (entry 45)

Romania’s integration into the EU means a lot to our country and a lot more to Europe. (entry 16)

Moreover, the EU is not presented as the only choice available, since many of the assertions are modalised. There are metaphorical realizations of cognitive and affective mental processes, introduced by ‘I hope,’ ‘I think,’ ‘I guess,’ ‘I’d like’, or instances of median modality, for example ‘the Romanians should’, as opposed to the politicians’ discourse based on prescriptions, non-modalised assertions or assumptions.

The legitimation strategies used are rationalization, personal authorization — e.g. ‘I’m telling you that…,’ moral evaluation, based on value assumptions, and mythopoesis, but to a lesser extent than in the MP’s discourse; they rely on moral tales, rather than cautionary tales of the type ‘If we don’t cherish EU values, great misfortunes will befall us.’ There are significantly numerous instances of rationalization, of explanations of causes and emphases of purposes:

The EU gives us a lot of money in structural funds, EXTENSION/CONCESSION but it’s not welfare benefits, ENHANCEMENT/EFFECT so we have to think carefully about how to invest it. (entry 40)

I intend to work in the EU ENHANCEMENT/REASON because salaries are very low in Romania. (entry 33)
At present I’m working in the UK in construction. EXTENSION I want to come back home as soon as possible ENHANCEMENT/REASON because I think PROJECTION/IDEA that joining the EU will open up many opportunities in Romania. EXTENSION Moreover, there’s nowhere like home. (entry 28)

I have few hopes, EXTENSION/CONCESSION but, ENHANCEMENT/PURPOSE in order to check my limits and given the novelty of the experience, I will definitely try. (entry 5)
The participants in the forum show enthusiasm about acquiring a European identity. Their attitude is based, nevertheless, on a careful balancing of advantages and disadvantages, and their openness towards such an identity comes from the prestige, personal welfare and freedom they associate with it. They see European identity mostly in terms of a civic and political identity, not of a cultural one, which confirms the fact that Romania will face the same problems as most of the other EU states, unless more energy is spent on promoting EU’s cultural values, in addition to its institutional ones. Some Romanian citizens also voice divergent opinions, which echo the fear of losing their national identity. To return to the beginning of the discussion, the identity patterns to be envisaged at the level of the population are those of cross-cut identities, but also, in an authentic transnational spirit, of ‘marble-cake’ identities, an entanglement of Romanian and European identities.

The case studies presented above are to be taken as departure points in a larger project about the development of the concept of European identity in Romania, both at institutional level and among ordinary citizens.

References


APPENDIX

Europe and Romania

Tradition and history «which bind us with the other states» reflect ideals and values «that have been disseminated not only on the European continent but all over the world, creating, beyond the dimensions «which have given the European Union its political shape», a Europe — symbol of cultural foundations». The United Europe could not have existed without the development and the pursuit of cultural and social values «that may help it to gain access not only to the citizens’ purses, but also to their hearts». (P4)

The contemporary world, in a constant rapid growth, needs Europe. For its citizens, the European Union has become the equivalent of the word ‘home’. The certitude of a strong democracy and especially the multitude of opportunities available have been embedded in the meaning of Europe. And I dare claim that the meaning of Europe has been embedded in the meaning of Romania as a European state. 9 May, through the resonance it has for each of us, makes us aware of our status of citizens of the United Europe. And that is why each of us may feel at ‘home’ in the European Union, cherishing the European values like a return to «what it really means to be part of Europe». (P5)

The Euro, the flag, the anthem, the motto ‘Unity in diversity’ are symbols of the European Union. But the most important symbol is the significance of its values, reflected in the status «that European citizens acquire» by conforming to these ideals and role-models. (P6)

«…» - are used to mark embedded clauses.
LINGUISTIC ZIG-ZAG
LINGUISTIC RESOURCES OF BIAS IN NEWS DISCOURSE

DELIA ROBESCU
Politechnica University of Timișoara

Abstract: The paper investigates linguistically achieved bias in news discourse and discusses potentially biased language structures / phenomena, such as passives, nominalizations, topic derivation, metaphorization, etc., which, if used in specific contexts, generate biased representations of newsworthy facts.

Introduction

In Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media (Belsey & Chadwick (eds.) 1995: 27) John O'Neill argues that “The journalist exists in two worlds: he or she enters a practice that is characterized by a commitment to truth-telling, and at the same time is an employee who works for a wage and is expected to produce a story of the kind demanded by his or her newspaper, magazine or TV station.” His remark epitomizes the nature of current journalistic practice characterized by the clash between the truth-telling value and the pressures exerted by the political and financial interests dominating our contemporary society. Bias, persuasion, disinformation, intoxication, manipulation have become common press descriptors pointing to various degrees of deviation from objective, perspicuous journalistic information and reproduction.

The French social theorist Baudrillard (apud Brînzeu 1997: 184) coins the reality-recreating phenomenon “Timișoara Syndrome” and argues that mass-media has the force and ability to reconstruct the ‘real’ reality and shape a new reality, a hyperreality, through projection of false images of what is real.

Translated into journalistic terms, this phenomenon is described as the agenda-extension theory (Kuypers 2002: 5-11), which represents the further development of the agenda-setting theory (McCombs & Shaw 1972), according to which press sets our agenda by selecting certain stories which become important only because they are chosen to appear in the newspaper. We read what journalists decide to insert in the newspaper. From the
very beginning, they seek to impose on us what to read and, implicitly, what to think. Kuypers further extends the agenda-setting theory, arguing that “Whereas agenda-setting serves to focus public attention upon an issue, agenda-extension occurs when the media move beyond a neutral reporting of events...... the media do more than tell the public what to think about; they also tell the public how to think about any given topic” (2002: 6).

Telling the news reader how to distill information is achieved through framing strategies which allow the salience of certain aspects of the news event while minimizing or/and discarding others. The news reporter acts as a focalizer by projecting frames that enable specific cognitive backgrounds and interpretative stances through which news events are approached and filtered by news readers. It is this dimension of news production, the framing stage, that facilitates the generation of bias through linguistic devices recognizable at surface-text processing.

The article addresses the issue of news bias from a linguistic perspective and analyses three linguistic devices employed by news writers for stance taking purposes in printed news: lexical choice, assignment of semantic roles and passivization.

**Lexical Choice**

At first glance, news framing may be analysed in terms of individual lexical items deliberately chosen by the news writer to frame news actors and events, since they are the first attention-drawing cognitive elements which support and affect the reality-creating force of language and thereby facilitate a biased informational load.

Van Dijk (1988: 81) speaks of this creating-distorting dimension of language by drawing attention to the meaning implications entailed by the terms “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” when applied to the same person, where the former activates negative connotations in the readers’ mind while the latter activates positive ones.

Undoubtedly, the terms *al-Qaeda suspect* and *‘top Bin Laden aide’*, naming one and the same person, may echo differently in the reader’s mind. The former resonates rather neutrally, while the polysemy of the latter (short of *aide-de-camp*, designating a military officer acting as assistant to a superior *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary*) activates the idea of guilty person in the reader’s perception.
In the same line of thought, René Florio (apud Popescu 2005: 81) appreciates that “the same woman, if she is the lover of an unemployed man, is referred to as ‘his girlfriend’; if the story is about an entrepreneur, she is a ‘dependant’; the lover of an anarchist is ‘his female comrade’, an emperor's lover will be a ‘favourite’, and a poet’s lover will be his ‘muse’.” (my translation).

Series of quasi-synonyms organized in lexical fields such as unrest, rebellion, revolution, mutiny, uprising, or rebel, assailant, revolutionary, guerrilla are characterized by bias-proneness, since they enable news writers to make the visible invisible and the invisible visible. By choosing a particular hyponym from the series, the news reporter allows maximization and, implicitly, the simultaneous minimization of specific semantic features, which, if strategically contextualized, lead to the distortion of reality.

Take, for example, the news story below, reporting on illegal work preventing inspections.

**Illegal workers held after raid on Wembley**

**A gang** of illegal Romanian workers has been arrested at Wembley stadium during a **raid** by immigration officers.

Around a dozen illegal workers were given £1,000 on-the-spot fines after getting jobs on the FA’s flagship project.

**The immigration swoop**, one of the first since Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, will raise new doubts about Britain’s border controls and be a major embarrassment to the FA and Multiplex, the company building Wembley.

It will prompt renewed concern about the ease with which illegal workers from the two new EU countries can gain work in Britain despite the strict curbs announced by Home Secretary John Reid.

It is understood that the Wembley **raid** took place after a **tip off** to the Government’s Immigration and Nationality Directorate from Multiplex about employees working for one of its contractors. The Romanians, thought to have been earning around £80 a day, were taken to a police station and given £1,000 fines.

One source said the Romanians, who were working with colleagues from Poland and other countries, had been dismayed to find themselves targeted.
“It was a major shock. One moment the Romanians were working on site and the next they were hauled off to a police station,” he said. „They were told they would either have to pay £1,000 or go to jail for two months. But most of them don’t have that kind of money.“ (Story continues) (The Daily Mail, 13 February 2007)

Illegal employees working for Multiplex, the world-wide known Australian construction company involved in the rebuilding of Wembley, Britain’s iconic soccer stadium, Romanian workers are framed as a gang not as a team of workers and, inevitably, perceived by the readership as a bunch of criminals, whose actions and behaviours are law breaking and morally condemnable.

The stark contrast between the generic, neutral term ‘group’, its hyponym ‘team’, which contextually would have been much more appropriate to use when referring to a group of people who work together to do a job, and the preferred incriminating term ‘gang’, designating a group of criminals that work together, is indicative of the social bias propagated by some English journalists, in an attempt to inculcate false perceptions about Romanian immigrants as being lawbreakers and social enemies.

The biased framing of Romanian workers as criminals is further reinforced by the presence of criminal behaviour describing lexis. Instead of inspection, control or check, the reporter chooses raid and swoop, both items entailing sudden, unexpected visits to a place by police in search for something illegal. Moreover, the Romanian workers are not taken to the police station, but they are hauled off, i.e. they are escorted and forced to go to prison by police, and all this is happening because of a tip off, that is a piece of secret information given to police about illegal activities.

Summing up, it must be pointed up that biased framing is to be approached in terms of a deliberately made lexical choice from a set of lexical items forming a lexical field or from a wider range of options geared to side the news text with an already socially dominant ideology or one which is intended to be imposed and socially ratified.

Assignment of Semantic Roles

One may approach the framing of newsworthy events in Halliday’s terms (1994: 106-130) by viewing the clause as the representation of a process which entails selecting a process type (material, mental, relational, existential etc.), participants (agentive, affected, recipient, instrumental,
etc.) and circumstantial elements (time, space, manner). Halliday maintains that “instead of Mary saw something wonderful, I may choose to say Mary came upon a wonderful sight, where the process has been represented as a material process came upon and the perception has been turned into a ‘participant’ a sight. Or I may say a wonderful sight met Mary’s eyes, with the process of perception split up into Actor a sight, material Process meet and Goal eyes; and Mary represented simply as the possessor of the eyes. These are all plausible representations of one and the same non-linguistic ‘state of affairs’. They are definitely not synonymous; the different encodings all contribute something different to the total meaning” (1994: 344).

In news discourse, power relations and ideological stances can be encoded in the process of assigning semantic roles to news actors through various predications, as agent-participants, recipient-participants, patient participants, instrumental participants, beneficiary participants etc. It has become a common practice to frame discriminated, powerless categories as affected participants whereas favoured, powerful categories will in all likelihood be framed as agenteive participants.

Moreover, the practice of sycophantic journalism is to conduct news event framing upon the principle maximize your strengths, minimize your weaknesses, maximize your enemy’s weaknesses, minimize their strengths (cf Van Dijk 1998: 21-63, Sweitzer 1996). Thus, powerful groups will most likely occur as agents of praiseworthy actions, while their negative behaviour is omitted or mitigated, leaving the affected participant semantic role to powerless groups, whose positive actions are purposely diminished, if not left out.

Notice how, in the news item below, semantic role assignment becomes a discriminatory linguistic device against the powerless group of illegal immigrants.

New crackdown on illegal immigrants (1)

Home Secretary John Reid will this week launch a drive to deny illegal immigrants (2) the benefits of living in the UK.

Immigration minister Liam Byrne said the initiative would involve a cross-Government effort to ensure that illegals (3) cannot get housing, healthcare or work.
Reports suggested that this could include fines of up to £20,000 for landlords who rent properties to illegal immigrants (4) and £5,000 for bosses who knowingly employ them.

The News of the World also reported that Home Office officials have been put into the DVLA to crack down on illegal immigrants (5) applying for driving licences.

Mr Byrne told ITVI’s The Sunday Edition: “We are announcing the first cross-Government strategy to block the benefits of Britain if you are here illegally.

„It is bringing together public agencies from across Government to block benefits like housing, healthcare, National Insurance numbers, work, for those who are here illegally.” (Story continues) (The Daily Mail, 4 March 2007)

It is by no means clear that the five occurrences of illegal immigrants,

1) affected participants (will be imposed a new crack down) (headline)
2) affected participants (will be denied the benefits of living in the UK) (paragraph 1)
3) beneficiary participants (beneficiaries of an unfavourable social measure) (paragraph 2)
4) instrumental participants (instruments of distress, i.e. fines, for landlords and bosses) (paragraph 3)
5) affected participants (will be denied application for driving licence) (paragraph 4),

shape a discreditable and clearly humiliating image of this social category. This recurrence in assigning semantic roles that facilitate the articulation of an unfavourable portrayal of immigrants is supportive of and congruent with the immigrant dehumanizing ideology controlled by the incumbent government.

The Passive-Active Relation in News Discourse

Although the general rule, in the case of passive structures, is to leave the agent unexpressed, since speakers focus their attention on the active object not the passive agent, an interrogation of the agent recoverability proves extremely helpful in assessing the degree of bias embedded in news items.
Grammarians (Quirk et al. 1980: 807, Side & Wellman 2001: 34) appreciate that around 20% of passive sentences omit the agent because of its irrelevancy and what matters most is the affected participant. Quirk further speaks of frequency constraints and relates passive/active uses to the distinction between "informative and imaginative prose rather than to a difference of subject matter or of spoken and written English. The passive is generally more commonly used in informative than in imaginative writing, notably in the objective, non-personal style of scientific articles and news items" (1980: 808).

Passivization is extensively used in news discourse primarily because, by allowing compression of information, it helps to simplify the message, making it more comprehensible, straightforward, impersonal and non-involving. Additionally, it helps to save editorial space, thus increasing the reading tempo and making the discourse more dynamic.

However, there is a major downside entailed by the deletion of the agent and, sometimes, of the goal of the action, allowed by the passive structure, since such deletions may turn out to be deliberate acts of omission with a view to conceal specific bits of information, contextually unfavourable for the agentive participant. The news item below is a case in point and underpins the idea that, once the non-expressed/surface agent has been recovered, a new outlook on the news report is beginning to take shape.

**U.S. soldier accused of aiding the enemy**

BAGHDAD - A senior U.S. officer has been charged with nine offenses, including aiding the enemy and fraternizing with the daughter of a detainee while he commanded a military police detachment at an American detention facility near Baghdad, the military said Thursday.

Army Lt. Col. William H. Steele was accused of giving "aid to the enemy" by providing an unmonitored cell phone to detainees.

Steele was the commander of the 451st Military Police Detachment at Camp Cropper, a U.S. detention center on the western outskirts of Baghdad, when the offenses allegedly occurred between October 2005 and February, military spokesman Lt. Col. James Hutton said.

Steele was being held in Kuwait pending a grand jury investigation, Hutton said.
The other charges included unauthorized possession of classified information, fraternizing with the daughter of a detainee, maintaining an inappropriate relationship with an interpreter, storing classified information in his quarters and possessing pornographic videos, the military said.

Steele also was charged with improperly marking classified information, failing to obey an order and failing to fulfill his obligations in the expenditure of funds, the military said.

Camp Cropper, located near the Baghdad airport, replaced the notorious Abu Ghraib prison as the main detention facility in the capital area.

(The New York Times, 28 April 2007)

Apparently, the news item takes the shape of a prototypical news report which does not violate journalistic norms. It just reports facts by giving enough precise details about the main actor, the actions in which he was involved, the location where events took place, without inserting evaluative comments or interpreting events by making predictions and mentioning consequences.

Assessed in terms of informativeness constraints, imposed by the topic under discussion (i.e. allegations), the text proves to be grossly deficient. In view of the journalistic libel risk, any accusation brought against somebody is normally expected to be backed up by evidence and issued by a legitimate authority in order to meet the credibility requirement. The accusations made against the US officer are framed as the most salient information, but there is no information precisely specifying the identity of the legal authority lawfully entitled to formulate such serious allegations and validate incriminating evidence. The reader is left to make assumptions about the identity of the agentive participant from the rather vaguely phrased declarative sentences (…the military said, …military spokesman Lt. Col. James Hutton said, …Hutton said) whose subject is three times expressed by a collective noun.

Moreover, the report fails to provide any kind of evidence capable of supporting so numerous and serious accusations. It goes without saying that the presence of unequivocal evidence becomes a pre-requisite for preserving story credibility and truthfulness. The two bits of information (authority and evidence) being unspecified and guessable, the rightfulness and legitimacy of these accusations are compromised and so is the behaviour of the accusing legal body. It becomes obvious that the passive voice
fulfils a whitewash function in this particular situation by maintaining confusion over the identity of a military authority whose actions and behaviour are condemnable, a fact reinforced by a follow-up news item informing that:

Lawyers for a U.S. lieutenant colonel accused of the capital offense of aiding the enemy complained Monday they had been denied access to top secret evidence as a hearing opened to determine if the officer must stand trial.


The same legal body, whose identity is again left unspecified through passivization (lawyers had been denied access), hinders defence lawyers’ work and attempts to ‘legally’ rehabilitate the US lieutenant colonel.

Both news reports are biased in siding with the current American ideology of downplaying and whitewashing negative, sometimes, culpable actions and behaviour of Iraq war-supporting statesmen and army heads within the socio-political context of an ever-increasing public rage against the prolongation of the Iraq war.

Conclusions

Press bias has been and will certainly remain among the most debated topics in the journalistic practice since, so far, it has proved to be a social phenomenon impossible to discard, yet a phenomenon which is likely and advisable to be controlled. An equally wise and efficacious action in this direction is to educate the news readership and turn it into a knowledgeable assessor of the news text, a goal to which my paper subscribes by raising awareness about various linguistic devices deployed for discriminatory purposes. Such devices include: deliberately made lexical choices to activate positive/negative connotations, strategic semantic role assignment and deployment of passive voice intended to support degrading/upgrading portrayals of news actors/events.

References


News reports cited:
Illegal workers held after raid on Wembley, *The Daily Mail*, February 13, 2007
LINGUISTIC FLIM-FLAM?

STEEN SCHOUSBOE
University of Copenhagen

Abstract: In Germanic languages, ablaut (vowel gradation) is best known for its use in the verbal paradigm, as in spring — sprang — sprung. With the regularization of the strong verbs, this function is slowly becoming rarer and is no longer productive. However, ablaut survives in other uses, notably word formation. The paper offers a closer look at this function.

Ablaut, also called vowel gradation, is a well-known phenomenon in Indo-European languages. In the Germanic sub-branch of IE languages it is best known for the part it plays in the paradigms of the so-called strong verbs. The most widespread ablaut pattern or series in Old English was /i - a - u/, corresponding to IE /e - o/. Spring - sprang - sprung is a Modern English example.

One of the changes from IE to Common Germanic or Proto-Germanic was the formation of the weak preterite and past participle in /-d/, as in Modern English walk - walked. I shall not discuss the origin of the weak preterite here, but the change must have been quite abrupt. Very few strong verbs were formed in the Germanic languages after the separation from the parent language and the new pattern became totally dominant.

However, ablaut remains productive in the Modern Germanic languages, though it is used for other purposes, namely in word-formation. This gives us words and idioms like sing-song, riff-raff, spick and span, etc. It is this productive use of ablaut in Modern English which is the topic of the present paper. The phenomenon is treated in the standard literature, e.g. Jespersen (1942), Quirk et al. (1985) and Marchand (1969).

Jespersen treats the ablaut expressions as a kind of reduplicative compounds and points to expressions like Come, come!, Hear, hear! as well as girly-girly, goody-goody, for years and years and again and again. While such examples share the reduplicative feature with the ablaut expressions, they differ in the important point that they are all based on ordinary words
(come, hear, girl, etc.). As we shall see below, this is not the case with all or even most ablaut expressions.

Jespersen notes that the ablaut of the type treated here, /i - a/, i.e. a narrow front vowel followed by an open central or back vowel, and, less frequently, /i — a - u(o)/, where the third element is a rounded back vowel, is found in all parts of the world and is in no way specific to Germanic or even Indo-European languages. He explains:

The reason why we find everywhere this and not the inverse sequence of sounds was already hinted at in my book Language, p. 402: you begin with what is light and indicates littleness and nearness and end with the opposite. On the shrill sound [i] as meaning small, see my paper in Linguistica 283 ff.; cf also the contrast between ‘near’ and ‘far’ in French ci and là, here and there, German hier and da, dort, etc. The duller and more open sound is also musically best adapted for the conclusion. The alternation often serves to express the sound produced by a movement to and fro or the movement itself as in zig-zag, hence vacillation, indecision, etc. and contemptible things in general. (Jespersen 1942:176)

Quirk et al. (1985: 1579) also treat ablaut expressions under reduplication: “Some compounds have two or more elements which are either identical or only slightly different, eg: goody-goody (‘affectedly good’, informal). The difference between the two elements may be in the initial consonants, as in walkie-talkie, or in the medial vowels, eg: criss-cross.” However, though ablaut expressions may well be regarded as instances of reduplication, they constitute a subtype with its own origin, form and, I believe, its own function in Modern English. What is typical of the ablaut expressions is not only that the consonantal frame is reduplicated while the vowel changes, but that the vowel changes in a specific way, namely the series mentioned above. In short, what we have here is the modern version of the Germanic /i - a/ ablaut pattern, not a random vowel change. With regard to the function of reduplication, Quirk et al. (1985: 1579-1580) say that

“the most common uses of reduplicatives are
(a) to imitate sounds, eg: rat-a-tat (knocking on door), tick-tock (of clock), ha ha (laughter) bow-wow (of dog)
(b) to suggest alternating movements, eg: seesaw, flip-flop, ping-pong
(b) to disparage by suggesting instability, nonsense, insincerity, vacillation, etc: higgledy-piggledy, hocus-pocus, wishy-washy, dilly-dally, shilly-shally
(d) to intensify, eg: teeny-weeny, tip-top”. 
They also state that, with respect to style, most reduplicatives are “highly informal or familiar, and many derive form the nursery, eg. din-din (‘dinner’)” (Quirk et al. 1985: 1579). The highly informal status is true of the ablaut expressions as well as the other reduplicatives, but I do not think that there are ablaut expressions which derive from the nursery.

Marchand’s treatment of the ablaut expressions is comprehensive and detailed. Like Jespersen and Quirk, he treats ablaut expressions as a subtype of reduplicative compounds. He notes that “pure” reduplication, i.e. reduplication of an unchanged word as in goody-goody, tap-tap, hush-hush is not found in English before the 19th century. Ablaut reduplication is much older, as we have seen. The “pure” reduplicatives, i.e. mere repetition, “is almost completely restricted to expressive sound words” (Marchand 1969: 83), goody-goody being one of the few exceptions.

According to Marchand (1969: 429), ablaut expressions and rhyme gemination are essentially pseudo-compounds, motivated by the significants, whether they are made up of two real morphemes (as singsong / walkie-talkie), of only one sign (as chitchat / popsy-wopsy), or whether they are entirely unmotivated by semantic content (as flimflam / boogie-woogie). They are not therefore compounds comparable to such types as steamboat or colorblind, which are grammatical syntagmas based on a determinant/determinatum relationship.

Regarding the phonetic form of the ablaut series, Marchand (1969: 431) says that

The member containing the higher vowel always precedes the one that has the lower vowel. This phonic tendency is widespread. The reasons are probably physiological as well as psychological: the smaller distance between tongue and palate for high vowels becomes greater with low vowels in a natural rise from the smaller to the bigger. The psychological value of the opposition is therefore quite logically that between high and low, with the rise preceding the fall.

From a derivational point of view, Marchand divides the ablaut expressions into four groups. By far the largest group is made up of expressions based on the second element, as chitchat and crisscross. This is. A smaller group is based on the first element, as mingle-mangle and rickety-rackety. Marchand (1969: 432) adds “I have considered the onomatopoeic words clipclop, dingdong, pingpong as consisting of two expressive elements,
though actually the sound words *clip, ding, ping* are recorded earlier than
the twin words*. Actually he includes these in the third group, those that are
based on two elements which are also found in isolation: *click-clack, clip-
clop, ping-pong, flip-flop, drip-drop*, etc. Surely the absence or presence of a
hyphen should not be regarded as decisive? The fourth group consists of the
“entirely unmotivated ‘trifle’ words” *flimflam, jimjam, trim-tram, riff-raff* and
*zigzag*.

While unmotivated expressions are rare among the ablaut com-
pounds, they are quite common among the rhyming compounds as in
*hanky-panky* and *hurly-burly*. Marchand regards this derivational difference
as related to the stylistic difference which he notes: “While both ablaut and
rime are basically playful, ablaut gemination is so in a neutrally aesthetic
way. Rime gemination is facetious, or playful in a childish, even babyish
manner. In contrast to ablaut gemination, it also has a sentimentalizing
effect.” (1969: 435) and “In ablaut combinations, the strict vowel alternation,
combined with a definite underlying morpheme, leaves no room for the
complete facetiousness that is possible with rime combinations.” (ibid.)

To sum up: the picture seems reasonably clear as far as the formal
properties of the ablaut pattern are concerned: a high unrounded front
vowel followed by a (rounded or unrounded) low front, low central or low
back vowel and, in the case of /i - a - u/, by a rounded back vowel. Similarly
for the stylistic values of ablaut and rhyme expressions: they all belong in
the informal register and are often playful or jocular.

We will now turn to meaning, i.e. the referential and communicative
potential of these combinations. On rhyming combinations, Marchand
(1969: 434-435) points out that

Rime, the magic fitting together of words, naturally lends itself to being
used in the sphere of jugglery, sorcery, or the like, which accounts for such
words as *hocus-pocus, hokey-pokey*...Many words connote the idea ‘dis-
order, confusion, tumult’ or the like, as *hugger-mugger, higgledy-piggledy,
hurly-burly*...As rime combinations are essentially non-serious, they may
convey derogatory, contemptuous or ridiculing shades of meaning when
used without the intention of being playful. Names for persons are deroga-
tory: *fuddy-duddy*...Nursery words have only a playful character; they are
not derogatory: *humpty-dumpty*...Impersonal substantives with a deroga-
tory shade are *hurdy-gurdy, rumble-tumble* ‘cart’, *ragtag, claptrap*. Adjectives fitting into this group are *namby-pamby, flibberty-gibberty, hoity-toity, rumble-tumble*. 
On ablaut combinations, Marchand (1969: 431) remarks that

The symbolism underlying ablaut variation is that of polarity which may assume various semantic aspects. Words denoting sounds form a large group, the vowel alternation symbolizing the bipolar range of sound possibilities: click-clack, ding-dong, tick-tock…With words expressive of movement the idea of polarity suggests to and fro rhythm: crinkle-crankle, criss-cross, zigzag…Related to this group are words for games, as wiggle-waggle, kit-cat, pingpong, all in a way characterized by two-phase movement. Another aspect of ‘to and fro movement’ is the idea of hesitation, as we have it in shilly-shally, dilly-dally…The same basic concept may lead to the variant of ambivalence, double-faced character, implying the dubious or spurious value of the referent. Flimflam, jimjam, trimtram, whimwham all have the original meaning of ‘trash’, ‘trifle’; the word knick-knack also belongs here. Many words have the basic meaning ‘idle talk’, as bibble-babble, chitchat, fiddle-faddle…In various ways depreciative (on the basis of ‘ambivalence’) are nominal combinations such as mishmash, mingle-mangle, slipslop, wishy-washy, singsong, rifraff.

It will appear that the semantic content of polarity can be extended in numerous ways. The only obvious check is that most ablaut expressions are based on an existing word, as noted above. Chitchat is semantically related to chat. With the onomatopoeic expressions, the ablaut pattern suggests repeated sounds as well as the pitch range. Perhaps the most abstract version of polarity is that of a set: two or three items which are brought together under one heading. One must agree with Jespersen and Marchand that sound symbolism (i.e. not sound imitation) plays an important part in many ablaut and rhyme expressions, cf. the well-known meaning of ‘ littleness’ connected to the vowel /a/, but it seems clear to me that there are many ablaut expressions whose meaning cannot be convincingly explained by sound symbolism in the traditional sense or by the roots on which they are based. Marchand’s “entirely unmotivated” combinations are among these. There is nothing little about *bibble, *riff or *zig and nothing big about *babble, *raff or *zag. There is only polarity or number (at least two items) and - as a consequence of this - a certain extension in time. Marchand’s “to and fro rhythm” and Quirk’s “alternative movements” and “vacillation” cover the facts admirably in the case of combinations referring to movement, but how can we account for ablaut expressions where there is no apparent sound symbolism in the traditional sense, nor any sense of movement or vacillation?
Riffraff is a case in point, but I believe that it is worthwhile to look at some other expressions which are not usually included in the treatment of ablaut expressions, but which, to my mind, reveal the strength of the ablaut mechanism. Not only does it form words, but also formulaic expressions and even names.

We always say this and that, never *that and this, cf. Jespersen above. This and that simply sounds right, by which I mean that it conforms to a well-known pattern. I do not think it is plausible to regard the meaning of “here” or “near” as an extension of the symbolic value of /i/ (littleness), but that does not mean that the sequence is arbitrary. On the contrary, if two elements are brought together in a formulaic expression, an idiom, it is a sufficient and necessary condition for the successful use of the ablaut frame that the element with /i/ precedes the element with the low central or back vowel. No special meaning is required from any of the elements, only a phonetic form. It is simply by putting the elements into the ablaut frame that the speaker makes a whole of the parts; and the “parts” need not even have a prior existence as independent words. They do in this and that and they do not in riffraff, flimflam, zigzag, etc. Semantically we can distinguish between proximity and distance and together they constitute a whole made up of parts, “location in relation to the speaker”. With riff-raff such an analysis is not possible; nevertheless, I believe that it is significant that the word denotes a (diverse) group or class of people, not an individual.

A word of caution may be needed here. This and that are in contrast, yet share the function or meaning as demonstratives, so it is natural to bring them together. I do not mean to say that the only reason why we have the sequence this and that rather than the opposite is that this has an /i/ and that an /a/. On the contrary, I think it is in keeping with human perception and cognition that we proceed from that which is near to that which is far. We cannot help seeing the world from an egocentric point of view. What I am saying is that, if for some reason and despite Jespersen’s examples above, this meant ‘that’ and that meant ‘this’ we would not have developed the fixed expression *that and this. A parallel analysis of ablaut in the Germanic (and Indo-European) verbal paradigm would go like this: We have present time and past time and we often talk about them in the same context. When we do, it is natural (“egocentric”) to mention present events and states before past events and states. If the ablaut phenomenon is older than the verbal conjugation, which I consider very likely though impossible
to prove, it would be only natural to use IE /e/ (CG /i/) for the present tense and /a/ for the past tense.

One of the properties of proper nouns is that they do not refer as common nouns do; they are simply names. Therefore, there is typically no element of sound imitation, or ‘littleness’ or ‘vacillation’ or any of the other potential meanings mentioned above. Yet they are not beyond the scope of productive ablaut formation. Let me end by giving two examples:

In his biography *Dickens*, Peter Ackroyd (1990: 393) discusses Dickens’s performance as a magician: “and at a later date he called himself ‘The Unparalleled Necromancer Rhia Rhama Rhoos’ amongst whose tricks were The Travelling Doll Wonder, The Pudding Wonder, and The Conflagration Wonder.” Dickens may have been acquainted with the Indian name Rhama and the rest of his assumed name was supplied by the ablaut pattern. Together they make a whole (and formidable) name out of three individual names.

When, in 1949, Disney’s Donald Duck was introduced in Denmark in the form of a monthly magazine, the translator did an admirable job with the names of the characters. *Donald*, a little-known name in Denmark, was replaced by *Anders And* (*and* means ‘duck’), keeping the alliteration of the original. His nephews Huey, Louie and Dewey were renamed *Rip, Rap and Rup*, always mentioned in that order as required by the ablaut formula. The trigger here may have been Danish *rap* meaning ‘quack’, the sound of a duck. The two other names came naturally, so to speak. The /i - a -u/ pattern is quite common in Danish (more so than in English) and still productive. By using the ablaut formula the translator did what the original did by means of rhyme: creating a whole (‘Donald’s nephews’) out of the parts (‘individuals who are the same age and look identical’).

**References**


ENGLISH PRESENT PERFECT:
ASPECTUAL AND TEMPORAL COMPONENTS

PREDRAG NOVAKOV
University of Novi Sad

Abstract: English Present Perfect does not seem to occupy a specific temporal section on the time-line; it encompasses the past, the present and possibly the future. It also implies that certain meanings which could be treated as aspectral ones (e.g., continuation, recentness, result, experience). The present study discusses these temporal and aspectral components, with examples from contemporary British fiction.

1. Introduction

In the relevant synchronic literature, English present perfect has usually been included into two grammatical categories: into the category of tense or into the category of aspect (and even into a third one — phase, cf. Palmer 1989: 46-47). Pedagogical grammars (e.g. Thomson and Martinet 1992) discuss it together with other tense forms, and a recent comprehensive grammar, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language, treats it as non-deictic past tense within the section titled “Perfect Tense”, which denotes the secondary tense system. In this grammar, the secondary past tense system includes the perfect as the marked member, and the nonperfect as the unmarked member (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 139). In other comprehensive grammars and studies (Quirk et al. 1985, Brinton 1988), perfect is discussed as a member in one pair of the two English aspectral oppositions (progressive-nonprogressive and perfect-nonperfect). In the similar manner, B. Comrie treats English perfect as a specific aspect, different from the other aspectral progressive-nonprogressive opposition (Comrie 1976: 52). Therefore, before proceeding with the discussion about English perfect, it is necessary to define the two main categories related to English perfect-tense and aspect.

Tense is a deictic category which locates situations in time, measuring this location from the point of speech (the deictic centre). The deictic centre as the basic orientation point provides only three temporal sections on
the time-line — present, past and future, so there are further subdivisions in English. The English past section is thus subdivided into past and before past. In traditional grammars, tenses are sometimes also divided into absolute and relative, the former being defined on the basis of the deictic centre only, the latter needing other points as well.

Developing his approach to tense, H. Reichenbach (1947) used three points to determine tenses: the point of speech (S), the point of event (E) and the point of reference (R). As far as English present perfect is concerned, Reichenbach used the formula $E \rightarrow S, R$, which means that the event is located in the past and precedes the point of speech and the reference point, which are simultaneous. The difference between the present perfect and past nonprogressive lies in the fact that the past has the formula $E, R \rightarrow S$, where the point of event and the point of reference coincide and occur before the point of speech. On the time-line, these points are represented in the following way:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \text{a) present perfect} & & \underline{\quad | \quad | \quad} \\
& & E & S, R \\
& \quad \text{b) past nonprogressive} & & \underline{\quad | \quad | \quad} \\
& & E, R & S
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, the present perfect occupies a specific position on the time-line: the event is entirely located in the past or it just began in the past, but it is viewed from the reference point which is coinciding with the point of speech.

As far as the category of aspect is concerned, one of the general definitions specifies that aspect implies an internal temporal constituency of a situation (Comrie 1976: 3) and that English has two aspectral oppositions: progressive — nonprogressive and perfect — nonperfect. The first opposition presents a situation as a structure (progressive) or as a whole (nonprogressive) (Comrie 1976: 18, 24), whereas the second opposition represents a different kind of aspect: it does not specify the situation itself, but relates that situation to another situation (Comrie 1976: 52). Actually, one could say that perfect aspect implies a link between a situation and the following situation or point in the past, present and future. This link could be established in different ways, so grammars typically distinguish four or more types of perfect — the perfect of result, the perfect of recent past, the perfect of persistent situation and the experiential perfect (cf. Comrie 1976: 56-61).
2. Temporal and Aspectual Components of English Past, Present and Future Perfect

The fact that English perfect is classified into the two or three above-mentioned grammatical categories shows that it obviously has both temporal and aspectual components — the temporal component being related to the location in time, and the aspectual one to a specific link with another situation. However, it appears that the temporal component does not have the same significance in these three kinds of perfect — past, present and future. Namely, in the case of past and future perfect, it seems that the link between situations is primarily temporal, because these two finite verb forms occupy a clearly definable temporal section on the time-line: past perfect denotes a past situation preceding another past situation (the formula E — R - S), and future perfect a future situation preceding another future situation (the formula S - E - R, cf. Reichenbach 1947: 290). These time-lines and the formulas are:

(2) a) past perfect

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) future perfect

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, it seems that past and future perfect could be quite clearly defined on the basis of their temporal component alone: they occupy the temporal sections before past, that is before future.

However, when it comes to present perfect, the temporal component is more complex, because present perfect does not imply only one clearly delimited temporal segment on the time-line: the event itself is primarily located in the past, but it could include the present moment and a portion of the future. Therefore, present perfect implies a mixture of at least two basic temporal segments — past and present, with the situation itself occurring in the past or continuing to the present. That seems to be the reason why aspectual components in present perfect became more important, that is notions like result, continuation, repetition up to now etc. Some grammarians even included these notions into the names of some types of present perfect, for example habit-in-a-period-leading-up-to-the-present or state-up-to-the-present (cf. Leech 2004: 39-40).

The main arguments why present perfect should not be included only into the English tenses relate to the fact that the primary function of present
perfect is not to locate events into a specific temporal section - past or present, but to indicate the relevance of a situation for the present moment. It is a well known fact that present perfect cannot specify the exact past time when a situation happened, and it does not occur with the specific past time adverbials like yesterday, last week etc, which is one of the basic features of past tenses. Moreover, present perfect cannot be treated as a typical present tense either, because it does not denote the basic present meaning - real present, situations going on at the time of speech. The only typical temporal notions related to present perfect seem to be temporal continuation (with or without repetition) and temporal recentness (recent past). Actually, it appears that this finite verb form has the primary function to denote some (broadly speaking) aspectual or pragmatic notions like current validity of the situation and results significant for the present. In an attempt to investigate that issue, this paper would discuss the temporal and aspectual components in a number of examples containing present perfect.

3. English Present Perfect — Corpus Analysis

To discuss the temporal and aspectual components in the English present perfect, the paper would analyse the corpus compiled from the contemporary British novel — Nice Work by D. Lodge (Lodge 1989). The corpus includes 191 examples, 170 of them being nonprogressive (89%) and 21 progressive (10,99%). Numbers in the brackets after the examples denote the pages in the book.

Several possible clues could be followed in an attempt to specify temporal and aspectual/pragmatic components in the concrete sentences from the corpus. This paper would start from temporal adverbials used with present perfect and then proceed to aspectual/pragmatic implications.

3.1. Temporal Adverbials and Present Perfect

The nonprogressive present perfect in the corpus is often accompanied by specific temporal adverbials (adverbs, phrases, clauses) which help to identify temporal relations in the given sentence and to establish the temporal patterns. Such adverbials could be divided into two basic groups: those denoting immediately preceding events or near past, and those denoting longer periods of time.
The adverbials from the first group typically mentioned in the English grammar books are *recently* and *just*. Examples from the corpus contain those and the similar adverbials:

(3) a) This has become a regular occurrence *lately*: lying awake in the dark, waiting for the alarm to beep, worrying. (13)

b) She carries the *Daily Mail*, which has *just* been delivered. (20)

c) Vic grunts, unsurprised that his Marketing Director has *not yet* arrived. (36)

d) They turn to face Philip Swallow, who has evidently *just* arrived, since he is wearing his rather grubby anorak... (61)

e) ...all talking at once, as if they have *just* been released from solitary confinement. (72)

f) I’ve been thinking *lately* I might try and supplement my income with a little freelance journalism.’ (187)

g) Oh, while I’m here — you haven’t had a letter from Rawlison’s buyer *lately*, by any chance? ’ (195)

h) ‘Have you seen Charles *recently?’ he asked. (259)

i) Anyway they’ve *just* discovered that compulsory retirement is unconstitutional... (329)

j) And Euphoric State has *just* put in a bid to be the home of a new Institute of Advanced Research on the West Coast. (359)

k) Haven’t had a reply *yet*. (363)

The adverbial *just* (examples 3b, d, e, i, j) clearly indicates the situation immediately preceding another given situation. The adverbial *lately* (examples 3a, f, g) is also quite frequently used to denote a larger anterior temporal section, but still within the segment of the relatively near past and with a possible repetition, as indicated by a prenominal modifier - *regular* in the example (3a). The third adverbial from the above-mentioned examples — *yet*, (examples 3c, k) could be included in this group, even though it might imply a longer period preceding the moment of speech; however, the context in these two examples indicates the event which the participants in the
situation expected to occur in the relatively near past or as soon as possible. Finally, the typical adverbial recently (example 3h) also unambiguously indicates near past. Therefore, the typical temporal pattern in these examples is the situation in the past immediately preceding the point of speech or the situation belonging to near past.

Moreover, it appears that the examples from the corpus which do not contain temporal adverbials also indicate immediately preceding situations or near past. For instance:

(4) a) The pressure of his foot on a wired pad under the stair-carpet has triggered the burglar alarm... (18)
b) What has been designated Industry Year has got off to a predictably silly start. (25)
c) The shrinkage of heavy industry, and the development of new forms of energy, have reduced the visible pollution of the air... (32)
d) She wonders why he has invited her into his office. (63)
e) It's not just the money, though, that has led me to this decision...(311)

All these examples carry the implication that the situation denoted by present perfect immediately precedes (4a, b, d, e) or indicates a relatively near past (4c).

The adverbials from the second group indicate periods of time starting in the past, but continuing till the moment of speech. For example:

(5) a) ... his eldest son, who dropped out of university four months ago and has not been usefully occupied since... (19)
b) Vic has never been inside the place. (28)
c) But the snow, which has been light in the past half-hour, suddenly begins to fall fast ... (100)
d) 'Haven't we met before?' he said. (110)
e) 'He's been with the company a long time.' (211)
f) 'He's been on the phone to me this morning.' (263)
g) ...it's the first accident he's ever had in twenty-five years' driving. (304)
h) I’ve read more in the last few weeks than in all the years since I left school,' he said. (356)

Adverbials like never (5b) and ever (5g) are in the English grammar books typically related to present perfect, denoting a longer time-span or the entire life of a participant, and the occurrence or non-occurrence of a situation during that period of time. The examples (5a, h) illustrate the use of since, so in all the years since I left school (5h) indicates the beginning of the time-span and its continuation to the point of speech. Another group of adverbials denotes a more or less definite period of time preceding the point of speech (5c, d, e): in the past half-hour, before, a long time. The example (5f) indicates the realization of a situation within a given period of time (this morning). The temporal pattern of this group on the one hand implies continuation from a point or a period in the past till the moment of speech and the occurrence or non-occurrence of a situation up to now; on the other, it indicates the occurrence of a situation in a specified temporal segment.

Finally, here are some examples with the present perfect progressive:

(6) a) ...like clamorous patients who have been waiting all night for the doctor’s surgery to open; (41)
b) Although she has been teaching now for some eight years, on and off, ....she always feels a twinge of anxiety at the beginning of a new term. (41)
c) All the students, even those who have been staring out of the window, react to this. (74)
d) The heads of other men present have been swiveling from side to side, like spectators in a tennis match, during this argument. (76)
e) The students who have been writing everything down now look up and smile wryly at Robyn Penrose, like victims of a successful hoax. (77)
f) A tradesman who has been ringing at the front door for several minutes gives up and goes away. (78)
g) Those who have been daydreaming or carving their initials into the desktops sit up. (78)
h) Those who have been taking notes continue to do so with even greater assiduousness. (78)
i) Robyn looks up from the copy of *North and South* from which she has been reading this passage, and surveys her audience with a cool, grey-green eyes. (80)

j) "We've been cleaning up the place — I took the opportunity to have the pin-ups taken off the walls.' (341)

As expected, these examples imply a situation lasting for some time, which is indicated by the adverbials *all night, for some eight years, during this argument* and *for several minutes* (6a, b, d, f). The examples without temporal adverbials indicate situations which started in the relatively near past (6c, e, g, h, i) or at some time in the past (6j). Their temporal pattern is continuation beginning slightly before the point of speech and lasting till the point of speech.

### 3.2. Aspectual/Pragmatic Components

As already pointed out, in addition to the temporal notions, grammar books explain the uses of the present perfect with the help of notions like relevance, result, experience; these notions are usually included into the category of aspect, and they could be illustrated by the following examples:

(7) a) ...one third of all the engineering companies in the West Midlands have closed down. (33)
b) Here and there an effort has been made at renovation, but always in deplorable taste...(98)
c) ‘You can’t explain poststructuralism to someone who hasn’t even discovered traditional humanism.’ (218)
d) I’ve been left behind by the tide of history... (311)
e) ‘What bits have you memorized, then?’ (356)
f) ‘I’ve been living in a dream. This business has woken me up. (380)

It is difficult to explain the use of the present perfect in these examples on the basis of the temporal components only, for example to explain the difference between past nonprogressive and present perfect in these contexts. Thus the examples (7) underline the validity of the situation denoted by the verb, the significance of that fact for the current discourse, in other words they have a specific pragmatic implication. For instance, (7b) and
(7e) respectively underline recent attempts to achieve something or ask about recent achievements, while the second clause in (7f) implies a cause leading to a change of state.

4. Conclusion

This discussion about the temporal and aspectual/pragmatic components of the English present perfect has once more proved the complexity of this finite verb form: the examples from the corpus have shown that both temporal and aspectual or pragmatic notions are necessary for a comprehensive explanation of the uses of the present perfect.

As for the temporal patterns, the following were typically found in the corpus: a) the past situation occurring in the immediate or near past, shortly before the point of speech, and b) a period of time in the past continuing to the present moment. In the latter case, the period of time could include the actual continuation of the situation (for example, waiting all night), or the repetition of a situation during that period or nonexistence of a situation in a given period (with the adverbial never). Moreover, that period of time could be specified by an adverbial (e.g. for eight years, since...) or could encompass the entire lifetime of a participant in the situation.

Aspectual and pragmatic notions are often necessary to distinguish present perfect from past non-progressive, because it seems that the temporal notions would not suffice for that. Actually, it appears that the essential common denominator for the uses of the present perfect is the speaker's writer's evaluation related to the validity or significance of the situation viewed from the point of speech.

References

ON DEPICTIVES, MANNER AND TRANSPARENT ADVERBS IN ENGLISH AND ROMANIAN

DARIA PROTOPOPESCU
University of Bucharest

Abstract: The paper investigates the contrast between VP-adjoined adjectives (the so-called ‘depictives’) and adverbial forms in English, which is manifest under the form of minimal pairs: John left sad vs. John left sadly. The two forms are often difficult to tell apart, in spite of what one might expect. Following Geuder (2004), the author also makes an attempt at analyzing Romanian manner and transparent adverbs as well.

1. Preliminaries.

The current paper set out to discuss the difference between two almost minimal pairs of sentence in English and Romanian where there arises a contrast between VP-adjoined adjectives (the so-called depictives) and adverbial forms.

(1)a. John, left Mary \textit{sad}_f.
   b. John left Mary \textit{sad}_j.
   c. John, left Mary \textit{sadly}_k.

In example a) \textit{sad} is a subject depictive, and the sentence has the reading where John was sad while leaving Mary. In example (1b) \textit{sad} is an object depictive and the sentence has the reading where Mary was sad while being left by John.

Geuder (2004) has shown that for German (a language with no adverbial morphology) it is difficult to tell the two forms of adjuncts apart. He shows that the two types of adjuncts are even more closely related to each other than previously thought due to the existence of what he calls a class of “transparent” adverbs. He distinguishes them from manner adverbs insofar as these adverbs share with depictives the property of denoting states and predicating of an individual.
For Romanian, the distinction is not so easy to make out since, like in German, there is little adverbial morphology. Most Romanian adverbs are derived from the masculine singular form of the corresponding adjective; therefore, the difference can be clearly captured in case of plural or feminine contexts.

(2)a. Copiii merg liniștiți la școală.
Children-THE walk calm-ADV masc.pl. to school
“The children walk to school calmly.”

b. Copiii merg liniștit la școală.
Children-THE walk calm-ADV to school
“The children walk to school calmly.”

As can be seen, in example (2a) there is agreement with the subject. Therefore, the interpretation of the sentence is that the children were calm as they were walking to school, whereas in the (2b) example there is no agreement, liniștit “calmly” clearly being an adverb and the interpretation being that the event of walking to school is performed in a calm manner. Such pairs of examples frequently arise in Romanian. This is what has probably triggered the ungrammatical use of adverbs with agreement features by some speakers in case adverbs appear as modifying other adjectives (Forăscu 2002):

(2)c.*Copii noi născuți
Children new-masc. pl. born-masc. pl.
“Newly born children”

d. *Musafiri proaspeți sosie
Guests fresh-masc. pl. arrived-masc.pl.
“Newly arrived guests”

The distinction between the examples in (1) can be rendered as follows (Geuder 2004: 132):

(3)a. leave Mary sad
leave (e,x, Mary) & sad (x) (depictive)
b. leave Mary sadly
leave (e, x, Mary) & sad (e) (adverb)

The representation of the adverb in (3b) can be taken to be the correct one for a manner adverb. However, manner adverbs are not the only case under consideration for the analysis of a distinction between depictives and adverbs. Geuder (2000: 178) is the first to label a rarely recognized class in the literature, namely that of “transparent” adverbs, which differ from manner adverbs, but resemble depictives in that they refer to a state of an individual.

To this end, the second section of my paper attempts a semantic discussion of depictives in order to prove that the event variable introduced by the main verb of a clause is needed to anchor them. This is an essential property they seem to share with adverbial constructions, i.e. they make reference to an event.

The third section discusses the existence of the class of “transparent” adverbs, which are, according to Geuder (2000: 179), more than simply predicates of events — as manner adverbs are. They denote states of their own and predicate of an individual — which is the holder of the state.

Finally, I shall look into the minimal semantic difference between a depictive and an adverbial form. I shall also investigate the means by which we can decide upon their choice, something that appears to be quite difficult in Romanian, given the lack of morphological difference between depictives and their adverbial counterparts, which in turn may give rise to confusion.

2. Depictive constructions

Depictive adjectives are traditionally treated as predicates of individuals and have to be anchored to the event variable of the clause. However, they cannot be just predicates of individuals, because individual level adjectives are in most cases excluded from depictive constructions. In the case of depictives, one can notice the involvement of the event arguments of verb and adjective. Depictives do not fit the standard picture of event predication as found with manner adverbs, since they appear in a syntactic position and receive a temporal interpretation, betraying a dependence on the event argument. Syntactically, they are always adjoined at the VP level, where we also find event adverbs.
Individual level adjectives undeniably show a tendency to enter into predication structures that only concern the individual (with unselective binders such as usually: e.g., *Cats are usually intelligent*). They are excluded from depictive constructions.

2.1. Depictives and syntax

In both English and Romanian, depictives occur invariably in postverbal position. In English they have to follow resultative adjectives and subject depictives follow object depictives (examples from Geuder 2004: 135)

(4) John kicked the door *open tired*.
   (resultative < subject depictive)

(5) Murphy hammered the coin *flat hot*.
   (resultative < object depictive)

(6) John ate the meat *raw tired*.
   (object depictive < subject depictive)

(7a) Diana […] îi privi cercetătoare.
     Diana […] them-CL-ACC looked inquisitive-FEM.sg.
     “Diana looked at them inquisitive.”
     (Ștefan Agopian — Tache de catifea: 78)

b. STUDENȚII l-au privit iscuditori.
   Students-THE him-CL-ACC -have looked inquiring-MASC.pl.
   “The students looked at him inquiring.”

c. STUDENȚII l-au privit iscuditor.
   Students-THE him-CL-ACC -have looked inquiringly.
   “The students looked at him inquiringly.”

The adjectives in (7a) and (7b) are both subject depictives, the meaning of the sentences being: (7a) *Diana looked at them and she was inquisitive* and (7b) *The students looked at him and they were inquiring*, whereas (7c) means that *The students looked at him in an inquiring manner*.

The ordering in both languages shows that subject and object depictives have to be right-adjoined. The question arises as to where exactly it is that these subject depictives are adjoined in these two languages.
Tests show that they must be attached at the VP-level.

**Pseudo-clefting**

(8)a. Ceea ce au făcut studenții a fost să-l privească îscoditori / îscoditor.
What have done students-the has been sã-subjunctive him-CL-ACC look inquiring-MASC.-pl/ inquiringly.
"What the students did was to look at him inquiring / inquiringly."

b. ?Ceea ce studenții au făcut îscoditori
What students-the have done inquiring-MASC.-pl a fost sã -l privească.
has been sã-subjunctive him-CL-ACC look.
"What the inquiring students did was to look at him."

c. Ceea ce au făcut studenții îscoditor a fost
What have done students-the inquiringly has been sã -l privească.
sã-subjunctive him-CL-ACC look.
"What the students did inquiringly was to look at him."

The fact that (8b) is quirky means that the adjective is not part of the VP, as seems to be the case with the adverb in (8c), therefore it is safe to assume that it is VP-adjoined.

**Though-movement (for English)**

(9)a. Though John left the room happy, he was not applauded.

b. ?Happy though John left the room, he was not applauded.

Therefore, depictives cannot be stranded by processes that affect VPs; they also go with the main verb under negation. If they did not, they would have been expected to attach higher at the IP-level.

(10) Bill didn’t leave angry at John.

The example in (10) can only be interpreted as *Bill wasn’t angry when he left John* and not as *Bill, being angry at John, didn’t leave*. Therefore, unlike other right-adjoined elements which are ambiguous in that they can
be interpreted inside or outside the scope of interpretation, depictives can only go with the main verb under negation.

Ernst (2002: 286) notices that manner adverbs can in principle follow depictives, although they are somewhat marginal and in need of contextual support (e.g. speaking about work in a painter’s studio):

\[(11)\] Al sits clothed *quietly*, but is often agitated when he has to be nude. Manner adverbs cannot be adjoined higher than the VP when they are on a left branch, so it is assumed that *quietly*, is also a VP-adjunct, therefore the depictive must also be a VP-adjunct.

3. Manner adverbs and transparent adverbs

In what follows, I shall take a closer look at those adverbs which contrast with depictive constructions. It appears that there is a particular lexical class of adjectives that causes the problem of minimal contrasts: adverbs that are derived from stative predicates of individuals like *sad, angry*, etc. Adjectives like *quick* that directly qualify properties of events by virtue of their underlying lexical meaning do not occur in depictive constructions. For adjectives such as *sad* and *angry*, the distinction between depictive and manner uses is usually quite sharp, because manner adverbs of this type involve a lexical shift from individual to event predication. Saying that the manner of some action is “angry” is not the same as ascribing this state to an individual in the event.

\[(12)\] — How did you manage to make them believe you were a real officer?
   — Well, I kept shouting at them all the time real *angrily*.

The second sentence in (12) contains a manner adverb *angrily*, which says that John’s shouting is marked with anger. The context however, leads one to expect that the predicate *angry* is not true of John in this situation. The assertion of the manner adverb concerns a different thing: namely the type of shouting which was angry — a true property of the event itself. The manner reading is opaque in general with respect to the property of individuals denoted by the underlying adjective.

\[(13)a.\]  
\[
\begin{align*}
  \text{(3a)} & \quad \text{Ea } e \quad \text{inteligent\u0102.} \\
  & \quad \text{She is intelligent-fern.sg.} \\
  & \quad \text{“She is intelligent.”}
\end{align*}
\]
She has solved the problem intelligently.

It is worth mentioning that Romanian prefers using adverbs derived directly from such adjectives. This could also account for the problem mentioned at the beginning of this paper, because, if so many adjectives are also used as adverbs, people may easily confuse them, yielding such ungrammatical results as the ones in examples (2c) and (2d). Mihai (1963: 210) proposes a classification of adjectives that are also used as manner adverbs.

a. Words that qualify as both adjectives and adverbs: absolut (absolute(ly)), anumne (certain), asemenea (alike), chiar (right), contrar (contrary), deosebit (special(ly)), deplin (full(y)), direct (direct(ly)), drept (right, straight), exact (exact(y)), exclusiv (exclusive(ly)), frumos (beautiful(ly)), greu (difficult / heavy), gros (thick), încet (slow(ly)), legat (tied), lung (long), mult (much), puțin (little), repede (quick(ly)), scurt (short), serios (serious(ly)), sigur (certain(ly)), strâmb (crooked), strâns (tight(ly)), tare (strong(ly) / loud(ly)), ușor (light(ly)), etc.

b. Words that function primarily as adjectives, but may occur as adverbs as well. This class is much more numerous: adânc (deep(ly)), atent (careful(ly)), automat (automatic(ally)), bucuros (happy / happily), cercetător (inquisitive(ly)), cinstit (honest(ly)), cumplit (terrible / terribly), discret (discreet(ly)), disprețuitor (scornful(ly)), dormol (slow(ly)), dureros (painful(ly)), elegant (elegant(ly)), elocvent (eloquent(ly)), iscoditor (inquiring(ly)), încrezător (confident(ly)), lacom (greedy / greedily), năpraznic (sudden(ly)), nervos (nervous(ly)), sever (severe(ly)), surprinzător (surprising(ly)), tainic (secret(ly)), etc.

The list is much more extensive and very productive and it can go up to some more 700 adjectives that can function as adverbs as well.

Ernst (2002: 117) makes the distinction in terms of “state reading” of “mental attitude adverbs”, while Geuder (2004: 178) calls them “transparent adverbs” a term that we have adopted for our analysis as well.

Ernst (2002: 67) captures the difference in entailments between (14a) and (14b).

(14) a. Though her emotions were in a turmoil, she managed to leave the room calmly.
b. Though her emotions were in a turmoil, she *calmly* had left the room.

Example (14a) shows the opaqueness of manner adverbs with respect to their adjectival base: the manner adverb *calmly* serves to pick out that manner of the event that is typically connected with calmness on the part of the agent — but not the preverbal occurrence of *calmly* from (14b). This is similar to the traditional distinction of manner versus subject-oriented reading of adverbs, where the interpretation of *calmly* in (14b) is subject-oriented that is the adverb is taken to assert the state of calm of an individual.

This difference in the readings is correlated with a difference in syntactic position. However, one cannot simply claim that manner adverbs are the ones in postverbal position, while transparent adverbs are those in preverbal position. Manner adverbs can in principle precede the verb as well (15b) if there is enough heavy material following the verb or if the verb is passive, although they preferentially go into the postverbal position.

(15) a. She walked *carefully* on the ice.
    b. She *carefully* walked on the ice.
    c. She walked *carefully*.
    d. ?She *carefully* walked.

4. Semantic difference between depictive adjectives and transparent adverbs

Ernst’s (2002: 63-66) classification into “State” and “Intentional” adverbs roughly corresponds to Geuder’s (2004: 178) “transparent” adverbs:

(16) a. **Manner:** ADV (e) = e [manifests] adj (x), with x = Agent (e)
    b. **State:** ADV (e) = e [is accompanied by] ADJ (x), with x = Agent (e)
    c. **Intentional:** ADV (e) = e [is intended with] ADJ (x), with x = Agent (e)

Ernst (2002: 63-66)

The problem with Ernst’s analysis is that he does not assume a semantic difference between depictives and those adverbial forms he subsumes
under “state” in (16b); he explicitly states (Ernst 2002:67) that he considers depictives to have the same representation. However, since depictives and transparent adverbs cannot be used interchangeably there is a serious shortcoming.

The existence of a meaning difference between depictives and transparent adverbs can be easily established considering minimal pairs in which only one of them is permitted. The fact that in certain cases the depictive is not allowed prompts us to the conclusion that there must be an interplay between the meaning of the verb and the adjective type which decides on the acceptability of depictive constructions. To this end, consider the minimal pairs with stage-level adjectives below:

(17) a. He left angry. (Geuder’s 2004 examples under 43:148)
    b. He read the review of this book {‘angry / ok angrily}

(18) a. S- a întors de la ședință
    She-refl-ACC- has returned from meeting
    foarte mândră.
    very proud-fem.-sg.
    “She returned from the meeting very proud.”

    b. Ne-a arătat pozele mândră / ok cu mândrie.
    us-has shown pictures-THE proud-fem.sg. / with pride
    “She showed us the pictures {’proud / ok proudly)”

The verbs leave and return in (17, 18a) seem to be well-suited for depictive adjuncts; they have a presentational effect, namely a quality of the subject becomes visible at a certain point. There is no further interaction between the state and the event. In the (17, 18b) cases, it is easy for one to assume that there is some kind of connection between the reading of the review and the anger of the reader, or the showing of the pictures and the pride of the agent doing that. The fact that in (18b) Romanian prefers the PP indicating the manner in which the showing occurred is indicative of the fact that it is this kind of inference (Geuder 2004:148) that makes depictives unacceptable in these contexts.
So far, a safe conclusion would be that the context favouring these transparent adverbs is that given by the emotional state of the event, and cases which suggest that the action is brought about by the emotional state:

(19) a. I angrily forwarded the letter to my solicitor.

b. Am deschis înfometat / cu înfometare frigiderul.  
   have-1sg. opened hungry / with hunger fridge-the.
   I opened the fridge hungrily / with hunger.

Another difference between depictives and transparent adverbs is the fact that depictives can be predicated of both subject and object, whereas transparent adverbs can only be predicated of the agent, as in example (1c). This difference can be tracked back to that part in their semantics that distinguishes them: the presence of a dependency relation between state and event.

5. Conclusions

To sum up, both transparent adverbs and depictives are subject to restrictions that relate to their interpretation. The difference is that the adverbs seem to have access to an argument via thematic role information, while depictives select the target of predication not according to information from event concepts, but rather according to functional conditions.

There is a distinction to be made between manner adverbs and transparent ones to the extent that the former are adjuncts which are predicates of events, while the latter are adjuncts which denote states of their own. In English the distinction is between adjuncts that are closely related to the event (whether they denote separate states or just manners) and adjuncts without any type of event-dependence (depictives).

Romanian is more ambiguous in this respect, since it is similar to German to a certain extent, as it exhibits poor morphological distinction between its depictives and transparent adverbs. Therefore, there is no real need to impose the categorization of adjuncts found in English due to the lack of support by morphological distinctions. Transparent adverbs and depictives may be in principle members of a single, undifferentiated semantic category.
Literary texts

References


The paper focuses on the interaction between two domains: a source domain of concrete, physical contact with machines and tools and the target domain of economic concepts. The qualitative corpus-based analysis of such metaphorical instantiations is meant to reveal the underlying benefits of this conceptualization strategy.

Metaphors are not restricted to poetry; they run through all uses of language. Metaphor is also not linguistic as opposed to conceptual, if that means that language is merely decorative or that it does not express cognitive content. Metaphorical interpretations can not only express cognitive content, including novel properties, that would not be expressed literally; they also have cognitive significance — that bears on action as well as knowledge — by way of their nature.

These are, in a nutshell, the theses the present paper borrows from the contemporary theory of conceptual metaphor. I also share Lakoff and Johnson's belief (1980) in the existence and importance of large-scale systematic networks to which metaphors belong, that uphold their interpretation. One such systematic network is to be delineated in what follows; it underlies the metaphorical correspondences that are launched by recourse to the conceptual field of machines and tools.

I take Lakoff and Johnson's account one step further and look at the relation between context and metaphorical networks. For Lakoff and his collaborators the real metaphors are cross-domain mappings; the realizations of conceptual metaphors in language are viewed as linguistic expressions, that is, linguistic types. In my paper, I follow Stern (2000: 179) and take metaphors never to be expression types per se, but interpretations (or uses) of expression tokens in contexts, although those interpretations may depend on the networks or mappings, to which the token belongs. This context-awareness spares us the peril of providing Lakoff’s example of the non-metaphorical / literal sentence ‘The balloon went up’; in an adequate
context, one could summarize the impact of a stock market run on a vulnerable economy with the same sentence, proving that, contrary to Lakoff et al.’s belief, there are no expression types per se that are either metaphorical or non-metaphorical.

This insistence on contextual dependency for the identification of metaphor will become manifest in the presentation of metaphorical linguistic expressions in full sentences or even larger pieces of discourse. The area of research is restricted to economic discourse and the corpus from which the samples have been extracted is an extensive business database, *Business Source Complete*. It contains full text for more than 8,500 scholarly business journals and other sources, including full text for more than 1,100 peer-reviewed business publications. Its reliability is also enhanced by its being daily updated.

Corpustics proves particularly useful in providing empirical evidence on which are the target domains informed by the source domain of machines and tools, and on how conventional or creative particular uses of language are. The perspective of a corpus of language use in an ESP domain is valuable, since it is easier to consult samples of language in a functional domain such as the economic discourse than in language in general. The corpus approach also fits better with the need for authenticity.

Machinistic views arose very early in the history of human thought; they developed out of the same effort to understand the unfamiliar via the familiar which characterizes metaphors. What people hang on in machinistic metaphors is their experience of devising, assembling and using objects and tools. In time, machinistic metaphors have encompassed a whole series of technological inventions and innovations, ranging from the wheel, chain or ladder to complex mechanisms, such as clocks and modern vehicles. This technological record has been transposed in metaphors pertaining to different discourse types, out of which we will single out the economics-centred ones.

Generic concepts in the semantic field of technology are mapped onto a country’s economy or some parts of it; referentially, the metaphor has the potential to reify the target entity (economy) and to carry over presuppositions referring to the precision, functionality and maneuverability of the economic system into the target domain. However, the agentivity of the human operators of the machine or mechanism is at once both hidden (since once the operational parameters have been set, a machine can go on function-
ing) and available for foregrounding (since behind every machine there is, at least initially, a human agent). Rhetorically then, the metaphor ECONOMY IS A MACHINE has its own pitfalls and manipulative potential.

— ‘Academics have analyzed government policies on entrepreneurship, but they have tended to share the same underlying beliefs in the function of entrepreneurs within the economic machine.’
— ‘A well-oiled economic machine.’
— ‘High-tech Crimes and the American Economic Machine.’
— ‘The Japanese economic machine has evolved into a leading world economy based on per capita income since 1976.’
— ‘Today Japan controls the most sophisticated and successful political-economic machine in the United States.’
— ‘The Exchange Rate Mechanism requires member Governments to keep the exchange rates of their currencies stable or strong.’
— ‘Adopting a Soviet-style centrally planned system after World War II, Hungary’s first attempt at comprehensive economic reform began in 1968 with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism.’
— ‘The competitive mechanism fails in economies with non-convex technologies.’
— ‘The search for alternative mechanisms in economies with increasing returns was developed and resulted in the principle of marginal cost pricing.’
— ‘Nominal wage contracts and the monetary transmission mechanism.’
— ‘We find a stronger monetary propagation mechanism under a synchronized setting as compared to a staggered setting.’

The metaphor ECONOMY IS A MACHINE also highlights another feature which is frequently associated with machines and economic developments alike, that of motion. The correspondence is so pervasive in economic discourse, that it surfaces in the very names of scholarly business publications, e.g., Review of Economic Dynamics and Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, to name just two. Samples of metaphorical expressions licensed by the motion schema frequently resort to the prototypical motion image suggested by wheels:

— ‘To the untrained eye, the wheels grind slowly. However, there is a good deal that can and should be done to improve market share.’
— ‘FDA reform: The wheels grind ever so slowly.’
— ‘They should have set the public relation wheels in motion.’
— ‘The wheels in motion towards a free enterprise system in Cuba.’
The focus on motion is complemented by a focus on human agents by means of verbal phrases such as *keep*/*set*/*get*/*put in motion* and *grease/*oil the wheels*:

— ‘It emphasizes on the evaluation of reward and recognition of veteran professionals who *keep* the company’s *wheels in motion*.’
— ‘Internet Firms *Grease Wheels of Commerce With Their IPO Shares.*’
— ‘Bayerische Motoren Werke AG *got* its marketing *wheels in motion* with a national campaign including print outdoor.’
— ‘Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan *set the wheels in motion* for a dollar devaluation in November 2004.’
— ‘*Putting telecommunications wheels in motion.*’
— ‘How MICEX *oils the wheels* of the Russian securities boom.’
— ‘The National Bank is also keeping its monopoly of hard currency transactions. There will be no interbank or money market to *oil the wheels of the new banking system.*’
— ‘Capitol Hill *wheels grind on* but financial modernization intricately intertwined in *sprockets.*’

Distraction of attention away from human agents is marked by replacing them with generic, inanimate nominal phrases (*inflation, oil, evaluations*) in:

‘*Inflation greases the economy’s wheels* by allowing firms in distress to escape slowly from a commitment to pay high wages so that the economy avoids a large employment cost.’

‘*Oil Fuels Economy.*’

‘*Evaluations oil the wheels of the industry*’

Another basic early tool that is extensively used in metaphorical economic discourse is *the chain*. That it happens so is not a surprise, if one associates it with the pre-conceptual link kinesthetic image schema. The connections between the links in a chain can be anything from contractual obligations, commonality of purposes, regional affiliation to hierarchical order.

— ‘5 people I would hire to run my supply *chain.*’
— ‘Another reader wonders whether it would be appropriate to bypass the *chain of command* and talk to their company’s CEO about an incompetent manager.’
— ‘According to Sharon Daniels, CEO of international training and consulting firm AchieveGlobal Ltd., managing up is the ability to communicate up the chain of command.’
— ‘Co-op Travel chain of shops offers a 5 per cent discount on its summer travel packages keeping in mind this predicament of the parents.’
— ‘Norwich Union PLC is set to make up to 20 marketers redundant after closing its high street chain of shops.’
— The estate agents have been the loose link in the chain from a regulatory perspective in the house buying process.
— ‘Greening of product chains has come up as an important means to systematically improve the environmental performance of products.’
— ‘Corporate governance is often regarded as a weak link in Asia’s company performance.’
— ‘A case can be made for identifying contractors, vendors and suppliers as potential weak links.’
— ‘Supplier diversity: A missing link in human resource development.’

The image of the ladder is metaphorically mapped onto the ascension to higher positions in a company, fitting into the metaphorical pattern CAREER IS AN UPWARD JOURNEY:
— ‘Climbing the corporate ladder.’
— ‘Speak up, get noticed, climb the ladder!’

Other tools that are, we assume, close to the prototypical centre of their category, are frequently mentioned by virtue of their experiential closeness: the hammer and nails for the decisiveness and strength of the hammering activity, clocks for the precision and exactness of the mechanism, and key for the crucial role it plays in the activity (opening doors).

— ‘Hammer down your costs.’
— ‘Watching Capitol Hill efforts to hammer out a financial services deregulation bill is like watching a Marx Brothers movie.’
— ‘Tactics to nail down that price.’
— ‘Thomson Scientific Nails Down $7.2 Million Contract.’
— ‘When to Sell and Nail Down Your Profits—While You Still Have Them.’
— ‘Like Clockwork: The Swiss Health Insurance System.’
— ‘Making the risk process run like clockwork.’
— ‘Growing cadre of consultants and managers claim that the key to creating a globally, competitive work force in the 1990’s is empowerment.’
— ‘Replacing key staff members can take a serious toll on your business. Instead of switching employees like cogs, study and nurture their skills.’
A rather less prototypical device, the siphon, is metonymically transferred into the verb to siphon off and then metaphorically applied to money management, since MONEY is frequently conceptualized as a LIQUID:

— ‘States Siphon Off Bigger Share Of Tobacco-Settlement Money.’
— ‘New government siphons off bad loans.’
— ‘The federal authorities may have missed an opportunity to stop Frankel early on in his alleged scheme to siphon off assets from struggling insurance companies.’

Another favourite conceptual transfer occurs in the adoption of the terms lever, leverage, to lever up in the business jargon:

‘Moreover, a chart that shows simulated effects of policy levers to lessen the insider threat is presented.’
‘Using the described approach, CEOs and employees focus their attention on the relevant control levers and use their time for interaction and learning rather than control.’
‘Taiwan wants to keep tight control over the expansion of its $3 billion in indirect trade with China, to use as a bargaining lever in future political relations.’
‘In addition, the level of financial leverage is not random.’
‘Universal Owners should recognise both their power and their responsibilities, and then leverage their investment strategies to catalyse ESG improvements in their investee companies.’
‘Clear Channel Communications Inc. filed an updated proxy statement as part of the radio broadcaster's effort to win approval for its leveraged buy-out.’
‘Firms lever up as opportunities improve to take advantage of tax shields.’

Professional jargon phrases in the field of economics frequently embrace the all-inclusive vehicle terms tool and instrument:

— ‘Personal selling and personal sales professionals use a number of tools to develop customer relationships.’
— ‘These marketing tools may prove useful to manage the relationship with other stakeholders.’
— ‘He likewise suggests the need for agents to have the necessary sales and marketing tools for their work to progress.’
— ‘The management tools usable for monitoring building O&M contracts were reviewed.’
— ‘The Tools and Techniques of Change Management.’
— ‘The authors signal a growing interest in using CoPs as management instruments and in governance.’
— ‘The article starts with a brief description of exchange rate risk and the most relevant risk management instruments.’
— ‘Use of economic instruments in the German renewable electricity policy.’

The pieces and components of machines and machineries are subjected to metaphorical mappings; a notable exception is the term cog, metonymically standing sometimes for the whole machine, in situations such as:

— ‘The Cogs of E-commerce.’
— ‘A truly working proposition will oil the cogs of business.’
— ‘Managing Director Paul Hearnden said that first time buyers keep the cogs of the housing market turning.’
— ‘For example, the liquidity adjustment problem has been largely ignored in the academic and financial literature. That’s odd, because it’s the very lubricant that greases the cogs of finance.’
— ‘Though labour and capital are both cogs in the output machinery, what produces a thriving economy is how efficiently the former uses the latter.’

The human capital is often equated to inanimate machinery components, that is cogs:

— ‘Rather than letting them feel like a dispensable cog in management’s machine, make the tie-in between good, customer service and repeat business clear.’
— ‘Since the time of the Industrial Revolution, managers have tended to view people as tools, while organizations have considered workers as cogs in a machine.’
— ‘Instead of switching employees like cogs, study and nurture their skills.’

The list of metaphorical patterns could not be complete without the presence, under the vehicle terms label, of advanced and modern technology items. The range of vehicles reunites trains, cars, ships, planes; their perceptually salient gestalt images — structured wholes — may be the reason for their selection.

The train analogy allows for derailing and tracks to be carried over into the domain of economics:

— ‘Four wholesalers bullish despite derailed mergers.’
— ‘Israel’s Economy Is Back on Track.’
The automobile analogy conceptually supports gear changes, as in:

— ‘Tif moves up a gear to maximise business value.’
— ‘Europe poised to move up a gear.’
— ‘Market begins to move up a gear.’
— ‘BMW in advertising high gear.’
— ‘The political gears are finally beginning to grind on China trade.’
— ‘Digital marketing steps up a gear.’

It is also worth noticing that one maintains in sharp focus whatever has direct connection to speed and motion - two cherished concepts in the economic discourse that, as shown before, lend themselves to metaphorical illustrations. Thus, moving up a gear, speeding up and using the brakes are common metaphorical phrases:

— ‘U.S. federal regulators are not moving with enough speed to put the brakes on nontraditional home loans.’
— ‘A Housing Slowdown Can Put the Brakes on a Job Sector but Open Other Opportunities.’
— ‘Following a quiet summer north of the border, the market for warehousing has started to pick up speed with local companies looking for distribution facilities.’
— ‘China: A Case Of Faulty Brakes.’
— ‘Transport index shows economy hitting the brakes.’

In a similar way, the vehicle hinted at in the examples below is either a ship or a plane:

— ‘Johnson Controls Steers Away from Autos.’
— ‘We think the auto industry is about to take off.’

Last, but not least, a series of verbal metaphorical mappings owes a lot to specific human activities which involve specific skills and tools: welding, forging, sharpening, etc. They implicitly convey the artificiality of the product hereby obtained and of the hard labour aspect of the process:

— ‘Former RealWorld president Kurt Mueffelman is planning a roll up of value-added resellers that can weld together an organization in the United States by the middle of 2000.’
— ‘Embedded Linux startup forges ahead with new CEO.’
— ‘Pantone, Clariant Forge Partnership.’
— ‘Japan revs up drive to forge free-trade agreements.’
— ‘Lead firms sharpen up their act.’
— ‘The insurance industry needs to sharpen its recruiting and retaining skills’.
— ‘Furthermore, IFF aims to sharpen its focus and accountability across the organization and speed its growth.’

Instead of allowing its context-dependence to be an obstacle to its semantic candidacy, I assumed that the very key to a satisfactory semantic analysis is to embrace the metaphor’s context-dependence. Within the cognitive semantic framework, the analysis has revealed some of the basic metaphorical patterns in which the conceptual domain of machines and tools has offered the input material. The remarks on the metaphors motivating the corpus metaphorical expressions point to the considerable applicability of the source domain. If one tries to explain this applicability, it can be suggested that the clue may lie in the immediate experiential availability of the domain of tools and machines, their indispensability and perceptual salience. This observation strengthens previous conclusions regarding the promotion of concrete conceptual domains to the status of source domains in conceptual metaphors, provided that they are of utmost concern and interest to the speakers of a language.

I may therefore hope that the interaction between corpus linguistics and cognitive linguistics has provided a valuable insight into the workings of metaphors.

References
Business Source Complete {online}. Available at http://www.ebsco.com [2007, April 27]
Abstract: After WWII, an intense activity of translation started in Romania and a great number of masterpieces of world literature - among which Shakespeare’s sonnets and all of his plays - came to be rendered into Romanian. The paper comments upon several translations of “Hamlet”, probably Shakespeare’s play most translated into the language, pointing out several problems caused by certain peculiarities typical of each culture (concerning religion, mediaeval theatre, terms of address, hunting, folklore, etc.) and discussing the solutions found.

Introduction

Any text may contain terms that are culturally marked — terms that refer to customs, beliefs, food, clothing, money, characters in well-known (fairy-)stories, etc. A translator should be able to correlate the rules of usage of one culture with those of another culture.

Commenting on Malinowki’s work, Hatim and Mason (1990: 36–37) point out that in order to make the results of his studies known to the English public, the anthropologist translated Melanesian texts into English, and provided commentaries on the translation, in an attempt to bridge the gap between the two cultures. He was aware that he had to “situalionalise the text” and that the cultural context was crucial in the interpretation of the message, taking in a variety of factors ranging from the ritualistic (which assumes great importance in traditional societies), to the most practical aspects of day-to-day existence (Hatim, Mason 1990: 37). This was to be called later ‘domestication’ by Venuti (1995: 19–21), who believes that many translations are fundamentally ethnocentric (1995: 93): the source language text is altered in the translation process, in order to fit the level of understanding of the target culture readers. The translator must apply a ‘culture filter’ (House 1997: 114), which sometimes may bring about a change of the text. When this is not done, the text may prove difficult to understand. I shall give two examples, taken from Hamlet, to support this last statement:
(1) (...) or else shall ‘a suffer not thinking on, with the **hobby-horse**, whose epitaph is ‘For O, for O, the **hobby-horse** is forgot’ (III, 2, 127 — 130)

The translated text, which speaks about a wooden horse, is meaningless to the Romanian reader, as none of the translators make any significant change in it (the hobby-horse was a figure in the country dances during the May games, no longer popular):

*Câci altminteri l-așteaptă soarta calului de lemn* ['the fate of the wooden horse'], al cărui epitaf e: „Saltă, saltă, căluș de lemn, ['little wooden horse'] uitat de toată lumea” (Streinu)

Altminteri, o să aibă parte de uitarea tuturora, la fel cu calul de lemn ['wooden horse'], care poartă epitaful: Vai! Vai! Uitat e bietul călușel! ['little wooden horse'] (Dumitriu, 1955, 1959)

Banuș-Calin (1948) only add a supplementary element, an explanation suggesting that the ‘hobby horse’ is some toy or character in a story or fairy-tale:

(…) căci altfel va cadea în uitare, asemenea căluțului de lemn din **poveste** ['like the wooden horse in the tale'], pe mormântul cărui stă scris ‘Dar vai, dar vai, călușul de lemn e uitat’

(2) Bring me to him. **Hide fox**, and all after. (IV, 2, 30)

Duce-mă-ți la el. *La vizuină vulpe* și toți după ea. (Streinu)

Duceți-mă la el. *Ascunde-te, vulpe*, și hai cu toții după tine. (Banuș-Călin)

Readers have no idea that ‘hide, fox’ is a children’s game, a kind of hide-and-seek, and can see absolutely no connection between a fox and Hamlet’s attempt to hide Polonius’ body; they may simply interpret *vulpe* ['fox'] as an appellative for Polonius (smarter ones might make a connection between Polonius’ position at the court of King Claudius and a fox’s deceitful nature).

As Gutt (2000: 238) points out, „[...] language differences are only one of the barriers that stand in the way of communication across languages; the other, and sometimes more formidable, barrier is that of differences in contextual background knowledge“.
In what follows I shall mainly present several instances of ethnocentrism found in five post-WWII translations of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*, commenting briefly upon the translator’s interventions in the text. The translation of some of the lines may also have been influenced by the ideology dominant at the time.

The translations examined are the following: Banuș-Călin (1949), Dumitriu (1955, 1959), Leçișchi-Duțescu (1964), Streinu (1965).

2. Instances of ethnocentrism

2.1. Terms of address: *My lord, sir*

When addressing Hamlet, the characters in the play often use the formal, polite noun phrase *my lord* or variations of it, containing also a modifier: *my honour’d lord, my most dear lord, sweet lord*. *My lord* may become *milord* in the Romanian versions or *lord Hamlet* or simply (and totally inappropriately) *Hamlet*, or it is translated as *stăpâne* [‘master’] (a rather generic term, for someone who has property and employees or people who serve or work for him, but does not necessarily refer to a nobleman), *alteță* [‘your highness’] or *prinț* [‘prince’], which are correct equivalents, since Hamlet is a prince. Quite often, *my lord* is translated as *măria-ta* or *doamne*, the vocative of *domn*; both forms of address were commonly used in Romanian to address the rulers or voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia (before the 20th century):

- **e.g.**  
  H. Lady, shall I lie in your lap?  

  — Domniță, mã pot culca în poala ta?  
  — Nu *măria-ta*. (Dum. 1955, 1959)

  Hor. What does this mean, *my lord*?  
  — *Măria-ta*, ce-nseamnă asta? (Dum, 1955, 1959)

  Hor. Here, *sweet lord*, at your service. (III, 2, 51)  
  — Aici sunt, *doamne bun*, să te slujesc. (Lev.-D)

*Măria-ta* is also frequently employed as an equivalent of *sir*:

- **e.g.**  
  1 Play. I hope we have reform’d that indifferently with us, *sir*. (III, 2, 35)
Nădăjduiesc, măria-ta, că noi am îndreptat oarecum cusurul ăsta. (Dum. 1959)

Trag nădejde, măria ta, că, în ce ne privește, am îndreptat cât de cât acest cusur. (Lev.-D)

Other words that make reference to Hamlet are rendered into Romanian as măria-ta in its genitive / dative form:

e.g.,   All. Our duty to your honour.
       H. Your loves, as mine to you; farewell. (I, 2, 253 — 254)

Supuși măriei-tale.
Din inimă, prieteni, bun rămâs. (Dum. 1955, 1959)

Hor. Hail to your lordship. (I, 2, 159)
Mă-nchin măriei tale. (Dum. 1955, 1959)

Hor. Here, sweet lord, at your service. (III, 2, 51)
Aici sunt, stăpâne drag, la porunca măriei tale. (Dum. 1955).

On occasion, however, the terms of address remain untranslated, probably for emphasis or in order to show deference, or, perhaps, to suggest irony:

Ham. Lady, shall I lie in your lap?
Oph. No, my lord. (III, 2, 108 — 109)

Să stau, my lady, în poala dumitale?
A, nu, my lord. (Streinu)

Pol. The actors are come hither, my lord. (II, 2, 419)
Actorii au venit, my lord. (Streinu)

Ham. Come on, sir.
Laer. Come, my lord. (V, 2, 272)

Hai, sir.
Hai, prințe! (Lev.-D.)

Come, sir, to draw toward an end with you. (III, 4, 216; Hamlet addresses Polonius’s corpse)

Hai, sir, să mântui treaba și cu tine. (Lev.-D.)
2.2. Social class

- There is no ancient gentleman but gard’ners, ditchers, and grave makers. (V, 1, 28 — 30)

For the communist ideology, a line like this, which stated the superiority of the hard-working people over other social classes, was a goldmine to be exploited. Dimitriu (1955, 1959) translates ditchers as „muncitorul cu sapa“ [„the worker that uses a spade“], i.e. a specific term is replaced by a more general word, which at the time had highly positive political connotations:

Nici nu-i pe lume nobil mai de soi decât grădinarul, muncitorul cu sapa și groparul.

Gentleman, a dated general term for a man of wealth and social position, is translated by Levițchi-Duțescu with the help of a marked term, boier [„boyar“], defined by a dictionary (DLRC 1955) as „a representative of the exploiting classes“ who owned land and held a high position in the state, a person of noble descent:

Boieri de neam vechi sunt numai grădinarii, săpătorii de pământ și groparii.

Ideology, I think, also influences the translation of the following lines:

- Let me be no assistant for a state,
  But keep a farm and carters. (II, 2, 165-166)

The translators avoid giving a word by word translation of keep a farm, since at the time the word fermă [„farm“] had suffered a narrowing of meaning, and was defined by dictionaries as „a socialist agricultural unit, which is part of an agricultural cooperative, has permanent employees, and usually grows animals“ (DLRM 1955, my transl.). Consequently, Dumitriu makes use of a shift and replaces the collocation by a single, „positively“ marked noun, plugar, a „ploughman, land-worker“, a word that was also employed as a synonym for „peasant“:

Mâ las de sfetnicie și mâ fac
Plugar și căruțaș (Dum, 1955, 1959)
2.3. Greeting and parting terms

- A greeting like salut (a kind of „hi“) is used mainly by males in informal settings, or jocularly by females, and suggests a relation of equality or friendship; therefore it is inappropriate when addressing someone in a higher position or when associated with a term of address used for nobility:

  Hor. **Hail** to your lordship. (I, 2, 159)
  *Salut*, milord. (Lev.- D.)

  We have here a mixing of registers: Horatio and Hamlet may have been colleagues in Wittenberg, but throughout the play, the attitude of the former towards Hamlet is one of reverence, which is hardly suggested by salut.

- The leave-taking interjection **farewell** has several equivalents in Romanian: rânâmas bun, rânâi cu bine, cu bine, adio, drum bun. One of the translations uses the phrase mergi sănătos [‘go in good health’]; the phrase is still employed mainly in the country-side:

  Ham. Your loves, as mine to you; **farewell**. (I, 2, 254)
  - Dragostea mea vă însoţeşte. *Mergeti sănătosi*. (Ban.-C.)

2.4. Religious customs

The translations analysed make frequent references to Romanian religious customs.

- The stage directions given in act V, scene 1 (between lines 211-215) differ in the various editions of the play. I have three variants:
  — *Enter the King, Queen, Laertes, in funeral procession after the coffin, with Priest and Lords attendant*. (Peter Alexander (ed.), 1966 (1951));
  — *Enter bearers with a coffin, the King and Queen, Laertes and other Lords, a Priest following*. (G. B. Harrison (ed.), 1966 (1937);
  — *Enter Priests, & c., in procession; the Corpse of Ophelia, Laertes and Mourners following; King, Queen, their Trains, etc.* (Jules Derocquigny, 1936; an English edition printed in Romania, 1978; in this last volume, it is stated that the plays are presented as they appear in the *First Folio* of 1623).

  Four of the Romanian translations examined follow the third variant. *Mourners* is translated as „bocitoare“ by Dumitriu („Într-o procesiune de
preoți, trupul Ofeliei purtat în sicriu deschis, urmat de Laertes și de bocitoare", 1955, „Întră un alai de preoți. Trupul Ofeliei purtat în sicriu deschis urmat de Laertes și de bocitoare“, 1959). Bocitoare is a woman, usually a widow, who wails at funerals; she is either a relative of the dead person or is specially paid by the relatives in order to cry and lament over the dead body in a loud voice. This is customary mainly (but not only!) in the countryside, especially in the Southern and Eastern parts of Romania. Notice also the explanations that Dumitriu gives about „the corpse of Ophelia“: he makes it clear that Ophelia was taken to her grave in an open, not sealed coffin (although the word itself does not appear in the original; I do not know what & c stands for — “and company?”); this again is typical of these regions.

We should profane the service of the dead
To sing sage requiem and such rest to her
As to peace-parted souls. (V, 1, 230-231)

Requiem is a piece of music, a song sung at burials, or the mass for a person who has recently died. Banuș-Călin translate it as „veșnică pomenire“ ['memory eternal']: „Am pângări slujba înmormântare dacă i-am cântat o veșnică pomenire, așa cum cântăm sufletelor ce mor împăcat“. Veșnică pomenire is a song that ends the service for the dead or for the commemoration of the dead). Other translators use prohod for „requiem“:

Ar fi să pângărim sfânta slujbă
A morților, de i-am cântat prohodul
Ca celor dușii cu sufletu-mpăcat (Dum. 1955)

E slujba morților și-am pângărit-o,
Cântându-i ei prohodul ce se cântă
Doar celor morții cu sufletu-mpăcat. (Dum. 1959)

Prohod is the word for the whole burial service; the collocation a cânta prohodul is unacceptable, since the service for the dead does not consist of songs only, from the beginning to the end (the prohod is officiated or celebrated - 'se slujește').
• Cut off even in the blossoms of my sin

*Unhouseled*, disappointed, *unaneled*.

No reckoning made, but sent to my account. (I, 5, 76 — 78)

The meaning of the word *unhouseled*, „without being given the Eucharist“, is explained in some of the Romanian translations through expansion, with the help of two words that refer to the two connected steps of this religious ritual: *nespovedit* ['without having confessed one’s sins'] and *neîmpârtășit* ['without receiving the Eucharist']:

Am fost smuls din vieatǎ atunci când înfloresc păcatele, *nespovedit*, *neuns*, *neîmpârtășit*... (Ban.-C.)

M-am stins *nespovedit*, *ne-mpârtǎşit*,
Cu ordia de nedesǎvǎrşirii
 Şi de pǎcate-n pǎrg. (Lev-D)

Dumitriu (1955, 1959) leaves out any reference to the Eucharist:

 Şi m-a trimis *neuns*, *nespovedit*,
Nepregătit, la marea judecatǎ.

*Unaneled* („not anointed“, „without the extreme unction“) remains either untranslated (Leviţchi-Duţescu) or, as seen above (Banuş-Călin, Dumitriu), it is rendered with the help of a rather neutral word: *neuns* („unoiled“), which may have several meanings (not necessarily religious). Romanian has a special word for this religious ritual, borrowed from Slavic: *nemiruit* (a semantically negative adjective, derived from the participle of the verb *a mirui*), which none of the translators makes use of.

Streiun avoids the translation of the words that refer to the Eucharist and to anointing, and employs just one term, *maslu* (another religious word of Slavic origin); this is a religious service officiated for a seriously ill person, in the hope that it will be of help for his/her recovery:

Curmat în floarea negrului păcat,
Nici *maslu* zis şi, mai mult, nici grijit,
Zvǎrlit bicisnic marelui judeţ.

• I would have such a fellow whipped for o’erdoing Termagant; *it out-herods Herod*. (III, 2, 15-17)
There are several known Herods, all connected to biblical events (the Herod who had the boys who were two years old and under killed in Bethlehem, in the hope that Jesus would be killed too; his son, tetrarch of Galilee, who beheaded John the Baptist and took part in the trial of Jesus; his grandson, king of Judea, who killed James, and arrested Peter). To probably avoid the religious reference, Banuș-Călin replace Herod with Caesar („Cezar”), which may be taken both as a proper name and as a common noun (the title given to Roman emperors):

Pe așa unul l-aș bici pentru aerele lui înfumurate; asta înseamnă să fi i mai Cezar decât Cezarul.

All the other translators use the Romanian Irod for Herod. Dumitriu (1955, 1959), however, makes an explanatory addition: „pe unul ca ăsta, ce se crede mai grozav decât Termagant și mai Irod decât Irod-Împărat [‘Herod, the Emperor’], aș pune să-l bată cu biciul”. (It is interesting that neither he nor the others felt the need to explain who Termagant was — a violent character in morality plays, unknown to Romanians, on whom the relevance of the text in which the name appears is thus lost).

2.5. Beliefs

No fairy takes, nor witch hath power to charm
So hallowed and so gracious is that time. (I, 1, 163)

The Romanian for fairy is „zână“ (a good character), and for witch - „vrăjitoare“ (most often a bad character). Banuș-Călin and Streinu translate the latter as iele, a word also employed by Dumitriu (1955, 1959) for the former:

Nici farmece de zână, nici vrăji de iele, atât e ceasul de sfânt și plin de har.
(Banuș-Călin)

Nici vrăji nu leagă, nici nu umblă iele;
Sînt nopți de sfântă rouă și iertare. (Streinu)

Nici iele nu pândesc, nici vrăjitoare;
Atât de plin de har și sfânt e ceasul. (Dumitriu, 1955, 1959)
In the Romanian mythology, the *iele* are supernatural female beings, who are beautiful, very seductive, have long hair and magical powers; they make their appearance mostly at night, in the moonlight, and usually dance naked or covered by some transparent veils; they are usually good, unless offended or seen while dancing. (*iele* is not a name proper, but the pronunciation of the third person, plural, feminine, of the personal pronoun *ele* [jele] ("they"); around the country, they are known under a fairly great number of other names).

Leviţchi-Duţescu use just one word for both *fairy* and *witch*: „hârcă“.

In Romanian fairy tales, a „hârcă“ is an old, ugly, bad woman, with supernatural powers:

Și nu fac hârcele solomonii. —
Atât de sfânt și milostiv e ceasul. (Lev.-D)

2.6. Popular drama

Ham. *A king of shreds and patches*. (III, 4, 102)

What Hamlet means to say with these words is that Claudius is a fake, a worthless king. This is translated into French by Jules Derocquigny „*un paillasse de roi*“, i.e. a clown; the word is derived in French from the Italian *Pagliaccio*, a character of the Italian popular theatre.

Three of the Romanian translations are almost literal: „Un rege făcut din sdrenţe şi petice“ (Banuş-Călin); „Un rege din făşii şi zdrenţe“ (Leviţchi-Duţescu); „Un rege slut, de petice“ (Streinu). This might make sense, in a way, to people of my generation: as children, after WWII, we would make puppets out of rags and scraps of cloth.

Dumitriu suggests Claudius’ lack of genuineness by making reference to a Romanian folk drama about the birth of Jesus, known by the name of *Vicleim* (a corruption of Bethlehem) in Wallachia. This used to be played in the country side, at Christmas time, by lads dressed up, according to their imagination, as kings (the magi) and as Herod (the latter confessing in the end that he was powerless in the face of Jesus):

*Un rege de Vicleim*, în petice şi zdrenţe (1955) [‘a Vicleim type of king’]

Un rege peticit, *de Vicleim* (1959)
2.7. Artefacts

- **Cockle hat, sandal**

Oph. How should I your true love know
From another one?
By his **cockle hat** and staff
And his **sandal shoon**. (IV, 5, 23 — 26)

Footnotes or endnotes to some of the editions of the play tell us that pilgrims who had visited the shrine of St. James of Compostella wore a cockle shell in their hats (Harrison 1966:177) and that *shoon* is an old plural for *shoe*.

In two of the five translations, *cockle shell* is given the correspondent *scoici* ['shells'] or *melc* ['snail', an animal that also has a shell on its back]; in Romania, however, nobody in their right mind would adorn their hats in this way and this association of words is probably simply interpreted as pointing further to Ophelia’s utter madness; notice also the use of the word *șapcă* (a peaked cap, worn by the workers or the military) for *hat*:

Fiind cu alții, care-i semnul
Iubitului tău drag?
El poarta-*un melc la pălărie*,
Sandale și toiag. (Streinu)

*Cum pot eu să-l recunosc*
*Pe iubitul dumitale?*
*După șapca lui cu scoici*
*După cărjă și sandale?* (Lev-D)

Dumitriu (1955) offers another solution, which would make more sense to the Romanian readers:

*Cine-i vieții tale drag*
*Ți-l ghicesc după toiag,*
*După cușma-i cu mărgele*
*Și-încălțarea de opincele.* (Dum.55)

*Cușmă* is a regional word for the fur hat/cap worn in the countryside in Moldavia, Bucovina, and Transylvania; sometimes such fur caps are
adorned with coloured beads [‘mârgele’]. Opincele is an unusual plural diminutive of opincă, probably created on purpose in order to rhyme with mârgele [‘beads’]; opincă is a Romanian peasant’s sandal (made up of a rectangular piece of leather sewn after the form of one’s foot, and tied with leather or woollen strings, which are then wrapped around one’s ankle).

Dumitriu 1959 changes the last two lines and replaces cușmă with tichie: „Și tichia cu mârgele / Și-ncălțări cu floricele“.

Tichie is a cap or bonnet without brims that covers only the top of the head; the word occurs in a well-known Romanian saying: Ce-i lipsesechetelului? Tichie de mărgăritar („What does the bald man need? A cap of pearls“ — said ironically about someone who is in need of basic things, but covets or runs after useless things).

Sometimes a peasant's hat or fur-cap is adorned with a feather, as seen in the following translation:

Cum s-aîleg din toți flâcăi
Cel mai credincios și drag?
După pana pâlăriei
Sau sandale și toïag? (Ban-Câl.)

In both his translations (1955, 1959), Dumitriu uses the generic term încălțări (usually a pluralia tantum noun), a regional word for „footwear“; a peasant would not wear sandals / „sandale“, in the modern acceptation of the word.

• And where the’offence is, let the great axe fall. (IV , 5, 214)

Axe is translated as ‘secure’ in most of the Romanian versions, a synonym of ‘topor’, the difference between the two lying in the size and shape of the blade. Levițchi-Duțescu use a different word for a specific type of axe, baltag, a small, light axe, which in folk poetry is an outlaw’s weapon (it is also the title of a well-known novel by a famous Romanian writer, M. Sadoveanu); while secure and topor serve mainly for cutting wood, baltag is defined in dictionaries as a weapon, used by shepherds and villagers:

Unde-i jignire
Să se abată marele baltag!

The collocation used („marele [‘the big’] baltag“) is inappropriate, as the size of a baltag is small.

• Go, get thee to Vaughan; fetch me a stoup of liquor. (V , 1, 60)
Stoup (an archaic word) is a large vessel with handle, spout, and lid, for holding liquor at table. Taking into account what is customary for Romanian grave diggers to drink, all translators assumed that liquor referred to spirits, namely, to plum (or other fruit) brandy, and, except for one, they all gave stoup a Romanian equivalent that denotes a glass recipient varying in size and shape and would allow association with hard liquor:

Adâ un șip de rachiu (Dumitriu 1959)
Adâ-mi o sticlă de rachiu (Leviți-Duțescu)
Adu-mi un clondir de drojdie (Streinu)

Dumitriu (1955), however, uses the word cană („mug“ — a container with handle for liquids, but not for hard liquor):

Adâ o cană de rachiu.

I wonder whether the liquor that Shakespeare had in mind was not simply ale or beer (o cană de bere).

May I also add that the proper name Yaughan, which is obscure for the Romanian reader, is taken over in Streinu („Hai, du-te la Yaughan“), is taken over and explicated by Leviți-Duțescu, who use a Romanian regional word for pub („Hai, du-te la crășma lui Yaughan“), and is left out and replaced by a word denoting the place that bears this name in Banuș-Călin („Și acum repede-te până la cârciumă“) and in Dumitriu 1955, 1959 („Hai, du-te pân’ la cârciumă“).

- What, frightened with false fire! (Ill, 2, 260)

Dumitriu (1955, 1959) chooses to translate this noun phrase as „Cum? Se sperie de un foc de paie?“ ['a flash in the pan'; a fire that does not last very long].

Banuș-Călin (1948, the first translation after the war) think of a different solution:

Cum? S-a speriat de gloanțe oarbe? ['was he frightened by blank cartridges?']

It is, I think, unnecessary to point out that blank or dummy cartridges did not exist in Hamlet’s time.
3. Conclusion

Translation theorists usually speak of “either / or” translation strategies used in a text, illustrating their statements with convincing passages taken from the translation of a given source text. The translator of a piece of work, however, does not use a coherent strategy in the process of translation, but applies a variety of solutions: for instance, as seen in the examples given above, one may indeed come across many cases of “domestication” of the text, but “foreignization” is also present (e.g. see the use of the English, untranslated forms of address). At the same time, one and the same strategy is used in a variety of ways: the “filtre” may be applied totally or only partially, because the text may not always lend itself to a total ethnocentric or a total ideological interpretation. A lot depends on the translators themselves — on their background, on their thorough knowledge of the two languages, of the culture from which they are translating, in one word, on their professionalism.

References


Sources


CONTEXTUAL ASSUMPTIONS AND THE TRANSLATOR’S STRATEGY. A CASE STUDY

ALBERT VERMES
Eszterházy Károly College, Eger

Abstract: The paper presents the results of an analysis of the Hungarian translation of Nick Hornby’s novel Fever Pitch. Its aim is to find out whether the translator had a consistent strategy in tackling problems of interpretation for the target reader arising from the differences between source and target readers’ cognitive environments.

1. Introduction

The paper analyzes the Hungarian translation of Nick Hornby’s novel Fever Pitch and aims to answer the question whether the translator had a coherent strategy for handling problems of interpretation arising from the existing differences between the source and the target readers’ cognitive environments, and if yes, what that strategy was. The following examples will serve to illustrate the problem. The expressions in question are written in italics, page numbers are given in a parenthesis, after the text.

(1) … the games master was a Welshman who once memorably tried to ban us from kicking a round ball even when we got home (22) → … a tornatanárunk, egy walesi fickó egyszer emlékezetes módon meg akarta tiltani nekünk, hogy akár csak iskola után is gömbölyű labdával játszunk*

* A walesiek közismerten rögbipártiak; a gömbölyű futball-labdával szemben a rögbilabda tojásdad alakú. A szerk. megjegyzése. [footnote] (21)

The noun phrase a round ball is translated literally and is explained in a footnote (by the editor): “The Welsh are known for their preference for rugby; as opposed to the round ball used in football, the rugby ball has an odd shape.”

(2) black-framed Brains-style National Health reading glasses (54) → fekete keretes Brains-féle esztéká olvasószemüveg (62)

The noun phrase National Health is substituted here by the colloquial name of the Hungarian counterpart of the British institution.
(3) Although the temptation to plunge into a warm bath containing dis-
solved essence of Kenneth Wolstenholme is always with me… (29) → Bár
mindig erős a kísértés, hogy beleüljek egy forró kádba, amely Kenneth
Wolstenholme szétolvadt esszenciájával van tele… (29)

Here again we find a literal translation, this time without an explana-
tion of who or what Kenneth Wolstenholme was — a name that the aver-
age Hungarian reader is not very likely to be familiar with.

(4) From NW3 to N17 (174) → Csak szurkoló (212)

In this case, the translation ("only a fan") completely modifies the
meaning of the original expression.

These four examples exhibit four different solutions, suggesting that
the translator had no strategy for treating cognitive differences. However, to
validate or to refute this initial hypothesis, we will have to take a closer look
at the translation.

2. Method

The expressions collected from the novel and their translation were
sorted into four categories, depending on the semantic relation that holds
between the original and its Hungarian correspondent. Four such relations
(or translation operations) are distinguished: total transfer (TT), logical
transfer (LT), encyclopaedic transfer (ET) and zero transfer (ZT). These rela-
tions are defined by the four possible configurations of the logical (L) and
encyclopaedic (E) entries associated with lexical items in relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), based on which elements of the semantic
content of the original are preserved in the translation.

The four relations are as follows:
— TT [+L, +E]: the target language item has the same relevant logical
and encyclopaedic content as the original;
— LT [+L, -E]: the TL item has the same relevant logical content as the
original, but the encyclopaedic content is different;
— ET [-L, +E]: the TL item has the same relevant encyclopaedic con-
tent as the original, but the logical content is different;
— ZT [-L, -E]: the TL item is different from the original both in terms of
its relevant logical and encyclopaedic content.
These relations can be illustrated with the following examples from the text:

TT: (5) the Heysel tragedy (55) → a Heysel stadionbeli tragédia (63) [back translation: the tragedy in Heysel stadium]. The name Heysel has no logical content, but is associated with the encyclopaedic information that it is the name of a football stadium. This information is explicated by the translator, obviously on the assumption that the target readers have no ready access to this information in their cognitive environments.

LT: (6) Rumbelows Cup (39) → Rumbelous kupa (43) [Rumbelows Cup]. The logical content of the original is preserved but the encyclopaedic content, though not readily accessible to Hungarian readers, is not explicated.

ET: (7) on the 5.35 from Paddington (60) → az 5.35-ös vonaton (70) [on the 5.35 train]. The logical content of the original is modified, while the encyclopaedic content is explicated.

ZT: (8) squirm through a packed Dell (42) → elvergődöm (47) [I squirm through]. Here both the logical and the encyclopaedic content of the italicised expression are lost in the translation.

What we want to see, then, is what solution the translator employs to bridge the distance between the cognitive environments of the source and the target readers when the interpretation of an expression requires access to a background assumption that is missing from the target readers' cognitive environment. It easy to see that the missing background assumptions can be made accessible for the target reader with the help of TT or ET, while LT or ZT do not aid the target reader in reconstructing the relevant encyclopaedic content. Thus an essential difference between TT and ET, on the one hand, and LT and ZT, on the other, is that the former two enable the target reader to reproduce the informative intention of the author with less processing effort, whereas in the case of the latter two, the reader does not get help to activate the encyclopaedic content and thus a greater amount of processing effort will become necessary.

3. Results

Table 1. Numerical results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TT</th>
<th>ET</th>
<th>LT</th>
<th>ZT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The numerical results are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that TT was the less frequent and LT the most frequent relation. TT and ET together occur 27 times, LT and ZT together 69 times. Thus it seems that the translator only occasionally picked a solution that would provide help to the reader in activating relevant background assumptions.

4. Discussion of results

4.1. Total transfer

The footnote shown in the Introduction is the only one in the translation, despite the fact that there are several parts where a footnote would have been useful. There are only three other cases where the translator provides an explanatory note in brackets:

(9) *Gazza* (33) → „Gazza” [Gascoigne — a ford.] [a ford. = the translator] (35);
(10) *Saint Trevor of England* (126) → *Angliai Szent Trevor* (Trevor Brooking — a ford.) (152);
(11) Goals have a rarity value that points and *runs* and sets do not (199) → A gólok a ritkaságuk folytán rendkívüli értékkel bírnak, amivel nem vetekedhetnek semmiféle pontok vagy szetek vagy „futások” (a krikett pontokat érő akciója — a ford.) [the actions that earn points in cricket — the translator] (243).

In these examples we can also notice the inconsistent use of quotation marks and brackets.

In three further cases, the encyclopaedic content is explicated in the body of the text:

(12) Flanders and Swann and the Goons, Adrian Mole and *Merchant-Ivory*, Francis Durbridge Presents… (49) → Flanders és Swann, *a Goons Show kornédiázai*, Adrian Mole és *a Merchant-Ivory stúdión*, Francis Durbridge bemutatja… [comedians of the Goons Show, Adrian Mole and the Merchant-Ivory Studio] (56);
(13) … and can tell their *Mavis Staples* from their Shirley Browns (103) → … nem keverik össze *a Mavis Staple-lemezeiket a Shirley Brownokkal* [can tell their Mavis Staples records from the Shirley Browns] (122).
However, it can also be seen that the explicitation is not carried out in all cases: *Flanders and Swann*, for instance, is not explicated for some reason.

Finally, there is one case when a footballer’s nickname is substituted by his family name: (14) *Merse* (215) $\rightarrow$ *Merson* (264). Here the substitution took place in order to make the referent’s identification easier (to save processing effort) and did not entail any loss of logical content, since the original also has an empty logical entry.

### 4.2. Encyclopaedic transfer

There are 19 expressions in the text where the logical content is lost in the translation, but the target reader receives help in activating the relevant encyclopaedic assumptions or the assumptions implicated by the encyclopaedic content. Among these we find expressions relating to English geography, English institutions, English football, English TV-shows, objects and idiomatic expressions.

In the case of (15) *Sherbet Fountains* (40) $\rightarrow$ *pezsgőpor* [fizzy powder] (44), the translator simply substitutes the encyclopaedic content of the original name. The next example is more complex:

(16) … the vast majority of whom are *Scousers* (31) $\rightarrow$ … amelynek a nagy része *sernleges szurkolókból* állt [the majority of which consisted of neutral fans] (32)

This example can be explained in the following way, using Wilson and Carston’s (2006) convention, whereby encyclopaedic assumptions (EA) as well as other assumptions are written in small capitals. EA1: THE INHABITANTS OF LIVERPOOL AND OF THE SURROUNDING AREAS ARE CALLED SCOUSERS. (Source of definitions: http://en.wikipedia.org.) The explicit content of the sentence implies in the context of EA1 the following contextual implication CI1: THE MAJORITY OF THE SPECTATORS OF THE GAME WERE PEOPLE FROM LIVERPOOL AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS. This in the context of EA2: PEOPLE FROM LIVERPOOL AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS ARE ENGLISH PEOPLE implies CI2: THE MAJORITY OF THE SPECTATORS OF THE GAME WERE ENGLISH PEOPLE. By processing previous parts of the text, the reader has stored the following contextual assumptions (CA) in memory. CA1: THE GAME IS PLAYED BY TWO FOREIGN TEAMS. CA2: ENGLISH SPECTATORS OF A GAME BETWEEN TWO FOREIGN TEAMS ARE NEUTRAL FANS. Now CI2 in the context of CA1 and CA2 implies CI3: THE MAJORITY OF THE SPECTATORS WERE NEUTRAL FANS.
As we see, the translation here does not simply provide the encyclopaedic content of the original, but the end result of the deduction process carried out with the help of this encyclopaedic content. This way, the translator has spared the target reader from a certain amount of processing effort. This, at the same time, also means that other possible routes of the deduction process are not made accessible for the target reader; that is, the range of possible interpretations (contextual effects) is narrowed down in the interest of reducing the processing cost. The following is a similar example:

(17) … I lived with my mother and my sister in a small detached house in the Home Counties. (15) → … én az anyámmal és a húgommal éltem egy kis házban egy London közelében (12)

EA1: THE HOME COUNTIES ARE THE COUNTIES BORDERING OR SURROUNDING LONDON. The explicit content of the sentence in the context of EA1 implies CI1: THE NARRATOR LIVES IN A COUNTY NEAR LONDON. This has the following analytical implication AI1: THE NARRATOR LIVES NEAR LONDON. By processing previous parts of the text, the reader has stored in memory CA1: THE NARRATOR LIVES IN A SMALL TOWN. Thus AI1 in the context of CA1 will imply CI2: THE NARRATOR LIVES IN A SMALL TOWN NEAR LONDON.

In the following example, there are two relevant encyclopaedic assumptions that the original sentence activates. EA1: THE Kop IS THE STAND IN LIVERPOOL FC’S STADIUM HOUSING THE CLUB’S DIEHARD SUPPORTERS. EA2: THE Stretford End IS THE STAND IN MANCHESTER UNITED’S STADIUM HOUSING THE CLUB’S DIEHARD SUPPORTERS. The source reader also has access to EA3: LIVERPOOL AND MANCHESTER UNITED ARE TWO OF THE BIG FOOTBALL TEAMS. Then the explicit content of the sentence in the context of these three assumptions will imply CI1: …UNLESS ONE STANDS AMONG THE DIEHARD SUPPORTERS OF THE OTHER BIG CLUBS, which is roughly what the target language version says:

(18) … unless one stands on the North Bank, or the Kop, or the Stretford End (77) → … ha csak nem az Északi Sáncon vagy bármely másik nagycsapat „táborában” szurkol [in the “camp” of any other big team] (91)

What makes the next example interesting is that the end of the deduction process is an assumption containing the colloquial name of an institution bound to Hungarian culture, the SZTK (acronym for Workers’ Union
Social Security Centre), which by activating the encyclopaedic contents associated with the name implies the following assumption, presumably also implied by the source language expression: THE READING GLASSES IN QUESTION WERE OF A CHEAP AND NOT PARTICULARLY GOOD-LOOKING KIND:

(19) black-framed Brains-style National Health reading glasses (54) → fekete keretes Brains-féle esztékő olvasószemüveg (62)

A further point of some interest is that in the same sentence the encyclopaedic content of the expression Brains-style is not explicated, although the Hungarian target reader most probably does not possess the background assumption that Brains was a character in an animated TV series called Thunderbirds, shown on British TV in the 1960s, who wore characteristic black-framed glasses. A further example where an encyclopaedic assumption is made accessible in some way in the target text:

(20) I have already dropped as many aitches as I can — the only ones left in my diction have dug themselves too far into definite articles to be wrinkled out (48) → Mindig buzgón gyilkoltam a magánhangzókat a beszédemben, bár néhányra belém ivódott, hogy így is megmenekült a haláltól... [I’ve been ardently murdering the vowels in my speech, although some have pervaded me so much that they escaped death] (55)

Here the relevant background assumption is that dropping one’s aitches is a characteristic of uneducated speakers. Now, since in the target language, Hungarian, uneducated speakers, instead of dropping aitches, may rather blur some vowel sounds, to preserve the encyclopaedic assumption, the translator had to alter the logical meaning in this fashion.

The next three examples are rather more straightforward, making explicit a single encyclopaedic assumption:

(21) Cockney (50) → londoni akcentus [London accent] (57); (22) ... was as happy as Larry inventing his gruesome and improbable lies (61) → boldogan találta ki vérfagylaló és valószerűtlen hazugságait [happily inventing...] (71); (23) Proper writers go on author tours, and appear as guests on Wogan ... (216) → Aztán meg minden valamirevaló író felolvasó turnékra jár, vagy meghívják a tévébe beszélgetni... [on TV] (265)
4.3. Logical transfer

This is the most numerous category where, all the target language expressions being literal translations of their originals, the target reader receives no help from the translator in working out the intended contextual effects. This group includes place names, personal names, expressions related to football, English culture, institutions, social groups, TV shows and magazines. Here are some examples:

(24) … the stadium itself, with its beautiful art deco stands and its Jacob Epstein busts… (21) → … s mintha maga a stadion is — a maga gyönyörű szecessziós lelátóival és Jacob Epstein mellszobraival… (18)

The missing EA: JACOB EPSTEIN WAS AN AMERICAN-BORN MODERN SCULPTOR WORKING MAINLY IN BRITAIN.

(25) Although the temptation to plunge into a warm bath containing dissolved essence of Kenneth Wolstenholme is always with me… (29) → Bár mindig erős a kísértés, hogy beleüljek egy forró kádba, amely Kenneth Wolstenholme szétolvadt esszenciájával van tele… (29)

EA: KENNETH WOLSTENHOLME WAS BBC TELEVISION’S FIRST FOOTBALL Commentator IN THE 1950S AND 1960S.

(26) … and made everything else look like so many Vauxhall Vivas. (37) → … mellettük minden más unalmas Vauxhall Vivának tűnt. (40)


(27) Rumblelows Cup (39) → Rumblelows kupa (43)


(28) In a way nobody can blame any of us, the Mockneys or the cod Irish, the black wannabees or the pseudo Sloanes. (49) → Igalából senki sem vándolhat bennünket — feketemajmolókat és ál-Sloane-okat (55)
EA: THE TERM SLOANES ORIGINALLY REFERRED TO THE YOUNG UPPER- AND UPPER-MIDDLE-CLASS MEN AND WOMEN LIVING IN WEST-LONDON’S FASHIONABLE SLOANE SQUARE.

(29) ... it was as if Elsie Tanner had walked into the Crossroads Motel (69) → ... mintha Elsie Tanner besétált volna a Crossroads Motelbe (82)


(30) And I’m not talking about the deaths of Heysel or Hillsborough or Ibrox or Bradford... (72) → És most természetesen nem a Heysel stadionban vagy Hillsboroughban vagy Ibroxban vagy Bradfordban bekövetkezett halálokról beszélek... (85)

EA: HILLSBOROUGH, IBROX AND BRADFORD WERE SCENES OF FOOTBALL DISASTERS OF THE SAME MAGNITUDE AS THAT AT HEYSEL.

(31) the Cannonball Kid of television drama (147) → a televíziós dráma Puskagolyó Kőlyke (178)

EA: CANNONBALL KID WAS A CHARACTER OBSESSED WITH FOOTBALL IN A POPULAR COMIC STRIP IN THE 1980s.

(32) ... return to the Amstrad refreshed (210) → ... felfrissülve térhetnék vissza az Amstradomhoz (258)

EA: THE TERM AMSTRAD DESIGNATES A WORD PROCESSING MACHINE.

(33) ... queuing for a ticket on Freddie Laker’s Skytrain (215) → ... álltam sorba jegyért Freddie Laker Skytrain-jére (264)

EA: THE EXPRESSION FREDDIE LAKER’S SKYTRAIN DESIGNATES A BRITISH PRIVATE AVIATION COMPANY LAUNCHED IN 1977 BY ENTREPRENEUR FREDDIE LAKER.

4.4. Zero transfer
This group includes target language expressions which are different from their originals in both logical and encyclopaedic content. Among
them, we find expressions related to places, football, TV shows, films and objects.

The difference in logical content may be the result of a misinterpretation of the original by the translator, as in (34) and (35):

(34) Esso World Cup coin collections (38) → „Esso” vb-gombfocikészletek [Esso World Cup button soccer sets] (40)

EA: **The Esso World Cup coin collection was a collection of 30 coins issued by the Esso oil company to commemorate the 1970 football World Cup, featuring portraits of the members of the English national team.**

(35) an entire family, known to everyone as the Munsters due to a somewhat outlandish and unfortunate physical appearance (144) → egy teljes család, amelyet mindenként csak „munsterieknek” nevezett a némiképp külföldies és szerencsétlen külsejük miatt [known to everyone as the people from Munster] (175)

EA: **“The Munsters” was a horror comedy series shown on American TV in the 1960s, depicting the life of a family of monsters.**

In (36) the translator opted for keeping the original English expression, which results in a loss of both logical and encyclopaedic content:

(36) an Old Firm game (129) → egy Old Firm-meccsen (155)

EA: **The term Old Firm is an epithet of the games played between Glasgow’s two rival teams Celtic and Rangers.**

In (37) and (38) the translator simply left out an expression altogether which, of course, results in a complete loss of all content:

(37) ... squirm through a packed Dell (42) → ... elvergődöm... [I squirm through] (47)

EA: **The Dell was Southampton FC’s stadium between 1898 and 1991.**

(38) ... a twelve-hour day, like Gordon Gekko’s lunch, was for wimps (201) → ... a tizenkét órás munkanap a nyápicoknak szólt [a twelve-hour day was for wimps] (246)

EA: **Gordon Gekko was a main character in the film Wall Street, whose infamous line said “Lunch is for wimps.”**
5. Conclusion

On the basis of the above it can be established that the translator had no coherent strategy to compensate for the lack of background assumptions in the target reader’s cognitive environment. Even in the case of expressions of the same type, for instance TV shows, various solutions were applied, often within one and the same sentence. It seems that in the case of expressions where the translator had access to the necessary encyclopaedic assumptions, he also provided help to the target reader, while in cases where he himself had no ready access to the encyclopaedic assumptions needed, he did not even try to recover them. In other words, one has the impression that the translator’s solutions were motivated not so much by an intention to reconstruct all the contextual effects of the original and to optimise the target reader’s level of processing effort needed to work out these effects, but by an intention to minimise the amount of his own translation effort. This translation, therefore, does not satisfy the principle of optimal resemblance as formulated by Gutt (1991).

References


Sources

POLITICAL - IDEOLOGICAL TRANSLATIONS OF ROBERT BURNS' POETRY IN THE SOVIET UNION

NATALIA VID
University of Maribor

Abstract: The paper compares Robert Burns’ poems with their Russian translation, published in the Soviet Union by a famous Russian poet and translator, Samuil Marshak, in 1947. The analysis of the translation reveals the presence of distortions of the original text, dictated by the ideology dominant at the time.

1. Introduction

Ever since the 1930s, the communist regime established in Russia after the October Revolution regulated literary expression through “socialist realism” - a new literary program, invented in 1934, with the purpose of defining each aspect of a literary work written or published in the Soviet Union, including its topic, style, preface, etc.

This was done with the help of a system of strict rules about a text's appropriateness and adaptation to the regime’s demands. According to the new ideological propaganda, literary works were expected to extol a new, better lifestyle of the communist society in the Soviet Union and to expose an unpleasant picture of the miserable life of workers and peasants in capitalist countries.

One of the most important aims of this program was to introduce to the Soviet people foreign authors as supporters of the communist regime and offer them newly adapted interpretations of famous literary works. Upon the proposal of Lunacharski (the first “narkom prosveshenija”)¹, each literary work written by a foreign author and published in the Soviet Union had to contain a special preface which explained the “correct” meaning of the work to its Soviet readers. This should be considered as a part of ideological pressure.

Soviet critics considered most world-famous artists to be spokesmen for a socialist regime. Their works had to be interpreted as communist manifestoes in which an individual’s protest against capitalism was put on the first place. Writers’ biographies and their literary works were adapted and
even changed according to this new scheme. Those works which could not be “properly” adapted were put on the black list and forbidden. Of course, this situation was extremely difficult for writers and translators. They had to adapt their literary talent to this new ideology, and they were forced to work under the strong pressure of the Soviet communist regime. We have to keep this in mind when we analyze ideological translations made in the Soviet Union at that time. This is not about how the translators wanted to translate, but about how they had to translate.

It is interesting, even horrifying, to see how ideology exerts pressures on literary translation. A literary text undergoes a series of transformations or distortions, depending on the stance or ideology of the author. My paper is meant to highlight the dilemma that faces a translator when his/her ideology contradicts the author’s or when s/he has to adopt techniques that are different from those of the author’s. Such differences can be construed as deviation, changes or adoption of an ideology which is at variance with what the author intends. Poems by the Scottish poet Robert Burns are a good example to demonstrate how a literary translation is compromised by ideology. His poems were translated by one of the most famous and talented translators in the Soviet Union, Samuel Marshak, who also translated Shakespeare. Marshak’s translations were extremely popular and widespread in the Soviet Union. Even nowadays they are considered to be the best translations of Robert Burns’s poetry, although they offer a clear picture of the ideological adaptation of literary texts.

2. “Soviet” Robert Burns

The popularity of Burns’ poetry in the Soviet Union reached its peak in 1930, when the conception of “progressive culture” was defined. Robert Burns was lucky. Soviet critics had no doubts about him — he was called “a progressive poet of the revolution”, and the process of his canonization in the Soviet Union started. His poems were pronounced acceptable and useful for the new communist ideology, but of course they had to be “properly” translated. As the best examples of Burns’ democratic spirit and his connection with peasants, workers and beggars, two poems were always quoted: “Is there for honest poverty” and “Love and Liberty”. They were used to show how much Burns was concerned about the poor and how he dreamed about democracy and equal rights all over the world. Burns was presented to Soviet readers as a communist poet, and this conception of his
poetry, as revolutionary and purely communist, remained unchanged for
many years. Because of a completely fabricated biography and his deliber-
ately misinterpreted main ideas, he became enormously popular in the
Soviet Union..

Burns’ true biography could not be considered to serve as a good
example of a communist oriented writer, especially the fact that Burns had
many illegitimate children and never participated in any revolutionary
organization. So, M. Gutner, a famous Soviet critic, wrote an article about
Burns’ life (1938: 5-20). He stressed those features of his biography which
favoured its “proper” interpretation. Especially important for his interpreta-
tion of Burns’ biography was the fact that Burns was born to the poor fami-
ly of a common farmer, who had nothing to do with the aristocratic circles
strongly criticized in Soviet literature. Gutner reminded Soviet readers that
the main reasons why Burns could not assert himself successfully as a poet
in England were his sympathies with the French Revolution and his open
protest against English aristocrats. He also stated that Burns actually partic-
ipated in the French revolution and was put in jail because of it. Burns was
presented as a fighter for human rights. Gutner also allowed himself to add
some inventions to Burns’ biography in order to stress his connection with
the poor and the revolutionary circles. For example, Gutner asserted that
Burns wrote his first poems as a young lad, while he was working hard in
the fields and that he gave them to his countrymen who were impressed
and dismayed by his bravery (Gutner 1938: 9). This was completely false.
There were no dates which could confirm that Burns actually gave his
poems to his countrymen. Another very interesting addition was the state-
ment that Burns started his poetic work with satires on the church and the
priests. Since Soviet ideology did not accept any kind of religion or the
church as an independent institution, and that during the Soviet regime
most churches were destroyed, it was very important for Soviet critics to
present Burns as an Antichristian. Gutner wrote that Burns criticized and
hated priests, who were responsible for the poor people’s poverty. As an
example of an Antichristian poem, he mentioned “Holy Willie’s prayer”
(1938: 14). It is true that in this poem Burns makes fun of a clumsy and
stingy priest, but we can hardly say that it is written with hatred or dismis-
sively. It is simply a satirical poem, free of any ideological ground.

The first poems translated by Marshak were published in the Molodaja
gvardija (a new Soviet newspaper) together with an article by A. Anikst, an
expert in English literature (1939: 43 -58), who also stressed Burns’ origins that brought him close to the commoners. Just like Gutner, Anikst stated that Burns not only sympathized with the French revolution but also participated in it and was thrown into jail (1939: 45). Anikst mentioned a Scottish circle of people who approved of and supported French revolutionaries and the head of this circle was supposed to be Burns (again a completely fabricated claim).

Anikst placed Burns among the most progressive fighters for democratic rights. According to him, Burns’ poetry played a very important role in the development of English literature, because he replaced the old classic forms and themes with a new one (1939: 50). This is partly true, but Anikst exaggerated. Burns did not cause drastic changes in the development of the English literature; he did not influence the forms or the themes dominant in the English literature.

One more fabricated claim mentioned by Anikst was that Burns’ poetry grew out of folklore (1939: 56). Burns did use material from folk songs and imitated their form and spirit, but his poetry cannot be compared with folk poetry, as he just used parts of it for his own purposes.

Burns was also presented as a victim of the upper classes. Anikst wrote that poverty and poor people’s sufferings forced Burns to take to drinking (1939: 57). Society was supposed to be guilty for his sorrows, because he felt helpless and could not change anything. Grief and society’s cruelty were the main reasons for his early death. But because a national poet could not be presented as a complete pessimist and sufferer, Anikst stressed his cheerful nature which helped him to cope with all obstacles with a smile on his face.

3. Burns and Marshak

The task of translating Burns’ poetry was assigned to S.J. Marshak (1887-1964), a famous dramatist and a poet himself. He started his work in 1930 and his first book was published in 1947. Robert Burns and, later, Scottish national songs became his life’s work. He devoted twenty years of hard work to Burns’ poetry. His last book of translations contained 215 poems.

In his translations Marshak followed two aims: the promotion of social democratic themes, according to the new established canons, and the weakening of the Scottish folk spirit.
It is obvious that Marshak chose his poems very carefully. He never translated poems that contained religious motives (unless they had a satirical tinge) or poems addressed to the poet’s friends, if they belonged to the aristocratic circles. “Soviet” Burns could not keep any connections with the upper classes. Poems devoted to the then political situation in Scotland and England were also ignored. It is a sad fact, because these poems belong to the most extensive and the most original part of Burns’ literary heritage.

Marshak translated songs and ballads in which peasants’ lives and customs were described and poems in which nationality, patriotism and poor people’s sufferings were particularly stressed. Burns’ epigrams, which did not possess any particular literary value in comparison with Pushkin’s or Byron’s, were also carefully translated. This means that ideological canonization was taken by Marshak into consideration from the very beginning.

Creating his translations, Marshak did not allow himself to change the texts completely. He wanted to keep the original meaning and tried not to alter the poetic and thematic structure of the poems. However, he shortened the poem “The Holy Fair”, translating just 14 out of its 22 lines, and made some synonymic changes: morn —> ‘day’; caller air —> ‘frost’; chantin’ —> ‘singing’; lightsomely —> ‘joyfully breathing’; silent —> ‘without noise’; real judges —> ‘earth judges’ and so on. Such changes did not disturb the rhythm and the style of the poem and were used only to stress the images. Marshak translated the poems very correctly and did his best to save Burns’ style and images, but his main task was to make Burns acceptable to the Soviet censorship, which meant to stress his democratic views.

In his translations, Marshak never mentioned God or anything connected with religion, even names from the Bible. Soviet ideology did not accept any kind of religion and Marshak presented Burns as an atheist who accused religion (not just the church) for the commoners’ sufferings, and who unveiled its antinational essence.

In the poem “For a’ that and a’ that”, the philosophical conclusion of the original, that man’s dignity does not depend on his position and fortune, was transformed into a typical communist slogan: “The poor are those who possess all moral priorities”. The last line in the poem, “The rank is but the guinea-stamp / The man’s the gowd for a’ that!” (Burns 1996: 7-8), was translated, “Áîãàòñòâî ø òàìï íà ç îë î ò îì, íî ç îë î ò î ìû ñàìè [ “wealth is just a stamp on the gold, but we are the gold ourselves”] (Marshak 1964: 8). This nuance in the translation is not easy to see: “the man” and “we our-
selves” mean almost the same, but the full context created by Marshak stresses the main idea that “we, the poor, resist the rich”. The original title of the poem, “For a’ that and a’ that”, was translated “×âñòèäëü ãàä í íñòüë” [“Honest Poverty”].

There is one more example in the same poem, which shows how carefully it was adapted to the new ideological scheme. The last line, “A prince can make a belted knight / A marquis, duke, and a’ that” (Burns 1996: 17-18), was translated, “Æî ð ïïü ñâèäï ñàì ãàä í ñòèäëü ãàäíâäë ñëü” [“a king made his servant a general”] (Marsak 1964: 32-33). Instead of the word “knight”, the equivalent of the word “servant” was used. Marshak wanted to emphasize that a king could not have knights but just servants. The original Russian word “çàçàê” / “lakej” used in the translation has a degrading meaning, denoting here “a lick-spittle”.

The images of beggars and the poor in Marshak’s translations were idealized. For example, in the poem “The Jolly Beggars”, the word mountebank was translated as a “êëî óí” [‘clown’], but in the original poem it was used with the meaning of “swindler”. In this way, with just one word, Marshak changed the original characteristic of the image. Beggars are not robbers, but just honest, amusing fellows.

The best example of the canonization and making heroes out of beggars and swindlers is the poem “Macpherson’s Farewell”, in which a highway-robber is transformed into a national hero and a revolutionary. This poem was changed almost completely. The lines, “Farewell, Ye dungeons dark and strong / The wretch’s destinie!” (Burns 1996: 1-2) were translated “Ïðèâ å ò ,  â àì òþðüìó ê î ð î ëÿ, ãäå æèçíü âëà÷àò ðàáû” [‘Hello, the prisons of the king, where slaves suffer’] (Marshak 1964: 1-2).

In the translation, such adjectives as “wantonly”, “dauntingly”, “rantingly” are absent. The main occupation of the hero, a robber, was changed into “war”. The first line, “Oh! What is death but parting breath?” (Burns 1996: 24), was translated “Â ïïëëî ñâèäï ñâèäëü ïàâëëë ãñëäë âñü ïñâèäíó ìà ðàç” [‘In the fields of war, among swords, I met death many times’] (Marshak 1964: 16-17). The original idea was completely changed, because the Soviet Robert Burns could not glorify robbers and beggars.

In Burns’ satirical poems that make fun of aristocrats and sometimes of the church, Marshak omits the reference to the first person singular if the author talks about religious feelings. For example, the last line of the poem...
"To a Louse, On Seeing it on a Lady's Bonnet at Church" is changed in the translation. Instead of "What airs in dress an'gait wad lea'e us, and ev'n Devotion" (Burns 1996: 45-46), "Î, êàê áû ñòàëè ì û òåðïèìû è ñêðîì í û " ["We would become more modest and patient"] (Marshak 1964: 45), was used. The poet, who was pronounced to be a democrat and a communist, could not talk about any feelings connected with religion in the first person singular. I have already mentioned that the new communist government tried to destroy everything connected with the church and did not accept any kind of religion.

The same "trick" can be observed in the translation of "For a'that and a' that" where the first line in the couplet was cut out because of the word "pray".

Again, the same can be noticed in the translation of the poem "To a Mountain Daisy, on turning one down with the plough, in April, 1786": in the Russian equivalent of the lines “Till wrench'd of ev'ry stay but HEAV'N / He, ruin'd, sink” (Burns 1996: 45-46), the word "heaven" was cut out.

Another important characteristic of Marshak's translations is the omission of any mention of Scotland. This could be understood from a translator's point of view, because sometimes mentioning foreign names makes the comprehension of a poem more difficult for the reader and demands additional comments or explanations. But the omission of Scotland became a characteristic feature of Marshak's translations. The events mentioned in the poems happen "nowhere". They could happen anywhere, at any time, so that the reader could easier identify with them more easily. Thus Scotland's poet became an international poet who struggled for human rights all over the world, not just in Scotland. This misrepresentation destroys the idea that Burns is national Scottish poet. Love and care for the motherland, images which were very important for the proper comprehension of Burns' poetry, were absent in the translations. Burns was no longer just a Scottish, but a "world" poet. In the translation of the poem "Scots wha hae", for example, it is impossible to understand that the main idea is an appeal to the Scottish king. He is not even mentioned in the translation.

The names of rivers, lakes, cities and countries are also omitted. In the poem "Lines written on a Bank-note", “For lake o’thee I leave this much-loved shore / Never perhaps to greet old Scotland more!” (Burns, 1996: 35-36), Marshak translated Scotland as “ð ìë èìà” ['motherland'].

349 LINGUISTIC ZIG-ZAG
In the translation of the poem “Elegy on Peg Nicholson” the lines, “But now she's floating down the Nith / And past the Mouth o’ Carin” (Burns, 1996: 56-58), the name Carin is cut out, only the “ðåêà” ['river'] is mentioned.

In the poem “Go fetch me a pint o’ wine”, the name “Leith” is not mentioned in the translation.

In the Russian version of the poem “Jolly Beggars”, the reference to the Scottish pipe is absent.

The same thing happened in the case of the poem “The Answer”, in which the fourth line, “That I for poor auld Scotland sake” (Burns 1996: 54) is translated, “Î âíîä è â-üöé ñ ôâô ûô ë æéê, ñèóèêöøû ñööåì å ìi îöîå ñöê” ['The only dream of my life is to serve the country as long as I could'] (Marshak 1964: 54); Scotland is replaced by the Russian word for “country”.

In the same poem Burns says that he is proud because to be Scottish, “A Scot still, but blot still I knew no higher place” (Burns 1996: 61-62). Marshak translated the line as if the words “Scot” and “peasant” were synonyms: “Ô îóëàìâêîé, çðêîêîìðîé ë ëì îêåë äüç ÿ åï äâ” ['I am proud because of my Scottish, peasant nature'] (Marshak 1964: 75-76).

The poem “The Tree of Liberty” was inspired by the French revolution, but Burns had in mind just some future revolution in England; the symbol of revolution was interpreted differently by Marshak: “Syne let us pray, auld England may Sure plant this far-famed tree, man” (Burns 1996: 41-42) was translated “Çàáóäóò ðàáñòî âî è í ó æäó íàðîäû è êðàÿ, áðàò” ['The nations and places would forget about the poverty and slavery, brother'] (Marshak, 1964: 45-46).

4. Conclusion

Marshak “cleaned” Burns' poetry of its Scottish “coloration”. He did everything to make his readers forget that Burns was a Scottish national poet. An important feature of Marshak’s translations was that he did not write in dialect, even though the Russian language offers a wide range of dialectical forms. Burns even had to write special comments on his poems, otherwise they would not have been understood in the other regions of Britain. However, Marshak translated from the Scottish dialect into the standard Russian language. He made it grammatically perfect and all Russian critics praised his laconic, melodic language. But Marshak never used even
one dialect word in his translations, so that the original folk spirit of Burns’ poetry was lost.

Marshak followed the tradition of Robert Burns’ translations formed during the nineteenth century. He summarized the experiences of Shepkina-Kuprina, Mihajlov, Veinberg and created an adequate, acceptable image of Robert Burns for the Soviet culture. Marshak’s translation remained the best translation of Burns for almost half a century (1940-1980). The next generation of translators faced a difficult task, because Marshak had created a “Russian / Soviet” Robert Burns and Russian readers were not ready yet to accept any other variants.

Note
1. Lunacharski, the first Soviet Commissar of Enlightenment, was in charge of education and of the Soviet state’s first censorship system.

References
Burns, R. 1982. The poetical works. Raduga: Moscow